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2.4+ptrace exploit fix breaks root's ability to strace

DISCUSSION Russell King 5 participants 12 messages Mar 22, 2003 – Mar 23, 2003 ptrace support

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#0 lore raw

Hi,

Are the authors of the ptrace patch aware that, in addition to closing the hole, the "fix" also prevents a ptrace-capable task (eg, strace started by root) from ptracing user threads?

For example, you can't strace vsftpd processes started from xinetd.

Is this intended behaviour?

Signature · 2 lines
Russell King ([email protected])                The developer of ARM Linux
             http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html
#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Russell King

Hi,

Are the authors of the ptrace patch aware that, in addition to closing the hole, the "fix" also prevents a ptrace-capable task (eg, strace started by root) from ptracing user threads?

For example, you can't strace vsftpd processes started from xinetd.

Is this intended behaviour?

Its an unintended side effect, nobody has sent a patch to fix it yet.

#2 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Alan Cox
Quoted 7 lines · Russell King

Are the authors of the ptrace patch aware that, in addition to closing the hole, the "fix" also prevents a ptrace-capable task (eg, strace started by root) from ptracing user threads?

For example, you can't strace vsftpd processes started from xinetd.

Is this intended behaviour?

Its an unintended side effect, nobody has sent a patch to fix it yet.

How about this fix? PT_PTRACE_CAP is set when we attach to a process and the process doing the attaching has the ptrace capability.

Note that this patch is against the 2.4.19 version of ptrace.c with the 2.4.20 ptrace patch applied.

kernel/ptrace.c +2 -2
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)
 {
 	mb();
-	if (!is_dumpable(child))
+	if (!is_dumpable(child) && !(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
 	/* Worry about races with exit() */
 	task_lock(tsk);
 	mm = tsk->mm;
-	if (!is_dumpable(tsk) || (&init_mm == mm))
+	if ((!is_dumpable(tsk) || (&init_mm == mm)) && !(tsk->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP))
 		mm = NULL;
 	if (mm)
 		atomic_inc(&mm->mm_users);
Signature · 2 lines
Russell King ([email protected])                The developer of ARM Linux
             http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html
#3 lore raw

kernel/ptrace.c line 28

Quoted 12 lines
kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)
 {
 	mb();
-	if (!is_dumpable(child))
+	if (!is_dumpable(child) && !(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP))
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))

this sounds really wrong; the child says it doesn't want to be ptraced and now you allow it anyway. I think the problem is more that the child isn't dumpable.... checking why

#4 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Arjan van de Ven
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)
 {
 	mb();
-	if (!is_dumpable(child))
+	if (!is_dumpable(child) && !(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACE_CAP))
 		return -EPERM;
 
Quoted 5 lines

kernel/ptrace.c line 28

Quoted 1 line
kernel/ptrace.c +0 -0
 	if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))

this sounds really wrong; the child says it doesn't want to be ptraced and now you allow it anyway. I think the problem is more that the child isn't dumpable.... checking why

ptrace has always explicitly allowed a process with the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to ptrace a task which isn't dumpable. With the ptrace "fix" in place, you can attach to a non-dumpable thread:

int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)

{
	...
-       if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+       if (!is_dumpable(task) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
                goto bad;
}

but you can't do anything with it (not even detach from it):

int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)

{
	...

+ if (!is_dumpable(child))
+ return -EPERM;
}

So, we went from being able to ptrace daemons as root, to being able to attach daemons and then being unable to do anything with them, even if you're root (or have the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability). I think this behaviour is getting on for being described as "insane" 8) and is clearly wrong.

Note that processes become "undumpable" as soon as they starts playing with its [GU]IDs (via setre[gu]id, set[gu]id, set_res[gu]id, setfs[ug]id.)

Signature · 2 lines
Russell King ([email protected])                The developer of ARM Linux
             http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html
#5 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Russell King

int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, int kill)

{
	...
(quoted diff) +2 -0
+       if (!is_dumpable(child))
+               return -EPERM;

}

Quoted 5 lines

So, we went from being able to ptrace daemons as root, to being able to attach daemons and then being unable to do anything with them, even if you're root (or have the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability). I think this behaviour is getting on for being described as "insane" 8) and is clearly wrong.

ok it seems this check is too strong. It *has* to check child->task_dumpable and return -EPERM, but child->mm->dumpable is not needed.

