exec: atomic MAY_EXEC check and SUID/SGID handling
Subsystems (19)
PATCH 1/1 exec: atomic MAY_EXEC check and SUID/SGID handling
There is a time window between permission(MAY_EXEC) check in open_exec() and S_ISUID check plus bprm->e_uid setting in prepare_binprm(). And S_ISUID is checked and bprm->e_uid is copied from the inode without any serialization with attribute updates.
That means that some executable may have permissions
-rwxr-xr-x root disk /bin/file
at the moment of MAY_EXEC check and
-rwsr-x--- root disk /bin/file
at the moment of S_ISUID check, providing lucky users starting /bin/file at the moment of permission change with a setuid-root program.
It's arguable whether it's a big security issue, but certainly such behavior is not what administrators may expect.
I do not like the idea of `chmod 04750' being non-atomic and instructions like
All system administrator should be aware that setting SUID bit on files that are (or used to be) world-executable is dangerous. Instead of
# chgrp disk /bin/file
# chmod 04750 /bin/file
administrators should run
# umask 077
# cp --preserve=timestamps /bin/file /bin/file.new # chgrp disk /bin/file.new
# chmod 04750 /bin/file.new
# mv /bin/file.new /bin/file
Quoted 1 line
From 2 possible solutions:
- take i_sem and call permission() for the second time in prepare_binprm(), causing inode's ->permission() method be called without i_sem in some places and with i_sem in the others, and
- offloading the decisions to the filesystems and returning i_mode, i_uid and i_gid from the place where MAY_EXEC permission is checked
I prefer the second one.
Any opinions?
Andrey
arch/mips/kernel/irixelf.c renamed from arch/mips/kernel/irixelf.c.stabexec +6 -1
@@ -448,7 +448,12 @@ static inline int look_for_irix_interpreif (retval <0 ) goto out; - file =open_exec (*name); +/* +* I don't understand this loop. +* Are we suppose to break the loop after successful open and +* read, or close the file, or store it somewhere? --SAW +*/ + file =open_exec (*name, bprm);if (IS_ERR (file)) { retval =PTR_ERR (file); goto out;
drivers/block/floppy.c renamed from drivers/block/floppy.c.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -3774,7 +3774,7 @@ static int floppy_open(struct inode *ino* Needed so that programs such as fdrawcmd still can work on write * protected disks */ if (filp->f_mode &2 - ||permission (filp->f_dentry->d_inode,2 ,NULL ) ==0 ) + ||permission (filp->f_dentry->d_inode,2 ,NULL ,NULL ) ==0 ) filp->private_data = (void *)8 ;if (UFDCS ->rawcmd ==1 )
fs/cifs/cifsfs.c renamed from fs/cifs/cifsfs.c.stabexec +3 -2
@@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ cifs_statfs(struct super_block *sb, strureturn 0 ;/* always return success? what if volume is no longer available? */ } -static int cifs_permission (struct inode * inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) +static int cifs_permission (struct inode * inode,int mask, +struct nameidata *nd,struct exec_perm *exec_perm) {struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb;
@@ -200,7 +201,7 @@ static int cifs_permission(struct inodeon the client (above and beyond ACL on servers) for servers which do not support setting and viewing mode bits, so allowing client to check permissions is useful */ -return vfs_permission (inode, mask); +return vfs_permission (inode, mask, exec_perm); }static kmem_cache_t *cifs_inode_cachep;
fs/coda/dir.c renamed from fs/coda/dir.c.stabexec +2 -1
@@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ exit: } -int coda_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) +int coda_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *perm) {int error =0 ;
fs/coda/pioctl.c renamed from fs/coda/pioctl.c.stabexec +3 -2
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@/* pioctl ops */ static int coda_ioctl_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask, -struct nameidata *nd); +struct nameidata *nd,struct exec_perm *);static int coda_pioctl (struct inode * inode,struct file * filp,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long user_data);
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ struct file_operations coda_ioctl_operat/* the coda pioctl inode ops */ static int coda_ioctl_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask, -struct nameidata *nd) +struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *exec_perm) {return 0 ; }
