Skip to contentSkip to conversation

LSM changes for 2.5.43

PATCH New Greg KH 1 participant 7 messages Oct 17, 2002

Subsystems (19)
lore
Share & tools
lore

Greg KH

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 LSM changes for 2.5.43

Hi,

Here are a set of patches that change the way the current LSM hooks operate. This patch creates CONFIG_SECURITY and disables it by default for now. When CONFIG_SECURITY is disabled, all security hooks are disabled, and compile away to nothing, with the exception of the default capability functions, which are compiled into the kernel.

If CONFIG_SECURITY is set to y, the old way of having the security hooks happens (a big table of function pointers.) I'll introduce a Config.in change to allow this to happen when the first security module is submitted for inclusion in the kernel tree (there are a number that should be submitted soon.)

This should appease the people who don't want the additional overhead of having the ability to load different types of security modules.

In creating these patches, I tried to use a #define approach, as some people pointed out. The main detraction from doing this was the need to allow the capability functions to be enabled if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Chris Wright proposed a way around this, but that forced all of the "dummy" capability hooks to be enabled, and built into the kernel, which the "size overhead" people would not appreciate.

If anyone comes up with a clean way to use a #define for these hooks, and implement the existing functionality as shown in these patches, I'll be glad to change them at a later time.

Linus, please pull from:

	bk://lsm.bkbits.net/linus-2.5

thanks,

greg k-h

 arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c          |    3 
 arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c         |    3 
 arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c         |    3 
 arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c          |    3 
 arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c        |    3 
 arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace32.c      |    3 
 arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c     |    8 
 arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c         |    3 
 arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c        |    4 
 arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c        |    3 
 arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c      |    3 
 arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c |    7 
 arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c           |    3 
 arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c       |    3 
 drivers/base/fs/class.c           |    2 
 drivers/base/fs/intf.c            |    2 
 fs/attr.c                         |    5 
 fs/dquot.c                        |    4 
 fs/exec.c                         |   16 
 fs/fcntl.c                        |   11 
 fs/file_table.c                   |    6 
 fs/inode.c                        |    6 
 fs/ioctl.c                        |    3 
 fs/locks.c                        |   13 
 fs/namei.c                        |   58 --
 fs/namespace.c                    |   23 
 fs/open.c                         |    3 
 fs/proc/base.c                    |    3 
 fs/quota.c                        |    2 
 fs/read_write.c                   |   12 
 fs/readdir.c                      |    4 
 fs/stat.c                         |    6 
 fs/super.c                        |    6 
 fs/xattr.c                        |   14 
 include/linux/sched.h             |    8 
 include/linux/security.h          | 1032 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 init/do_mounts.c                  |    3 
 ipc/msg.c                         |    7 
 ipc/sem.c                         |    7 
 ipc/shm.c                         |    7 
 ipc/util.c                        |    2 
 kernel/acct.c                     |    4 
 kernel/capability.c               |   11 
 kernel/exit.c                     |    6 
 kernel/fork.c                     |    7 
 kernel/kmod.c                     |    3 
 kernel/ptrace.c                   |    4 
 kernel/sched.c                    |   15 
 kernel/signal.c                   |    4 
 kernel/sys.c                      |   49 -
 kernel/uid16.c                    |    3 
 mm/mmap.c                         |    3 
 mm/mprotect.c                     |    3 
 net/core/scm.c                    |    3 
 net/decnet/af_decnet.c            |    2 
 security/Config.help              |    7 
 security/Config.in                |    2 
 security/Makefile                 |   10 
 security/capability.c             |  328 ++++++------
 59 files changed, 1380 insertions(+), 401 deletions(-)

-----

[email protected], 2002-10-17 14:08:43-07:00, [email protected]
LSM: convert over the remaining security calls to the new format.

 ipc/msg.c              |    7 +++----
 ipc/sem.c              |    7 +++----
 ipc/shm.c              |    7 +++----
 ipc/util.c             |    2 +-
 kernel/acct.c          |    3 +--
 kernel/capability.c    |   10 +++++-----
 kernel/exit.c          |    6 +++---
 kernel/fork.c          |    7 +++----
 kernel/kmod.c          |    2 +-
 kernel/sched.c         |   15 +++++----------
 kernel/signal.c        |    3 +--
 kernel/sys.c           |   49 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------------------
 kernel/uid16.c         |    3 +--
 net/decnet/af_decnet.c |    2 +-
 14 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)

------

[email protected], 2002-10-17 14:06:57-07:00, [email protected]
LSM: change all of the VFS related security calls to the new format.

 fs/attr.c        |    5 +---
 fs/dquot.c       |    3 --
 fs/fcntl.c       |   11 +++-------
 fs/file_table.c  |    6 ++---
 fs/inode.c       |    6 ++---
 fs/ioctl.c       |    3 --
 fs/locks.c       |   12 +++--------
 fs/namei.c       |   58 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------------
 fs/namespace.c   |   22 ++++++++------------
 fs/open.c        |    3 --
 fs/proc/base.c   |    2 -
 fs/quota.c       |    2 -
 fs/read_write.c  |   12 +++--------
 fs/readdir.c     |    3 --
 fs/stat.c        |    6 +----
 fs/super.c       |    4 +--
 fs/xattr.c       |   13 +++---------
 init/do_mounts.c |    2 -
 mm/mmap.c        |    3 --
 mm/mprotect.c    |    3 --
 net/core/scm.c   |    3 --
 21 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)

