Question about /dev/mem and /dev/kmem
I was looking at some articles about rootkits on monolithic kernels, and had a thought. Would a kernel config option to disable write access to /dev/mem and /dev/kmem be a workable idea?
I know it'll kill X (unless you're using the framebuffer X server), but would there be any other big problems? SELinux has a finer-grained control over those files, but also involves a bit of administrative and system overhead.
I see this as an option that could be used in routers, web servers, firewalls and other systems that have a greater risk of exposure to rootkits. Granted, it only makes sense with a monolithic kernel, but most people nowadays would only use monolithic kernels for security reasons. You could also put a couple of printk()'s in to raise alarms if someone does try to open the device file for writing.
Am I speaking ex rectum? Granted, I'm kinda new to this, but I can't see any reason not to offer the choice to someone compiling a kernel - and I think it could be done with a minimum of code bloat.
I offer this to the firing range ;)
Jim
Quoted 1 line · Jim Nelson
I was looking at some articles about rootkits on monolithic kernels, and had a thought. Would a kernel config option to disable write > access to
/dev/memand/dev/kmembe a workable idea?
Yes, its a workable idea, and in fact, has already been implemented in grsecurity.
Quoted 3 lines · Jim Nelson
I was looking at some articles about rootkits on monolithic kernels, and had a thought. Would a kernel config option to disable write access to
/dev/memand/dev/kmembe a workable idea?
look at the -mm patch series ;-)
(fwiw this patch is also in the Fedora Core kernels for quite some time now)
Quoted 3 lines · Previously Jim Nelson
I was looking at some articles about rootkits on monolithic kernels, and had a thought. Would a kernel config option to disable write access to
/dev/memand/dev/kmembe a workable idea?
Yes, but not a very useful one since it is an incomplete solution. You can easily do something better using /proc/kernel/cap-bound (like writing 0xFFFCFFFF into it).
Wichert.
Signature · 2 lines
Wichert Akkerman <[email protected]> It is simple to make things. http://www.wiggy.net/ It is hard to make things simple.
Quoted 7 lines · Wichert Akkerman
Quoted 1 line · Previously Jim Nelson
I was looking at some articles about rootkits on monolithic kernels, and had a thought. Would a kernel config option to disable write access to
/dev/memand/dev/kmembe a workable idea?Yes, but not a very useful one since it is an incomplete solution. You can easily do something better using
/proc/kernel/cap-bound
Isn't that /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound?
Quoted 2 lines
(like writing
0xFFFCFFFFinto it).
And what stops an attacker who's already gained root from doing a "cat "0" > /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound" ?
Quoted 2 lines
Wichert.
Quoted 1 line · Previously Jim Nelson
Isn't that
/proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound?
yes, it is.
Quoted 2 lines
And what stops an attacker who's already gained root from doing a "cat "0"
Quoted 1 line
/proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound" ?
The fact that you are not allowed to change the cap-bound settings with that specific bitmask.
Wichert.
Signature · 2 lines
Wichert Akkerman <[email protected]> It is simple to make things. http://www.wiggy.net/ It is hard to make things simple.
Quoted 2 lines · Jim Nelson
And what stops an attacker who's already gained root from doing a "cat "0" >
/proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound" ?
If they already had root you've already lost.
An SELinux policy would probably be a lot more useful because you also want to block ioperm/iopl