fs/ext2/acl.c renamed from fs/ext2/acl.c.stabexec +24 -1
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ ext2_set_acl(struct inode *inode, int ty* inode->i_sem: don't care */ int -ext2_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) +__ext2_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask) {int mode = inode->i_mode;
@@ -336,6 +336,29 @@ check_capabilities:return -EACCES ; } +int +ext2_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *exec_perm) +{ +int ret; + +if (exec_perm !=NULL ) +down (&inode->i_sem); + + ret =__ext2_permission (inode, mask); + +if (exec_perm !=NULL ) { +if (!ret) { + exec_perm->set =1 ; + exec_perm->mode = inode->i_mode; + exec_perm->uid = inode->i_uid; + exec_perm->gid = inode->i_gid; + } +up (&inode->i_sem); + } +return ret; +} +/* * Initialize the ACLs of a new inode. Called from ext2_new_inode. *
fs/ext2/acl.h renamed from fs/ext2/acl.h.stabexec +2 -1
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ static inline int ext2_acl_count(size_t#define EXT2_ACL_NOT_CACHED ((void *)-1)/* acl.c */ -extern int ext2_permission (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *); +extern int ext2_permission (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *, +struct exec_perm *);extern int ext2_acl_chmod (struct inode *);extern int ext2_init_acl (struct inode *,struct inode *);
fs/ext2/xattr_user.c renamed from fs/ext2/xattr_user.c.stabexec +2 -2
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ ext2_xattr_user_get(struct inode *inode,return -EINVAL ;if (!test_opt (inode->i_sb,XATTR_USER ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - error =permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ); + error =permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ,NULL );if (error)return error;
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ ext2_xattr_user_set(struct inode *inode,if ( !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode) && (!S_ISDIR (inode->i_mode) || inode->i_mode &S_ISVTX ))return -EPERM ; - error =permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ); + error =permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ,NULL );if (error)return error;
fs/ext3/acl.c renamed from fs/ext3/acl.c.stabexec +24 -1
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ ext3_set_acl(handle_t *handle, struct in* inode->i_sem: don't care */ int -ext3_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) +__ext3_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) {int mode = inode->i_mode;
@@ -341,6 +341,29 @@ check_capabilities:return -EACCES ; } +int +ext3_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *exec_perm) +{ +int ret; + +if (exec_perm !=NULL ) +down (&inode->i_sem); + + ret =__ext3_permission (inode, mask); + +if (exec_perm !=NULL ) { +if (!ret) { + exec_perm->set =1 ; + exec_perm->mode = inode->i_mode; + exec_perm->uid = inode->i_uid; + exec_perm->gid = inode->i_gid; + } +up (&inode->i_sem); + } +return ret; +} +/* * Initialize the ACLs of a new inode. Called from ext3_new_inode. *
fs/ext3/acl.h renamed from fs/ext3/acl.h.stabexec +2 -1
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ static inline int ext3_acl_count(size_t#define EXT3_ACL_NOT_CACHED ((void *)-1)/* acl.c */ -extern int ext3_permission (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *); +extern int ext3_permission (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *, +struct exec_perm *);extern int ext3_acl_chmod (struct inode *);extern int ext3_init_acl (handle_t *,struct inode *,struct inode *);
fs/ext3/xattr_user.c renamed from fs/ext3/xattr_user.c.stabexec +2 -2
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ ext3_xattr_user_get(struct inode *inode,return -EINVAL ;if (!test_opt (inode->i_sb,XATTR_USER ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - error =permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ); + error =permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ,NULL );if (error)return error;
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ ext3_xattr_user_set(struct inode *inode,if ( !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode) && (!S_ISDIR (inode->i_mode) || inode->i_mode &S_ISVTX ))return -EPERM ; - error =permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ); + error =permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ,NULL );if (error)return error;