------

[email protected], 2002-10-17 14:05:48-07:00, [email protected]
LSM: change all security bprm related calls to the new format.

 arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c     |    7 +++----
 arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c |    7 +++----
 fs/exec.c                         |   15 ++++++---------
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

------

[email protected], 2002-10-17 14:04:04-07:00, [email protected]
LSM: change all usages of security_ops->ptrace() to security_ptrace()

 arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c     |    3 +--
 arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c    |    3 +--
 arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c    |    3 +--
 arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c     |    3 +--
 arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c   |    3 +--
 arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace32.c |    3 +--
 arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c    |    3 +--
 arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c   |    3 +--
 arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c   |    3 +--
 arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c |    3 +--
 arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c      |    3 +--
 arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c  |    3 +--
 kernel/ptrace.c              |    3 +--
 13 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)

------

[email protected], 2002-10-17 13:47:59-07:00, [email protected]
LSM: Create CONFIG_SECURITY and disable it by default for now.

This allows the security hooks to be compiled away into nothingness if CONFIG_SECURITY is disabled. When disabled, the default capabilities functionality is preserved. When enabled, security modules are allowed to be loaded.

 include/linux/sched.h    |    8 
 include/linux/security.h | 1032 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/Config.help     |    7 
 security/Config.in       |    2 
 security/Makefile        |   10 
 security/capability.c    |  328 +++++++-------
 6 files changed, 1216 insertions(+), 171 deletions(-)

------

[email protected], 2002-10-17 13:16:54-07:00, [email protected]
LSM: add #include <linux/security.h> to a lot of files as they all have security calls in them.

This is needed for the next patches that change the way the security calls work.

 arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c |    1 +
 arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c    |    1 +
 drivers/base/fs/class.c       |    2 ++
 drivers/base/fs/intf.c        |    2 ++
 fs/dquot.c                    |    1 +
 fs/exec.c                     |    1 +
 fs/locks.c                    |    1 +
 fs/namespace.c                |    1 +
 fs/proc/base.c                |    1 +
 fs/readdir.c                  |    1 +
 fs/super.c                    |    2 +-
 fs/xattr.c                    |    1 +
 init/do_mounts.c              |    1 +
 kernel/acct.c                 |    1 +
 kernel/capability.c           |    1 +
 kernel/kmod.c                 |    1 +
 kernel/ptrace.c               |    1 +
 kernel/signal.c               |    1 +
 18 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

------

author
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 LSM changes for 2.5.43

ChangeSet 1.798, 2002/10/17 13:16:54-07:00, [email protected]

LSM: add #include <linux/security.h> to a lot of files as they all have security calls in them.

This is needed for the next patches that change the way the security calls work.

arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c b/arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/types.h>
 #include <asm/ipc.h>
arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/user.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/segment.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
drivers/base/fs/class.c +2 -0
diff -Nru a/drivers/base/fs/class.c b/drivers/base/fs/class.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
 #include "fs.h"
 
 static struct driver_dir_entry class_dir;
drivers/base/fs/intf.c +2 -0
diff -Nru a/drivers/base/fs/intf.c b/drivers/base/fs/intf.c
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/device.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
 #include "fs.h"
 
 /**
fs/dquot.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/fs/dquot.c b/fs/dquot.c
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
fs/exec.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
fs/locks.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
 #include <linux/timer.h>
 #include <linux/time.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
fs/namespace.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/namespace.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
fs/proc/base.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/namespace.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 /*
  * For hysterical raisins we keep the same inumbers as in the old procfs.
fs/readdir.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/fs/readdir.c b/fs/readdir.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
fs/super.c +1 -1
diff -Nru a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
@@ -29,9 +29,9 @@
 #include <linux/quotaops.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
 #include <linux/buffer_head.h>		/* for fsync_super() */
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
-#include <linux/security.h>
 
 void get_filesystem(struct file_system_type *fs);
 void put_filesystem(struct file_system_type *fs);
fs/xattr.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 /*
init/do_mounts.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/init/do_mounts.c b/init/do_mounts.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/suspend.h>
 #include <linux/root_dev.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <linux/nfs_fs.h>
 #include <linux/nfs_fs_sb.h>
kernel/acct.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 #include <linux/acct.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 /*
kernel/capability.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
  */ 
 
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
kernel/kmod.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/completion.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
kernel/ptrace.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
kernel/signal.c +1 -0
diff -Nru a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/tty.h>
 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
 #include <asm/param.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/siginfo.h>
author
#2 lore raw

ChangeSet 1.799, 2002/10/17 13:47:59-07:00, [email protected]

LSM: Create CONFIG_SECURITY and disable it by default for now.

