lsm stacking v0.2: intro

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/security.c
===================================================================
@@ -81,15 +81,15 @@ int __init security_init(void)
  */
 int register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 {
+	if (security_ops != &dummy_security_ops)
+		return -EAGAIN;
+
 	if (verify(ops)) {
 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s could not verify "
 		       "security_operations structure.\n", __FUNCTION__);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (security_ops != &dummy_security_ops)
-		return -EAGAIN;
-
 	security_ops = ops;
 
 	return 0;

@@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ int unregister_security(struct security_
  */
 int mod_reg_security(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
 {
-	if (verify(ops)) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "%s could not verify "
-		       "security operations.\n", __FUNCTION__);
+	if (!ops) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s received NULL security operations",
+						       __FUNCTION__);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/fs/compat.c
===================================================================
@@ -1519,6 +1519,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,
 	bprm->file = file;
 	bprm->filename = filename;
 	bprm->interp = filename;
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&bprm->security);
 	bprm->mm = mm_alloc();
 	retval = -ENOMEM;
 	if (!bprm->mm)

@@ -1575,8 +1576,7 @@ out:
 			__free_page(page);
 	}
 
-	if (bprm->security)
-		security_bprm_free(bprm);
+	security_bprm_free(bprm);
 
 out_mm:
 	if (bprm->mm)

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/fs/exec.c
===================================================================
@@ -1154,6 +1154,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,
 	bprm->file = file;
 	bprm->filename = filename;
 	bprm->interp = filename;
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&bprm->security);
 	bprm->mm = mm_alloc();
 	retval = -ENOMEM;
 	if (!bprm->mm)

@@ -1212,8 +1213,7 @@ out:
 			__free_page(page);
 	}
 
-	if (bprm->security)
-		security_bprm_free(bprm);
+	security_bprm_free(bprm);
 
 out_mm:
 	if (bprm->mm)

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/fs/inode.c
===================================================================
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static struct inode *alloc_inode(struct 
 		inode->i_bdev = NULL;
 		inode->i_cdev = NULL;
 		inode->i_rdev = 0;
-		inode->i_security = NULL;
+		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&inode->i_security);
 		inode->dirtied_when = 0;
 		if (security_inode_alloc(inode)) {
 			if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode)

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/binfmts.h
===================================================================
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ struct linux_binprm{
 	struct file * file;
 	int e_uid, e_gid;
 	kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective;
-	void *security;
+	struct hlist_head security;
 	int argc, envc;
 	char * filename;	/* Name of binary as seen by procps */
 	char * interp;		/* Name of the binary really executed. Most

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/fs.h
===================================================================
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ struct inode {
 	unsigned int		i_flags;
 
 	atomic_t		i_writecount;
-	void			*i_security;
+	struct hlist_head	i_security;
 	union {
 		void		*generic_ip;
 	} u;

@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ struct fown_struct {
 	rwlock_t lock;          /* protects pid, uid, euid fields */
 	int pid;		/* pid or -pgrp where SIGIO should be sent */
 	uid_t uid, euid;	/* uid/euid of process setting the owner */
-	void *security;
+	struct hlist_head security;
 	int signum;		/* posix.1b rt signal to be delivered on IO */
 };
 

@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ struct file {
 
 	size_t			f_maxcount;
 	unsigned long		f_version;
-	void			*f_security;
+	struct hlist_head	f_security;
 
 	/* needed for tty driver, and maybe others */
 	void			*private_data;

@@ -778,7 +778,7 @@ struct super_block {
 	int			s_syncing;
 	int			s_need_sync_fs;
 	atomic_t		s_active;
-	void                    *s_security;
+ 	struct hlist_head	s_security;
 	struct xattr_handler	**s_xattr;
 
 	struct list_head	s_inodes;	/* all inodes */

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/ipc.h
===================================================================
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 #define _LINUX_IPC_H
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
 
 #define IPC_PRIVATE ((__kernel_key_t) 0)  
 

@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ struct kern_ipc_perm
 	gid_t		cgid;
 	mode_t		mode; 
 	unsigned long	seq;
-	void		*security;
+	struct hlist_head security;
 };
 
 #endif /* __KERNEL__ */

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/msg.h
===================================================================
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ struct msg_msg {
 	long  m_type;          
 	int m_ts;           /* message text size */
 	struct msg_msgseg* next;
-	void *security;
+	struct hlist_head security;
 	/* the actual message follows immediately */
 };
 

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/sched.h
===================================================================
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ struct task_struct {
 	void *notifier_data;
 	sigset_t *notifier_mask;
 	
-	void *security;
+	struct hlist_head security;
 	struct audit_context *audit_context;
 	seccomp_t seccomp;
 

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/net/sock.h
===================================================================
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ struct sock {
 	struct sk_buff		*sk_send_head;
 	__u32			sk_sndmsg_off;
 	int			sk_write_pending;
-	void			*sk_security;
+	struct hlist_head	sk_security;
 	void			(*sk_state_change)(struct sock *sk);
 	void			(*sk_data_ready)(struct sock *sk, int bytes);
 	void			(*sk_write_space)(struct sock *sk);