fs/hfs/inode.c renamed from fs/hfs/inode.c.stabexec +2 -2
@@ -512,11 +512,11 @@ void hfs_clear_inode(struct inode *inode }static int hfs_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask, -struct nameidata *nd) +struct nameidata *nd,struct exec_perm *exec_perm) {if (S_ISREG (inode->i_mode) && mask &MAY_EXEC )return 0 ; -return vfs_permission (inode, mask); +return vfs_permission (inode, mask,NULL ); }static int hfs_file_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *file)
fs/hfsplus/inode.c renamed from fs/hfsplus/inode.c.stabexec +6 -2
@@ -252,15 +252,19 @@ static void hfsplus_set_perms(struct ino perms->dev =cpu_to_be32 (HFSPLUS_I (inode).dev); } -static int hfsplus_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) +static int hfsplus_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask, +struct nameidata *nd,struct exec_perm *exec_perm) {/* MAY_EXEC is also used for lookup, if no x bit is set allow lookup, * open_exec has the same test, so it's still not executable, if a x bit * is set fall back to standard permission check. +* +* The comment above and the check below don't make much sense +* with S_ISREG condition... --SAW */ if (S_ISREG (inode->i_mode) && mask &MAY_EXEC && !(inode->i_mode &0111 ))return 0 ; -return vfs_permission (inode, mask); +return vfs_permission (inode, mask, exec_perm); }
fs/hostfs/hostfs_kern.c renamed from fs/hostfs/hostfs_kern.c.stabexec +3 -2
@@ -790,7 +790,8 @@ void hostfs_truncate(struct inode *ino)not_implemented (); } -int hostfs_permission (struct inode *ino,int desired,struct nameidata *nd) +int hostfs_permission (struct inode *ino,int desired,struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *exec_perm) {char *name;int r =0 , w =0 , x =0 , err;
@@ -802,7 +803,7 @@ int hostfs_permission(struct inode *ino,if (name ==NULL )return (-ENOMEM ); err =access_file (name, r, w, x);kfree (name); -if (!err) err =vfs_permission (ino, desired); +if (!err) err =vfs_permission (ino, desired, exec_perm);return (err); }
fs/hpfs/namei.c renamed from fs/hpfs/namei.c.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ again:d_drop (dentry);spin_lock (&dentry->d_lock);if (atomic_read (&dentry->d_count) >1 || -permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ) || +permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ,NULL ) || !S_ISREG (inode->i_mode) ||get_write_access (inode)) {spin_unlock (&dentry->d_lock);
fs/jfs/acl.c renamed from fs/jfs/acl.c.stabexec +23 -1
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ out:* * modified vfs_permission to check posix acl */ -int jfs_permission (struct inode * inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) +int __jfs_permission (struct inode * inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) {umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;struct jfs_inode_info *ji =JFS_IP (inode);
@@ -207,6 +207,28 @@ check_capabilities:return -EACCES ; } +int jfs_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *exec_perm) +{ +int ret; + +if (exec_perm !=NULL ) +down (&inode->i_sem); + + ret =__jfs_permission (inode, mask); + +if (exec_perm !=NULL ) { +if (!ret) { + exec_perm->set =1 ; + exec_perm->mode = inode->i_mode; + exec_perm->uid = inode->i_uid; + exec_perm->gid = inode->i_gid; + } +up (&inode->i_sem); + } +return ret; +} +int jfs_init_acl (struct inode *inode,struct inode *dir) {struct posix_acl *acl =NULL ;
fs/jfs/jfs_acl.h renamed from fs/jfs/jfs_acl.h.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@#include <linux/xattr_acl.h> -int jfs_permission (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *); +int jfs_permission (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *,struct exec_perm *);int jfs_init_acl (struct inode *,struct inode *);int jfs_setattr (struct dentry *,struct iattr *);
fs/jfs/xattr.c renamed from fs/jfs/xattr.c.stabexec +2 -2
@@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ static int can_set_xattr(struct inode *i (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || inode->i_mode &S_ISVTX)) return -EPERM; -return permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ); +return permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ,NULL ); } int __jfs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value,