This allows the security hooks to be compiled away into nothingness if CONFIG_SECURITY is disabled. When disabled, the default capabilities functionality is preserved. When enabled, security modules are allowed to be loaded.

include/linux/sched.h +4 -4
diff -Nru a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -596,9 +596,9 @@
 		       unsigned long, const char *, void *);
 extern void free_irq(unsigned int, void *);
 
-/* capable prototype and code moved to security.[hc] */
-#include <linux/security.h>
-#if 0
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY
+/* capable prototype and code are in security.[hc] if CONFIG_SECURITY */
 static inline int capable(int cap)
 {
 	if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap)) {
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
-#endif	/* if 0 */
+#endif
 
 /*
  * Routines for handling mm_structs
include/linux/security.h +1027 -5

1,064 lines not on this page · raw message

security/Config.help +7 -0
diff -Nru a/security/Config.help b/security/Config.help
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+CONFIG_SECURITY
+  This enables the ability to have different security modules
+  in the kernel.  If this option is not selected, the default
+  capabilities functionality will be enabled.
+
+  If you are unsure how to answer this questions, answer N.
+
 CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
   This enables the "default" Linux capabilities functionality.
   If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
security/Config.in +1 -1
diff -Nru a/security/Config.in b/security/Config.in
@@ -3,5 +3,5 @@
 #
 mainmenu_option next_comment
 comment 'Security options'
-define_bool CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES y
+define_bool CONFIG_SECURITY n
 endmenu
security/Makefile +7 -3
diff -Nru a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile
@@ -3,11 +3,15 @@
 #
 
 # Objects that export symbols
-export-objs	:= security.o
+export-objs	:= security.o capability.o
 
-# Object file lists
-obj-y		:= security.o dummy.o
+# if we don't select a security model, use the default capabilities
+ifneq ($(CONFIG_SECURITY),y)
+obj-y		+= capability.o
+endif
 
+# Object file lists
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o dummy.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)	+= capability.o
 
 include $(TOPDIR)/Rules.make
security/capability.c +170 -158

403 lines not on this page · raw message

author
#3 lore raw

ChangeSet 1.800, 2002/10/17 14:04:04-07:00, [email protected]

LSM: change all usages of security_ops->ptrace() to security_ptrace()

arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -719,8 +719,7 @@
 		/* are we already being traced? */
 		if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if (ret)
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
 			goto out;
 		/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
 		current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -160,8 +160,7 @@
 		/* are we already being traced? */
 		if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if (ret)
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
 			goto out;
 		/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
 		current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1101,8 +1101,7 @@
 		/* are we already being traced? */
 		if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if (ret)
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
 			goto out;
 		current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
 		ret = 0;
arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ppc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -166,8 +166,7 @@
 		/* are we already being traced? */
 		if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if (ret)
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
 			goto out;
 		/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
 		current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -59,8 +59,7 @@
 		/* are we already being traced? */
 		if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if (ret)
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
 			goto out;
 		/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
 		current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace32.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace32.c b/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace32.c
@@ -48,8 +48,7 @@
 		/* are we already being traced? */
 		if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if (ret)
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
 			goto out;
 		/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
 		current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -330,8 +330,7 @@
 		ret = -EPERM;
 		if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if (ret)
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
 			goto out;
 		/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
 		current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390x/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -569,8 +569,7 @@
 		ret = -EPERM;
 		if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if (ret)
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
 			goto out;
 		/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
 		current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -291,8 +291,7 @@
 			pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
 			goto out;
 		}
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if (ret) {
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current))) {
 			pt_error_return(regs, -ret);
 			goto out;
 		}
arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -140,8 +140,7 @@
 			pt_error_return(regs, EPERM);
 			goto out;
 		}
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if (ret) {
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current))) {
 			pt_error_return(regs, -ret);
 			goto out;
 		}
arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -33,8 +33,7 @@
 		if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
 
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if(ret)
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
  			goto out;
 
 		/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -178,8 +178,7 @@
 		/* are we already being traced? */
 		if (current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 			goto out;
-		ret = security_ops->ptrace(current->parent, current);
-		if (ret)
+		if ((ret = security_ptrace(current->parent, current)))
 			goto out;
 		/* set the ptrace bit in the process flags. */
 		current->ptrace |= PT_PTRACED;
kernel/ptrace.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -101,8 +101,7 @@
 	/* the same process cannot be attached many times */
 	if (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)
 		goto bad;
-	retval = security_ops->ptrace(current, task);
-	if (retval)
+	if ((retval = security_ptrace(current, task)))
 		goto bad;
 
 	/* Go */
author
#4 lore raw

ChangeSet 1.801, 2002/10/17 14:05:48-07:00, [email protected]

LSM: change all security bprm related calls to the new format.

arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c +3 -4
diff -Nru a/arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c b/arch/ppc64/kernel/sys_ppc32.c
@@ -3518,8 +3518,7 @@
 	if ((retval = bprm.envc) < 0)
 		goto out_mm;
 
-	retval = security_ops->bprm_alloc_security(&bprm);
-	if (retval) 
+	if ((retval = security_bprm_alloc(&bprm)))
 		goto out;
 
 	retval = prepare_binprm(&bprm);
@@ -3542,7 +3541,7 @@
 	retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
 	if (retval >= 0) {
 		/* execve success */
-		security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+		security_bprm_free(&bprm);
 		return retval;
 	}
 
@@ -3555,7 +3554,7 @@
 	}
 
 	if (bprm.security)
-		security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+		security_bprm_free(&bprm);
 
 out_mm:
 	mmdrop(bprm.mm);
arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c +3 -4
diff -Nru a/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c b/arch/sparc64/kernel/sys_sparc32.c
@@ -2964,8 +2964,7 @@
 	if ((retval = bprm.envc) < 0)
 		goto out_mm;
 
-	retval = security_ops->bprm_alloc_security(&bprm);
-	if (retval) 
+	if ((retval = security_bprm_alloc(&bprm)))
 		goto out;
 
 	retval = prepare_binprm(&bprm);
@@ -2988,7 +2987,7 @@
 	retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm, regs);
 	if (retval >= 0) {
 		/* execve success */
-		security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+		security_bprm_free(&bprm);
 		return retval;
 	}
 
