propolice support for linux
Subsystems (3)
Hi,
The propolice gcc-extension prevents buffer-overflows in binaries:
http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/
The effect is that all buffer-overflow exploits are turned into a -- logged -- Denial of service.
And since most of the security-flaws in linux are buffer-overflows I would like to request that a patch based on this one is applied to the kernel so people can use this extension by default.
Note: The propolice-patch for gcc-3.3.2 also applies fine to
gcc-3.3.5
Note: glibc from CVS already supports propolice.
Note: OpenBSD is fully compiled with propolice.
http://frogger974.homelinux.org/propolice/linux-2.6.3-ssp-config-1.patch
Makefile +4 -0
@@ -442,6 +442,10 @@ CFLAGS += -fomit-frame-pointer endif +ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SSP +CFLAGS += -fstack-protector +endif + ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO CFLAGS += -g endif
include/linux/kernel.h +4 -0
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@#define TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD (1<<3)extern void dump_stack (void ); +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SSP +extern int __guard; +extern void __stack_smash_handler (int ,char []); +#endif #ifdef DEBUG #define pr_debug(fmt,arg...) \
Files linux-2.6.3/lib/.propolice.c.swp and linux-2.6.3.ssp/lib/.propolice.c.swp differ
lib/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_INFLATE) += zlib_inflate/ obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_DEFLATE) += zlib_deflate/ +obj-$(CONFIG_HARDENED_SSP) += propolice.o + host-progs := gen_crc32table clean-files := crc32table.h
lib/propolice.c +15 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/errno.h> + +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOVERS (__guard); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOVERS (__stack_smash_handler); + +int __guard ='\0\0\n\777' ; + +void +__stack_smash_handler (int damaged,char func[]) +{ +static char *message ="propolice detects %x at function %s.\n" ; +panic (message, damaged, func); +} +
security/Kconfig +6 -0
@@ -46,5 +46,11 @@ source security/selinux/Kconfig +config HARDENED_SSP + bool 'Hardened ProPolice SSP build support' + help + This enables kernel building with stack-smashing protection + via the -fstack-protector GCC flag. + endmenu
# Han
Makefile
Quoted 2 lines
Makefile +0
-0
2.6.3 is from stoneage..
Makefile line 447
Quoted 3 lines
Makefile +3
-0+ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SSP +CFLAGS += -fstack-protector +endif
What about just CONFIG_PROPOLICY? The hardnedefoo naming is so childish (or gentooish, in the end it's the same anyway..)
include/linux/kernel.h line 121
Quoted 11 lines
diff -urN
linux-2.6.3/include/linux/kernel.hlinux-2.6.3.ssp/include/linux/kernel.hinclude/linux/kernel.h +4
-0@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@#define TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD (1<<3)extern void dump_stack (void ); +#ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_SSP +extern int __guard; +extern void __stack_smash_handler (int ,char []); +#endif
What do you need these prototypes for, they're not used at all. Also no need to put ifdefs around them.
lib/propolice.c line 2
Quoted 6 lines
diff -urN
linux-2.6.3/lib/propolice.clinux-2.6.3.ssp/lib/propolice.clib/propolice.c +2
-0@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/errno.h>
What do you need errno for?
lib/propolice.c line 14
Quoted 13 lines
lib/propolice.c +12
-0+ +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOVERS (__guard); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOVERS (__stack_smash_handler); + +int __guard ='\0\0\n\777' ; + +void +__stack_smash_handler (int damaged,char func[]) +{ +static char *message ="propolice detects %x at function %s.\n" ; +panic (message, damaged, func); +}
ah, it seems you need them because you put the exports before the delaration. This file should probably look more like:
/*
* Insert Copyright here.
*
* Insert small description here.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
int __guard = '\0\0\n\777';EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOVERS(__guard);
static const char message[] = "propolice detects %x at function %s.\n";
void __stack_smash_handler(int damaged, char func[])
{
panic(message, damaged, func);
}EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOVERS(__stack_smash_handler);
Quoted 2 lines
EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOVERS(__guard);
_NOVERS is dead btw
Thanks for your comments! This wasn't my patch, just the closed thing to something working I could find. Here is my version.
