netlink check sender
Subsystems (3)
cover netlink check sender
The following patches are for comment. They introduce a new callback to enable netlink messages to be validated in the sender's context, and then convert a couple kernel netlink receivers to use this callback. This eliminates the need to copy the sender's effective capabilities into the netlink control buffer. It also allows the audit system to manage the loginuid in the kernel without adding more fields to netlink_skb_parms or requiring special case netlink code. I think this would obsolete the security_netlink_recv hook, and simplify the security_netlink_send hook.
Currently I've only hooked the unicast messages, because I didn't think any of the kernel netlink input functions would be processing broadcast messages (perhaps I missed something).
I didn't move the logic that simply ignores messages (e.g. type < RTM_BASE), but I did move the logic that looks for invalid messages (e.g. type > RTM_MAX) to the check_sender callback.
Thoughts?
thanks,
-chris
Signature · 1 line
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
RFC PATCH 1/3 netlink check sender
* Add check_sender callback to struct netlink_opt.
* Add netlink_kernel_create_check() to register that callback, and turn netlink_kernel_create() into a simple wrapper around that.
* Invoke callback when set to verify sender in sender's context.
===== net/netlink/af_netlink.c 1.69 vs edited =====
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +17 -5
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct netlink_optstruct netlink_callback *cb;spinlock_t cb_lock;void (*data_ready)(struct sock *sk,int bytes); +int (*check_sender)(struct sk_buff *skb); };#define nlk_sk (__sk) ((struct netlink_opt *)(__sk)->sk_protinfo)
@@ -636,9 +637,17 @@ int netlink_attachskb(struct sock *sk, sint netlink_sendskb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,int protocol) {struct netlink_opt *nlk; -int len = skb->len; - +int err, len = skb->len; + nlk =nlk_sk (sk); + +printk ("%s: %s(%d) send_check %p\n" , __FUNCTION__, current->comm, current->pid, nlk->check_sender); +if (nlk->check_sender) +if ((err = nlk->check_sender (skb))) { +netlink_detachskb (sk, skb); +return err; + } +#ifdef NL_EMULATE_DEV if (nlk->handler) {skb_orphan (skb);
@@ -1033,7 +1042,8 @@ static void netlink_data_ready(struct so*/ struct sock * -netlink_kernel_create (int unit,void (*input)(struct sock *sk,int len)) +netlink_kernel_create_check (int unit,void (*input)(struct sock *sk,int len), +int (*check)(struct sk_buff *skb)) {struct socket *sock;struct sock *sk;
@@ -1053,8 +1063,10 @@ netlink_kernel_create(int unit, void (*i } sk = sock->sk; sk->sk_data_ready = netlink_data_ready; -if (input) +if (input) {nlk_sk (sk)->data_ready = input; +nlk_sk (sk)->check_sender = check; + }if (netlink_insert (sk,0 )) {sock_release (sock);
@@ -1459,7 +1471,7 @@ MODULE_ALIAS_NETPROTO(PF_NETLINK);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_ack);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_broadcast);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_dump_start); -EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_kernel_create); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_kernel_create_check);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_register_notifier);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_set_err);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_set_nonroot);
===== include/linux/netlink.h 1.23 vs edited =====
include/linux/netlink.h +5 -1
@@ -116,7 +116,11 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms#define NETLINK_CREDS (skb) (&NETLINK_CB((skb)).creds) -extern struct sock *netlink_kernel_create (int unit,void (*input)(struct sock *sk,int len)); +extern struct sock *netlink_kernel_create_check (int unit,void (*input)(struct sock *sk,int len),int (*check)(struct sk_buff *skb)); +static inline struct sock *netlink_kernel_create (int unit,void (*input)(struct sock *sk,int len)) +{ +return netlink_kernel_create_check (unit, input,NULL ); +}extern void netlink_ack (struct sk_buff *in_skb,struct nlmsghdr *nlh,int err);extern int netlink_unicast (struct sock *ssk,struct sk_buff *skb,__u32 pid,int nonblock); extern int netlink_broadcast(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 pid,
RFC PATCH 2/3 netlink check sender, audit
Add audit_check_sender() function for audit netlink messages. This can also be used to set the loginuid, although I left that off for the moment.