@@ -3001,7 +3000,7 @@
 	}
 
 	if (bprm.security)
-		security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+		security_bprm_free(&bprm);
 
 out_mm:
 	mmdrop(bprm.mm);
fs/exec.c +6 -9
diff -Nru a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
@@ -819,8 +819,7 @@
 	}
 
 	/* fill in binprm security blob */
-	retval = security_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
-	if (retval)
+	if ((retval = security_bprm_set(bprm)))
 		return retval;
 
 	memset(bprm->buf,0,BINPRM_BUF_SIZE);
@@ -868,7 +867,7 @@
 	if(do_unlock)
 		unlock_kernel();
 
-	security_ops->bprm_compute_creds(bprm);
+	security_bprm_compute_creds(bprm);
 }
 
 void remove_arg_zero(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -937,8 +936,7 @@
 	    }
 	}
 #endif
-	retval = security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
-	if (retval) 
+	if ((retval = security_bprm_check(bprm)))
 		return retval;
 
 	/* kernel module loader fixup */
@@ -1034,8 +1032,7 @@
 	if ((retval = bprm.envc) < 0)
 		goto out_mm;
 
-	retval = security_ops->bprm_alloc_security(&bprm);
-	if (retval) 
+	if ((retval = security_bprm_alloc(&bprm)))
 		goto out;
 
 	retval = prepare_binprm(&bprm);
@@ -1058,7 +1055,7 @@
 	retval = search_binary_handler(&bprm,regs);
 	if (retval >= 0) {
 		/* execve success */
-		security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+		security_bprm_free(&bprm);
 		return retval;
 	}
 
@@ -1071,7 +1068,7 @@
 	}
 
 	if (bprm.security)
-		security_ops->bprm_free_security(&bprm);
+		security_bprm_free(&bprm);
 
 out_mm:
 	mmdrop(bprm.mm);
author
#5 lore raw

ChangeSet 1.802, 2002/10/17 14:06:57-07:00, [email protected]

LSM: change all of the VFS related security calls to the new format.

fs/attr.c +2 -3
diff -Nru a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c
@@ -153,13 +153,12 @@
 	}
 
 	if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->setattr) {
-		error = security_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
-		if (!error)
+		if (!(error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, attr)))
 			error = inode->i_op->setattr(dentry, attr);
 	} else {
 		error = inode_change_ok(inode, attr);
 		if (!error)
-			error = security_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
+			error = security_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
 		if (!error) {
 			if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID && attr->ia_uid != inode->i_uid) ||
 			    (ia_valid & ATTR_GID && attr->ia_gid != inode->i_gid))
fs/dquot.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/fs/dquot.c b/fs/dquot.c
@@ -1306,8 +1306,7 @@
 	error = -EIO;
 	if (!f->f_op || !f->f_op->read || !f->f_op->write)
 		goto out_f;
-	error = security_ops->quota_on(f);
-	if (error)
+	if ((error = security_quota_on(f)))
 		goto out_f;
 	inode = f->f_dentry->d_inode;
 	error = -EACCES;
fs/fcntl.c +4 -7
diff -Nru a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
@@ -274,8 +274,7 @@
 {
 	int err;
 	
-	err = security_ops->file_set_fowner(filp);
-	if (err)
+	if ((err = security_file_set_fowner(filp)))
 		return err;
 
 	f_modown(filp, arg, current->uid, current->euid, force);
@@ -368,8 +367,7 @@
 	if (!filp)
 		goto out;
 
-	err = security_ops->file_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
-	if (err) {
+	if ((err = security_file_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg))) {
 		fput(filp);
 		return err;
 	}
@@ -392,8 +390,7 @@
 	if (!filp)
 		goto out;
 
-	err = security_ops->file_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg);
-	if (err) {
+	if ((err = security_file_fcntl(filp, cmd, arg))) {
 		fput(filp);
 		return err;
 	}
@@ -444,7 +441,7 @@
 	if (!sigio_perm(p, fown))
 		return;
 
-	if (security_ops->file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, fd, reason))
+	if (security_file_send_sigiotask(p, fown, fd, reason))
 		return;
 
 	switch (fown->signum) {
fs/file_table.c +3 -3
diff -Nru a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
 		files_stat.nr_free_files--;
 	new_one:
 		memset(f, 0, sizeof(*f));
-		if (security_ops->file_alloc_security(f)) {
+		if (security_file_alloc(f)) {
 			list_add(&f->f_list, &free_list);
 			files_stat.nr_free_files++;
 			file_list_unlock();
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
 
 	if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
 		file->f_op->release(inode, file);
-	security_ops->file_free_security(file);
+	security_file_free(file);
 	fops_put(file->f_op);
 	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
 		put_write_access(inode);
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@
 void put_filp(struct file *file)
 {
 	if(atomic_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
-		security_ops->file_free_security(file);
+		security_file_free(file);
 		file_list_lock();
 		list_del(&file->f_list);
 		list_add(&file->f_list, &free_list);
fs/inode.c +3 -3
diff -Nru a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
 		inode->i_bdev = NULL;
 		inode->i_cdev = NULL;
 		inode->i_security = NULL;
-		if (security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode)) {
+		if (security_inode_alloc(inode)) {
 			if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode)
 				inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode(inode);
 			else
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
 {
 	if (inode_has_buffers(inode))
 		BUG();
-	security_ops->inode_free_security(inode);
+	security_inode_free(inode);
 	if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode) {
 		inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode(inode);
 	} else {
@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@
 	if (inode->i_data.nrpages)
 		truncate_inode_pages(&inode->i_data, 0);
 