Now all I wonder about is what the _NOVERS should become, since Arjen pointed it it `was dead,' since I don't really understand what he means with that.
Perhaps I should also add some additional comment about how little effect this extension resorts on kernel-level.
And I got two warnings about `int __guard = '\0\0\n\777';'
lib/propolice.c:15:15: warning: octal escape sequence out of range lib/propolice.c:15:15: warning: multi-character character constant
lib/propolice.c renamed from lib/propolice.c.orig +24 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* +* Copyright 2005, Han Boetes <[email protected]> +* +* This code adds support for the propolice stacksmashing +* extension for gcc. +* http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/ +* +* This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public +* License, Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details. +* +*/ +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> + +int __guard ='\0\0\n\777' ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOVERS (__guard); + +static const char message[] ="propolice detects %x at function %s.\n" ; + +void __stack_smash_handler (int damaged,char func[]) +{ +panic (message, damaged, func); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_NOVERS (__stack_smash_handler);
lib/Makefile renamed from lib/Makefile.orig +2 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP) += iomap.o obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_INFLATE) += zlib_inflate/ obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_DEFLATE) += zlib_deflate/ +obj-$(CONFIG_PROPOLICE) += propolice.o + hostprogs-y := gen_crc32table clean-files := crc32table.h
security/Kconfig renamed from security/Kconfig.orig +12 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config PROPOLICE + bool 'GCC ProPolice SSP build support' + help + This enables kernel building with stack-smashing protection + via the -fstack-protector GCC flag, if you have GCC build with + propolice. + + See <http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/> for + more information about this compiler-extension. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + source security/selinux/Kconfig endmenu
Makefile renamed from Makefile.orig +4 -0
@@ -490,6 +490,10 @@ ifndef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER CFLAGS += -fomit-frame-pointer endif +ifdef CONFIG_PROPOLICE +CFLAGS += -fstack-protector +endif + ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO CFLAGS += -g endif
# Han
Quoted 2 lines · Han Boetes
Thanks for your comments! This wasn't my patch, just the closed thing to something working I could find. Here is my version.
you haven't commented on the "why is this useful for the kernel" question I asked, can you point out a single kernel buffer overflow ??
(I know userspace has them; I'm asking you specifically about kernel space since you provide a patch useful for kernel space only)
Quoted 2 lines · Arjan van de Ven
you haven't commented on the "why is this useful for the kernel" question I asked,
You didn't ask this question, and I did comment.
Quoted 1 line
can you point out a single kernel buffer overflow ??
Let's ask Edsger Dijkstra :-)
``Program testing can be used to show the presence of bugs, but
never to show their absence! -- Edsger Dijkstra, [1972]''
I get your point though, but since it can't do any harm let us paranoid freaks have a proper patch at the least.
Quoted 3 lines
(I know userspace has them; I'm asking you specifically about kernel space since you provide a patch useful for kernel space only)
Well I suggest it here as well:
http://forums.mozillazine.org/viewtopic.php?t=199891
But got zero replies. Could you be so kind to point out to these people it's a good idea?
# Han
Quoted 6 lines
Well I suggest it here as well:
http://forums.mozillazine.org/viewtopic.php?t=199891But got zero replies. Could you be so kind to point out to these people it's a good idea?
there are other alternatives to PP that don't require code changes; for example Jakub wrote a patch for gcc4 and 3.4 that has the effect of detecting buffer overflows but that
1) Does not require code changes in userspace (only CFLAGS)
2) is supposedly better in line with the gcc architecture (but I'm not a gcc export to judge that)
Before people say "NIH NIH NIH" I have to say this: Propolice is a great piece of work. But if it's architecture is not suitable for gcc mainline (especially with the SSA changes in gcc4) then it's most likely not going anywhere (as a way of "proof": PP is around for a long time, but it still hasn't made gcc mainline, I don't even know if it has been submitted for that even). The functionality of detecting buffer overflows is useful, and Jakubs patch addresses that functionality as well, but in a way that is more in line with the gcc design. (It's actually quite cool stuff, current rawhide is getting compiled with it for example and working quite nicely there)
Quoted 7 lines · Han Boetes
Thanks for your comments! This wasn't my patch, just the closed thing to something working I could find. Here is my version.
