Light-weight Auditing Framework
Subsystems (8)
PATCH 1/1 Light-weight Auditing Framework
Below is a patch against 2.6.4 that provides a low-overhead system-call auditing framework for Linux that is usable by LSM components (e.g., SELinux). This is an update of the patch discussed in this thread:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=107815888100001&r=1&w=2
In brief, it provides for netlink-based logging of audit records that have been generated in other parts of the kernel (e.g., SELinux) as well as the ability to audit system calls, either independently (using simple filtering) or as a compliment to the audit record that another part of the kernel generated.
The main goals were to provide system call auditing with 1) as low overhead as possible, and 2) without duplicating functionality that is already provided by SELinux (and/or other security infrastructures). This framework will work "stand-alone", but is not designed to provide, e.g., CAPP functionality without another security component in place.
This updated patch includes changes from feedback I have received, including the ability to compile without CONFIG_NET (and better use of tabs, so use -w if you diff against the older patch).
Please see http://people.redhat.com/faith/audit/ for an early example user-space client (auditd-0.4.tar.gz) and instructions on how to try it.
My future intentions at the kernel level include improving filtering (e.g., syscall personality/exit codes) and syscall support for more architectures. First, though, I'm going to work on documentation, a (real) audit daemon, and patches for other user-space tools so that people can play with the framework and understand how it can be used with and without SELinux.
arch/i386/kernel/entry.S | 6 arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c | 9 arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S | 15 arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c | 27 - arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32entry.S | 12 arch/x86_64/kernel/entry.S | 21 arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c | 23 - fs/namei.c | 15 include/asm-i386/thread_info.h | 5 include/asm-ppc64/thread_info.h | 3 include/asm-x86_64/thread_info.h | 5 include/linux/audit.h | 202 +++++++++ include/linux/fs.h | 14 include/linux/netlink.h | 1 include/linux/sched.h | 5 init/Kconfig | 20 kernel/Makefile | 2 kernel/audit.c | 813 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/auditsc.c | 869 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/fork.c | 10 security/selinux/avc.c | 158 ++----- security/selinux/include/avc.h | 7 security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 23 files changed, 2108 insertions(+), 136 deletions(-)
arch/i386/kernel/entry.S +3 -3
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ sysenter_past_esp: cmpl $(nr_syscalls), %eax jae syscall_badsys - testb $_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE,TI_FLAGS(%ebp) + testb $_TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A,TI_FLAGS(%ebp) jnz syscall_trace_entry call *sys_call_table(,%eax,4) movl %eax,EAX(%esp)
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ ENTRY(system_call) cmpl $(nr_syscalls), %eax jae syscall_badsys # system call tracing in operation - testb $_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE,TI_FLAGS(%ebp) + testb $_TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A,TI_FLAGS(%ebp) jnz syscall_trace_entry syscall_call: call *sys_call_table(,%eax,4)
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ syscall_trace_entry: # perform syscall exit tracing ALIGN syscall_exit_work: - testb $_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE, %cl + testb $_TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A, %cl jz work_pending sti # could let do_syscall_trace() call # schedule() instead
arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c +9 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/user.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -524,6 +525,14 @@ out: __attribute__((regparm (3 )))void do_syscall_trace (struct pt_regs *regs,int entryexit) { +if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) { +if (!entryexit) +audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->orig_eax, + regs->ebx); +else +audit_syscall_exit (current); + } +if (!test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ))return ;if (!(current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ))
arch/ppc64/kernel/entry.S +8 -7
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ _GLOBAL(DoSyscall) #endif /* SHOW_SYSCALLS */ clrrdi r10,r1,THREAD_SHIFT ld r10,TI_FLAGS(r10) - andi. r11,r10,_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE + andi. r11,r10,_TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A bne- 50f cmpli 0,r0,NR_syscalls bge- 66f
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ _GLOBAL(ret_from_syscall_1) b 22b /* Traced system call support */ -50: bl .do_syscall_trace +50: addi r3,r1,STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD + bl .do_syscall_trace_enter ld r0,GPR0(r1) /* Restore original registers */ ld r3,GPR3(r1) ld r4,GPR4(r1)
@@ -201,7 +202,7 @@ _GLOBAL(ret_from_syscall_2) oris r10,r10,0x1000 std r10,_CCR(r1) 60: std r3,GPR3(r1) /* Update return value */ - bl .do_syscall_trace + bl .do_syscall_trace_leave b .ret_from_except 66: li r3,ENOSYS b 57b
@@ -234,14 +235,14 @@ _GLOBAL(ppc64_rt_sigreturn) 80: clrrdi r4,r1,THREAD_SHIFT ld r4,TI_FLAGS(r4) - andi. r4,r4,_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE + andi. r4,r4,_TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A bne- 81f cmpi 0,r3,0 bge .ret_from_except b .ret_from_syscall_1 81: cmpi 0,r3,0 blt .ret_from_syscall_2 - bl .do_syscall_trace + bl .do_syscall_trace_leave b .ret_from_except /*
@@ -327,9 +328,9 @@ _GLOBAL(ret_from_fork) bl .schedule_tail clrrdi r4,r1,THREAD_SHIFT ld r4,TI_FLAGS(r4) - andi. r4,r4,_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE + andi. r4,r4,_TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A beq+ .ret_from_except - bl .do_syscall_trace + bl .do_syscall_trace_leave b .ret_from_except _GLOBAL(ret_from_except)
arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c +22 -5
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@#include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/user.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/page.h>
@@ -286,12 +287,8 @@ out:return ret; } -void do_syscall_trace (void ) +static void do_syscall_trace (void ) { -if (!test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE )) -return ; -if (!(current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED )) -return ;/* the 0x80 provides a way for the tracing parent to distinguish between a syscall stop and SIGTRAP delivery */ ptrace_notify(SIGTRAP | ((current->ptrace & PT_TRACESYSGOOD)
@@ -307,3 +304,23 @@ void do_syscall_trace(void) current->exit_code =0 ; } } + +void do_syscall_trace_enter (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) +audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->gpr[0 ], regs->gpr[3 ]); + +if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) + && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED )) +do_syscall_trace (); +} + +void do_syscall_trace_leave (void ) +{ +if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) +audit_syscall_exit (current); + +if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) + && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED )) +do_syscall_trace (); +}
arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32entry.S +6 -6
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ ENTRY(ia32_cstar_target) .quad 1b,cstar_badarg .previous GET_THREAD_INFO(%r10) - bt $TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE,threadinfo_flags(%r10) - jc ia32_tracesys + testl $_TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A,threadinfo_flags(%r10) + jnz ia32_tracesys cstar_do_call: cmpl $IA32_NR_syscalls,%eax jae ia32_badsys
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ cstar_tracesys: SAVE_REST movq $-ENOSYS,RAX(%rsp) /* really needed? */ movq %rsp,%rdi /* &pt_regs -> arg1 */ - call syscall_trace + call syscall_trace_enter LOAD_ARGS ARGOFFSET /* reload args from stack in case ptrace changed it */ RESTORE_REST jmp cstar_do_call
@@ -141,8 +141,8 @@ ENTRY(ia32_syscall) this could be a problem. */ SAVE_ARGS GET_THREAD_INFO(%r10) - bt $TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE,threadinfo_flags(%r10) - jc ia32_tracesys + testl $_TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A,threadinfo_flags(%r10) + jnz ia32_tracesys ia32_do_syscall: cmpl $(IA32_NR_syscalls),%eax jae ia32_badsys
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ ia32_tracesys: SAVE_REST movq $-ENOSYS,RAX(%rsp) /* really needed? */ movq %rsp,%rdi /* &pt_regs -> arg1 */ - call syscall_trace + call syscall_trace_enter LOAD_ARGS ARGOFFSET /* reload args from stack in case ptrace changed it */ RESTORE_REST jmp ia32_do_syscall
arch/x86_64/kernel/entry.S +11 -10
@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork) CFI_DEFAULT_STACK call schedule_tail GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx) - bt $TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE,threadinfo_flags(%rcx) - jc rff_trace + testl $_TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A,threadinfo_flags(%rcx) + jnz rff_trace rff_action: RESTORE_REST testl $3,CS-ARGOFFSET(%rsp) # from kernel_thread?