-	security_ops->inode_delete(inode);
+	security_inode_delete(inode);
 
 	if (op && op->delete_inode) {
 		void (*delete)(struct inode *) = op->delete_inode;
fs/ioctl.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/fs/ioctl.c b/fs/ioctl.c
@@ -59,8 +59,7 @@
 		goto out;
 	error = 0;
 
-	error = security_ops->file_ioctl(filp, cmd, arg);
-        if (error) {
+	if ((error = security_file_ioctl(filp, cmd, arg))) {
                 fput(filp);
                 goto out;
         }
fs/locks.c +4 -8
diff -Nru a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c
@@ -1175,8 +1175,7 @@
 		return -EACCES;
 	if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	error = security_ops->file_lock(filp, arg);
-	if (error)
+	if ((error = security_file_lock(filp, arg)))
 		return error;
 
 	lock_kernel();
@@ -1289,8 +1288,7 @@
 	if (error)
 		goto out_putf;
 
-	error = security_ops->file_lock(filp, cmd);
-	if (error)
+	if ((error = security_file_lock(filp, cmd)))
 		goto out_free;
 
 	for (;;) {
@@ -1439,8 +1437,7 @@
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	error = security_ops->file_lock(filp, file_lock->fl_type);
-	if (error)
+	if ((error = security_file_lock(filp, file_lock->fl_type)))
 		goto out;
 
 	if (filp->f_op && filp->f_op->lock != NULL) {
@@ -1579,8 +1576,7 @@
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	error = security_ops->file_lock(filp, file_lock->fl_type);
-	if (error)
+	if ((error = security_file_lock(filp, file_lock->fl_type)))
 		goto out;
 
 	if (filp->f_op && filp->f_op->lock != NULL) {
fs/namei.c +23 -35

190 lines not on this page · raw message

fs/namespace.c +9 -13
diff -Nru a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -289,8 +289,7 @@
 	struct super_block * sb = mnt->mnt_sb;
 	int retval = 0;
 
-	retval = security_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
-	if (retval)
+	if ((retval = security_sb_umount(mnt, flags)))
 		return retval;
 
 	/*
@@ -342,7 +341,7 @@
 		DQUOT_OFF(sb);
 		acct_auto_close(sb);
 		unlock_kernel();
-		security_ops->sb_umount_close(mnt);
+		security_sb_umount_close(mnt);
 		spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
 	}
 	retval = -EBUSY;
@@ -353,7 +352,7 @@
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
 	if (retval)
-		security_ops->sb_umount_busy(mnt);
+		security_sb_umount_busy(mnt);
 	up_write(&current->namespace->sem);
 	return retval;
 }
@@ -471,8 +470,7 @@
 	if (IS_DEADDIR(nd->dentry->d_inode))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	err = security_ops->sb_check_sb(mnt, nd);
-	if (err)
+	if ((err = security_sb_check_sb(mnt, nd)))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
@@ -488,7 +486,7 @@
 out_unlock:
 	up(&nd->dentry->d_inode->i_sem);
 	if (!err)
-		security_ops->sb_post_addmount(mnt, nd);
+		security_sb_post_addmount(mnt, nd);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -559,7 +557,7 @@
 		nd->mnt->mnt_flags=mnt_flags;
 	up_write(&sb->s_umount);
 	if (!err)
-		security_ops->sb_post_remount(nd->mnt, flags, data);
+		security_sb_post_remount(nd->mnt, flags, data);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -742,8 +740,7 @@
 	if (retval)
 		return retval;
 
-	retval = security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, &nd, type_page, flags, data_page);
-	if (retval)
+	if ((retval = security_sb_mount(dev_name, &nd, type_page, flags, data_page)))
 		goto dput_out;
 
 	if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
@@ -940,8 +937,7 @@
 	if (error)
 		goto out1;
 
-	error = security_ops->sb_pivotroot(&old_nd, &new_nd);
-	if (error) {
+	if ((error = security_sb_pivotroot(&old_nd, &new_nd))) {
 		path_release(&old_nd);
 		goto out1;
 	}
@@ -990,7 +986,7 @@
 	attach_mnt(new_nd.mnt, &root_parent);
 	spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
 	chroot_fs_refs(&user_nd, &new_nd);
-	security_ops->sb_post_pivotroot(&user_nd, &new_nd);
+	security_sb_post_pivotroot(&user_nd, &new_nd);
 	error = 0;
 	path_release(&root_parent);
 	path_release(&parent_nd);
fs/open.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
@@ -30,8 +30,7 @@
 		retval = -ENOSYS;
 		if (sb->s_op && sb->s_op->statfs) {
 			memset(buf, 0, sizeof(struct statfs));
-			retval = security_ops->sb_statfs(sb);
-			if (retval)
+			if ((retval = security_sb_statfs(sb)))
 				return retval;
 			retval = sb->s_op->statfs(sb, buf);
 		}
fs/proc/base.c +1 -1
diff -Nru a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -395,7 +395,7 @@
 };
 
 #define MAY_PTRACE(p) \
-(p==current||(p->parent==current&&(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)&&p->state==TASK_STOPPED&&security_ops->ptrace(current,p)==0))
+(p==current||(p->parent==current&&(p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED)&&p->state==TASK_STOPPED&&security_ptrace(current,p)==0))
 
 
 static int mem_open(struct inode* inode, struct file* file)
fs/quota.c +1 -1
diff -Nru a/fs/quota.c b/fs/quota.c
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
 