@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ static int can_get_xattr(struct inode *i {if (strncmp (name,XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX ,XATTR_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN ) ==0 )return 0 ; -return permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ); +return permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ,NULL ); } ssize_t __jfs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *data,
fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c renamed from fs/ncpfs/ioctl.c.stabexec +11 -11
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ ncp_get_fs_info(struct ncp_server* serve {struct ncp_fs_info info; -if ((permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ) !=0 ) +if ((permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {return -EACCES ; }
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ ncp_get_fs_info_v2(struct ncp_server* se {struct ncp_fs_info_v2 info2; -if ((permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ) !=0 ) +if ((permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {return -EACCES ; }
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ int ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, strucswitch (cmd) {case NCP_IOC_NCPREQUEST : -if ((permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ) !=0 ) +if ((permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {return -EACCES ; }
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ int ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struc {unsigned long tmp = server->m.mounted_uid; -if ( (permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ) !=0 ) +if ( (permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {return -EACCES ;
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ int ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struc {struct ncp_setroot_ioctl sr; -if ( (permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ) !=0 ) +if ( (permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {return -EACCES ;
@@ -341,7 +341,7 @@ int ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struc#ifdef CONFIG_NCPFS_PACKET_SIGNING case NCP_IOC_SIGN_INIT : -if ((permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ) !=0 ) +if ((permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {return -EACCES ;
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ int ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, strucreturn 0 ;case NCP_IOC_SIGN_WANTED : -if ( (permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ) !=0 ) +if ( (permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {return -EACCES ;
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ int ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struc {int newstate; -if ( (permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ) !=0 ) +if ( (permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {return -EACCES ;
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ int ncp_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struc#ifdef CONFIG_NCPFS_IOCTL_LOCKING case NCP_IOC_LOCKUNLOCK : -if ( (permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ) !=0 ) +if ( (permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {return -EACCES ;
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ outrel:#endif /* CONFIG_NCPFS_NLS */ case NCP_IOC_SETDENTRYTTL : -if ((permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ) !=0 ) && +if ((permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid))return -EACCES ; {
@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ outrel:so we have this out of switch */ if (cmd ==NCP_IOC_GETMOUNTUID ) {__kernel_uid_t uid =0 ; -if ((permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ) !=0 ) +if ((permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) && (current->uid != server->m.mounted_uid)) {return -EACCES ; }
fs/nfs/dir.c renamed from fs/nfs/dir.c.stabexec +4 -2
@@ -1541,7 +1541,8 @@ out:return -EACCES ; } -int nfs_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) +int nfs_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *exec_perm) {struct rpc_cred *cred;int mode = inode->i_mode;
@@ -1582,6 +1583,7 @@ int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode,if (!NFS_PROTO (inode)->access) goto out_notsup; +/* Can NFS fill exec_perm atomically? Don't know... --SAW */ cred =rpcauth_lookupcred (NFS_CLIENT (inode)->cl_auth,0 ); res =nfs_do_access (inode, cred, mask);put_rpccred (cred);