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/ipc/msg.c
===================================================================
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static int newque (key_t key, int msgflg
 	msq->q_perm.mode = (msgflg & S_IRWXUGO);
 	msq->q_perm.key = key;
 
-	msq->q_perm.security = NULL;
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&msq->q_perm.security);
 	retval = security_msg_queue_alloc(msq);
 	if (retval) {
 		ipc_rcu_putref(msq);

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/ipc/msgutil.c
===================================================================
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ struct msg_msg *load_msg(const void __us
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
 	msg->next = NULL;
-	msg->security = NULL;
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&msg->security);
 
 	if (copy_from_user(msg + 1, src, alen)) {
 		err = -EFAULT;

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/ipc/sem.c
===================================================================
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static int newary (key_t key, int nsems,
 	sma->sem_perm.mode = (semflg & S_IRWXUGO);
 	sma->sem_perm.key = key;
 
-	sma->sem_perm.security = NULL;
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&sma->sem_perm.security);
 	retval = security_sem_alloc(sma);
 	if (retval) {
 		ipc_rcu_putref(sma);

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/ipc/shm.c
===================================================================
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int newseg (key_t key, int shmflg
 	shp->shm_flags = (shmflg & S_IRWXUGO);
 	shp->mlock_user = NULL;
 
-	shp->shm_perm.security = NULL;
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&shp->shm_perm.security);
 	error = security_shm_alloc(shp);
 	if (error) {
 		ipc_rcu_putref(shp);

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/kernel/fork.c
===================================================================
@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ static task_t *copy_process(unsigned lon
 
 	p->lock_depth = -1;		/* -1 = no lock */
 	do_posix_clock_monotonic_gettime(&p->start_time);
-	p->security = NULL;
+	INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&p->security);
 	p->io_context = NULL;
 	p->io_wait = NULL;
 	p->audit_context = NULL;

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/security-stack.h
===================================================================
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * security-stack.h
+ *
+ * Contains function prototypes or inline definitions for the
+ * function which manipulate kernel object security annotations.
+ *
+ * If stacker is compiled in, then we use the full functions as
+ * defined in security/security.c.  Otherwise we use the #defines
+ * here.
+ */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_STACKER
+extern struct security_list *security_get_value(struct hlist_head *head,
+			int security_id);
+
+extern struct security_list *security_set_value(struct hlist_head *head,
+			int security_id, struct security_list *obj_node);
+extern struct security_list *security_add_value(struct hlist_head *head,
+			int security_id, struct security_list *obj_node);
+extern struct security_list *security_del_value(struct hlist_head *head,
+			int security_id);
+#else
+static inline struct security_list *
+security_get_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id)
+{
+	struct hlist_node *tmp = head->first;
+	return tmp ? hlist_entry(tmp, struct security_list, list) : NULL;
+}
+
+static inline struct security_list *
+security_set_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id,
+	struct security_list *obj_node)
+{
+	head->first = &obj_node->list;
+}
+
+static inline struct security_list *
+security_add_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id,
+	struct security_list *obj_node)
+{
+	head->first = &obj_node->list;
+}
+
+static inline struct security_list *
+security_del_value(struct hlist_head *head, int security_id)
+{
+	struct hlist_node *tmp = head->first;
+	head->first = NULL;
+	return tmp ? hlist_entry(tmp, struct security_list, list) : NULL;
+}
+#endif

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/security.h
===================================================================
@@ -34,6 +34,35 @@
 struct ctl_table;
 
 /*
+ * structure to be embedded at top of each LSM's security
+ * objects.
+ */
+struct security_list {
+	struct hlist_node list;
+	int security_id;
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * These #defines present more convenient interfaces to
+ * LSMs for using the security{g,d,s}et_value functions.
+ */
+#define security_get_value_type(head, id, type) ( { \
+	struct security_list *v = security_get_value(head, id); \
+	v ? hlist_entry(v, type, lsm_list) : NULL; } )
+
+#define security_set_value_type(head, id, value) \
+	security_set_value(head, id, &value->lsm_list);
+
+#define security_add_value_type(head, id, value) \
+	security_add_value(head, id, &value->lsm_list);
+
+#define security_del_value_type(head, id, type) ( { \
+	struct security_list *v; \
+	v = security_del_value(head, id); \
+	v ? hlist_entry(v, type, lsm_list) : NULL; } )
+
+/*
  * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
  * as the default capabilities functions
  */

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Index: gregkh-2.6/include/linux/security.h
===================================================================
@@ -1983,6 +1983,11 @@
 extern int unregister_security	(struct security_operations *ops);
 extern int mod_reg_security	(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops);
 extern int mod_unreg_security	(const char *name, struct security_operations *ops);
+extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode,
+					     struct dentry *parent, void *data,
+					     struct file_operations *fops);
+extern struct dentry *securityfs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent);
+extern void securityfs_remove(struct dentry *dentry);
 
 
 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/seclvl.c
===================================================================
@@ -119,69 +119,6 @@
 	} while (0)
 