===== kernel/audit.c 1.9 vs edited =====
kernel/audit.c +16 -11
@@ -309,27 +309,36 @@ nlmsg_failure: /* Used by NLMSG_PUT */* Check for appropriate CAP_AUDIT_ capabilities on incoming audit * control messages. */ -static int audit_netlink_ok (kernel_cap_t eff_cap,u16 msg_type) +static int audit_check_sender (struct sk_buff *skb) { -int err =0 ; +struct nlmsghdr *nlh; +u16 msg_type; +int err = -EINVAL ; +if (skb->len <NLMSG_LENGTH (0 )) + goto out; + + nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data; + msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type; + + err =0 ;switch (msg_type) {case AUDIT_GET :case AUDIT_LIST :case AUDIT_SET :case AUDIT_ADD :case AUDIT_DEL : -if (!cap_raised (eff_cap,CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL )) +if (!capable (CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL )) err = -EPERM ;break ;case AUDIT_USER : -if (!cap_raised (eff_cap,CAP_AUDIT_WRITE )) +if (!capable (CAP_AUDIT_WRITE )) err = -EPERM ;break ;default :/* bad msg */ err = -EINVAL ; } - +out:return err; }
@@ -338,14 +347,10 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_bu32 uid, pid, seq;void *data;struct audit_status *status_get, status_set; -int err; +int err =0 ;struct audit_buffer *ab;u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type; - err =audit_netlink_ok (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, msg_type); -if (err) -return err; - pid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->pid; uid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->uid; seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
@@ -551,7 +556,7 @@ int __init audit_init(void) {printk (KERN_INFO "audit: initializing netlink socket (%s)\n" , audit_default ?"enabled" :"disabled" ); - audit_sock =netlink_kernel_create (NETLINK_AUDIT , audit_receive); + audit_sock =netlink_kernel_create_check (NETLINK_AUDIT , audit_receive, audit_check_sender);if (!audit_sock)audit_panic ("cannot initialize netlink socket" );
RFC PATCH 3/3 netlink check sender, rtnetlink
Add rtnetlink_check_sender() function to validate rtnetlink messages in sender context. Invalid messages (due to content or sender privileges) will be rejected before queued to socket.
===== net/core/rtnetlink.c 1.33 vs edited =====
net/core/rtnetlink.c +27 -11
@@ -462,8 +462,32 @@ static int rtnetlink_done(struct netlinkstatic struct rtattr **rta_buf;static int rtattr_max; -/* Process one rtnetlink message. */ +static int rtnetlink_check_sender (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +struct nlmsghdr *nlh; +int kind; +int type; + +if (skb->len <NLMSG_LENGTH (0 )) +return -EINVAL ; + + nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data; + type = nlh->nlmsg_type; + +/* Unknown message: reply with EINVAL */ +if (type >RTM_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ; + + type -=RTM_BASE ; + kind = type&3 ; +if (kind !=2 && !capable (CAP_NET_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + +return 0 ; +} + +/* Process one rtnetlink message. */ static __inline__int rtnetlink_rcv_msg (struct sk_buff *skb,struct nlmsghdr *nlh,int *errp) {
@@ -485,10 +509,6 @@ rtnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, sif (type <RTM_BASE )return 0 ; -/* Unknown message: reply with EINVAL */ -if (type >RTM_MAX ) - goto err_inval; - type -=RTM_BASE ;/* All the messages must have at least 1 byte length */
@@ -509,11 +529,6 @@ rtnetlink_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, s sz_idx = type>>2 ; kind = type&3 ; -if (kind !=2 &&security_netlink_recv (skb)) { - *errp = -EPERM ; -return -1 ; - } -if (kind ==2 && nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_DUMP ) {u32 rlen;
@@ -690,7 +705,8 @@ void __init rtnetlink_init(void)if (!rta_buf)panic ("rtnetlink_init: cannot allocate rta_buf\n" ); - rtnl =netlink_kernel_create (NETLINK_ROUTE , rtnetlink_rcv); + rtnl =netlink_kernel_create_check (NETLINK_ROUTE , rtnetlink_rcv, + rtnetlink_check_sender);if (rtnl ==NULL )panic ("rtnetlink_init: cannot initialize rtnetlink\n" );netlink_set_nonroot (NETLINK_ROUTE ,NL_NONROOT_RECV );
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
In reply to Chris WrightQuoted 15 lines · Chris Wright
Add
