Skip to contentSkip to conversation

The disappearing sys_call_table export.

DISCUSSION Chuck Ebbert 4 participants 5 messages May 9, 2003 – May 10, 2003

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Alan Cox
Quoted 4 lines

So when I register my filesystem, can I indicate that I want to be
layered over top of the ext3 driver and get control anytime someone mounts an ext3 fileystem, so I can decide whether the volume being mounted is one that I want to intercept open/read/write requests for?

That would assume you had a right to dictate that the administrator couldnt mount other file systems without your stacking.

Security-sensitive upper layers like virus scanners and loggers
would want to do it that way. The upper layer might even just log the fact that mount happened and then stay out of the way after that.

#1 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Chuck Ebbert

Security-sensitive upper layers like virus scanners and loggers
would want to do it that way. The upper layer might even just log the fact that mount happened and then stay out of the way after that.

Maybe _they_ want it. We don't want it, though.

#2 lore raw
In reply to Chuck Ebbert
Quoted 3 lines · Chuck Ebbert

Security-sensitive upper layers like virus scanners and loggers
would want to do it that way. The upper layer might even just log the fact that mount happened and then stay out of the way after that.

What makes you say that. If the administrator has full priviledges then its kind of irrelevant trying to force anything "for security reasons"

#3 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Alan Cox

What makes you say that. If the administrator has full priviledges then its kind of irrelevant trying to force anything "for security reasons"

Many security models require that there *not* be one person who has "full" privileges (for obvious reasons).

#4 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · On Gwe, 2003-05-09 at 18:07, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · Alan Cox

What makes you say that. If the administrator has full priviledges then its kind of irrelevant trying to force anything "for security reasons"

Many security models require that there *not* be one person who has "full" privileges (for obvious reasons).

And SELInux already lets you enforce such a policy