 /**
- * kobject stuff
- */
-
-struct subsystem seclvl_subsys;
-
-struct seclvl_obj {
-	char *name;
-	struct list_head slot_list;
-	struct kobject kobj;
-};
-
-/**
- * There is a seclvl_attribute struct for each file in sysfs.
- *
- * In our case, we have one of these structs for "passwd" and another
- * for "seclvl".
- */
-struct seclvl_attribute {
-	struct attribute attr;
-	ssize_t(*show) (struct seclvl_obj *, char *);
-	ssize_t(*store) (struct seclvl_obj *, const char *, size_t);
-};
-
-/**
- * When this function is called, one of the files in sysfs is being
- * written to.  attribute->store is a function pointer to whatever the
- * struct seclvl_attribute store function pointer points to.  It is
- * unique for "passwd" and "seclvl".
- */
-static ssize_t
-seclvl_attr_store(struct kobject *kobj,
-		  struct attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t len)
-{
-	struct seclvl_obj *obj = container_of(kobj, struct seclvl_obj, kobj);
-	struct seclvl_attribute *attribute =
-	    container_of(attr, struct seclvl_attribute, attr);
-	return attribute->store ? attribute->store(obj, buf, len) : -EIO;
-}
-
-static ssize_t
-seclvl_attr_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, char *buf)
-{
-	struct seclvl_obj *obj = container_of(kobj, struct seclvl_obj, kobj);
-	struct seclvl_attribute *attribute =
-	    container_of(attr, struct seclvl_attribute, attr);
-	return attribute->show ? attribute->show(obj, buf) : -EIO;
-}
-
-/**
- * Callback function pointers for show and store
- */
-static struct sysfs_ops seclvlfs_sysfs_ops = {
-	.show = seclvl_attr_show,
-	.store = seclvl_attr_store,
-};
-
-static struct kobj_type seclvl_ktype = {
-	.sysfs_ops = &seclvlfs_sysfs_ops
-};
-
-decl_subsys(seclvl, &seclvl_ktype, NULL);
-
-/**
  * The actual security level.  Ranges between -1 and 2 inclusive.
  */
 static int seclvl;

@@ -216,9 +153,15 @@
  * Called whenever the user reads the sysfs handle to this kernel
  * object
  */
-static ssize_t seclvl_read_file(struct seclvl_obj *obj, char *buff)
+#define TMPBUFLEN 12
+static ssize_t seclvl_read_file(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	return snprintf(buff, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", seclvl);
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
+
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", seclvl);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
 /**

@@ -253,57 +196,58 @@
  * object (seclvl/seclvl).  It expects a single-digit number.
  */
 static ssize_t
-seclvl_write_file(struct seclvl_obj *obj, const char *buff, size_t count)
+seclvl_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	unsigned long val;
-	if (count > 2 || (count == 2 && buff[1] != '\n')) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Invalid value passed to "
-			      "seclvl: [%s]\n", buff);
+	int val;
+	int err;
+	char *page;
+
+	if (count > 2)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	page = (char *) get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count)) {
+		err = -EFAULT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (sscanf(page, "%d", &val) != 1) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 	}
-	val = buff[0] - 48;
+
 	if (seclvl_sanity(val)) {
 		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Illegal secure level "
 			      "requested: [%d]\n", (int)val);
-		return -EPERM;
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
 	}
+	err = count;
 	if (do_seclvl_advance(val)) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Failure advancing security level "
-			      "to %lu\n", val);
+			      "to %d\n", val);
+		err = -EINVAL;
 	}
-	return count;
+
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+	return err;
 }
 
-/* Generate sysfs_attr_seclvl */
-static struct seclvl_attribute sysfs_attr_seclvl =
-__ATTR(seclvl, (S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR), seclvl_read_file,
-       seclvl_write_file);
+static struct file_operations seclvl_file_ops = {
+	.read = seclvl_read_file,
+	.write = seclvl_write_file,
+};
 
 static unsigned char hashedPassword[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
 /**
- * Called whenever the user reads the sysfs passwd handle.
- */
-static ssize_t seclvl_read_passwd(struct seclvl_obj *obj, char *buff)
-{
-	/* So just how good *is* your password? :-) */
-	char tmp[3];
-	int i = 0;
-	buff[0] = '\0';
-	if (hideHash) {
-		/* Security through obscurity */
-		return 0;
-	}
-	while (i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
-		snprintf(tmp, 3, "%02x", hashedPassword[i]);
-		strncat(buff, tmp, 2);
-		i++;
-	}
-	strcat(buff, "\n");
-	return ((SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2) + 1);
-}
-
-/**
  * Converts a block of plaintext of into its SHA1 hashed value.
  *
  * It would be nice if crypto had a wrapper to do this for us linear

@@ -347,12 +291,15 @@
  * object.  It hashes the password and compares the hashed results.
  */
 static ssize_t
-seclvl_write_passwd(struct seclvl_obj *obj, const char *buff, size_t count)
+passwd_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int i;
 	unsigned char tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	char *page;
 	int rc;
 	int len;
+
 	if (!*passwd && !*sha1_passwd) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Attempt to password-unlock the "
 			      "seclvl module, but neither a plain text "