audit_check_sender()function for audit netlink messages. This can also be used to set the loginuid, although I left that off for the moment.=====
kernel/audit.c1.9 vs edited =====kernel/audit.c +2
-2@@ -309,27 +309,36 @@ nlmsg_failure: /* Used by NLMSG_PUT */* Check for appropriate CAP_AUDIT_ capabilities on incoming audit * control messages. */ -static int audit_netlink_ok (kernel_cap_t eff_cap,u16 msg_type) +static int audit_check_sender (struct sk_buff *skb) { -int err =0 ; +struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
kernel/audit.c nlmsg_failure: /* Used by NLMSG_PUT */ · line 324
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +7
-0+u16 msg_type; +int err = -EINVAL ; +if (skb->len <NLMSG_LENGTH (0 )) + goto out; + + nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data; + msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
You're introducing some kind of check for malformed packets here as well, don't you think that such thing should be done by the receiver ?
I also see another option which is passing as parameter such function which check for capabilities/audit stuff to my netlink_process_skb function, calling it before process_msg. But in that case, the packet sent by a sender that doesn't has the right to was already enqueued. I understand that this is exactly what you are trying to avoid.
--
Pablo
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
Quoted 1 line · Pablo Neira
I also see another option which is passing as parameter such function which check for capabilities/audit stuff to my
netlink_process_skbfunction, calling it beforeprocess_msg. But in that case, the packet sent by a sender that doesn't has the right to was already enqueued. I understand that this is exactly what you are trying to avoid.
With your patch, a message from user space process that doesn't have the capabilites follows this path:
sys_sendmsg() -> netlink_sendmsg() -> netlink_unicast() -> netlink_sendskb() = discarded here.
Currently, it continues, for example in case of rtnetlink:
... -> netlink_sendskb() -> sk_data_ready(sk, len) -> rtnetlink_rcv() -> rtnetlink_rcv_skb() -> rtnetlink_rcv_msg() = discarded here.
Nowadays the message is enqueued but it's discarded later. So if I'm not missing anything, I don't see the point of adding a new function to check for capabilities/audit stuff just a bit before.
--
Pablo
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
Quoted 6 lines · Pablo Neira
With your patch, a message from user space process that doesn't have the capabilites follows this path:
sys_sendmsg()->netlink_sendmsg()->netlink_unicast()->netlink_sendskb()= discarded here.
Quoted 8 lines
Currently, it continues, for example in case of rtnetlink:
... ->
netlink_sendskb()->sk_data_ready(sk, len)->rtnetlink_rcv()->rtnetlink_rcv_skb()->rtnetlink_rcv_msg()= discarded here.Nowadays the message is enqueued but it's discarded later. So if I'm not missing anything, I don't see the point of adding a new function to check for capabilities/audit stuff just a bit before.
Two reasons:
1) The sender-side checks allow checking (and auditing) based on the current task's credentials, vs. having to save the information in the netlink_skb_parms for use on the receiver side.
2) Performing the check up front at send time allows the kernel to reject it early and reduce extraneous processing / resource consumption by unauthorized processes.
Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> National Security Agency
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
In reply to Pablo NeiraQuoted 15 lines · * Pablo Neira ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 5 lines · Pablo Neira
I also see another option which is passing as parameter such function which check for capabilities/audit stuff to my
netlink_process_skbfunction, calling it beforeprocess_msg. But in that case, the packet sent by a sender that doesn't has the right to was already enqueued. I understand that this is exactly what you are trying to avoid.With your patch, a message from user space process that doesn't have the capabilites follows this path:
sys_sendmsg()->netlink_sendmsg()->netlink_unicast()->netlink_sendskb()= discarded here.