@@ -1589,7 +1591,7 @@ int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode,return res; out_notsup:nfs_revalidate_inode (NFS_SERVER (inode), inode); - res =vfs_permission (inode, mask); + res =vfs_permission (inode, mask, exec_perm);unlock_kernel ();return res; }
fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c renamed from fs/nfsd/nfsfh.c.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ int nfsd_acceptable(void *expv, struct d/* make sure parents give x permission to user */ int err; parent =dget_parent (tdentry); - err =permission (parent->d_inode,MAY_EXEC ,NULL ); + err =permission (parent->d_inode,MAY_EXEC ,NULL ,NULL );if (err <0 ) {dput (parent);break ;
fs/nfsd/vfs.c renamed from fs/nfsd/vfs.c.stabexec +3 -2
@@ -1765,12 +1765,13 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_export *exp, inode->i_uid == current->fsuid)return 0 ; - err =permission (inode, acc & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC ),NULL ); + err =permission (inode, acc & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC ), +NULL ,NULL );/* Allow read access to binaries even when mode 111 */ if (err == -EACCES &&S_ISREG (inode->i_mode) && acc == (MAY_READ |MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE )) - err =permission (inode,MAY_EXEC ,NULL ); + err =permission (inode,MAY_EXEC ,NULL ,NULL );return err?nfserrno (err) :0 ; }
fs/proc/base.c renamed from fs/proc/base.c.stabexec +3 -2
@@ -469,9 +469,10 @@ out: goto exit; } -static int proc_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) +static int proc_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *exec_perm) { -if (vfs_permission (inode, mask) !=0 ) +if (vfs_permission (inode, mask, exec_perm) !=0 )return -EACCES ;return proc_check_root (inode); }
fs/reiserfs/xattr.c renamed from fs/reiserfs/xattr.c.stabexec +19 -2
@@ -1436,9 +1436,26 @@ check_capabilities: }int -reiserfs_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) +reiserfs_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *exec_perm) { -return __reiserfs_permission (inode, mask, nd,1 ); +int ret; + +if (exec_perm !=NULL ) +down (&inode->i_sem); + + ret =__reiserfs_permission (inode, mask, nd,1 ); + +if (exec_perm !=NULL ) { +if (!ret) { + exec_perm->set =1 ; + exec_perm->mode = inode->i_mode; + exec_perm->uid = inode->i_uid; + exec_perm->gid = inode->i_gid; + } +up (&inode->i_sem); + } +return ret; }int
fs/smbfs/file.c renamed from fs/smbfs/file.c.stabexec +2 -1
@@ -387,7 +387,8 @@ smb_file_release(struct inode *inode, st* privileges, so we need our own check for this. */ static int -smb_file_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd) +smb_file_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *exec_perm) {int mode = inode->i_mode;int error =0 ;
fs/udf/file.c renamed from fs/udf/file.c.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ int udf_ioctl(struct inode *inode, struc {int result = -EINVAL ; -if (permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ) !=0 ) +if (permission (inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ,NULL ) !=0 ) {udf_debug ("no permission to access inode %lu\n" , inode->i_ino);
fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c renamed from fs/xfs/linux-2.6/xfs_iops.c.stabexec +2 -1
@@ -468,7 +468,8 @@ STATIC intlinvfs_permission ( struct inode *inode, int mode, - struct nameidata *nd) + struct nameidata *nd, + struct exec_perm *exec_perm) { vnode_t *vp = LINVFS_GET_VP(inode);int error;
fs/exec.c renamed from fs/exec.c.stabexec +28 -17
102 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/namei.c renamed from fs/namei.c.stabexec +32 -10
97 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/namespace.c renamed from fs/namespace.c.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -515,7 +515,7 @@ static int mount_is_safe(struct nameidatif (current->uid != nd->dentry->d_inode->i_uid) return -EPERM; } -if (permission (nd->dentry->d_inode,MAY_WRITE , nd)) +if (permission (nd->dentry->d_inode,MAY_WRITE , nd,NULL ))return -EPERM ;return 0 ;#endif
fs/open.c renamed from fs/open.c.stabexec +7 -7