Now all I wonder about is what the
_NOVERSshould become, since Arjen pointed it it `was dead,' since I don't really understand what he means with that.
Quoted 7 lines
Perhaps I should also add some additional comment about how little effect this extension resorts on kernel-level.
And I got two warnings about `int
__guard= '\0\0\n\777';'
lib/propolice.c:15:15: warning: octal escape sequence out of rangelib/propolice.c:15:15: warning: multi-character character constant
Unless you foresee a port of Linux to some 36 bit hardware (like MULTICS) with nine bit bytes, is there a reason not to us \377? I have used 36 (and 48) bit hardware, but I don't expect it to ever get a Linux port.
Signature · 3 lines
-bill davidsen ([email protected]) "The secret to procrastination is to put things off until the last possible moment - but no longer" -me
Quoted 10 lines · Bill Davidsen
Quoted 4 lines · Han Boetes
And I got two warnings about `int
__guard= '\0\0\n\777';'
lib/propolice.c:15:15: warning: octal escape sequence out of rangelib/propolice.c:15:15: warning: multi-character character constantUnless you foresee a port of Linux to some 36 bit hardware (like MULTICS) with nine bit bytes, is there a reason not to us \377? I have used 36 (and 48) bit hardware, but I don't expect it to ever get a Linux port.
Could you please refrain from using rhetorical questions, since they really obscure what you are trying explain and only appear to intend to embarrass me.
If I understand right what you just said I would suggest you would have say something like: ``This should most likely be \377. \777 is intended for 36 bit hardware.''
# Han
Quoted 7 lines · Han Boetes
Thanks for your comments! This wasn't my patch, just the closed thing to something working I could find. Here is my version.
Now all I wonder about is what the
_NOVERSshould become, since Arjen pointed it it `was dead,' since I don't really understand what he means with that.
Just use the normal EXPORT_SYMBOL it has the same effect.
Quoted 6 lines · Zwane Mwaikambo
Quoted 3 lines · Han Boetes
Now all I wonder about is what the
_NOVERSshould become, since Arjen pointed it it `was dead,' since I don't really understand what he means with that.Just use the normal
EXPORT_SYMBOLit has the same effect.
Thank you, much appreciated.
Here is the latest version of the patch:
lib/propolice.c renamed from lib/propolice.c.orig +24 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +/* +* Copyright 2005, Han Boetes <[email protected]> +* +* This code adds support for the propolice stacksmashing +* extension for gcc. +* http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/ +* +* This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public +* License, Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details. +* +*/ +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> + +int __guard ='\0\0\n\377' ; +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__guard); + +static const char message[] ="propolice detects %x at function %s.\n" ; + +void __stack_smash_handler (int damaged,char func[]) +{ +panic (message, damaged, func); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__stack_smash_handler);
lib/Makefile renamed from lib/Makefile.orig +2 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP) += iomap.o obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_INFLATE) += zlib_inflate/ obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_DEFLATE) += zlib_deflate/ +obj-$(CONFIG_PROPOLICE) += propolice.o + hostprogs-y := gen_crc32table clean-files := crc32table.h
security/Kconfig renamed from security/Kconfig.orig +12 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config PROPOLICE + bool 'GCC ProPolice SSP build support' + help + This enables kernel building with stack-smashing protection + via the -fstack-protector GCC flag, if you have GCC build with + propolice. + + See <http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/> for + more information about this compiler-extension. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + source security/selinux/Kconfig endmenu
Makefile renamed from Makefile.orig +4 -0
@@ -490,6 +490,10 @@ ifndef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER CFLAGS += -fomit-frame-pointer endif +ifdef CONFIG_PROPOLICE +CFLAGS += -fstack-protector +endif + ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO CFLAGS += -g endif
# Han
Quoted 3 lines · Han Boetes
And I got two warnings about `int
__guard= '\0\0\n\777';'
lib/propolice.c:15:15: warning: octal escape sequence out of range
Yeah, I have no idea what '\777' is supposed to be - that's 9 bits wide.