Quoted 8 lines
Currently, it continues, for example in case of rtnetlink:
... ->
netlink_sendskb()->sk_data_ready(sk, len)->rtnetlink_rcv()->rtnetlink_rcv_skb()->rtnetlink_rcv_msg()= discarded here.Nowadays the message is enqueued but it's discarded later. So if I'm not missing anything, I don't see the point of adding a new function to check for capabilities/audit stuff just a bit before.
The purpose is to guarantee that the checks are done in the sender's context to avoid having to cache values such as capabilities, SELinux SID, audit loginuid.
thanks,
-chris
Signature · 1 line
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
Quoted 8 lines · Chris Wright
Quoted 8 lines
With your patch, a message from user space process that doesn't have the capabilites follows this path:
sys_sendmsg()->netlink_sendmsg()->netlink_unicast()->netlink_sendskb()= discarded here.Currently, it continues, for example in case of rtnetlink:
... ->
netlink_sendskb()->sk_data_ready(sk, len)->rtnetlink_rcv()->rtnetlink_rcv_skb()->rtnetlink_rcv_msg()= discarded here.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Nowadays the message is enqueued but it's discarded later. So if I'm not missing anything, I don't see the point of adding a new function to check for capabilities/audit stuff just a bit before.
The purpose is to guarantee that the checks are done in the sender's context to avoid having to cache values such as capabilities, SELinux SID, audit loginuid.
Thanks for the explanation. I don't still like so much the new netlink_kernel_create_check function. I think that we could get more variations of netlink_kernel_create in future just to add another feature/checking. So I prefer new function (netlink_kernel_set_check) that set check_sender if it's needed once the netlink socket is created. I've modified your patches to use this function.
Comments welcome.
--
Pablo
===== include/linux/netlink.h 1.23 vs edited =====
include/linux/netlink.h +1 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@extern struct sock *netlink_kernel_create (int unit,void (*input)(struct sock *sk,int len)); +extern inline void netlink_kernel_set_check (struct sock *sk,int (*check)(struct sk_buff *skb));extern void netlink_ack (struct sk_buff *in_skb,struct nlmsghdr *nlh,int err);extern int netlink_unicast (struct sock *ssk,struct sk_buff *skb,__u32 pid,int nonblock); extern int netlink_broadcast(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 pid,
===== net/netlink/af_netlink.c 1.69 vs edited =====
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +8 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@struct netlink_callback *cb;spinlock_t cb_lock;void (*data_ready)(struct sock *sk,int bytes); +int (*check_sender)(struct sk_buff *skb); };#define nlk_sk (__sk) ((struct netlink_opt *)(__sk)->sk_protinfo)
@@ -1063,6 +1064,12 @@return sk; } +inline void netlink_kernel_set_check (struct sock *sk, +int (*check)(struct sk_buff *skb)) +{ +nlk_sk (sk)->check_sender = check; +} +void netlink_set_nonroot (int protocol,unsigned int flags) {if ((unsigned int )protocol <MAX_LINKS )
@@ -1460,6 +1467,7 @@EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_broadcast);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_dump_start);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_kernel_create); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_kernel_set_check);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_register_notifier);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_set_err);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_set_nonroot);
===== kernel/audit.c 1.9 vs edited =====
kernel/audit.c +17 -10
@@ -309,27 +309,36 @@* Check for appropriate CAP_AUDIT_ capabilities on incoming audit * control messages. */ -static int audit_netlink_ok (kernel_cap_t eff_cap,u16 msg_type) +static int audit_check_sender (struct sk_buff *skb) { -int err =0 ; +struct nlmsghdr *nlh; +u16 msg_type; +int err = -EINVAL ; +if (skb->len <NLMSG_LENGTH (0 )) + goto out; + + nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data; + msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type; + + err =0 ;switch (msg_type) {case AUDIT_GET :case AUDIT_LIST :case AUDIT_SET :case AUDIT_ADD :case AUDIT_DEL : -if (!cap_raised (eff_cap,CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL )) +if (!capable (CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL )) err = -EPERM ;break ;case AUDIT_USER : -if (!cap_raised (eff_cap,CAP_AUDIT_WRITE )) +if (!capable (CAP_AUDIT_WRITE )) err = -EPERM ;break ;default :/* bad msg */ err = -EINVAL ; } - +out:return err; }