-	return security_ops->quotactl (cmd, type, id, sb);
+	return security_quotactl (cmd, type, id, sb);
 }
 
 /* Resolve device pathname to superblock */
fs/read_write.c +4 -8
diff -Nru a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c
@@ -193,8 +193,7 @@
 
 	ret = locks_verify_area(FLOCK_VERIFY_READ, inode, file, *pos, count);
 	if (!ret) {
-		ret = security_ops->file_permission (file, MAY_READ);
-		if (!ret) {
+		if (!(ret = security_file_permission (file, MAY_READ))) {
 			if (file->f_op->read)
 				ret = file->f_op->read(file, buf, count, pos);
 			else
@@ -233,8 +232,7 @@
 
 	ret = locks_verify_area(FLOCK_VERIFY_WRITE, inode, file, *pos, count);
 	if (!ret) {
-		ret = security_ops->file_permission (file, MAY_WRITE);
-		if (!ret) {
+		if (!(ret = security_file_permission (file, MAY_WRITE))) {
 			if (file->f_op->write)
 				ret = file->f_op->write(file, buf, count, pos);
 			else
@@ -465,8 +463,7 @@
 		goto bad_file;
 	if (file->f_op && (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) &&
 	    (file->f_op->readv || file->f_op->read)) {
-		ret = security_ops->file_permission (file, MAY_READ);
-		if (!ret)
+		if (!(ret = security_file_permission (file, MAY_READ)))
 			ret = do_readv_writev(READ, file, vector, nr_segs);
 	}
 	fput(file);
@@ -488,8 +485,7 @@
 		goto bad_file;
 	if (file->f_op && (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) &&
 	    (file->f_op->writev || file->f_op->write)) {
-		ret = security_ops->file_permission (file, MAY_WRITE);
-		if (!ret)
+		if (!(ret = security_file_permission (file, MAY_WRITE)))
 			ret = do_readv_writev(WRITE, file, vector, nr_segs);
 	}
 	fput(file);
fs/readdir.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/fs/readdir.c b/fs/readdir.c
@@ -22,8 +22,7 @@
 	if (!file->f_op || !file->f_op->readdir)
 		goto out;
 
-	res = security_ops->file_permission(file, MAY_READ);
-	if (res)
+	if ((res = security_file_permission(file, MAY_READ)))
 		goto out;
 
 	down(&inode->i_sem);
fs/stat.c +2 -4
diff -Nru a/fs/stat.c b/fs/stat.c
@@ -39,8 +39,7 @@
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int retval;
 
-	retval = security_ops->inode_getattr(mnt, dentry);
-	if (retval)
+	if ((retval = security_inode_getattr(mnt, dentry)))
 		return retval;
 
 	if (inode->i_op->getattr)
@@ -238,8 +237,7 @@
 
 		error = -EINVAL;
 		if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->readlink) {
-			error = security_ops->inode_readlink(nd.dentry);
-			if (!error) {
+			if (!(error = security_inode_readlink(nd.dentry))) {
 				UPDATE_ATIME(inode);
 				error = inode->i_op->readlink(nd.dentry, buf, bufsiz);
 			}
fs/super.c +2 -2
diff -Nru a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
 	struct super_block *s = kmalloc(sizeof(struct super_block),  GFP_USER);
 	if (s) {
 		memset(s, 0, sizeof(struct super_block));
-		if (security_ops->sb_alloc_security(s)) {
+		if (security_sb_alloc(s)) {
 			kfree(s);
 			s = NULL;
 			goto out;
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
  */
 static inline void destroy_super(struct super_block *s)
 {
-	security_ops->sb_free_security(s);
+	security_sb_free(s);
 	kfree(s);
 }
 
fs/xattr.c +4 -9
diff -Nru a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -86,9 +86,7 @@
 
 	error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (d->d_inode->i_op && d->d_inode->i_op->setxattr) {
-		error = security_ops->inode_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue,
-				size, flags);
-		if (error)
+		if ((error = security_inode_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags)))
 			goto out;
 		down(&d->d_inode->i_sem);
 		error = d->d_inode->i_op->setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
@@ -164,8 +162,7 @@
 
 	error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (d->d_inode->i_op && d->d_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
-		error = security_ops->inode_getxattr(d, kname);
-		if (error)
+		if ((error = security_inode_getxattr(d, kname)))
 			goto out;
 		down(&d->d_inode->i_sem);
 		error = d->d_inode->i_op->getxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size);
@@ -237,8 +234,7 @@
 
 	error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (d->d_inode->i_op && d->d_inode->i_op->listxattr) {
-		error = security_ops->inode_listxattr(d);
-		if (error)
+		if ((error = security_inode_listxattr(d)))
 			goto out;
 		down(&d->d_inode->i_sem);
 		error = d->d_inode->i_op->listxattr(d, klist, size);
@@ -312,8 +308,7 @@
 
 	error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (d->d_inode->i_op && d->d_inode->i_op->removexattr) {
-		error = security_ops->inode_removexattr(d, kname);
-		if (error)
+		if ((error = security_inode_removexattr(d, kname)))
 			goto out;
 		down(&d->d_inode->i_sem);
 		error = d->d_inode->i_op->removexattr(d, kname);
init/do_mounts.c +1 -1
diff -Nru a/init/do_mounts.c b/init/do_mounts.c
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@
 	sys_umount("/dev", 0);
 	sys_mount(".", "/", NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL);
 	sys_chroot(".");
-	security_ops->sb_post_mountroot();
+	security_sb_post_mountroot();
 	mount_devfs_fs ();
 }
 
mm/mmap.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
@@ -498,8 +498,7 @@
 		}
 	}
 
