patch for home_root_t
Subsystems (2)
The attached patch makes home_root_t work.
Signature · 4 lines
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/admin.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/admin.te +1 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ # sysadm_t is the system administrator domain. type sysadm_t, domain, privlog, privowner, admin, userdomain, privhome; +allow privhome home_root_t:dir search; # system_r is authorized for sysadm_t for single-user mode. role system_r types sysadm_t;
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/apache.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/apache.te +3 -1
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ # Allow the script process to search the cgi directory, and users directory ############################################################################## allow httpd_user_script_process_t httpd_user_script_t:dir {search add_name}; +allow httpd_user_script_process_t home_root_t:dir { getattr search }; allow httpd_user_script_process_t user_home_dir_type:dir {getattr search}; allow httpd_user_script_process_t httpd_user_content_t:dir {search}; allow httpd_user_script_process_t httpd_sys_script_t:dir {search};
@@ -383,7 +384,8 @@ ################### # Allow httpd to search users diretories ###################### -allow httpd_t { user_home_dir_type user_home_type }:dir { getattr search }; +allow httpd_t home_root_t:dir { getattr search }; +allow httpd_t user_home_dir_type:dir { getattr search }; allow httpd_t user_home_type:dir { getattr search read }; # need ioctl for php3 allow httpd_t user_home_type:{ file lnk_file } { getattr read ioctl };
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/crond.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/crond.te +1 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ allow crond_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir r_dir_perms; # to search /home +allow crond_t home_root_t:dir { getattr search }; allow crond_t user_home_dir_type:dir r_dir_perms; # Run a shell.
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/fcron.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/fcron.te +1 -1
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ allow fcron_t etc_t:lnk_file read; allow fcron_t { etc_t resolv_conf_t }:file { read getattr }; -allow fcron_t { sysadm_home_dir_t user_home_dir_type }:dir search; +allow fcron_t { home_root_t sysadm_home_dir_t user_home_dir_type }:dir search; # Permit fcron_t to transition to this domain. # The transition is requested explicitly by the modified crond
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/fingerd.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/fingerd.te +1 -1
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ can_tcp_connect(userdomain, fingerd_t) # for .finger, .plan. etc -allow fingerd_t user_home_dir_type:dir search; +allow fingerd_t { home_root_t user_home_dir_type }:dir search; # should really have a different type for .plan etc allow fingerd_t user_home_type:file { getattr read }; # stop it accessing sub-directories, prevents checking a Maildir for new mail,
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/gpg.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/gpg.te +1 -2
@@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ # Type for gpg or pgp executables. type gpg_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type; -allow sysadm_gpg_t user_home_dir_t:dir search; -allow sysadm_gpg_t newrole_t:fd use; +allow sysadm_gpg_t { home_root_t user_home_dir_t }:dir search; allow sysadm_gpg_t ptyfile:chr_file rw_file_perms; # Everything else is in the gpg_domain macro in
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/initrc.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/initrc.te +1 -1
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ allow initrc_t file_t:file { unlink getattr }; # Read user home directories. -allow initrc_t home_type:dir r_dir_perms; +allow initrc_t { home_root_t home_type }:dir r_dir_perms; allow initrc_t home_type:file r_file_perms; # for system start scripts
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/login.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/login.te +2 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ domain_trans(local_login_t, shell_exec_t, userdomain) # Permit login to search the user home directories. +allow local_login_t home_root_t:dir search; allow local_login_t home_dir_type:dir search; # Do not audit denied attempts to access devices.
@@ -122,6 +123,7 @@ # Only permit unprivileged user domains to be entered via rlogin, # since very weak authentication is used. domain_trans(remote_login_t, shell_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain) +allow remote_login_t home_root_t:dir search; allow remote_login_t home_dir_type:dir search; # Use the pty created by rlogind.