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ rff_action: jmp ret_from_sys_call rff_trace: movq %rsp,%rdi - call syscall_trace + call syscall_trace_leave GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx) jmp rff_action CFI_ENDPROC
@@ -185,8 +185,8 @@ ENTRY(system_call) movq %rax,ORIG_RAX-ARGOFFSET(%rsp) movq %rcx,RIP-ARGOFFSET(%rsp) GET_THREAD_INFO(%rcx) - bt $TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE,threadinfo_flags(%rcx) - jc tracesys + testl $_TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A,threadinfo_flags(%rcx) + jnz tracesys cmpq $__NR_syscall_max,%rax ja badsys movq %r10,%rcx
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ tracesys: movq $-ENOSYS,RAX(%rsp) FIXUP_TOP_OF_STACK %rdi movq %rsp,%rdi - call syscall_trace + call syscall_trace_enter LOAD_ARGS ARGOFFSET /* reload args from stack in case ptrace changed it */ RESTORE_REST cmpq $__NR_syscall_max,%rax
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ tracesys: movq %rax,RAX-ARGOFFSET(%rsp) 1: SAVE_REST movq %rsp,%rdi - call syscall_trace + call syscall_trace_leave RESTORE_TOP_OF_STACK %rbx RESTORE_REST jmp ret_from_sys_call
@@ -297,13 +297,14 @@ int_very_careful: sti SAVE_REST /* Check for syscall exit trace */ - bt $TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE,%edx - jnc int_signal + testl $_TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A,%edx + jz int_signal pushq %rdi leaq 8(%rsp),%rdi # &ptregs -> arg1 - call syscall_trace + call syscall_trace_leave popq %rdi btr $TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE,%edi + btr $TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT,%edi jmp int_restore_rest int_signal:
arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c +22 -1
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@#include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/user.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -486,7 +487,7 @@ out:return ret; } -asmlinkage void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs) +static void syscall_trace (struct pt_regs *regs) {#if 0
@@ -513,3 +514,23 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace(struct pt_ current->exit_code =0 ; } } + +asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) +audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->orig_rax, regs->rdi); + +if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) + && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED )) +syscall_trace (regs); +} + +asmlinkage void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) +audit_syscall_exit (current); + +if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) + && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED )) +syscall_trace (regs); +}
fs/namei.c +13 -2
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@#include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> #include <asm/namei.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -141,10 +142,12 @@ char * getname(const char __user * filen result = tmp;if (retval <0 ) { -putname (tmp); +__putname (tmp); result =ERR_PTR (retval); } } +if (unlikely (current->audit_context) && !IS_ERR (result) && result) +audit_getname (result);return result; }
@@ -860,6 +863,8 @@ walk_init_root(const char *name, struct int fastcall path_lookup(const char *name, unsigned int flags, struct nameidata *nd) { +int retval; + nd->last_type =LAST_ROOT ;/* if there are only slashes... */ nd->flags = flags;
@@ -882,7 +887,13 @@ int fastcall path_lookup(const char *nam }read_unlock (¤t->fs->lock); current->total_link_count =0 ; -return link_path_walk (name, nd); + retval =link_path_walk (name, nd); +if (unlikely (current->audit_context + && nd && nd->dentry && nd->dentry->d_inode)) +audit_inode (name, + nd->dentry->d_inode->i_ino, + nd->dentry->d_inode->i_rdev); +return retval; }/*
include/asm-i386/thread_info.h +4 -1
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *curren#define TIF_NEED_RESCHED 3/* rescheduling necessary */ #define TIF_SINGLESTEP 4/* restore singlestep on return to user mode */ #define TIF_IRET 5/* return with iret */ +#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7/* syscall auditing active */ #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG 16/* true if poll_idle() is polling TIF_NEED_RESCHED */ #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
@@ -141,9 +142,11 @@ static inline struct thread_info *curren#define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP (1<<TIF_SINGLESTEP)#define _TIF_IRET (1<<TIF_IRET) +#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT) +#define _TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)#define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG (1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG) -#define _TIF_WORK_MASK 0x0000FFFE/* work to do on interrupt/exception return */ +#define _TIF_WORK_MASK 0x0000FF7E/* work to do on interrupt/exception return */ #define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK 0x0000FFFF/* work to do on any return to u-space */ /*
include/asm-ppc64/thread_info.h +3 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *curren#define TIF_32BIT 5/* 32 bit binary */ #define TIF_RUN_LIGHT 6/* iSeries run light */ #define TIF_ABI_PENDING 7/* 32/64 bit switch needed */ +#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 8/* syscall auditing active */ /* as above, but as bit values */ #define _TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
@@ -107,6 +108,8 @@ static inline struct thread_info *curren#define _TIF_32BIT (1<<TIF_32BIT)#define _TIF_RUN_LIGHT (1<<TIF_RUN_LIGHT)#define _TIF_ABI_PENDING (1<<TIF_ABI_PENDING) +#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT) +#define _TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)#define _TIF_USER_WORK_MASK (_TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME | _TIF_SIGPENDING | \ _TIF_NEED_RESCHED)
include/asm-x86_64/thread_info.h +4 -1
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ static inline struct thread_info *stack_#define TIF_NEED_RESCHED 3/* rescheduling necessary */ #define TIF_SINGLESTEP 4/* reenable singlestep on user return*/ #define TIF_IRET 5/* force IRET */ +#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7/* syscall auditing active */ #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG 16/* true if poll_idle() is polling TIF_NEED_RESCHED */ #define TIF_IA32 17/* 32bit process */ #define TIF_FORK 18/* ret_from_fork */