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static inline long do_sys_truncate(constif (!S_ISREG (inode->i_mode)) goto dput_and_out; - error =permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,&nd); + error =permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,&nd,NULL );if (error) goto dput_and_out;
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_utime(char __user * goto dput_and_out;if (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid && - (error =permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,&nd)) !=0 ) + (error =permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,&nd,NULL )) !=0 ) goto dput_and_out; }down (&inode->i_sem);
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ long do_utimes(char __user * filename, s goto dput_and_out;if (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid && - (error =permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,&nd)) !=0 ) + (error =permission (inode,MAY_WRITE ,&nd,NULL )) !=0 ) goto dput_and_out; }down (&inode->i_sem);
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_access(const char __ res =__user_walk (filename,LOOKUP_FOLLOW |LOOKUP_ACCESS , &nd);if (!res) { - res =permission (nd.dentry->d_inode, mode, &nd); + res =permission (nd.dentry->d_inode, mode, &nd,NULL );/* SuS v2 requires we report a read only fs too */ if (!res && (mode &S_IWOTH ) &&IS_RDONLY (nd.dentry->d_inode) && !special_file (nd.dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chdir(const char __uif (error) goto out; - error =permission (nd.dentry->d_inode,MAY_EXEC ,&nd); + error =permission (nd.dentry->d_inode,MAY_EXEC ,&nd,NULL );if (error) goto dput_and_out;
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fchdir(unsigned intif (!S_ISDIR (inode->i_mode)) goto out_putf; - error =permission (inode,MAY_EXEC ,NULL ); + error =permission (inode,MAY_EXEC ,NULL ,NULL );if (!error)set_fs_pwd (current->fs, mnt, dentry); out_putf:
@@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_chroot(const char __if (error) goto out; - error =permission (nd.dentry->d_inode,MAY_EXEC ,&nd); + error =permission (nd.dentry->d_inode,MAY_EXEC ,&nd,NULL );if (error) goto dput_and_out;
fs/binfmt_misc.c renamed from fs/binfmt_misc.c.stabexec +3 -2
@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux/* if the binary is not readable than enforce mm->dumpable=0 regardless of the interpreter's permissions */ -if (permission (bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode,MAY_READ ,NULL )) +if (permission (bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode,MAY_READ , +NULL ,NULL )) bprm->interp_flags |=BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP ;allow_write_access (bprm->file);
@@ -179,7 +180,7 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux bprm->interp = iname;/* for binfmt_script */ - interp_file =open_exec (iname); + interp_file =open_exec (iname, bprm); retval =PTR_ERR (interp_file);if (IS_ERR (interp_file)) goto _error;
fs/binfmt_elf.c renamed from fs/binfmt_elf.c.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_*/ SET_PERSONALITY (elf_ex, ibcs2_interpreter); - interpreter =open_exec (elf_interpreter); + interpreter =open_exec (elf_interpreter,NULL ); retval =PTR_ERR (interpreter);if (IS_ERR (interpreter)) goto out_free_interp;
fs/binfmt_em86.c renamed from fs/binfmt_em86.c.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static int load_em86(struct linux_binprm* Note that we use open_exec() as the name is now in kernel * space, and we don't need to copy it. */ - file =open_exec (interp); + file =open_exec (interp, bprm);if (IS_ERR (file))return PTR_ERR (file);
fs/binfmt_flat.c renamed from fs/binfmt_flat.c.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static int load_flat_shared_library(int/* Open the file up */ bprm.filename = buf; - bprm.file =open_exec (bprm.filename); + bprm.file =open_exec (bprm.filename, &bprm); res =PTR_ERR (bprm.file);if (IS_ERR (bprm.file))return res;
fs/binfmt_script.c renamed from fs/binfmt_script.c.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static int load_script(struct linux_binp/* * OK, now restart the process with the interpreter's dentry. */ - file =open_exec (interp); + file =open_exec (interp, bprm);if (IS_ERR (file))return PTR_ERR (file);
fs/compat.c renamed from fs/compat.c.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -1369,7 +1369,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,int retval;int i; - file =open_exec (filename); + file =open_exec (filename, &bprm); retval =PTR_ERR (file);if (IS_ERR (file))