Quoted 1 line
lib/propolice.c:15:15: warning: multi-character character constant
Since the __guard symbol isn't used directly by C code it doesn't matter what type it is, right? You should be able to just say something like:
unsigned char __guard[sizeof(int)] = { '\0', '\0', '\n', (unsighed char) -1 };
Or maybe you want those in the opposite order for endianness.. not sure. Having the '\0' first in memory makes the most sense to me but I haven't thought about it much.
lib/propolice.c line 20
Quoted 3 lines
lib/propolice.c renamed from lib/propolice.c.orig +3
-0+static const char message[] ="propolice detects %x at function %s.\n" ; + +void __stack_smash_handler (int damaged,char func[])
1. "damaged" should be "unsigned int"; it's used with a "%x" format specifier
2. "func" should probably be "const char *func"
3. Why is message[] defined instead of just using it directly in the call to panic like panic("blah blah...", ...) Maybe I'm missing something subtle there.
-Mitch
Thanks for your excellent comments. However unimportant this patch is for kernel-security at least lets make it an exercise in decent coding :-)
lib/Makefile renamed from lib/Makefile.orig +2 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP) += iomap.o obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_INFLATE) += zlib_inflate/ obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_DEFLATE) += zlib_deflate/ +obj-$(CONFIG_PROPOLICE) += propolice.o + hostprogs-y := gen_crc32table clean-files := crc32table.h
security/Kconfig renamed from security/Kconfig.orig +12 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config PROPOLICE + bool 'GCC ProPolice SSP build support' + help + This enables kernel building with stack-smashing protection + via the -fstack-protector GCC flag, if you have GCC build with + propolice. + + See <http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/> for + more information about this compiler-extension. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + source security/selinux/Kconfig endmenu
Makefile renamed from Makefile.orig +4 -0
@@ -490,6 +490,10 @@ ifndef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER CFLAGS += -fomit-frame-pointer endif +ifdef CONFIG_PROPOLICE +CFLAGS += -fstack-protector +endif + ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO CFLAGS += -g endif
lib/propolice.c renamed from lib/propolice.c.orig +22 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* +* Copyright 2005, Han Boetes <[email protected]> +* +* This code adds support for the propolice stacksmashing +* extension for gcc. +* http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/ +* +* This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public +* License, Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details. +* +*/ +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> + +unsigned char __guard[sizeof (int )] = {'\0' ,'\0' ,'\n' , (unsigned char )-1 }; +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__guard); + +void __stack_smash_handler (unsigned int damaged,const char *func) +{ +panic ("propolice detects %x at function %s.\n" , damaged, func); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__stack_smash_handler);
# Han
Last nitpicks, I swear:
Quoted 1 line · Han Boetes
+
panic("propolice detects %x at function %s.\n", damaged, func);
You don't need the "\n" at the end - panic() already includes a newline Most panic() messages don't seem to have punctuation either so you can probably lose the "." too.
Also it's nice to use "0x%X" to print hex numbers so they don't ever get misinterpreted as decimals.
-Mitch
Quoted 1 line · Mitchell Blank Jr
Last nitpicks, I swear:
*g* Would we have created the perfect code ;-)
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line · Han Boetes
+
panic("propolice detects %x at function %s.\n", damaged, func);You don't need the "\n" at the end -
panic()already includes a newline Mostpanic()messages don't seem to have punctuation either so you can probably lose the "." too.Also it's nice to use "0x%X" to print hex numbers so they don't ever get misinterpreted as decimals.