@@ -363,13 +310,26 @@
 			      "maintainer about this event.\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	len = strlen(buff);
+
+	if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	len = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+		goto out;
+	
+	len = strlen(page);
 	/* ``echo "secret" > seclvl/passwd'' includes a newline */
-	if (buff[len - 1] == '\n') {
+	if (page[len - 1] == '\n') {
 		len--;
 	}
 	/* Hash the password, then compare the hashed values */
-	if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, buff, len))) {
+	if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, page, len))) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error hashing password: rc = "
 			      "[%d]\n", rc);
 		return rc;

@@ -382,13 +342,16 @@
 	seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO,
 		      "Password accepted; seclvl reduced to 0.\n");
 	seclvl = 0;
-	return count;
+	len = count;
+
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+	return len;
 }
 
-/* Generate sysfs_attr_passwd */
-static struct seclvl_attribute sysfs_attr_passwd =
-__ATTR(passwd, (S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR), seclvl_read_passwd,
-       seclvl_write_passwd);
+static struct file_operations passwd_file_ops = {
+	.write = passwd_write_file,
+};
 
 /**
  * Explicitely disallow ptrace'ing the init process.

@@ -647,22 +610,34 @@
 }
 
 /**
- * Sysfs registrations
+ * securityfs registrations
  */
-static int doSysfsRegistrations(void)
+struct dentry *dir_ino, *seclvl_ino, *passwd_ino;
+
+static int seclvlfs_register(void)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
-	if ((rc = subsystem_register(&seclvl_subsys))) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_WARNING,
-			      "Error [%d] registering seclvl subsystem\n", rc);
-		return rc;
-	}
-	sysfs_create_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj, &sysfs_attr_seclvl.attr);
+	dir_ino = securityfs_create_dir("seclvl", NULL);
+	if (!dir_ino)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	seclvl_ino = securityfs_create_file("seclvl", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
+				dir_ino, NULL, &seclvl_file_ops);
+	if (!seclvl_ino)
+		goto out_deldir;
 	if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) {
-		sysfs_create_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj,
-				  &sysfs_attr_passwd.attr);
+		passwd_ino = securityfs_create_file("passwd", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
+				dir_ino, NULL, &passwd_file_ops);
+		if (!passwd_ino)
+			goto out_delf;
 	}
 	return 0;
+
+out_deldir:
+	securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
+out_delf:
+	securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
+
+	return -EFAULT;
 }
 
 /**

@@ -677,8 +652,6 @@
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto exit;
 	}
-	sysfs_attr_seclvl.attr.owner = THIS_MODULE;
-	sysfs_attr_passwd.attr.owner = THIS_MODULE;
 	if (initlvl < -1 || initlvl > 2) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: bad initial securelevel "
 			      "[%d].\n", initlvl);

@@ -706,7 +679,7 @@
 		}		/* if primary module registered */
 		secondary = 1;
 	}			/* if we registered ourselves with the security framework */
-	if ((rc = doSysfsRegistrations())) {
+	if ((rc = seclvlfs_register())) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error registering with sysfs\n");
 		goto exit;
 	}

@@ -724,12 +697,11 @@
  */
 static void __exit seclvl_exit(void)
 {
-	sysfs_remove_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj, &sysfs_attr_seclvl.attr);
+	securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
 	if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) {
-		sysfs_remove_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj,
-				  &sysfs_attr_passwd.attr);
+		securityfs_remove(passwd_ino);
 	}
-	subsystem_unregister(&seclvl_subsys);
+	securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
 	if (secondary == 1) {
 		mod_unreg_security(MY_NAME, &seclvl_ops);
 	} else if (unregister_security(&seclvl_ops)) {

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/inode.c
===================================================================
@@ -330,6 +330,116 @@ static void __exit securityfs_exit(void)
 	subsystem_unregister(&security_subsys);
 }
 