include/linux/fs.h renamed from include/linux/fs.h.stabexec +13 -4
@@ -538,6 +538,12 @@ static inline unsigned imajor(struct inoextern struct block_device *I_BDEV (struct inode *inode); +struct exec_perm { +umode_t mode; +uid_t uid, gid; +int set; +}; +struct fown_struct {rwlock_t lock;/* protects pid, uid, euid fields */ int pid;/* pid or -pgrp where SIGIO should be sent */
@@ -929,7 +935,8 @@ struct inode_operations {int (*follow_link) (struct dentry *,struct nameidata *);void (*put_link) (struct dentry *,struct nameidata *);void (*truncate) (struct inode *); -int (*permission) (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *); +int (*permission) (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *, +struct exec_perm *);int (*setattr) (struct dentry *,struct iattr *);int (*getattr) (struct vfsmount *mnt,struct dentry *,struct kstat *);int (*setxattr) (struct dentry *,const char *,const void *,size_t ,int );
@@ -1335,8 +1342,9 @@ extern int do_remount_sb(struct super_blextern sector_t bmap (struct inode *,sector_t );extern int setattr_mask (unsigned int );extern int notify_change (struct dentry *,struct iattr *); -extern int permission (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *); -extern int vfs_permission (struct inode *,int ); +extern int permission (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *, +struct exec_perm *); +extern int vfs_permission (struct inode *,int ,struct exec_perm *);extern int get_write_access (struct inode *);extern int deny_write_access (struct file *);static inline void put_write_access (struct inode * inode)
@@ -1353,8 +1361,9 @@ extern int do_pipe(int *);extern int open_namei (const char *,int ,int ,struct nameidata *);extern int may_open (struct nameidata *,int ,int ); +struct linux_binprm ;extern int kernel_read (struct file *,unsigned long ,char *,unsigned long ); -extern struct file *open_exec (const char *); +extern struct file *open_exec (const char *,struct linux_binprm *);/* fs/dcache.c -- generic fs support functions */ extern int is_subdir (struct dentry *,struct dentry *);
include/linux/binfmts.h renamed from include/linux/binfmts.h.stabexec +2 -0
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@#define _LINUX_BINFMTS_H#include <linux/capability.h> +#include <linux/fs.h> struct pt_regs ;
@@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ struct linux_binprm{int sh_bang;struct file * file;int e_uid, e_gid; +struct exec_perm perm;kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective;void *security;int argc, envc;
include/linux/coda_linux.h renamed from include/linux/coda_linux.h.stabexec +2 -1
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ extern struct file_operations coda_ioctlint coda_open (struct inode *i,struct file *f);int coda_flush (struct file *f);int coda_release (struct inode *i,struct file *f); -int coda_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd); +int coda_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *exec_perm);int coda_revalidate_inode (struct dentry *);int coda_getattr (struct vfsmount *,struct dentry *,struct kstat *);int coda_setattr (struct dentry *,struct iattr *);
include/linux/nfs_fs.h renamed from include/linux/nfs_fs.h.stabexec +2 -1
@@ -290,7 +290,8 @@ extern struct inode *nfs_fhget(struct su struct nfs_fattr *);extern int nfs_refresh_inode (struct inode *,struct nfs_fattr *);extern int nfs_getattr (struct vfsmount *,struct dentry *,struct kstat *); -extern int nfs_permission (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *); +extern int nfs_permission (struct inode *,int ,struct nameidata *, +struct exec_perm *);extern int nfs_access_get_cached (struct inode *,struct rpc_cred *,struct nfs_access_entry *);extern void nfs_access_add_cache (struct inode *,struct nfs_access_entry *);extern int nfs_open (struct inode *,struct file *);
include/linux/reiserfs_xattr.h renamed from include/linux/reiserfs_xattr.h.stabexec +2 -1
@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ int reiserfs_removexattr (struct dentryint reiserfs_delete_xattrs (struct inode *inode);int reiserfs_chown_xattrs (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attrs);int reiserfs_xattr_init (struct super_block *sb,int mount_flags); -int reiserfs_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd); +int reiserfs_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd, +struct exec_perm *exec_perm);int reiserfs_permission_locked (struct inode *inode,int mask,struct nameidata *nd);int reiserfs_xattr_del (struct inode *,const char *);