-	error = security_ops->file_mmap(file, prot, flags);
-	if (error)
+	if ((error = security_file_mmap(file, prot, flags)))
 		return error;
 		
 	/* Clear old maps */
mm/mprotect.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -262,8 +262,7 @@
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		error = security_ops->file_mprotect(vma, prot);
-		if (error)
+		if ((error = security_file_mprotect(vma, prot)))
 			goto out;
 
 		if (vma->vm_end > end) {
net/core/scm.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -217,8 +217,7 @@
 	for (i=0, cmfptr=(int*)CMSG_DATA(cm); i<fdmax; i++, cmfptr++)
 	{
 		int new_fd;
-		err = security_ops->file_receive(fp[i]);
-		if (err)
+		if ((err = security_file_receive(fp[i])))
 			break;
 		err = get_unused_fd();
 		if (err < 0)
author
#6 lore raw

ChangeSet 1.803, 2002/10/17 14:08:43-07:00, [email protected]

LSM: convert over the remaining security calls to the new format.

ipc/msg.c +3 -4
diff -Nru a/ipc/msg.c b/ipc/msg.c
@@ -101,15 +101,14 @@
 	msq->q_perm.key = key;
 
 	msq->q_perm.security = NULL;
-	retval = security_ops->msg_queue_alloc_security(msq);
-	if (retval) {
+	if ((retval = security_msg_queue_alloc(msq))) {
 		kfree(msq);
 		return retval;
 	}
 
 	id = ipc_addid(&msg_ids, &msq->q_perm, msg_ctlmni);
 	if(id == -1) {
-		security_ops->msg_queue_free_security(msq);
+		security_msg_queue_free(msq);
 		kfree(msq);
 		return -ENOSPC;
 	}
@@ -281,7 +280,7 @@
 		free_msg(msg);
 	}
 	atomic_sub(msq->q_cbytes, &msg_bytes);
-	security_ops->msg_queue_free_security(msq);
+	security_msg_queue_free(msq);
 	kfree(msq);
 }
 
ipc/sem.c +3 -4
diff -Nru a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -136,15 +136,14 @@
 	sma->sem_perm.key = key;
 
 	sma->sem_perm.security = NULL;
-	retval = security_ops->sem_alloc_security(sma);
-	if (retval) {
+	if ((retval = security_sem_alloc(sma))) {
 		ipc_free(sma, size);
 		return retval;
 	}
 
 	id = ipc_addid(&sem_ids, &sma->sem_perm, sc_semmni);
 	if(id == -1) {
-		security_ops->sem_free_security(sma);
+		security_sem_free(sma);
 		ipc_free(sma, size);
 		return -ENOSPC;
 	}
@@ -427,7 +426,7 @@
 
 	used_sems -= sma->sem_nsems;
 	size = sizeof (*sma) + sma->sem_nsems * sizeof (struct sem);
-	security_ops->sem_free_security(sma);
+	security_sem_free(sma);
 	ipc_free(sma, size);
 }
 
ipc/shm.c +3 -4
diff -Nru a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
 	shm_unlock(shp->id);
 	shmem_lock(shp->shm_file, 0);
 	fput (shp->shm_file);
-	security_ops->shm_free_security(shp);
+	security_shm_free(shp);
 	kfree (shp);
 }
 
@@ -188,8 +188,7 @@
 	shp->shm_flags = (shmflg & S_IRWXUGO);
 
 	shp->shm_perm.security = NULL;
-	error = security_ops->shm_alloc_security(shp);
-	if (error) {
+	if ((error = security_shm_alloc(shp))) {
 		kfree(shp);
 		return error;
 	}
@@ -222,7 +221,7 @@
 no_id:
 	fput(file);
 no_file:
-	security_ops->shm_free_security(shp);
+	security_shm_free(shp);
 	kfree(shp);
 	return error;
 }
ipc/util.c +1 -1
diff -Nru a/ipc/util.c b/ipc/util.c
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@
 	    !capable(CAP_IPC_OWNER))
 		return -1;
 
-	return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
+	return security_ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
 }
 
 /*
kernel/acct.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/kernel/acct.c b/kernel/acct.c
@@ -223,8 +223,7 @@
 		}
 	}
 
-	error = security_ops->acct(file);
-	if (error)
+	if ((error = security_acct(file)))
 		return error;
 
 	spin_lock(&acct_globals.lock);
kernel/capability.c +5 -5
diff -Nru a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
      data.permitted = cap_t(target->cap_permitted);
      data.inheritable = cap_t(target->cap_inheritable); 
      data.effective = cap_t(target->cap_effective);
-     ret = security_ops->capget(target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, &data.permitted);
+     ret = security_capget(target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, &data.permitted);
 
 out:
      read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); 
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@
      do_each_thread(g, target) {
              if (target->pgrp != pgrp)
                      continue;
-	     security_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	     security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
      } while_each_thread(g, target);
 }
 
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
      do_each_thread(g, target) {
              if (target == current || target->pid == 1)
                      continue;
-	     security_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	     security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
      } while_each_thread(g, target);
 }
 