@@ -113,12 +114,14 @@ static inline struct thread_info *stack_#define _TIF_SINGLESTEP (1<<TIF_SINGLESTEP)#define _TIF_NEED_RESCHED (1<<TIF_NEED_RESCHED)#define _TIF_IRET (1<<TIF_IRET) +#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1<<TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT) +#define _TIF_SYSCALL_T_OR_A (_TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE|_TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)#define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG (1<<TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)#define _TIF_IA32 (1<<TIF_IA32)#define _TIF_FORK (1<<TIF_FORK)#define _TIF_ABI_PENDING (1<<TIF_ABI_PENDING) -#define _TIF_WORK_MASK 0x0000FFFE/* work to do on interrupt/exception return */ +#define _TIF_WORK_MASK 0x0000FF7E/* work to do on interrupt/exception return */ #define _TIF_ALLWORK_MASK 0x0000FFFF/* work to do on any return to u-space */ #define PREEMPT_ACTIVE 0x4000000
include/linux/audit.h +202 -0
202 lines not on this page · raw message
include/linux/fs.h +13 -1
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include <linux/radix-tree.h> #include <linux/kobject.h> #include <asm/atomic.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> struct iovec ;struct nameidata ;
@@ -1128,7 +1129,18 @@ extern char * getname(const char __userextern void vfs_caches_init (unsigned long );#define __getname () kmem_cache_alloc(names_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL) -#define putname (name) kmem_cache_free(names_cachep, (void *)(name)) +#define __putname (name) kmem_cache_free(names_cachep, (void *)(name)) +#ifndef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL +#define putname (name) __putname(name) +#else +#define putname (name) \ + do { \ + if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) \ + audit_putname(name); \ + else \ + __putname(name); \ + } while (0) +#endif extern int register_blkdev (unsigned int ,const char *);extern int unregister_blkdev (unsigned int ,const char *);
include/linux/netlink.h +1 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#define NETLINK_XFRM 6/* ipsec */ #define NETLINK_SELINUX 7/* SELinux event notifications */ #define NETLINK_ARPD 8 +#define NETLINK_AUDIT 9/* auditing */ #define NETLINK_ROUTE6 11/* af_inet6 route comm channel */ #define NETLINK_IP6_FW 13#define NETLINK_DNRTMSG 14/* DECnet routing messages */
include/linux/sched.h +4 -1
@@ -358,6 +358,8 @@ int set_current_groups(struct group_info ((gi)->blocks[(i)/NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK][(i)%NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK]) +struct audit_context ;/* See audit.c */ +struct task_struct {volatile long state;/* -1 unrunnable, 0 runnable, >0 stopped */ struct thread_info *thread_info;
@@ -467,7 +469,8 @@ struct task_struct {sigset_t *notifier_mask;void *security; - +struct audit_context *audit_context; +/* Thread group tracking */ u32 parent_exec_id;u32 self_exec_id;
init/Kconfig +20 -0
@@ -120,6 +120,26 @@ config SYSCTL building a kernel for install/rescue disks or your system is very limited in memory. +config AUDIT + bool "Auditing support" + default y if SECURITY_SELINUX + default n + help + Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another + kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for + logging of avc messages output). Does not do system-call + auditing without CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL. + +config AUDITSYSCALL + bool "Enable system-call auditing support" + depends on AUDIT && (X86 || PPC64) + default y if SECURITY_SELINUX + default n + help + Enable low-overhead system-call auditing infrastructure that + can be used independently or with another kernel subsystem, + such as SELinux. + config LOG_BUF_SHIFT int "Kernel log buffer size (16 => 64KB, 17 => 128KB)" if DEBUG_KERNEL range 12 20
kernel/audit.c +813 -0
813 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/auditsc.c +869 -0
869 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/fork.c +9 -1
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#include <linux/futex.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/audit.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -85,6 +86,8 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_strucWARN_ON (atomic_read (&tsk->usage));WARN_ON (tsk == current); +if (unlikely (tsk->audit_context)) +audit_free (tsk);security_task_free (tsk);free_uid (tsk->user);put_group_info (tsk->group_info);
@@ -945,13 +948,16 @@ struct task_struct *copy_process(unsigne p->start_time =get_jiffies_64 (); p->security =NULL ; p->io_context =NULL ; + p->audit_context =NULL ; retval = -ENOMEM ;if ((retval =security_task_alloc (p))) goto bad_fork_cleanup; +if ((retval =audit_alloc (p))) + goto bad_fork_cleanup_security;/* copy all the process information */ if ((retval =copy_semundo (clone_flags, p))) - goto bad_fork_cleanup_security; + goto bad_fork_cleanup_audit;if ((retval =copy_files (clone_flags, p))) goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;if ((retval =copy_fs (clone_flags, p)))
@@ -1086,6 +1092,8 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_files:exit_files (p);/* blocking */ bad_fork_cleanup_semundo:exit_sem (p); +bad_fork_cleanup_audit: +audit_free (p); bad_fork_cleanup_security:security_task_free (p); bad_fork_cleanup:
kernel/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) += compat.o obj-$(CONFIG_IKCONFIG) += configs.o obj-$(CONFIG_IKCONFIG_PROC) += configs.o obj-$(CONFIG_STOP_MACHINE) += stop_machine.o +obj-$(CONFIG_AUDIT) += audit.o +obj-$(CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL) += auditsc.o ifneq ($(CONFIG_IA64),y) # According to Alan Modra <[email protected]>, the -fno-omit-frame-pointer is
security/selinux/avc.c +65 -93
321 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/include/avc.h +4 -3
@@ -114,9 +114,10 @@ static inline void avc_cache_stats_add(i/* * AVC display support */ -void avc_dump_av (u16 tclass,u32 av); -void avc_dump_query (u32 ssid,u32 tsid,u16 tclass); -void avc_dump_cache (char *tag); +struct audit_buffer ; +void avc_dump_av (struct audit_buffer *ab,u16 tclass,u32 av); +void avc_dump_query (struct audit_buffer *ab,u32 ssid,u32 tsid,u16 tclass); +void avc_dump_cache (struct audit_buffer *ab,char *tag);/* * AVC operations
security/selinux/ss/services.c +1 -1
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, chachar *scontextp; *scontext_len =strlen (initial_sid_to_string[sid]) +1 ; - scontextp =kmalloc (*scontext_len,GFP_KERNEL ); + scontextp =kmalloc (*scontext_len,GFP_ATOMIC );strcpy (scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]); *scontext = scontextp; goto out;
Quoted 4 lines · Rik Faith
Below is a patch against 2.6.4 that provides a low-overhead system-call auditing framework for Linux that is usable by LSM components (e.g., SELinux). This is an update of the patch discussed in this thread:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=107815888100001&r=1&w=2
Just FYI, I have no objection to the changes in this patch to the SELinux module; we would be glad to have SELinux use this auditing framework if it is accepted into the mainline kernel. I suppose we can separately submit a patch to remove the avc_ratelimit code from the SELinux avc, as that should be handled by the audit framework itself.
Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> National Security Agency
Quoted 4 lines · Rik Faith
Below is a patch against 2.6.4 that provides a low-overhead system-call
auditing framework for Linux that is usable by LSM components (e.g., SELinux).
Thanks Rik.
This is not my area, but based on the earlier discussions, and on RH's intent to distribute and support the code and on its overall footprint and upon Stephen's words I shall proceed with this.
This patch gets non-trivial rejects against x86_64-update.patch, mainly in thread_info.h. Also note that arch/x86_64/ia32/ia32entry.S has gained another usage of TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE. Could you please rework and retest it on top of
ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.4/2.6.4-mm1/broken-out/x86_64-update.patch
Or you can wait a day or so - we should merge the x86_64 patch into Linus's tree later this week.
Quoted 6 lines · Andrew Morton
This patch gets non-trivial rejects against x86_64-update.patch, mainly in
thread_info.h. Also note thatarch/x86_64/ia32/ia32entry.Shas gained another usage ofTIF_SYSCALL_TRACE. Could you please rework and retest it on top offtp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.4/2.6.4-mm1/broken-out/x86_64-update.patch
Please see
http://people.redhat.com/faith/audit/audit-20040311.2217.patch
for an update that applies in the face of x86_64-update.patch. I've tested this on ia32 and x86_64.
Quoted 7 lines · Rik Faith
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Morton
This patch gets non-trivial rejects against x86_64-update.patch, mainly in
thread_info.h. Also note thatarch/x86_64/ia32/ia32entry.Shas gained another usage ofTIF_SYSCALL_TRACE. Could you please rework and retest it on top of
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.4/2.6.4-mm1/broken-out/x86_64-update.patch
Please see
http://people.redhat.com/faith/audit/audit-20040311.2217.patchfor an update that applies in the face of x86_64-update.patch. I've tested this on ia32 and
x86_64.
Please see
http://people.redhat.com/faith/audit/audit-20040312.1006.patch
for an update against 2.6.4-bk1. This includes a bug fix to a bug I recently introduced, so please don't use the .2217 patch. Thanks.
Quoted 3 lines · Andrew Morton
This is not my area, but based on the earlier discussions, and on RH's intent to distribute and support the code and on its overall footprint and upon Stephen's words I shall proceed with this.
Do we know whether this code is a good fit for most people who want audit support?
I would have expected more feedback on this, e.g. from other companies/people/projects who have been working towards similar goals.
- James
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines · Rik Faith
Below is a patch against 2.6.4 that provides a low-overhead system-call auditing framework for Linux that is usable by LSM components (e.g., SELinux). This is an update of the patch discussed in this thread:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?t=107815888100001&r=1&w=2
[ . . . ]
Great application of RCU -- audit rules should not change often, but could be referenced quite frequently!
A couple of comments:
o I don't see any rcu_read_lock() or rcu_read_unlock() calls.
These are needed on the read side in order to (1) let the people reading the code know the extent of the read-side critical section and (2) disable preemption in CONFIG_PREEMPT kernels. Without the former, someone will end up putting a blocking primitive in the wrong place. Without the latter, the kernel will do the dirty work all by itself. Either way, you get breakage.
For example, I suspect that audit_filter_task() needs to read as follows:
static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_entry *e;
enum audit_state state;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_tsklist, list) {
if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return state;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
} Alternatively, you could put the rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock() around the single call to audit_filter_task() from audit_alloc().
All of the list_for_each_.*_rcu() macros need to be enclosed by rcu_read_lock() and rcu_read_unlock() calls.
o Presumably something surrounding netlink_kernel_create()
ensures that only one instance of audit_del_rule() will be executing at a given time. If not, some locking is needed.
Once this locking is present, the list_for_each_entry_rcu() in audit_del_rule() should be changed to list_for_each_entry(), as it cannot race with deletion, since it -is- deletion. The list_del_rcu() is correct, and should remain.
If you are using some sort of implicit locking, then please inject a clue...
o The audit_add_rule() function also needs something to prevent
races with other audit_add_rule() and audit_del_rule() instances. Again, this might be happening somehow in the netlink_kernel_create() mechanism, but I don't immediately see it. Then again, I do not claim to fully understand how the netlink_kernel_create() mechanism functions.
Again, looks like a promising application of RCU!
Thanx, Paul
Quoted 1 line · Paul E. McKenney
o I don't see any
rcu_read_lock()orrcu_read_unlock()calls.
Fixed.
Quoted 4 lines
o Presumably something surrounding
netlink_kernel_create()
ensures that only one instance ofaudit_del_rule()will be executing at a given time. If not, some locking is needed.
I was unable to find anything, so I added a semaphore to the receive routine, and comments to the add and delete routines.
Quoted 3 lines
o The
audit_add_rule()function also needs something to prevent
races with otheraudit_add_rule()andaudit_del_rule()instances.