@@ -338,14 +347,10 @@u32 uid, pid, seq;void *data;struct audit_status *status_get, status_set; -int err; +int err =0 ;struct audit_buffer *ab;u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type; - err =audit_netlink_ok (NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap, msg_type); -if (err) -return err; - pid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->pid; uid =NETLINK_CREDS (skb)->uid; seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
@@ -554,6 +559,8 @@ audit_sock =netlink_kernel_create (NETLINK_AUDIT , audit_receive);if (!audit_sock)audit_panic ("cannot initialize netlink socket" ); + +netlink_kernel_set_check (audit_sock, audit_check_sender); audit_initialized =1 ; audit_enabled = audit_default;
===== net/core/rtnetlink.c 1.33 vs edited =====
net/core/rtnetlink.c +26 -10
@@ -462,8 +462,32 @@static struct rtattr **rta_buf;static int rtattr_max; -/* Process one rtnetlink message. */ +static int rtnetlink_check_sender (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +struct nlmsghdr *nlh; +int kind; +int type; + +if (skb->len <NLMSG_LENGTH (0 )) +return -EINVAL ; + + nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data; + type = nlh->nlmsg_type; + +/* Unknown message: reply with EINVAL */ +if (type >RTM_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ; + + type -=RTM_BASE ; + kind = type&3 ; +if (kind !=2 && !capable (CAP_NET_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ; + +return 0 ; +} + +/* Process one rtnetlink message. */ static __inline__int rtnetlink_rcv_msg (struct sk_buff *skb,struct nlmsghdr *nlh,int *errp) {
@@ -485,10 +509,6 @@if (type <RTM_BASE )return 0 ; -/* Unknown message: reply with EINVAL */ -if (type >RTM_MAX ) - goto err_inval; - type -=RTM_BASE ;/* All the messages must have at least 1 byte length */
@@ -509,11 +529,6 @@ sz_idx = type>>2 ; kind = type&3 ; -if (kind !=2 &&security_netlink_recv (skb)) { - *errp = -EPERM ; -return -1 ; - } -if (kind ==2 && nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_DUMP ) {u32 rlen;
@@ -693,6 +708,7 @@ rtnl =netlink_kernel_create (NETLINK_ROUTE , rtnetlink_rcv);if (rtnl ==NULL )panic ("rtnetlink_init: cannot initialize rtnetlink\n" ); +netlink_kernel_set_check (rtnl, rtnetlink_check_sender);netlink_set_nonroot (NETLINK_ROUTE ,NL_NONROOT_RECV );register_netdevice_notifier (&rtnetlink_dev_notifier); rtnetlink_links[PF_UNSPEC ] = link_rtnetlink_table;
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
Quoted 14 lines · Pablo Neira
Quoted 12 lines · Chris Wright
Quoted 10 lines
With your patch, a message from user space process that doesn't have the capabilites follows this path:
sys_sendmsg()->netlink_sendmsg()->netlink_unicast()->netlink_sendskb()= discarded here.Currently, it continues, for example in case of rtnetlink:
... ->
netlink_sendskb()->sk_data_ready(sk, len)->rtnetlink_rcv()->rtnetlink_rcv_skb()->rtnetlink_rcv_msg()= discarded here.Nowadays the message is enqueued but it's discarded later. So if I'm not missing anything, I don't see the point of adding a new function to check for capabilities/audit stuff just a bit before.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
The purpose is to guarantee that the checks are done in the sender's context to avoid having to cache values such as capabilities, SELinux SID, audit loginuid.
Thanks for the explanation. I don't still like so much the new
netlink_kernel_create_checkfunction. I think that we could get more variations ofnetlink_kernel_createin future just to add another feature/checking. So I prefer new function (netlink_kernel_set_check) that setcheck_senderif it's needed once the netlink socket is created. I've modified your patches to use this function.
Sorry, I'm stupid. Wrong patch.