+/* mostly copied from fs/libfs.c:simple_attr */
+struct secfs_int_attr {
+	int (*get)(void *);
+	int (*set)(void *, int);
+	char get_buf[24];	/* enough to store an int and "\n\0" */
+	char set_buf[24];
+	void *data;
+	const char *fmt;	/* format for read operation */
+	struct semaphore sem;	/* protects access to these buffers */
+};
+
+int open_file_int(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+		     int (*get)(void *), int (*set)(void *, int),
+		     const char *fmt)
+{
+	struct secfs_int_attr *attr;
+
+	attr = kmalloc(sizeof(*attr), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!attr)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	attr->get = get;
+	attr->set = set;
+	attr->data = inode->u.generic_ip;
+	attr->fmt = fmt;
+	init_MUTEX(&attr->sem);
+
+	file->private_data = attr;
+
+	return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
+}
+
+int close_file_int(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	kfree(file->private_data);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+ssize_t read_file_int(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct secfs_int_attr *attr;
+	size_t size;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	attr = file->private_data;
+
+	if (!attr->get)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	down(&attr->sem);
+	if (*ppos) /* continued read */
+		size = strlen(attr->get_buf);
+	else	  /* first read */
+		size = scnprintf(attr->get_buf, sizeof(attr->get_buf),
+				 attr->fmt,
+				 (unsigned long long)attr->get(attr->data));
+
+	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, attr->get_buf, size);
+	up(&attr->sem);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+ssize_t write_file_int(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct secfs_int_attr *attr;
+	int val;
+	size_t size;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	attr = file->private_data;
+
+	if (!attr->set)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	down(&attr->sem);
+	ret = -EFAULT;
+	size = min(sizeof(attr->set_buf) - 1, count);
+	if (copy_from_user(attr->set_buf, user_buf, size))
+		goto out;
+
+	attr->set_buf[size] = '\0';
+	val = simple_strtol(attr->set_buf, NULL, 0);
+	ret = attr->set(attr->data, val);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+	ret = count; /* claim we got the whole input */
+out:
+	up(&attr->sem);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void secfs_int_set(void *data, int val)
+{
+	*(int *)data = val;
+}
+
+int secfs_int_get(void *data)
+{
+	return *(int *)data;
+}
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(read_file_int);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(close_file_int);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(open_file_int);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(write_file_int);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secfs_int_set);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secfs_int_get);
+
 core_initcall(securityfs_init);
 module_exit(securityfs_exit);
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/security.h
===================================================================
@@ -1977,6 +1977,30 @@ static inline int security_netlink_recv(
 	return security_ops->netlink_recv(skb);
 }
 
+#define SECFS_DEFINE_INT_FILE(__fops, __get, __set, __fmt)		\
+static int __fops ## _open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)	\
+{									\
+	return open_file_int(inode, file, __get, __set, __fmt);		\
+}									\
+static struct file_operations __fops = {				\
+	.owner	 = THIS_MODULE,						\
+	.open	 = __fops ## _open,					\
+	.release = close_file_int,					\
+	.read	 = read_file_int,					\
+	.write	 = write_file_int,					\
+};
+
+int open_file_int(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+		     int (*get)(void *), int (*set)(void *, int),
+		     const char *fmt);
+int close_file_int(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);
+ssize_t read_file_int(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
+ssize_t write_file_int(struct file *file, const char __user *user_buf,
+			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos);
+void secfs_int_set(void *data, int val);
+int secfs_int_get(void *data);
+
 /* prototypes */
 extern int security_init	(void);
 extern int register_security	(struct security_operations *ops);

108 lines not on this page · raw message

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/seclvl.c
===================================================================
@@ -119,69 +119,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(hideHash, "When set to 
 	} while (0)
 
 /**
- * kobject stuff
- */
-
-struct subsystem seclvl_subsys;
-
-struct seclvl_obj {
-	char *name;
-	struct list_head slot_list;
-	struct kobject kobj;
-};
-
-/**
- * There is a seclvl_attribute struct for each file in sysfs.
- *
- * In our case, we have one of these structs for "passwd" and another
- * for "seclvl".
- */
-struct seclvl_attribute {
-	struct attribute attr;
-	ssize_t(*show) (struct seclvl_obj *, char *);
-	ssize_t(*store) (struct seclvl_obj *, const char *, size_t);
-};
-
-/**
- * When this function is called, one of the files in sysfs is being
- * written to.  attribute->store is a function pointer to whatever the
- * struct seclvl_attribute store function pointer points to.  It is
- * unique for "passwd" and "seclvl".
- */
-static ssize_t
-seclvl_attr_store(struct kobject *kobj,
-		  struct attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t len)
-{
-	struct seclvl_obj *obj = container_of(kobj, struct seclvl_obj, kobj);
-	struct seclvl_attribute *attribute =
-	    container_of(attr, struct seclvl_attribute, attr);
-	return attribute->store ? attribute->store(obj, buf, len) : -EIO;
-}
-
-static ssize_t
-seclvl_attr_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, char *buf)
-{
-	struct seclvl_obj *obj = container_of(kobj, struct seclvl_obj, kobj);
-	struct seclvl_attribute *attribute =
-	    container_of(attr, struct seclvl_attribute, attr);
-	return attribute->show ? attribute->show(obj, buf) : -EIO;
-}
-
-/**
- * Callback function pointers for show and store
- */
-static struct sysfs_ops seclvlfs_sysfs_ops = {
-	.show = seclvl_attr_show,
-	.store = seclvl_attr_store,
-};
-
-static struct kobj_type seclvl_ktype = {
-	.sysfs_ops = &seclvlfs_sysfs_ops
-};
-
-decl_subsys(seclvl, &seclvl_ktype, NULL);
-
-/**
  * The actual security level.  Ranges between -1 and 2 inclusive.
  */
 static int seclvl;