This is also handled by the semaphore.
Thanks for your comments! This patch is against 2.6.5-rc1-mm1. It also corrects a problem that could trigger a BUG() near boot time.
audit.c | 9 +++++++++ auditsc.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/audit.c +9 -0
@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ static LIST_HEAD(audit_tsklist);static LIST_HEAD (audit_entlist);static LIST_HEAD (audit_extlist); +/* The netlink socket is only to be read by 1 CPU, which lets us assume +* that list additions and deletions never happen simultaneiously in +* auditsc.c */ +static DECLARE_MUTEX (audit_netlink_sem); +/* AUDIT_BUFSIZ is the size of the temporary buffer used for formatting * audit records. Since printk uses a 1024 byte buffer, this buffer * should be at least that large. */
@@ -427,6 +432,9 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sock *s {struct sk_buff *skb; +if (down_trylock (&audit_netlink_sem)) +return ; +/* FIXME: this must not cause starvation */ while ((skb =skb_dequeue (&sk->sk_receive_queue))) {if (audit_receive_skb (skb) && skb->len)
@@ -434,6 +442,7 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sock *selse kfree_skb (skb); } +up (&audit_netlink_sem); }/* Move data from tmp buffer into an skb. This is an extra copy, and
kernel/auditsc.c +29 -9
@@ -158,6 +158,9 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audreturn 0 ; } +/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via +* audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by +* audit_netlink_sem. */ static inline int audit_add_rule (struct audit_entry *entry,struct list_head *list) {
@@ -175,12 +178,17 @@ static void audit_free_rule(void *arg)kfree (arg); } +/* Note that audit_add_rule and audit_del_rule are called via +* audit_receive() in audit.c, and are protected by +* audit_netlink_sem. */ static inline int audit_del_rule (struct audit_rule *rule,struct list_head *list) {struct audit_entry *e; -list_for_each_entry_rcu (e, list, list) { +/* Do not use the _rcu iterator here, since this is the only +* deletion routine. */ +list_for_each_entry (e, list, list) {if (!audit_compare_rule (rule, &e->rule)) {list_del_rcu (&e->list);call_rcu (&e->rcu, audit_free_rule, e);
@@ -223,6 +231,7 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pswitch (type) {case AUDIT_LIST : +rcu_read_lock ();list_for_each_entry_rcu (entry, &audit_tsklist, list)audit_send_reply (pid, seq,AUDIT_LIST ,0 ,1 , &entry->rule,sizeof (entry->rule));
@@ -232,6 +241,7 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int plist_for_each_entry_rcu (entry, &audit_extlist, list)audit_send_reply (pid, seq,AUDIT_LIST ,0 ,1 , &entry->rule,sizeof (entry->rule)); +rcu_read_unlock ();audit_send_reply (pid, seq,AUDIT_LIST ,1 ,1 ,NULL ,0 );break ;case AUDIT_ADD :
@@ -382,10 +392,14 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_tasstruct audit_entry *e;enum audit_state state; +rcu_read_lock ();list_for_each_entry_rcu (e, &audit_tsklist, list) { -if (audit_filter_rules (tsk, &e->rule,NULL , &state)) +if (audit_filter_rules (tsk, &e->rule,NULL , &state)) { +rcu_read_unlock ();return state; + } } +rcu_read_unlock ();return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT ; }
@@ -403,11 +417,15 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_sysint word =AUDIT_WORD (ctx->major);int bit =AUDIT_BIT (ctx->major); +rcu_read_lock ();list_for_each_entry_rcu (e, list, list) {if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit - &&audit_filter_rules (tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) + &&audit_filter_rules (tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) { +rcu_read_unlock ();return state; + } } +rcu_read_unlock ();return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT ; }
@@ -753,8 +771,8 @@ void audit_getname(const char *name)BUG_ON (!context);if (!context->in_syscall) {#if AUDIT_DEBUG ==2 -printk (KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n" , - __LINE__, context->serial, name); +printk (KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n" , + __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);dump_stack ();#endif return ;
@@ -777,8 +795,8 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)BUG_ON (!context);if (!context->in_syscall) {#if AUDIT_DEBUG ==2 -printk (KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n" , - __LINE__, context->serial, name); +printk (KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n" , + __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);if (context->name_count) {int i;for (i =0 ; i < context->name_count; i++)
@@ -793,10 +811,10 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)else { ++context->put_count;if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { -printk (KERN_ERR "audit.c:%d(:%d): major=%d" +printk (KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" " put_count=%d\n" , - __LINE__, + __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, context->put_count);
@@ -813,6 +831,8 @@ void audit_inode(const char *name, unsigint idx;struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; +if (!context->in_syscall) +return ;if (context->name_count && context->names[context->name_count-1 ].name && context->names[context->name_count-1 ].name == name)
Quoted 5 lines · Rik Faith
Quoted 1 line · Paul E. McKenney
o I don't see any
rcu_read_lock()orrcu_read_unlock()calls.Fixed.
Much improved!
Since audit_receive_filter() is only called with audit_netlink_sem held, it cannot race with either audit_del_rule() or audit_add_rule(), so the list_for_each_entry_rcu()s may be replaced by list_for_each_entry()s, and the rcu_read_{un,}lock()s removed.
Not a fatal problem, just a bit of unnecessary overhead.
The others look good!
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
o Presumably something surrounding
netlink_kernel_create()
ensures that only one instance ofaudit_del_rule()will be executing at a given time. If not, some locking is needed.I was unable to find anything, so I added a semaphore to the receive routine, and comments to the add and delete routines.
Looks good!
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
o The
audit_add_rule()function also needs something to prevent
races with otheraudit_add_rule()andaudit_del_rule()instances.This is also handled by the semaphore.
Ditto!
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks for your comments! This patch is against 2.6.5-rc1-mm1. It also corrects a problem that could trigger a
BUG()near boot time.audit.c | 9 +++++++++ auditsc.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Glad to help!
Thanx, Paul
Quoted 7 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 5 lines · Rik Faith
Quoted 1 line · Paul E. McKenney
o I don't see any
rcu_read_lock()orrcu_read_unlock()calls.Fixed.
Quoted 8 lines
Much improved!
Since
audit_receive_filter()is only called withaudit_netlink_semheld, it cannot race with eitheraudit_del_rule()oraudit_add_rule(), so the list_for_each_entry_rcu()s may be replaced by list_for_each_entry()s, and the rcu_read_{un,}lock()s removed.Not a fatal problem, just a bit of unnecessary overhead.