Ok, here goes the final version, dear mailinglist-archive-delver. I hope you found this version and didn't stop looking at the first hit you found on google. Do read the whole thread, there are some very knowledgeable people giving their opinion.
lib/Makefile renamed from lib/Makefile.orig +2 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP) += iomap.o obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_INFLATE) += zlib_inflate/ obj-$(CONFIG_ZLIB_DEFLATE) += zlib_deflate/ +obj-$(CONFIG_PROPOLICE) += propolice.o + hostprogs-y := gen_crc32table clean-files := crc32table.h
security/Kconfig renamed from security/Kconfig.orig +12 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config PROPOLICE + bool 'GCC ProPolice SSP build support' + help + This enables kernel building with stack-smashing protection + via the -fstack-protector GCC flag, if you have GCC build with + propolice. + + See <http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/> for + more information about this compiler-extension. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + source security/selinux/Kconfig endmenu
Makefile renamed from Makefile.orig +4 -0
@@ -490,6 +490,10 @@ ifndef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER CFLAGS += -fomit-frame-pointer endif +ifdef CONFIG_PROPOLICE +CFLAGS += -fstack-protector +endif + ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO CFLAGS += -g endif
lib/propolice.c renamed from lib/propolice.c.orig +22 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/* +* Copyright 2005, Han Boetes <[email protected]> +* +* This code adds support for the propolice stacksmashing +* extension for gcc. +* http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/ +* +* This source code is licensed under the GNU General Public +* License, Version 2. See the file COPYING for more details. +* +*/ +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> + +unsigned char __guard[sizeof (int )] = {'\0' ,'\0' ,'\n' , (unsigned char )-1 }; +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__guard); + +void __stack_smash_handler (unsigned int damaged,const char *func) +{ +panic ("propolice detects 0x%X at function %s" , damaged, func); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__stack_smash_handler);
# Han
Quoted 4 lines · Han Boetes
And since most of the security-flaws in linux are buffer-overflows I would like to request that a patch based on this one is applied to the kernel so people can use this extension by default.
I'm sorry but I disagree with this. Most of the security flaws in the kernel are NOT buffer overflows. Almost none are! (and that is because in the linux kernel you are very much stack constrained and can't put large-ish buffers on the stack).
Userland.. that's a different matter.
Propolice is one of the options there, there are others too. But for the kernel, buffer overflows are really rare (esp ones that propolice and other tools can catch).
Quoted 8 lines · Han Boetes
Hi,
The propolice gcc-extension prevents buffer-overflows in binaries:
http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/
The effect is that all buffer-overflow exploits are turned into a -- logged -- Denial of service.
This is little bit too strong.
The effect is that it detects some stack buffer-overflow exploits.
Jakub
Quoted 3 lines · Han Boetes
And since most of the security-flaws in linux are buffer-overflows I would like to request that a patch based on this one is applied to the kernel so people can use this extension by default.
Not in the linux kernel. If you followed the last security issues none of them involved a overrun stack buffer. In fact I can only remember one stack buffer overflow at all in the kernel long ago.
-Andi
Aside from all the arguments about why this patch isn't good for the kernel, everybody should be aware that the ProPolice gcc patches are pretty unusable. They rely in recognizing certain tree patterns which for some architectures do not exist, and for others can look differently, depending on the optimization. To paraphrase one of the gcc developers: "this kind of functionality should be written to work _with_ gcc, not _against_ it as the propolice patch does".
Before you suggest using something like this patch you better first inform yourself by asking the people who actually know the code which is modified.
Quoted 9 lines · Ulrich Drepper
Aside from all the arguments about why this patch isn't good for the kernel, everybody should be aware that the ProPolice gcc patches are pretty unusable. They rely in recognizing certain tree patterns which for some architectures do not exist, and for others can look differently, depending on the optimization. To paraphrase one of the gcc developers: "this kind of functionality should be written to work _with_ gcc, not _against_ it as the propolice patch does".
Quoted 3 lines
Before you suggest using something like this patch you better first inform yourself by asking the people who actually know the code which is modified.
Ok I have a problem here. You are Ulrich Drepper and you are _the_ maintainer of glibc and I am Han Boetes and I am a C noob. It's like Kasparov trying to explain something to a club-chess-player.
I'm afraid that whatever explanation you give to me is over my head, you'll feel like talking to a dummy and I'll be terribly unsatisfied.
To avoid that I would like to ask you if you can show me some example-code, something I which can compile and run and see for myself, for the following situations:
1) Where an application compiled with PP is working worse or even failing where it would work right without PP.