--
Pablo
===== net/netlink/af_netlink.c 1.69 vs edited =====
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +16 -2
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@struct netlink_callback *cb;spinlock_t cb_lock;void (*data_ready)(struct sock *sk,int bytes); +int (*check_sender)(struct sk_buff *skb); };#define nlk_sk (__sk) ((struct netlink_opt *)(__sk)->sk_protinfo)
@@ -636,9 +637,15 @@int netlink_sendskb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,int protocol) {struct netlink_opt *nlk; -int len = skb->len; +int err, len = skb->len; + nlk =nlk_sk (sk); + +if (nlk->check_sender) +if ((err = nlk->check_sender (skb))) { +netlink_detachskb (sk, skb); +return err; + } - nlk =nlk_sk (sk);#ifdef NL_EMULATE_DEV if (nlk->handler) {skb_orphan (skb);
@@ -1063,6 +1070,12 @@return sk; } +inline void netlink_kernel_set_check (struct sock *sk, +int (*check)(struct sk_buff *skb)) +{ +nlk_sk (sk)->check_sender = check; +} +void netlink_set_nonroot (int protocol,unsigned int flags) {if ((unsigned int )protocol <MAX_LINKS )
@@ -1460,6 +1473,7 @@EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_broadcast);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_dump_start);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_kernel_create); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_kernel_set_check);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_register_notifier);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_set_err);EXPORT_SYMBOL (netlink_set_nonroot);
===== include/linux/netlink.h 1.23 vs edited =====
include/linux/netlink.h +1 -0
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@extern struct sock *netlink_kernel_create (int unit,void (*input)(struct sock *sk,int len)); +extern inline void netlink_kernel_set_check (struct sock *sk,int (*check)(struct sk_buff *skb));extern void netlink_ack (struct sk_buff *in_skb,struct nlmsghdr *nlh,int err);extern int netlink_unicast (struct sock *ssk,struct sk_buff *skb,__u32 pid,int nonblock); extern int netlink_broadcast(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 pid,
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
In reply to Pablo NeiraQuoted 4 lines · * Pablo Neira ([email protected]) wrote:
Thanks for the explanation. I don't still like so much the new
netlink_kernel_create_checkfunction. I think that we could get more variations ofnetlink_kernel_createin future just to add another feature/checking. So I prefer new function (netlink_kernel_set_check)
I agree, had the same concern. I breifly considered an ops struct that could be passed in during registration so that it could grow a little easier.
Quoted 2 lines
that set
check_senderif it's needed once the netlink socket is created. I've modified your patches to use this function.
Great, thanks. This is technically racy. It's possible (albeit small window) that something could be delivered before this is set. Using a callback struct during registration would fix this.
thanks,
-chris
Signature · 1 line
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
Quoted 3 lines · Chris Wright
Great, thanks. This is technically racy. It's possible (albeit small window) that something could be delivered before this is set.
Yes, hard trigger but that can happen and doesn't tell too much in favour of me.
Quoted 3 lines
Using a callback struct during registration would fix this.
I agree, maybe something like the example patch attached. Hope that helps.
--
Pablo
===== net/netlink/af_netlink.c 1.69 vs edited =====
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +17 -5
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@struct netlink_callback *cb;spinlock_t cb_lock;void (*data_ready)(struct sock *sk,int bytes); +int (*check_sender)(struct sk_buff *skb); };#define nlk_sk (__sk) ((struct netlink_opt *)(__sk)->sk_protinfo)
@@ -636,9 +637,16 @@int netlink_sendskb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,int protocol) {struct netlink_opt *nlk; -int len = skb->len; +int err, len = skb->len; + + nlk =nlk_sk (sk); + +if (nlk->check_sender) +if ((err = nlk->check_sender (skb))) { +netlink_detachskb (sk, skb); +return err; + } - nlk =nlk_sk (sk);#ifdef NL_EMULATE_DEV if (nlk->handler) {skb_orphan (skb);
@@ -1033,7 +1041,7 @@*/ struct sock * -netlink_kernel_create (int unit,void (*input)(struct sock *sk,int len)) +netlink_kernel_create (int unit,struct netlink_ops *nlops) {struct socket *sock;struct sock *sk;
