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/proc/$PID/mem rationale

DISCUSSION Serge van den Boom 2 participants 3 messages May 4, 2005 – May 5, 2005

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#0 lore raw

Hi,

Could someone explain the reasoning behind these two design decisions regarding /proc/$PID/mem?
- You can only read() from this file from a process which is attached to the file's process through ptrace(). Why this requirement? The following command line could be rather useful, but the ptrace() requirement prevents this from working:
dd if=/proc/$SOME_PID/mem bs=1 seek=$ADDRESS
- You can only read() from the mem file from the process that open()ed it. Even if the ptrace() requirement were dropped, you wouldn't be able to do something like the following command because of this:
dd bs=1 seek=$ADDRESS < /proc/$SOME_PID/mem
The usefulness of this may be limited, but I haven't been able to find any reason not to allow such actions.

I would appreciate it if you could CC me in replies.

Cheers,

Serge van den Boom

#1 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Serge van den Boom

Could someone explain the reasoning behind these two design decisions regarding /proc/$PID/mem?
- You can only read() from this file from a process which is attached to the file's process through ptrace(). Why this requirement? The following command line could be rather useful, but the ptrace() requirement prevents this from working:
dd if=/proc/$SOME_PID/mem bs=1 seek=$ADDRESS

It's prohibited *because* it could be rather useful - to a hacker. It's an issue of information leakage - there are some corner cases where the permissions on /proc/PID/mem would appear to allow a read, but you don't in fact want to allow it (for the full list, look at the ptrace() code and the tests it makes for things like euid != uid and so on). There's a bunch of race conditions in there too.

Quoted 4 lines

- You can only read() from the mem file from the process that open()ed it. Even if the ptrace() requirement were dropped, you wouldn't be able to do something like the following command because of this:
dd bs=1 seek=$ADDRESS < /proc/$SOME_PID/mem

Same reasons. ptrace() is able to make some checks and set some bits that read() isn't allowed anywhere near (in particular, ptrace() can *stop* a process so it can't race - read() can't do that.)

#2 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · On Wed, 4 May 2005 [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 5 lines · Serge van den Boom

- You can only read() from this file from a process which is attached to the file's process through ptrace(). Why this requirement? The following command line could be rather useful, but the ptrace() requirement prevents this from working:
dd if=/proc/$SOME_PID/mem bs=1 seek=$ADDRESS

Quoted 6 lines

It's prohibited *because* it could be rather useful - to a hacker. It's an issue of information leakage - there are some corner cases where the permissions on /proc/PID/mem would appear to allow a read, but you don't in fact want to allow it (for the full list, look at the ptrace() code and the tests it makes for things like euid != uid and so on). There's a bunch of race conditions in there too.

Actually, mem_read(), the read handler for the "mem" file, calls may_ptrace_attach(), which makes exactly the same checks as ptrace_attach(). In fact, mem_read() makes these checks each time it is called, while if you were to use ptrace() to read data, these checks would be made only at PTRACE_ATTACH, and not at PTRACE_PEEKDATA.
The only security that mem_read() gets from checking whether the process is tracing the child seems to be as an indicator that some checks have been done in the past. But these are exactly the checks that are being done again right after this tracing check.
I don't see how that's going to affect any race conditions.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

- You can only read() from the mem file from the process that open()ed it. Even if the ptrace() requirement were dropped, you wouldn't be able to do something like the following command because of this:
dd bs=1 seek=$ADDRESS < /proc/$SOME_PID/mem

Same reasons. ptrace() is able to make some checks and set some bits that read() isn't allowed anywhere near (in particular, ptrace() can *stop* a process so it can't race - read() can't do that.)

This question isn't about requiring the child being traced by the reader or not. I'm asking why the process that opens the "mem" file needs to be the one that does the reading. There are no special checks being done when the file is opened.

As for stopping the child process: if that's necessary, then it looks like there's a race condition present as it is. Because as far as I can tell, there's nothing preventing a process from sending a SIGCONT to the child process while the mem_read() is going on.

Please CC me in replies again.

Cheers,

Serge