2) Where a bufferoverflow can be exploited even though the application is compiled with PP.
As an example where PP does work right the test-code provided by the propolice maintainer:
/* test-propolice.c */
#define OVERFLOW "This is longer than 10 bytes"
#include <string.h>
int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
char buffer[10];
strcpy(buffer, OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}# Han
Hi,
Quoted 2 lines · Han Boetes
1) Where an application compiled with PP is working worse or even failing where it would work right without PP.
No idea on this one, I never tried PP, although I know how it basically works since I worked on a similar concept in 97 of last century (but I didn't have the skills to touch the compiler and still don't).
Quoted 2 lines
2) Where a bufferoverflow can be exploited even though the application is compiled with PP.
1) any broken function of this kind :
int create_temp_dir(struct task *t, char *dir) {
int err;
int can_unlink;
char dirname[MAXPATHLEN];
can_unlink = (task->euid == 0); strncpy(dirname, dir, MAXPATHLEN); strcat(dirname, "/tmp"); dirname[MAXPATHLEN] = '\0';
if (err = mkdir(dirname, 0755)) {
if (can_unlink) {
unlink(dirname);
err = mkdir(dirname, 0755);
} }
return err;
}
Get it ? Just pass any name of MAXPATHLEN length, and get any existing file removed and replace with an empty directory. Useful for hosts.deny, /var/log/messages, init scripts, etc...
2) all heap overflows (but not in kernel AFAIK).
I think you have a misconception about what a buffer overflow is. First, propolice will be usable only against some *stack* overflows (which I agree are the most common in userspace). But regular buffer overflows like above, which can be triggered either in the stack on in the data space, are not stopped. And heap overflows such as the double free bug in zlib will not be prevented by propolice either.
Quoted 12 lines
As an example where PP does work right the test-code provided by the propolice maintainer:
/* test-propolice.c */ #define OVERFLOW "This is longer than 10 bytes" #include <string.h> int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { char buffer[10]; strcpy(buffer, OVERFLOW); return 0; }
This is kind, but this is also the easiest buggy program to write. The one we all use when trying to write shell code. But this is far away from real life, there often are other constraints.
Like others, I think that PP is close to useless in the kernel, but since the patch is little and does not break anything, why not include it to let people try it and return feedback ?
Regards,
Willy
Quoted 3 lines · Han Boetes
To avoid that I would like to ask you if you can show me some example-code, something I which can compile and run and see for myself, for the following situations:
The analysis of the patch does not stem from trying programs and seeing them failing. The gcc maintainers looked at it with understanding of the compiler and the way the patch interacts with the existing code. It might be possible for them to come up with a program which is miscompiled. More importantly, though, it'll most probably be possible to come up with code which should be instrumented but isn't. You must agree that this is a terrible thing to happen. The patch gives a wrong sense of security.
Finally, the gcc patch is not going to work as is on architectures like IA-64 which do not have the kind of adressing modes which are needed for the code to work.
To fully understand the problem, you need to understand compiler design, and especially RTL. The latter by itself is another problem:
getting the code work in gcc 4 is at least challenging due the SSA.
Anyway, if you want more information you'll need to ask the gcc people.
On 14 Jan 2005, Ulrich Drepper yowled:
Quoted 3 lines
Finally, the gcc patch is not going to work as is on architectures like IA-64 which do not have the kind of adressing modes which are needed for the code to work.
Nor does it work on SPARC-like processors (it tries, but the resulting programs dump core).
Quoted 3 lines
To fully understand the problem, you need to understand compiler design, and especially RTL. The latter by itself is another problem:
getting the code work in gcc 4 is at least challenging due the SSA.
Probably a rewrite (using trees instead of RTL) would be easier; preferably by someone who actually documents what the patch is doing and submits it in a fashion acceptable to the GCC people; i.e. not in a single huge nearly-unexplained lump followed by all queries going unanswered.
Working directly on trees would have the advantage that it would work on every platform GCC supports straight away (or at least it would have a higher chance of doing so).
Signature · 2 lines
`Blish is clearly in love with language. Unfortunately, language dislikes him intensely.' --- Russ Allbery