@@ -194,6 +131,11 @@ static int secondary;
 /**
  * Verifies that the requested secure level is valid, given the current
  * secure level.
+ *
+ * security level advancement rules:
+ *   Valid levels are -1 through 2, inclusive.
+ *   From -1, stuck.  [ in case compiled into kernel ]
+ *   From 0 or above, can only increment.
  */
 static int seclvl_sanity(int reqlvl)
 {

@@ -202,6 +144,11 @@ static int seclvl_sanity(int reqlvl)
 			      "range: [%d]\n", reqlvl);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+	if (seclvl == -1) {
+		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Not allowed to switch from "
+			      "seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl);
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
 	if ((seclvl == 0) && (reqlvl == -1))
 		return 0;
 	if (reqlvl < seclvl) {

@@ -216,36 +163,15 @@ static int seclvl_sanity(int reqlvl)
  * Called whenever the user reads the sysfs handle to this kernel
  * object
  */
-static ssize_t seclvl_read_file(struct seclvl_obj *obj, char *buff)
+#define TMPBUFLEN 12
+static ssize_t seclvl_read_file(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	return snprintf(buff, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", seclvl);
-}
+	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t length;
 
-/**
- * security level advancement rules:
- *   Valid levels are -1 through 2, inclusive.
- *   From -1, stuck.  [ in case compiled into kernel ]
- *   From 0 or above, can only increment.
- */
-static int do_seclvl_advance(int newlvl)
-{
-	if (newlvl <= seclvl) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Cannot advance to seclvl "
-			      "[%d]\n", newlvl);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (newlvl > 2) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Cannot advance to seclvl "
-			      "[%d]\n", newlvl);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	if (seclvl == -1) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Not allowed to advance to "
-			      "seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl);
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-	seclvl = newlvl;
-	return 0;
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d\n", seclvl);
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
 /**

@@ -253,57 +179,38 @@ static int do_seclvl_advance(int newlvl)
  * object (seclvl/seclvl).  It expects a single-digit number.
  */
 static ssize_t
-seclvl_write_file(struct seclvl_obj *obj, const char *buff, size_t count)
+seclvl_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * user_buf,
+			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	unsigned long val;
-	if (count > 2 || (count == 2 && buff[1] != '\n')) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Invalid value passed to "
-			      "seclvl: [%s]\n", buff);
+	int newlvl;
+	int buf_size;
+	char buf[32];
+
+	buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf)-1));
+	if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (sscanf(buf, "%d\n", &newlvl) != 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	val = buff[0] - 48;
-	if (seclvl_sanity(val)) {
+
+	if (seclvl_sanity(newlvl)) {
 		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Illegal secure level "
-			      "requested: [%d]\n", (int)val);
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-	if (do_seclvl_advance(val)) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Failure advancing security level "
-			      "to %lu\n", val);
+			      "requested: [%d]\n", newlvl);
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+
+	seclvl = newlvl;
 	return count;
 }
 
-/* Generate sysfs_attr_seclvl */
-static struct seclvl_attribute sysfs_attr_seclvl =
-__ATTR(seclvl, (S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR), seclvl_read_file,
-       seclvl_write_file);
+static struct file_operations seclvl_file_ops = {
+	.read = seclvl_read_file,
+	.write = seclvl_write_file,
+};
 
 static unsigned char hashedPassword[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
 /**
- * Called whenever the user reads the sysfs passwd handle.
- */
-static ssize_t seclvl_read_passwd(struct seclvl_obj *obj, char *buff)
-{
-	/* So just how good *is* your password? :-) */
-	char tmp[3];
-	int i = 0;
-	buff[0] = '\0';
-	if (hideHash) {
-		/* Security through obscurity */
-		return 0;
-	}
-	while (i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
-		snprintf(tmp, 3, "%02x", hashedPassword[i]);
-		strncat(buff, tmp, 2);
-		i++;
-	}
-	strcat(buff, "\n");
-	return ((SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2) + 1);
-}
-
-/**
  * Converts a block of plaintext of into its SHA1 hashed value.
  *
  * It would be nice if crypto had a wrapper to do this for us linear

@@ -347,12 +254,15 @@ plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, c
  * object.  It hashes the password and compares the hashed results.
  */
 static ssize_t
-seclvl_write_passwd(struct seclvl_obj *obj, const char *buff, size_t count)
+passwd_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int i;
 	unsigned char tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	char *page;
 	int rc;
 	int len;
+
 	if (!*passwd && !*sha1_passwd) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Attempt to password-unlock the "
 			      "seclvl module, but neither a plain text "

@@ -363,13 +273,26 @@ seclvl_write_passwd(struct seclvl_obj *o
 			      "maintainer about this event.\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	len = strlen(buff);
+
+	if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	len = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+		goto out;
+	
+	len = strlen(page);
 	/* ``echo "secret" > seclvl/passwd'' includes a newline */
-	if (buff[len - 1] == '\n') {
+	if (page[len - 1] == '\n') {
 		len--;
 	}
 	/* Hash the password, then compare the hashed values */
-	if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, buff, len))) {
+	if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, page, len))) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error hashing password: rc = "
 			      "[%d]\n", rc);
 		return rc;

@@ -382,13 +305,16 @@ seclvl_write_passwd(struct seclvl_obj *o
 	seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO,
 		      "Password accepted; seclvl reduced to 0.\n");
 	seclvl = 0;
-	return count;
+	len = count;
+
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+	return len;
 }
 
-/* Generate sysfs_attr_passwd */
-static struct seclvl_attribute sysfs_attr_passwd =
-__ATTR(passwd, (S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR), seclvl_read_passwd,
-       seclvl_write_passwd);
+static struct file_operations passwd_file_ops = {
+	.write = passwd_write_file,
+};
 
 /**
  * Explicitely disallow ptrace'ing the init process.

