UDP recvmsg blocks after select(), 2.6 bug?
This has probably been said before, but just in case I missed it; there are many viewpoints in this thread, but the two main camps appear to be arguing at cross-purposes.
As far as I can see:
- YES, Linux select 'lies' and violates POSIX wrt checksums:
a call to recvmsg() might well have blocked when select() said data was ready, as a result of a currupt UDP packet;
- NO, 'fixing' select() won't guarantee that recvmsg() will not block/return EAGAIN, because select() only guarantees that a call to recvmsg() would not have blocked at that time - as others have observed, it cannot guarantee that 'valid' data won't subsequently be discarded; any subsequent call to recvmsg() is only 'immediate' in a fuzzy, imprecise and inadequate sense.
Can we get back to arguing about something less repetitive (or at least, make the circle larger and more scenic)?
John.
On Sun, Oct 17, 2004 at 07:22:44PM +0200, Lars Marowsky-Bree wrote
Quoted 60 lines · Buddy Lucas
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
The SuV spec is actually quite detailed about the options here:
A descriptor shall be considered ready for reading when a call to an input function with
O_NONBLOCKclear would not block, whether or not the function would transfer data successfully. (The function might return data, an end-of-file indication, or an error other than one indicating that it is blocked, and in each of these cases the descriptor shall be considered ready for reading.)But it says nowhere that the select()/recvmsg() operation is atomic, right?
See, Buddy, the point here is that Linux _does_ violate the specification. You can try weaseling out of it, but it's not going to work.
This isn't per se the same as saying that it's not a sensible violation, but very clearly the specs disagree with the current Linux behaviour.
It's impossible to claim that you are allowed by the spec to block on a recvmsg directly following a successful select. You are not. You could claim that, but you'd be wrong.
If the packet has been dropped in between, which _could_ have happened because UDP is allowed to be dropped basically anywhere, EIO may be returned. But blocking or returning EAGAIN/EWOULDBLOCK is verboten. The spec is very clearly on that.
(Now I'd claim that returning EIO after a succesful select is also slightly suboptimal - the performance optimizations should be turned off for blocking sockets, IMHO, and the data which caused the
select()to return should be considered comitted - but it would be allowed.)I'm not so sure what's so hard to accept about that. It may be well that Linux is following the de-facto industry standard (or even setting it) here, and I'd agree that if you don't want blocking use
O_NONBLOCK, but in no way can Linux claim POSIX/SuV spec compliance for this behaviour.I'm not getting why people argue so much to try and weasel the words so that it comes out as compliant. It's not. It may make sense due to practical reasons, but it's not compliant.
Sincerely,
Lars Marowsky-Br�e <[email protected]>Signature · 12 lines
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Quoted 14 lines · John Pearson
As far as I can see:
- YES, Linux select 'lies' and violates POSIX wrt checksums:
a call torecvmsg()might well have blocked whenselect()said data was ready, as a result of a currupt UDP packet;- NO, 'fixing'
select()won't guarantee thatrecvmsg()will not block/return EAGAIN, becauseselect()only guarantees that a call torecvmsg()would not have blocked at that time - as others have observed, it cannot guarantee that 'valid' data won't subsequently be discarded; any subsequent call torecvmsg()is only 'immediate' in a fuzzy, imprecise and inadequate sense.
Quoted 2 lines
Can we get back to arguing about something less repetitive (or at least, make the circle larger and more scenic)?
I would put a third point on the list; the behaviour makes the failure case for a lot of broken apps much more likely, and easy to trigger remotely.
In the interest of making things more "scenic", let's have a few more broken apps:
glibc RPC - so portmap, statd, ...
It seems there's a common idiom in most of the broken programs. Programmers assume that they can take a collection of library functions that do blocking IO, and then multiplex them by sticking a select on the front to choose when to call them. Given the wording of the POSIX standard, it could be naively read to endorse this idiom - it says a socket is readable if it won't block to read. glibc RPC does this; the underlying functions all assume blocking fds, and it then sticks a select on the front. This occurs again in inetd, again in syslog, again in net-snmp, and those are just the ones I see on my desktop machine. You can easily patch the kernel to have it report them all (just remember to disable syslog first, as it is one of the culprits).
Sure they are all broken, but now they are all exposed to bad UDP checksums. Perhaps the people who benefit from the time saved by this micro-optimisation would care to use the time saved to fix glibc?