@@ -1053,8 +1061,12 @@ } sk = sock->sk; sk->sk_data_ready = netlink_data_ready; -if (input) -nlk_sk (sk)->data_ready = input; +if (nlops !=NULL ) { +if (nlops->input) +nlk_sk (sk)->data_ready = nlops->input; +if (nlops->check_sender) +nlk_sk (sk)->check_sender = nlops->check_sender; + }if (netlink_insert (sk,0 )) {sock_release (sock);
===== include/linux/netlink.h 1.23 vs edited =====
include/linux/netlink.h +6 -1
@@ -115,8 +115,13 @@#define NETLINK_CB (skb) (*(struct netlink_skb_parms*)&((skb)->cb))#define NETLINK_CREDS (skb) (&NETLINK_CB((skb)).creds) +struct netlink_ops +{ +void (*input)(struct sock *sk,int len); +int (*check_sender)(struct sk_buff *skb); +}; -extern struct sock *netlink_kernel_create (int unit,void (*input)(struct sock *sk,int len)); +extern struct sock *netlink_kernel_create (int unit,struct netlink_ops *nlops);extern void netlink_ack (struct sk_buff *in_skb,struct nlmsghdr *nlh,int err);extern int netlink_unicast (struct sock *ssk,struct sk_buff *skb,__u32 pid,int nonblock); extern int netlink_broadcast(struct sock *ssk, struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 pid,
===== net/core/rtnetlink.c 1.33 vs edited =====
net/core/rtnetlink.c +30 -11
72 lines not on this page · raw message
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
Quoted 2 lines · * Pablo Neira ([email protected]) wrote:
I agree, maybe something like the example patch attached. Hope that helps.
This is better, but...
net/netlink/af_netlink.c line 1044
Quoted 2 lines
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +1
-1-netlink_kernel_create(int unit, void (*input)(struct sock *sk, int len)) +netlink_kernel_create(int unit, struct netlink_ops *nlops)
...this is exported interface, so would probably require a new function.
thanks,
-chris
Signature · 1 line
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
Quoted 11 lines · Chris Wright
Quoted 3 lines · * Pablo Neira ([email protected]) wrote:
I agree, maybe something like the example patch attached. Hope that helps.
This is better, but...
Quoted 8 lines
net/netlink/af_netlink.c line 1044
Quoted 4 lines
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +1
-1-netlink_kernel_create(int unit, void (*input)(struct sock *sk, int len)) +netlink_kernel_create(int unit, struct netlink_ops *nlops)...this is exported interface, so would probably require a new function.
I was aware of that. Actually I think that we can modify all calls to netlink_kernel_create (that aren't that much) to fit the new interface, I can post a patch to do that. I prefer providing just one function to create a netlink socket in kernel space.
--
Pablo
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
Quoted 4 lines · * Pablo Neira ([email protected]) wrote:
I was aware of that. Actually I think that we can modify all calls to
netlink_kernel_create(that aren't that much) to fit the new interface, I can post a patch to do that. I prefer providing just one function to create a netlink socket in kernel space.
My only thought is as an exported symobl it's harder to be clear on who's using it (possibly out-of-tree).
thanks,
-chris
Signature · 1 line
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Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
Quoted 8 lines · Chris Wright
Quoted 4 lines · * Pablo Neira ([email protected]) wrote:
I was aware of that. Actually I think that we can modify all calls to
netlink_kernel_create(that aren't that much) to fit the new interface, I can post a patch to do that. I prefer providing just one function to create a netlink socket in kernel space.My only thought is as an exported symobl it's harder to be clear on who's using it (possibly out-of-tree).
Doesn't matter, the kernel has no ABI.
http://www.kroah.com/log/linux/stable_api_nonsense.html?seemore=y
- James
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC][PATCH 2/3] netlink check sender, audit
In reply to Pablo NeiraQuoted 8 lines · * Pablo Neira ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 7 lines · Chris Wright
+static int
audit_check_sender(struct sk_buff *skb){kernel/audit.c +3
-1-int err =0 ; +struct nlmsghdr *nlh; +u16 msg_type; +int err = -EINVAL ;
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c nlmsg_failure: /* Used by NLMSG_PUT */ · line 322
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/audit.c +5
-0+if (skb->len <NLMSG_LENGTH (0 )) + goto out; + + nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data; + msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;You're introducing some kind of check for malformed packets here as well, don't you think that such thing should be done by the receiver ?