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@
 
      ret = -EPERM;
 
-     if (security_ops->capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted))
+     if (security_capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted))
 	     goto out;
 
      if (!cap_issubset(inheritable, cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable,
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@
              else            /* all procs in process group */
                      cap_set_pg(-pid, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
      } else {
-	     security_ops->capset_set(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
+	     security_capset_set(target, &effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
      }
 
 out:
kernel/exit.c +3 -3
diff -Nru a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
 		wait_task_inactive(p);
 
 	atomic_dec(&p->user->processes);
-	security_ops->task_free_security(p);
+	security_task_free(p);
 	free_uid(p->user);
 	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
 	if (unlikely(p->ptrace))
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
 	/* cpus_allowed? */
 	/* rt_priority? */
 	/* signals? */
-	security_ops->task_reparent_to_init(current);
+	security_task_reparent_to_init(current);
 	memcpy(current->rlim, init_task.rlim, sizeof(*(current->rlim)));
 	current->user = INIT_USER;
 
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@
 	if (current->tgid != p->tgid && delay_group_leader(p))
 		return 2;
 
-	if (security_ops->task_wait(p))
+	if (security_task_wait(p))
 		return 0;
 
 	return 1;
kernel/fork.c +3 -4
diff -Nru a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -682,8 +682,7 @@
 	if ((clone_flags & CLONE_DETACHED) && !(clone_flags & CLONE_THREAD))
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 
-	retval = security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
-	if (retval)
+	if ((retval = security_task_create(clone_flags)))
 		goto fork_out;
 
 	retval = -ENOMEM;
@@ -772,7 +771,7 @@
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->local_pages);
 
 	retval = -ENOMEM;
-	if (security_ops->task_alloc_security(p))
+	if (security_task_alloc(p))
 		goto bad_fork_cleanup;
 	/* copy all the process information */
 	if (copy_semundo(clone_flags, p))
@@ -922,7 +921,7 @@
 bad_fork_cleanup_semundo:
 	exit_semundo(p);
 bad_fork_cleanup_security:
-	security_ops->task_free_security(p);
+	security_task_free(p);
 bad_fork_cleanup:
 	if (p->pid > 0)
 		free_pidmap(p->pid);
kernel/kmod.c +1 -1
diff -Nru a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
 	/* Give kmod all effective privileges.. */
 	curtask->euid = curtask->fsuid = 0;
 	curtask->egid = curtask->fsgid = 0;
-	security_ops->task_kmod_set_label();
+	security_task_kmod_set_label();
 
 	/* Allow execve args to be in kernel space. */
 	set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
kernel/sched.c +5 -10
diff -Nru a/kernel/sched.c b/kernel/sched.c
@@ -1329,8 +1329,7 @@
 	if (nice > 19)
 		nice = 19;
 
-	retval = security_ops->task_setnice(current, nice);
-	if (retval)
+	if ((retval = security_task_setnice(current, nice)))
 		return retval;
 
 	set_user_nice(current, nice);
@@ -1451,8 +1450,7 @@
 	    !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	retval = security_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, &lp);
-	if (retval)
+	if ((retval = security_task_setscheduler(p, policy, &lp)))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	array = p->array;
@@ -1515,8 +1513,7 @@
 	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
 	p = find_process_by_pid(pid);
 	if (p) {
-		retval = security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
-		if (!retval)
+		if (!(retval = security_task_getscheduler(p)))
 			retval = p->policy;
 	}
 	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
@@ -1545,8 +1542,7 @@
 	if (!p)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	retval = security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
-	if (retval)
+	if ((retval = security_task_getscheduler(p)))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	lp.sched_priority = p->rt_priority;
@@ -1778,8 +1774,7 @@
 	if (!p)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	retval = security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
-	if (retval)
+	if ((retval = security_task_getscheduler(p)))
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	jiffies_to_timespec(p->policy & SCHED_FIFO ?
kernel/signal.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -707,8 +707,7 @@
 	ret = -EPERM;
 	if (bad_signal(sig, info, t))
 		goto out;
-	ret = security_ops->task_kill(t, info, sig);
-	if (ret)
+	if ((ret = security_task_kill(t, info, sig)))
 		goto out;
 
 	/* The null signal is a permissions and process existence probe.
kernel/sys.c +18 -31

157 lines not on this page · raw message

kernel/uid16.c +1 -2
diff -Nru a/kernel/uid16.c b/kernel/uid16.c
@@ -140,8 +140,7 @@
 		return -EFAULT;
 	for (i = 0 ; i < gidsetsize ; i++)
 		new_groups[i] = (gid_t)groups[i];
-	i = security_ops->task_setgroups(gidsetsize, new_groups);
-	if (i)
+	if ((i = security_task_setgroups(gidsetsize, new_groups)))
 		return i;
 	memcpy(current->groups, new_groups, gidsetsize * sizeof(gid_t));
 	current->ngroups = gidsetsize;
net/decnet/af_decnet.c +1 -1
diff -Nru a/net/decnet/af_decnet.c b/net/decnet/af_decnet.c
@@ -794,7 +794,7 @@
 	 * dn_prot_sock ? Would be nice if the capable call would go there
 	 * too.
 	 */
-	if (security_ops->dn_prot_sock(saddr) &&
+	if (security_dn_prot_sock(saddr) &&
 	    !capable(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE) || 
 	    saddr->sdn_objnum || (saddr->sdn_flags & SDF_WILD))
 		return -EACCES;