@@ -647,22 +573,34 @@ static int processPassword(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * Sysfs registrations
+ * securityfs registrations
  */
-static int doSysfsRegistrations(void)
+struct dentry *dir_ino, *seclvl_ino, *passwd_ino;
+
+static int seclvlfs_register(void)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
-	if ((rc = subsystem_register(&seclvl_subsys))) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_WARNING,
-			      "Error [%d] registering seclvl subsystem\n", rc);
-		return rc;
-	}
-	sysfs_create_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj, &sysfs_attr_seclvl.attr);
+	dir_ino = securityfs_create_dir("seclvl", NULL);
+	if (!dir_ino)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	seclvl_ino = securityfs_create_file("seclvl", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
+				dir_ino, NULL, &seclvl_file_ops);
+	if (!seclvl_ino)
+		goto out_deldir;
 	if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) {
-		sysfs_create_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj,
-				  &sysfs_attr_passwd.attr);
+		passwd_ino = securityfs_create_file("passwd", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
+				dir_ino, NULL, &passwd_file_ops);
+		if (!passwd_ino)
+			goto out_delf;
 	}
 	return 0;
+
+out_deldir:
+	securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
+out_delf:
+	securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
+
+	return -EFAULT;
 }
 
 /**

@@ -677,8 +615,6 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto exit;
 	}
-	sysfs_attr_seclvl.attr.owner = THIS_MODULE;
-	sysfs_attr_passwd.attr.owner = THIS_MODULE;
 	if (initlvl < -1 || initlvl > 2) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: bad initial securelevel "
 			      "[%d].\n", initlvl);

@@ -706,7 +642,7 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
 		}		/* if primary module registered */
 		secondary = 1;
 	}			/* if we registered ourselves with the security framework */
-	if ((rc = doSysfsRegistrations())) {
+	if ((rc = seclvlfs_register())) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error registering with sysfs\n");
 		goto exit;
 	}

@@ -724,12 +660,11 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
  */
 static void __exit seclvl_exit(void)
 {
-	sysfs_remove_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj, &sysfs_attr_seclvl.attr);
+	securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
 	if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) {
-		sysfs_remove_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj,
-				  &sysfs_attr_passwd.attr);
+		securityfs_remove(passwd_ino);
 	}
-	subsystem_unregister(&seclvl_subsys);
+	securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
 	if (secondary == 1) {
 		mod_unreg_security(MY_NAME, &seclvl_ops);
 	} else if (unregister_security(&seclvl_ops)) {

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/fs.h
===================================================================
@@ -1717,7 +1717,6 @@ static inline void simple_transaction_se
 #define DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(__fops, __get, __set, __fmt)		\
 static int __fops ## _open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)	\
 {									\
-	__simple_attr_check_format(__fmt, 0ull);			\
 	return simple_attr_open(inode, file, __get, __set, __fmt);	\
 }									\
 static struct file_operations __fops = {				\

323 lines not on this page · raw message

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/include/linux/fs.h
===================================================================
@@ -1717,7 +1717,6 @@ static inline void simple_transaction_se
 #define DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(__fops, __get, __set, __fmt)		\
 static int __fops ## _open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)	\
 {									\
-	__simple_attr_check_format(__fmt, 0ull);			\
 	return simple_attr_open(inode, file, __get, __set, __fmt);	\
 }									\
 static struct file_operations __fops = {				\

323 lines not on this page · raw message

Index: linux-2.6.13-rc1/security/seclvl.c
===================================================================
@@ -119,69 +119,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(hideHash, "When set to 
 	} while (0)
 