This has to be done to make the capability check meaningful, as it's different per msg type. Need to have a valid header to check msg type.
Quoted 5 lines
I also see another option which is passing as parameter such function which check for capabilities/audit stuff to my
netlink_process_skbfunction, calling it beforeprocess_msg. But in that case, the packet sent by a sender that doesn't has the right to was already enqueued. I understand that this is exactly what you are trying to avoid.
That's how it's done now. The purpose of this patch is to guarantee the check is done in the sender's context to avoid having to add values to the control buffer to support protocol specific data (such as loginuid in this case of audit).
thanks,
-chris
Signature · 1 line
Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net
Quoted 9 lines · Chris Wright
=====
net/netlink/af_netlink.c1.69 vs edited =====net/netlink/af_netlink.c +1
-2int netlink_sendskb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,int protocol) {struct netlink_opt *nlk; -int len = skb->len; - +int err, len = skb->len;
net/netlink/af_netlink.c int netlink_attachskb(struct sock *sk, s · line 650
Quoted 10 lines
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +9
-0+ nlk =nlk_sk (sk); + +printk ("%s: %s(%d) send_check %p\n" , __FUNCTION__, current->comm, current->pid, nlk->check_sender); +if (nlk->check_sender) +if ((err = nlk->check_sender (skb))) { +netlink_detachskb (sk, skb); +return err; + } +
printk() is a leftover from debugging, I assume.
Why place the check_sender() call here vs. just replacing the existing security_netlink_send() call in netlink_sendmsg() with this new call?
Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> National Security Agency
Quoted 3 lines · Stephen Smalley
printk()is a leftover from debugging, I assume.
Why place thecheck_sender()call here vs. just replacing the existingsecurity_netlink_send()call innetlink_sendmsg()with this new call?
Sorry, replacing security_netlink_send() would be bad (for SELinux checking), but I'm not clear on why you don't put the check_sender() call right after it in netlink_sendmsg() so that you ensure that you have complete coverage (vs. unicast-specific).
Signature · 2 lines
Stephen Smalley <[email protected]> National Security Agency
Quoted 9 lines · * Stephen Smalley ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 3 lines · Stephen Smalley
printk()is a leftover from debugging, I assume.
Why place thecheck_sender()call here vs. just replacing the existingsecurity_netlink_send()call innetlink_sendmsg()with this new call?Sorry, replacing
security_netlink_send()would be bad (for SELinux checking), but I'm not clear on why you don't put thecheck_sender()call right after it innetlink_sendmsg()so that you ensure that you have complete coverage (vs. unicast-specific).
The receiver hasn't been looked up, so you don't have the nlk_sk()->check_sender handy yet.
thanks,
-chris
Signature · 1 line
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Quoted 14 lines · * Stephen Smalley ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 13 lines · Chris Wright
=====
net/netlink/af_netlink.c1.69 vs edited =====net/netlink/af_netlink.c +4
-2int netlink_sendskb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,int protocol) {struct netlink_opt *nlk; -int len = skb->len; - +int err, len = skb->len; + nlk =nlk_sk (sk); + +printk ("%s: %s(%d) send_check %p\n" , __FUNCTION__, current->comm, current->pid, nlk->check_sender);
Quoted 8 lines
net/netlink/af_netlink.c int netlink_attachskb(struct sock *sk, s · line 650
Quoted 6 lines
net/netlink/af_netlink.c +6
-0+if (nlk->check_sender) +if ((err = nlk->check_sender (skb))) { +netlink_detachskb (sk, skb); +return err; + } +
printk()is a leftover from debugging, I assume.
Heh, yeah, just leftover gargabe.
Quoted 2 lines
Why place the
check_sender()call here vs. just replacing the existingsecurity_netlink_send()call innetlink_sendmsg()with this new call?
That's fine, however it needs to be this late, to get the receiver looked up. I think the sk would change in _send hook, so for RFC, I just left them separate. Ideal would be complete consolidation.
thanks,
-chris
Signature · 1 line
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