A fix for this is part of the attached patch.
Other features of the attached patch are:
1) generalized the ability to test for inequality
2) added syscall exit status reporting and testing
3) added ability to report and test first 4 syscall arguments (this adds a large amount of flexibility for little cost; not implemented or tested on ppc64)
4) added ability to report and test personality
User-space demo program enhanced for new fields and inequality testing:
http://people.redhat.com/faith/audit/auditd-0.5.tar.gz
This patch is against 2.6.5-rc2, but also applies against 2.6.5-rc2-mm1.
arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 - arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c | 6 + arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c | 11 +- include/linux/audit.h | 19 +++- kernel/auditsc.c | 170 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 5 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)
arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c +3 -2
@@ -528,9 +528,10 @@ void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *reif (unlikely (current->audit_context)) {if (!entryexit)audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->orig_eax, - regs->ebx); + regs->ebx, regs->ecx, + regs->edx, regs->esi);else -audit_syscall_exit (current); +audit_syscall_exit (current, regs->eax); }if (!test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ))
arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c +4 -2
@@ -308,7 +308,9 @@ static void do_syscall_trace(void)void do_syscall_trace_enter (struct pt_regs *regs) {if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) -audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->gpr[0 ], regs->gpr[3 ]); +audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->gpr[0 ], + regs->gpr[3 ], regs->gpr[4 ], + regs->gpr[5 ], regs->gpr[6 ]);if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ))
@@ -318,7 +320,7 @@ void do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_revoid do_syscall_trace_leave (void ) {if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) -audit_syscall_exit (current); +audit_syscall_exit (current,0 );/* FIXME: pass pt_regs */ if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ))
arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c +4 -7
@@ -497,11 +497,6 @@ static void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs current_thread_info()->flags, current->ptrace);#endif -if (!test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE )) -return ; -if (!(current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED )) -return ; -ptrace_notify (SIGTRAP | ((current->ptrace &PT_TRACESYSGOOD ) ?0x80 :0 ));/*
@@ -518,7 +513,9 @@ static void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) {if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) -audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->orig_rax, regs->rdi); +audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->orig_rax, + regs->rdi, regs->rsi, + regs->rdx, regs->r10);if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ))
@@ -528,7 +525,7 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(stru asmlinkage void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs) {if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) -audit_syscall_exit (current); +audit_syscall_exit (current, regs->rax);if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ))
include/linux/audit.h +14 -5
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@#define AUDIT_SGID 7#define AUDIT_FSGID 8#define AUDIT_LOGINUID 9 +#define AUDIT_PERS 10/* These are ONLY useful when checking * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
@@ -73,7 +74,14 @@#define AUDIT_DEVMINOR 101#define AUDIT_INODE 102#define AUDIT_EXIT 103 -#define AUDIT_NOTEXIT 104 +#define AUDIT_SUCCESS 104/* exit >= 0; value ignored */ + +#define AUDIT_ARG0 200 +#define AUDIT_ARG1 (AUDIT_ARG0+1) +#define AUDIT_ARG2 (AUDIT_ARG0+2) +#define AUDIT_ARG3 (AUDIT_ARG0+3) + +#define AUDIT_NEGATE 0x80000000/* Status symbols */
@@ -134,8 +142,9 @@ struct audit_context;extern int audit_alloc (struct task_struct *task);extern void audit_free (struct task_struct *task);extern void audit_syscall_entry (struct task_struct *task, -int major,int minor); -extern void audit_syscall_exit (struct task_struct *task); +int major,unsigned long a0,unsigned long a1, +unsigned long a2,unsigned long a3); +extern void audit_syscall_exit (struct task_struct *task,int return_code);extern void audit_getname (const char *name);extern void audit_putname (const char *name);extern void audit_inode (const char *name,unsigned long ino,dev_t rdev);
@@ -149,8 +158,8 @@ extern int audit_set_loginuid(struct au#else #define audit_alloc (t) ({ 0; })#define audit_free (t) do { ; } while (0) -#define audit_syscall_entry (t,a,b) do { ; } while (0) -#define audit_syscall_exit (t) do { ; } while (0) +#define audit_syscall_entry (t,a,b,c,d,e) do { ; } while (0) +#define audit_syscall_exit (t,r) do { ; } while (0)#define audit_getname (n) do { ; } while (0)#define audit_putname (n) do { ; } while (0)#define audit_inode (n,i,d) do { ; } while (0)
kernel/auditsc.c +101 -69
299 lines not on this page · raw message
Quoted 1 line · Rik Faith
This patch is against 2.6.5-rc2, but also applies against 2.6.5-rc2-mm1.
The patch I posted was against 2.6.5-rc2-mm1 or 2.6.5-rc2+previous-audit-patches. A complete patch that will apply against vanilla 2.6.5-rc2 is available at:
http://people.redhat.com/faith/audit/audit-20040324.0831.patch
Looks good to me from an RCU viewpoint!
Thanx, Paul
Quoted 483 lines · Rik Faith
Quoted 7 lines · Paul E. McKenney
Quoted 5 lines · Rik Faith
Quoted 1 line · Paul E. McKenney
o I don't see any
rcu_read_lock()orrcu_read_unlock()calls.Fixed.
Quoted 8 lines
Much improved!
Since
audit_receive_filter()is only called withaudit_netlink_semheld, it cannot race with eitheraudit_del_rule()oraudit_add_rule(), so the list_for_each_entry_rcu()s may be replaced by list_for_each_entry()s, and the rcu_read_{un,}lock()s removed.Not a fatal problem, just a bit of unnecessary overhead.
A fix for this is part of the attached patch.