#6 lore raw
In reply to Russell King
Quoted 3 lines · Russell King

ptrace has always explicitly allowed a process with the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to ptrace a task which isn't dumpable. With the ptrace "fix" in place, you can attach to a non-dumpable thread:

Note that this is a bug, and is now a fixed bug. The looser check you can do requires you check

my_capabilities >= his capbilities

Otherwise you have priviledge escalation for CAP_SYS_PTRACE to CAP_SYS_RAWIO trivially

#7 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Alan Cox
Quoted 3 lines · Russell King

ptrace has always explicitly allowed a process with the CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to ptrace a task which isn't dumpable. With the ptrace "fix" in place, you can attach to a non-dumpable thread:

Quoted 7 lines

Note that this is a bug, and is now a fixed bug. The looser check you can do requires you check

my_capabilities >= his capbilities

Otherwise you have priviledge escalation for CAP_SYS_PTRACE to CAP_SYS_RAWIO trivially

In which case we should not allow ptrace to even attach to the process. Currently you can attach to such a process and stop it running, even if you have lesser priviledges than the child.

Therefore, I wouldn't call this "fixed" in the existing ptrace patch.

Signature · 2 lines
Russell King ([email protected])                The developer of ARM Linux
             http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html
#8 lore raw
In reply to Alan Cox
Quoted 6 lines · Alan Cox
Quoted 3 lines · Russell King

Are the authors of the ptrace patch aware that, in addition to closing the hole, the "fix" also prevents a ptrace-capable task (eg, strace started by root) from ptracing user threads?

Its an unintended side effect, nobody has sent a patch to fix it yet.

Hi,

mlafon send a patch to the list:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2003 12:28:02 +0100
From: [email protected]
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Ptrace hole / Linux 2.2.25

The patch breaks /proc/<pid>/cmdline and /proc/<pid>/environ for 'non dumpable'
processes, even for root.

We need to access theses proc files for processes monitoring.

Included is a patch to restore this functionnality for root.

Any comments ?
(See attached file: cmdline_environ_fix.diff)
--------------------------------------------------------------------

Nobody responded to his e-mail. I attach the patch again. I will test the patch tomorow.

Cosmin

kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
diff -u -r1.3.24.1 ptrace.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@
 	/* Worry about races with exit() */
 	task_lock(tsk);
 	mm = tsk->mm;
-	if (!is_dumpable(tsk) || (&init_mm == mm))
+	if ((!is_dumpable(tsk) || (&init_mm == mm)) && (current->uid != 0))
 		mm = NULL;
 	if (mm)
 		atomic_inc(&mm->mm_users);
#9 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Lists (lst)

The patch breaks /proc/<pid>/cmdline and /proc/<pid>/environ for 'non dumpable' processes, even for root.

This fix is definitely wrong.

kernel/ptrace.c line 144

Quoted 3 lines
kernel/ptrace.c +1 -1
-	if (!is_dumpable(tsk) || (&init_mm == mm))
+	if ((!is_dumpable(tsk) || (&init_mm == mm)) && (current->uid != 0))
 		mm = NULL;

Today, security is based around the capability system, not UID numbers.

Signature · 2 lines
Russell King ([email protected])                The developer of ARM Linux
             http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html
#10 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Russell King

Today, security is based around the capability system, not UID numbers.

So can you send a patch to make this work the right[tm] way? I need this capability as well...

Quoted 4 lines
Signature · 2 lines
Russell King ([email protected])                The developer of ARM Linux
             http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/personal/aboutme.html
Signature · 4 lines
  .''`.   Martin Loschwitz           Debian GNU/Linux developer
 : :'  :  [email protected]        [email protected]
 `. `'`   http://www.madkiss.org/    people.debian.org/~madkiss/
   `-     Use Debian GNU/Linux 3.0!  See http://www.debian.org/
#11 lore raw
In reply to Lists (lst)
Quoted 7 lines · Lists (lst)
Quoted 5 lines · Alan Cox
Quoted 3 lines · Russell King

Are the authors of the ptrace patch aware that, in addition to closing the hole, the "fix" also prevents a ptrace-capable task (eg, strace started by root) from ptracing user threads?

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

Its an unintended side effect, nobody has sent a patch to fix it yet.

Hi,

mlafon send a patch to the list:

uid == 0 is the wrong test