ipc/mqueue.c renamed from ipc/mqueue.c.stabexec +2 -1
@@ -631,7 +631,8 @@ static int oflag2acc[O_ACCMODE] = { MAY_if ((oflag &O_ACCMODE ) == (O_RDWR |O_WRONLY ))return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); -if (permission (dentry->d_inode, oflag2acc[oflag &O_ACCMODE ],NULL )) +if (permission (dentry->d_inode, oflag2acc[oflag &O_ACCMODE ], +NULL ,NULL ))return ERR_PTR (-EACCES ); filp =dentry_open (dentry, mqueue_mnt, oflag);
net/unix/af_unix.c renamed from net/unix/af_unix.c.stabexec +1 -1
@@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_other(stru err =path_lookup (sunname->sun_path,LOOKUP_FOLLOW , &nd);if (err) goto fail; - err =permission (nd.dentry->d_inode,MAY_WRITE , &nd); + err =permission (nd.dentry->d_inode,MAY_WRITE , &nd,NULL );if (err) goto put_fail;
Quoted 12 lines · * Andrey Savochkin ([email protected]) wrote:
There is a time window between
permission(MAY_EXEC)check inopen_exec()andS_ISUIDcheck plusbprm->e_uidsetting inprepare_binprm(). AndS_ISUIDis checked andbprm->e_uidis copied from the inode without any serialization with attribute updates.That means that some executable may have permissions
-rwxr-xr-x root disk/bin/file
at the moment ofMAY_EXECcheck and
-rwsr-x--- root disk/bin/file
at the moment ofS_ISUIDcheck, providing lucky users starting/bin/fileat the moment of permission change with a setuid-root program.
Quoted 2 lines
It's arguable whether it's a big security issue, but certainly such behavior is not what administrators may expect.
If you can find a way for a user to exploit this it's an issue. Looks like it's not, and doesn't warrant such a big change as your patch. The fact that you introduce a new field and then almost always supply it with NULL is a clue that it's not the right direction IMO. Something simple (as you mentioned) that grabs i_sem and rechecks during suid setup in binprm_prepare is sufficient. Worth it? Guess I'm not convinced.
thanks,
-chris
Signature · 1 line
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
Quoted 13 lines · Chris Wright
Quoted 12 lines · * Andrey Savochkin ([email protected]) wrote:
There is a time window between
permission(MAY_EXEC)check inopen_exec()andS_ISUIDcheck plusbprm->e_uidsetting inprepare_binprm(). AndS_ISUIDis checked andbprm->e_uidis copied from the inode without any serialization with attribute updates.That means that some executable may have permissions
-rwxr-xr-x root disk/bin/file
at the moment ofMAY_EXECcheck and
-rwsr-x--- root disk/bin/file
at the moment ofS_ISUIDcheck, providing lucky users starting/bin/fileat the moment of permission change with a setuid-root program.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
It's arguable whether it's a big security issue, but certainly such behavior is not what administrators may expect.
If you can find a way for a user to exploit this it's an issue. Looks
Exploiting it requires waiting for the administrator to change file permissions... May be, some social engineering.
But THERE IS a race, which may result in user having more permissions than he is expected to have.
I'm not comfortable living with such a race.
Instead of
inode->i_mode = attr->ia_mode; we can write inode_setattr() as inode->i_mode |= 06777; inode->i_mode &= attr->ia_mode;
Will it be easily exploitable? I guess, no.
Will I be comfortable if the code is vulnerable in this way? No.
Quoted 6 lines
like it's not, and doesn't warrant such a big change as your patch. The fact that you introduce a new field and then almost always supply it with NULL is a clue that it's not the right direction IMO. Something simple (as you mentioned) that grabs
i_semand rechecks during suid setup inbinprm_prepareis sufficient. Worth it? Guess I'm not convinced.
I explained my arguments against re-checking permissions:
- the locking convention where ->permission() method may be called with or without i_sem doesn't look suberb;
- it's better to avoid calling permission() with the same arguments for the second time, especially if it does something complicated in security_inode_permission(), with ACLs or in case of a remote filesystem.
Andrey