Other features of the attached patch are:
1) generalized the ability to test for inequality
2) added syscall exit status reporting and testing
3) added ability to report and test first 4 syscall arguments (this adds a large amount of flexibility for little cost; not implemented or tested on ppc64)
4) added ability to report and test personalityUser-space demo program enhanced for new fields and inequality testing:
http://people.redhat.com/faith/audit/auditd-0.5.tar.gzThis patch is against 2.6.5-rc2, but also applies against 2.6.5-rc2-mm1.
arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c | 5 - arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c | 6 + arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c | 11 +- include/linux/audit.h | 19 +++- kernel/auditsc.c | 170 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 5 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)diff -rupP --exclude-from=ignore
linux-2.6.4-pristine/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.clinux-2.6.4/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.carch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c +3
-2@@ -528,9 +528,10 @@ void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *reif (unlikely (current->audit_context)) {if (!entryexit)audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->orig_eax, - regs->ebx); + regs->ebx, regs->ecx, + regs->edx, regs->esi);else -audit_syscall_exit (current); +audit_syscall_exit (current, regs->eax); }if (!test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ))diff -rupP --exclude-from=ignore
linux-2.6.4-pristine/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.clinux-2.6.4/arch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.carch/ppc64/kernel/ptrace.c +4
-2@@ -308,7 +308,9 @@ static void do_syscall_trace(void)void do_syscall_trace_enter (struct pt_regs *regs) {if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) -audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->gpr[0 ], regs->gpr[3 ]); +audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->gpr[0 ], + regs->gpr[3 ], regs->gpr[4 ], + regs->gpr[5 ], regs->gpr[6 ]);if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ))@@ -318,7 +320,7 @@ void do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_revoid do_syscall_trace_leave (void ) {if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) -audit_syscall_exit (current); +audit_syscall_exit (current,0 );/* FIXME: pass pt_regs */ if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ))diff -rupP --exclude-from=ignore
linux-2.6.4-pristine/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.clinux-2.6.4/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.carch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c +4
-7@@ -497,11 +497,6 @@ static void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs current_thread_info()->flags, current->ptrace);#endif -if (!test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE )) -return ; -if (!(current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED )) -return ; -ptrace_notify (SIGTRAP | ((current->ptrace &PT_TRACESYSGOOD ) ?0x80 :0 ));/* @@ -518,7 +513,9 @@ static void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) {if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) -audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->orig_rax, regs->rdi); +audit_syscall_entry (current, regs->orig_rax, + regs->rdi, regs->rsi, + regs->rdx, regs->r10);if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ))@@ -528,7 +525,7 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(stru asmlinkage void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs) {if (unlikely (current->audit_context)) -audit_syscall_exit (current); +audit_syscall_exit (current, regs->rax);if (test_thread_flag (TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ) && (current->ptrace &PT_PTRACED ))diff -rupP --exclude-from=ignore
linux-2.6.4-pristine/include/linux/audit.hlinux-2.6.4/include/linux/audit.hinclude/linux/audit.h +14
-5@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@#define AUDIT_SGID 7#define AUDIT_FSGID 8#define AUDIT_LOGINUID 9 +#define AUDIT_PERS 10/* These are ONLY useful when checking * at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */ @@ -73,7 +74,14 @@#define AUDIT_DEVMINOR 101#define AUDIT_INODE 102#define AUDIT_EXIT 103 -#define AUDIT_NOTEXIT 104 +#define AUDIT_SUCCESS 104/* exit >= 0; value ignored */ + +#define AUDIT_ARG0 200 +#define AUDIT_ARG1 (AUDIT_ARG0+1) +#define AUDIT_ARG2 (AUDIT_ARG0+2) +#define AUDIT_ARG3 (AUDIT_ARG0+3) + +#define AUDIT_NEGATE 0x80000000/* Status symbols */ @@ -134,8 +142,9 @@ struct audit_context;extern int audit_alloc (struct task_struct *task);extern void audit_free (struct task_struct *task);extern void audit_syscall_entry (struct task_struct *task, -int major,int minor); -extern void audit_syscall_exit (struct task_struct *task); +int major,unsigned long a0,unsigned long a1, +unsigned long a2,unsigned long a3); +extern void audit_syscall_exit (struct task_struct *task,int return_code);extern void audit_getname (const char *name);extern void audit_putname (const char *name);extern void audit_inode (const char *name,unsigned long ino,dev_t rdev);@@ -149,8 +158,8 @@ extern int audit_set_loginuid(struct au#else #define audit_alloc (t) ({ 0; })#define audit_free (t) do { ; } while (0) -#define audit_syscall_entry (t,a,b) do { ; } while (0) -#define audit_syscall_exit (t) do { ; } while (0) +#define audit_syscall_entry (t,a,b,c,d,e) do { ; } while (0) +#define audit_syscall_exit (t,r) do { ; } while (0)#define audit_getname (n) do { ; } while (0)#define audit_putname (n) do { ; } while (0)#define audit_inode (n,i,d) do { ; } while (0)diff -rupP --exclude-from=ignore
linux-2.6.4-pristine/kernel/auditsc.clinux-2.6.4/kernel/auditsc.ckernel/auditsc.c +101
-69@@ -99,7 +99,9 @@ struct audit_context {struct timespec ctime;/* time of syscall entry */ uid_t loginuid;/* login uid (identity) */ int major;/* syscall number */ -int minor;/* function for multiplex syscalls */ +unsigned long argv[4 ];/* syscall arguments */ +int return_valid;/* return code is valid */ +int return_code;/* syscall return code */ int auditable;/* 1 if record should be written */ int name_count;struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES ];@@ -109,6 +111,7 @@ struct audit_context {pid_t pid;uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; +unsigned long personality;#if AUDIT_DEBUG int put_count;@@ -231,17 +234,17 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pswitch (type) {case AUDIT_LIST : -rcu_read_lock (); -list_for_each_entry_rcu (entry, &audit_tsklist, list) +/* The *_rcu iterators not needed here because we are +always called with audit_netlink_sem held. */ +list_for_each_entry (entry, &audit_tsklist, list)audit_send_reply (pid, seq,AUDIT_LIST ,0 ,1 , &entry->rule,sizeof (entry->rule)); -list_for_each_entry_rcu (entry, &audit_entlist, list) +list_for_each_entry (entry, &audit_entlist, list)audit_send_reply (pid, seq,AUDIT_LIST ,0 ,1 , &entry->rule,sizeof (entry->rule)); -list_for_each_entry_rcu (entry, &audit_extlist, list) +list_for_each_entry (entry, &audit_extlist, list)audit_send_reply (pid, seq,AUDIT_LIST ,0 ,1 , &entry->rule,sizeof (entry->rule)); -rcu_read_unlock ();audit_send_reply (pid, seq,AUDIT_LIST ,1 ,1 ,NULL ,0 );break ;case AUDIT_ADD :@@ -286,94 +289,100 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct tas enum audit_state *state) {int i, j; -int found;for (i =0 ; i < rule->field_count; i++) { -u32 value = rule->values[i]; +u32 field = rule->fields[i] & ~AUDIT_NEGATE ; +u32 value = rule->values[i]; +int result =0 ; -switch (rule->fields[i]) { +switch (field) {case AUDIT_PID : -if (tsk->pid != value) -return 0 ; + result = (tsk->pid == value);break ;case AUDIT_UID : -if (tsk->uid != value) -return 0 ; + result = (tsk->uid == value);break ;case AUDIT_EUID : -if (tsk->euid != value) -return 0 ; + result = (tsk->euid == value);break ;case AUDIT_SUID : -if (tsk->suid != value) -return 0 ; + result = (tsk->suid == value);break ;case AUDIT_FSUID : -if (tsk->fsuid != value) -return 0 ; + result = (tsk->fsuid == value);break ;case AUDIT_GID : -if (tsk->gid != value) -return 0 ; + result = (tsk->gid == value);break ;case AUDIT_EGID : -if (tsk->egid != value) -return 0 ; + result = (tsk->egid == value);break ;case AUDIT_SGID : -if (tsk->sgid != value) -return 0 ; + result = (tsk->sgid == value);break ;case AUDIT_FSGID : -if (tsk->fsgid != value) -return 0 ; + result = (tsk->fsgid == value);break ; +case AUDIT_PERS : + result = (tsk->personality == value); +break ; +case AUDIT_EXIT : -if (tsk->exit_code!=value) -return 0 ; +if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) + result = (ctx->return_code == value);break ; -case AUDIT_NOTEXIT : -if (tsk->exit_code==value) -return 0 ; +case AUDIT_SUCCESS : +if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) + result = (ctx->return_code >=0 );break ;case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR : -if (!ctx) -return 0 ; - found =0 ; -for (j =0 ; !found && j < ctx->name_count; j++) { -if (MAJOR (ctx->names[j].rdev) == value) - ++found; +if (ctx) { +for (j =0 ; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { +if (MAJOR (ctx->names[j].rdev)==value) { + ++result; +break ; + } + } } -if (!found) -return 0 ;break ;case AUDIT_DEVMINOR : -if (!ctx) -return 0 ; - found =0 ; -for (j =0 ; !found && j < ctx->name_count; j++) { -if (MINOR (ctx->names[j].rdev) == value) - ++found; +if (ctx) { +for (j =0 ; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { +if (MINOR (ctx->names[j].rdev)==value) { + ++result; +break ; + } + } } -if (!found) -return 0 ;break ;case AUDIT_INODE : -if (!ctx) -return 0 ; - found =0 ; -for (j =0 ; !found && j < ctx->name_count; j++) { -if (ctx->names[j].ino == value) - ++found; +if (ctx) { +for (j =0 ; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { +if (MINOR (ctx->names[j].ino)==value) { + ++result; +break ; + } + } } -if (!found) -return 0 ;break ;case AUDIT_LOGINUID : -if (!ctx || ctx->loginuid != value) -return 0 ; + result =0 ; +if (ctx) + result = (ctx->loginuid == value); +break ; +case AUDIT_ARG0 : +case AUDIT_ARG1 : +case AUDIT_ARG2 : +case AUDIT_ARG3 : +if (ctx) + result = (ctx->argv[field-AUDIT_ARG0 ]==value);break ; } + +if (rule->fields[i] &AUDIT_NEGATE ) + result = !result; +if (!result) +return 0 ; }switch (rule->action) {case AUDIT_NEVER : *state =AUDIT_DISABLED ;break ;@@ -430,12 +439,17 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_sys }/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */ -static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context (struct task_struct *tsk) +static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context (struct task_struct *tsk, +int return_valid, +int return_code) {struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;if (likely (!context))return NULL ; + context->return_valid = return_valid; + context->return_code = return_code; +if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) {enum audit_state state; state =audit_filter_syscall (tsk, context, &audit_extlist);@@ -452,6 +466,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audi context->egid = tsk->egid; context->sgid = tsk->sgid; context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid; + context->personality = tsk->personality; tsk->audit_context =NULL ;return context; }@@ -565,14 +580,25 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(ststatic void audit_log_exit (struct audit_context *context) {int i; +struct audit_buffer *ab; - audit_log(context, - "syscall=%d,0x%x items=%d" + ab =audit_log_start (context); +if (!ab) +return ;/* audit_panic has been called */ +audit_log_format (ab,"syscall=%d" , context->major); +if (context->personality !=PER_LINUX ) +audit_log_format (ab," per=%lx" , context->personality); +if (context->return_valid) +audit_log_format (ab," exit=%u" , context->return_code); + audit_log_format(ab, + " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" " pid=%d loginuid=%d uid=%d gid=%d" " euid=%d suid=%d fsuid=%d" " egid=%d sgid=%d fsgid=%d", - context->major, - context->minor, + context->argv[0], + context->argv[1], + context->argv[2], + context->argv[3], context->name_count, context->pid, context->loginuid,@@ -580,8 +606,9 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_ context->gid, context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid); +audit_log_end (ab);for (i =0 ; i < context->name_count; i++) { -struct audit_buffer *ab =audit_log_start (context); + ab =audit_log_start (context);if (!ab)continue ;/* audit_panic has been called */ audit_log_format (ab,"item=%d" , i);@@ -608,7 +635,7 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)struct audit_context *context;task_lock (tsk); - context =audit_get_context (tsk); + context =audit_get_context (tsk,0 ,0 );task_unlock (tsk);if (likely (!context))@@ -659,7 +686,9 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_serial(* then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it * be written). */ -void audit_syscall_entry (struct task_struct *tsk,int major,int minor) +void audit_syscall_entry (struct task_struct *tsk,int major, +unsigned long a1,unsigned long a2, +unsigned long a3,unsigned long a4) {struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;enum audit_state state;@@ -712,7 +741,10 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_strreturn ; context->major = major; - context->minor = minor;/* Only valid for some calls */ + context->argv[0 ] = a1; + context->argv[1 ] = a2; + context->argv[2 ] = a3; + context->argv[3 ] = a4; state = context->state;if (state ==AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state ==AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT )@@ -731,13 +763,13 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_str* filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, * free the names stored from getname(). */ -void audit_syscall_exit (struct task_struct *tsk) +void audit_syscall_exit (struct task_struct *tsk,int return_code) {struct audit_context *context;get_task_struct (tsk);task_lock (tsk); - context =audit_get_context (tsk); + context =audit_get_context (tsk,1 , return_code);task_unlock (tsk);/* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have