PATCH: setuid core dump take 2
Subsystems (8)
This fixes the /proc problems that were pointed out in the original. I've left the values numeric since I think the code actually reads better in that form, but thats open for debate.
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +20 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ - shmmax [ sysv ipc ] - shmmni - stop-a [ SPARC only ] +- suid_dumpable - sysrq ==> Documentation/sysrq.txt - tainted - threads-max
@@ -300,6 +301,25 @@ ============================================================== +suid_dumpable: + +This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid +or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are + +0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed + privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped +1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is + owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is + intended for system debugging situations only. +2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally not be dumped is dumped + readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove + such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons + core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or + other files. This mode is appropriate when adminstrators are + attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. + +============================================================== + tainted: Non-zero if the kernel has been tainted. Numeric values, which
fs/exec.c +22 -4
@@ -56,6 +56,8 @@int core_uses_pid;char core_pattern[65 ] ="core" ; +int suid_dumpable =0 ; +/* The maximal length of core_pattern is also specified in sysctl.c */ static struct linux_binfmt *formats;
@@ -843,6 +845,9 @@if (current->euid == current->uid && current->egid == current->gid) current->mm->dumpable =1 ; +else + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable; + name = bprm->filename;for (i=0 ; (ch = *(name++)) !='\0' ;) {if (ch =='/' )
@@ -859,7 +864,7 @@if (bprm->e_uid != current->euid || bprm->e_gid != current->egid ||permission (bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode,MAY_READ ,NULL ) || (bprm->interp_flags &BINPRM_FLAGS_ENFORCE_NONDUMP )) - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;/* An exec changes our domain. We are no longer part of the thread group */
@@ -1158,7 +1163,6 @@ retval =search_binary_handler (&bprm,regs);if (retval >=0 ) {free_arg_pages (&bprm); -/* execve success */ security_bprm_free (&bprm);return retval;
@@ -1374,7 +1378,9 @@struct inode * inode;struct file * file;int retval =0 ; - +int fsuid = current->fsuid; +int flag =0 ; + binfmt = current->binfmt;if (!binfmt || !binfmt->core_dump) goto fail;
@@ -1383,6 +1389,17 @@up_write (&mm->mmap_sem); goto fail; } + +/* +* We cannot trust fsuid as being the "true" uid of the +* process nor do we know its entire history. We only know it +* was tainted so we dump it as root in mode 2. +*/ +if (mm->dumpable ==2 )/* Setuid core dump mode */ + { + flag =O_EXCL ;/* Stop rewrite attacks */ + current->fsuid =0 ;/* Dump root private */ + } mm->dumpable =0 ;init_completion (&mm->core_done); current->signal->group_exit =1 ;
@@ -1399,7 +1416,7 @@lock_kernel ();format_corename (corename, core_pattern, signr);unlock_kernel (); - file =filp_open (corename,O_CREAT |2 |O_NOFOLLOW |O_LARGEFILE ,0600 ); + file =filp_open (corename,O_CREAT |2 |O_NOFOLLOW |O_LARGEFILE | flag,0600 );if (IS_ERR (file)) goto fail_unlock; inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
@@ -1423,6 +1440,7 @@ close_fail:filp_close (file,NULL ); fail_unlock: + current->fsuid = fsuid;complete_all (&mm->core_done); fail:return retval;
fs/proc/base.c +4 -2
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ (current->gid != task->gid)) && !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) goto out;rmb (); -if (!task->mm->dumpable && !capable (CAP_SYS_PTRACE )) +if (task->mm->dumpable !=1 && !capable (CAP_SYS_PTRACE )) goto out;if (security_ptrace (current, task)) goto out;
@@ -929,7 +929,9 @@if (mm) dumpable = mm->dumpable;task_unlock (task); -return dumpable; +if (dumpable ==1 ) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; }
include/linux/binfmts.h +2 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@extern int search_binary_handler (struct linux_binprm *,struct pt_regs *);extern int flush_old_exec (struct linux_binprm * bprm); +extern int suid_dumpable; +/* Stack area protections */ #define EXSTACK_DEFAULT 0/* Whatever the arch defaults to */ #define EXSTACK_DISABLE_X 1/* Disable executable stacks */
include/linux/sched.h +1 -1
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@unsigned long saved_auxv[42 ];/* for /proc/PID/auxv */ - unsigned dumpable:1; + unsigned dumpable:2;cpumask_t cpu_vm_mask;/* Architecture-specific MM context */
include/linux/sysctl.h +1 -0
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@KERN_SPARC_SCONS_PWROFF =64 ,/* int: serial console power-off halt */ KERN_HZ_TIMER =65 ,/* int: hz timer on or off */ KERN_UNKNOWN_NMI_PANIC =66 ,/* int: unknown nmi panic flag */ + KERN_SETUID_DUMPABLE=67, /* int: behaviour of dumps for setuid core */ };
kernel/sys.c +11 -11
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ }if (new_egid != old_egid) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;wmb (); } if (rgid != (gid_t) -1 ||
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ {if (old_egid != gid) { - current->mm->dumpable=0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;wmb (); } current->gid = current->egid = current->sgid = current->fsgid = gid;
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ {if (old_egid != gid) { - current->mm->dumpable=0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;wmb (); } current->egid = current->fsgid = gid;
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@if (dumpclear) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;wmb (); } current->uid = new_ruid;
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@if (new_euid != old_euid) { - current->mm->dumpable=0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;wmb (); } current->fsuid = current->euid = new_euid;
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@if (old_euid != uid) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;wmb (); } current->fsuid = current->euid = uid;
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@if (euid != (uid_t) -1 ) {if (euid != current->euid) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;wmb (); } current->euid = euid;
@@ -853,7 +853,7 @@if (egid != (gid_t) -1 ) {if (egid != current->egid) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;wmb (); } current->egid = egid;
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ {if (uid != old_fsuid) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;wmb (); } current->fsuid = uid;
@@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ {if (gid != old_fsgid) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;wmb (); } current->fsgid = gid;
@@ -1681,7 +1681,7 @@ error =1 ;break ;case PR_SET_DUMPABLE : -if (arg2 !=0 && arg2 !=1 ) { +if (arg2 <0 || arg2 >2 ) { error = -EINVAL ;break ; }
kernel/sysctl.c +9 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@extern int max_threads;extern int sysrq_enabled;extern int core_uses_pid; +extern int suid_dumpable;extern char core_pattern[];extern int cad_pid;extern int pid_max;
@@ -619,6 +620,14 @@ .proc_handler = &proc_unknown_nmi_panic, },#endif + { + .ctl_name = KERN_SETUID_DUMPABLE, + .procname = "suid_dumpable", + .data = &suid_dumpable, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0644, + .proc_handler = &proc_dointvec, + }, { .ctl_name = 0 } };
security/commoncap.c +1 -1
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid || !cap_issubset (new_permitted, current->cap_permitted)) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;if (unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP ) {if (!capable (CAP_SETUID )) {
security/dummy.c +1 -1
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@static void dummy_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm,int unsafe) {if (bprm->e_uid != current->uid || bprm->e_gid != current->gid) { - current->mm->dumpable =0 ; + current->mm->dumpable = suid_dumpable;if ((unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP ) && !capable (CAP_SETUID )) { bprm->e_uid = current->uid;