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/modutil.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/modutil.te +1 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow depmod_t sysadm_gph_t:fd use;') # Read System.map from home directories. -allow depmod_t { user_home_dir_type sysadm_home_dir_t }:dir r_dir_perms; +allow depmod_t { home_root_t user_home_dir_type sysadm_home_dir_t }:dir r_dir_perms; r_dir_file(depmod_t, { user_home_type sysadm_home_t }) # Rules for /proc/sys/kernel/tainted
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/portslave.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/portslave.te +1 -1
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ allow portslave_t ppp_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; # for ~/.ppprc - if it actually exists then you need some policy to read it -allow portslave_t { sysadm_home_dir_t user_home_dir_type }:dir search; +allow portslave_t { sysadm_home_dir_t home_root_t user_home_dir_type }:dir search; file_type_auto_trans(portslave_t, var_run_t, var_run_pppd_t) can_exec(portslave_t, { etc_t shell_exec_t })
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/pppd.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/pppd.te +1 -1
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ allow pppd_t etc_t:lnk_file read; # for ~/.ppprc - if it actually exists then you need some policy to read it -allow pppd_t { sysadm_home_dir_t user_home_dir_type }:dir search; +allow pppd_t { sysadm_home_dir_t home_root_t user_home_dir_type }:dir search; ifdef(`pppd_for_user', ` # Run pppd in pppd_t by default for user
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/ssh.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/ssh.te +1 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ allow $1 self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid setgid setuid net_bind_service sys_tty_config }; can_network($1) allow $1 shadow_t:file { read getattr }; -allow $1 { user_home_dir_type sysadm_home_dir_t }:dir { search getattr }; +allow $1 { home_root_t user_home_dir_type sysadm_home_dir_t }:dir { search getattr }; # Run shells in user_t by default domain_auto_trans($1, shell_exec_t, user_t)
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/domains/program/xdm.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/domains/program/xdm.te +1 -0
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ allow xdm_t userdomain:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms; # Allow xdm access to the user domains +allow xdm_t home_root_t:dir search; allow xdm_t home_type:dir { write search add_name remove_name create setattr }; allow xdm_t home_type:file { create link read append write setattr unlink }; allow xdm_t userdomain:shm { unix_read unix_write read write getattr associate };
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/macros/program/crontab_macros.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/macros/program/crontab_macros.te +1 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ can_network($1_crontab_t) # Read user crontabs +allow $1_crontab_t home_root_t:dir search; allow $1_crontab_t { $1_home_t $1_home_dir_t }:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1_crontab_t $1_home_t:file r_file_perms;
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/macros/program/gpg_macros.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/macros/program/gpg_macros.te +2 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ uses_shlib($1_gpg_t) +allow $1_gpg_t home_root_t:dir search; + # use $1_gpg_secret_t for files it creates # NB we are doing the type transition for directory creation only! # so ~/.gnupg will be of $1_gpg_secret_t, then files created under it such as
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/macros/program/gph_macros.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/macros/program/gph_macros.te +1 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ allow $1_gph_t lastlog_t:file rw_file_perms; # Allow gnome-pty-helper to write the .xsession-errors file. +allow $1_gph_t home_root_t:dir search; allow $1_gph_t $1_home_t:dir { search add_name }; allow $1_gph_t $1_home_t:file { create write }; ')
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/macros/program/lpr_macros.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/macros/program/lpr_macros.te +1 -0
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow $1_lpr_t $1_gph_t:fd use;') # Read user files. +allow $1_lpr_t home_root_t:dir search; allow $1_lpr_t { $1_home_t $1_home_dir_t }:dir search; allow $1_lpr_t $1_home_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/macros/program/mta_macros.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/macros/program/mta_macros.te +1 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow $1_mail_t $1_gph_t:fd use;') # Create dead.letter in user home directories. +allow $1_mail_t home_root_t:dir search; file_type_auto_trans($1_mail_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t) # if you do not want to allow dead.letter then use the following instead
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/macros/program/netscape_macros.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/macros/program/netscape_macros.te +1 -0
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ allow $1_netscape_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; # Read the home directory, e.g. for .Xauthority and to get to .netscape. +allow $1_netscape_t home_root_t:dir search; file_type_auto_trans($1_netscape_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_netscape_rw_t) # for .Xauthority - need different perms for this allow $1_netscape_t $1_home_t:file { read getattr };
usr/share/selinux/policy/current/macros/program/xserver_macros.te renamed from usr/share/selinux/policy/default/macros/program/xserver_macros.te +2 -0
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ # Use the mouse. allow $1_xserver_t mouse_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; +allow $1_xserver_t home_root_t:dir search; + ifelse($1, xdm, ` dontaudit xdm_xserver_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { read search }; ', `
Quoted 1 line · Russell Coker
The attached patch makes
home_root_twork.
Most of this should already be covered by the rule in base_file_read_access.
--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
[email protected]
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Quoted 5 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 1 line · Russell Coker
The attached patch makes
home_root_twork.Most of this should already be covered by the rule in
base_file_read_access.
I've gone back and removed some duplicate references to home_root_t from my tree.
After you've merged those of my current patches that you like I'll send you another patch for any further changes.
NB Many of the home_root_t (and almost all of them in .te files I wrote) are actually needed. Most things broke when I initially changed the type of /home...
Signature · 10 lines
http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 1 line · Russell Coker
The attached patch makes
home_root_twork.
I merged this patch, although some of the rules are redundant with the corresponding rule in base_file_read_access, which is included by every_domain.
--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
[email protected]
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This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.