 /**
- * kobject stuff
- */
-
-struct subsystem seclvl_subsys;
-
-struct seclvl_obj {
-	char *name;
-	struct list_head slot_list;
-	struct kobject kobj;
-};
-
-/**
- * There is a seclvl_attribute struct for each file in sysfs.
- *
- * In our case, we have one of these structs for "passwd" and another
- * for "seclvl".
- */
-struct seclvl_attribute {
-	struct attribute attr;
-	ssize_t(*show) (struct seclvl_obj *, char *);
-	ssize_t(*store) (struct seclvl_obj *, const char *, size_t);
-};
-
-/**
- * When this function is called, one of the files in sysfs is being
- * written to.  attribute->store is a function pointer to whatever the
- * struct seclvl_attribute store function pointer points to.  It is
- * unique for "passwd" and "seclvl".
- */
-static ssize_t
-seclvl_attr_store(struct kobject *kobj,
-		  struct attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t len)
-{
-	struct seclvl_obj *obj = container_of(kobj, struct seclvl_obj, kobj);
-	struct seclvl_attribute *attribute =
-	    container_of(attr, struct seclvl_attribute, attr);
-	return attribute->store ? attribute->store(obj, buf, len) : -EIO;
-}
-
-static ssize_t
-seclvl_attr_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, char *buf)
-{
-	struct seclvl_obj *obj = container_of(kobj, struct seclvl_obj, kobj);
-	struct seclvl_attribute *attribute =
-	    container_of(attr, struct seclvl_attribute, attr);
-	return attribute->show ? attribute->show(obj, buf) : -EIO;
-}
-
-/**
- * Callback function pointers for show and store
- */
-static struct sysfs_ops seclvlfs_sysfs_ops = {
-	.show = seclvl_attr_show,
-	.store = seclvl_attr_store,
-};
-
-static struct kobj_type seclvl_ktype = {
-	.sysfs_ops = &seclvlfs_sysfs_ops
-};
-
-decl_subsys(seclvl, &seclvl_ktype, NULL);
-
-/**
  * The actual security level.  Ranges between -1 and 2 inclusive.
  */
 static int seclvl;

@@ -213,97 +150,44 @@ static int seclvl_sanity(int reqlvl)
 }
 
 /**
- * Called whenever the user reads the sysfs handle to this kernel
- * object
- */
-static ssize_t seclvl_read_file(struct seclvl_obj *obj, char *buff)
-{
-	return snprintf(buff, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", seclvl);
-}
-
-/**
  * security level advancement rules:
  *   Valid levels are -1 through 2, inclusive.
  *   From -1, stuck.  [ in case compiled into kernel ]
  *   From 0 or above, can only increment.
  */
-static int do_seclvl_advance(int newlvl)
+static void do_seclvl_advance(void *data, u64 val)
 {
-	if (newlvl <= seclvl) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Cannot advance to seclvl "
-			      "[%d]\n", newlvl);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+	int ret;
+	int newlvl = (int)val;
+
+	ret = seclvl_sanity(newlvl);
+	if (ret)
+		return;
+
 	if (newlvl > 2) {
 		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Cannot advance to seclvl "
 			      "[%d]\n", newlvl);
-		return -EINVAL;
+		return;
 	}
 	if (seclvl == -1) {
 		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Not allowed to advance to "
 			      "seclvl [%d]\n", seclvl);
-		return -EPERM;
+		return;
 	}
-	seclvl = newlvl;
-	return 0;
+	seclvl = newlvl;  /* would it be more "correct" to set *data? */
+	return;
 }
 
-/**
- * Called whenever the user writes to the sysfs handle to this kernel
- * object (seclvl/seclvl).  It expects a single-digit number.
- */
-static ssize_t
-seclvl_write_file(struct seclvl_obj *obj, const char *buff, size_t count)
+static u64 seclvl_int_get(void *data)
 {
-	unsigned long val;
-	if (count > 2 || (count == 2 && buff[1] != '\n')) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Invalid value passed to "
-			      "seclvl: [%s]\n", buff);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-	val = buff[0] - 48;
-	if (seclvl_sanity(val)) {
-		seclvl_printk(1, KERN_WARNING, "Illegal secure level "
-			      "requested: [%d]\n", (int)val);
-		return -EPERM;
-	}
-	if (do_seclvl_advance(val)) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Failure advancing security level "
-			      "to %lu\n", val);
-	}
-	return count;
+	return *(int *)data;
 }
 
-/* Generate sysfs_attr_seclvl */
-static struct seclvl_attribute sysfs_attr_seclvl =
-__ATTR(seclvl, (S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR), seclvl_read_file,
-       seclvl_write_file);
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(seclvl_file_ops, seclvl_int_get, do_seclvl_advance, "%lld\n");
 
 static unsigned char hashedPassword[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
 /**
- * Called whenever the user reads the sysfs passwd handle.
- */
-static ssize_t seclvl_read_passwd(struct seclvl_obj *obj, char *buff)
-{
-	/* So just how good *is* your password? :-) */
-	char tmp[3];
-	int i = 0;
-	buff[0] = '\0';
-	if (hideHash) {
-		/* Security through obscurity */
-		return 0;
-	}
-	while (i < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) {
-		snprintf(tmp, 3, "%02x", hashedPassword[i]);
-		strncat(buff, tmp, 2);
-		i++;
-	}
-	strcat(buff, "\n");
-	return ((SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE * 2) + 1);
-}
-
-/**
  * Converts a block of plaintext of into its SHA1 hashed value.
  *
  * It would be nice if crypto had a wrapper to do this for us linear

@@ -347,12 +231,15 @@ plaintext_to_sha1(unsigned char *hash, c
  * object.  It hashes the password and compares the hashed results.
  */
 static ssize_t
-seclvl_write_passwd(struct seclvl_obj *obj, const char *buff, size_t count)
+passwd_write_file(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
+				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	int i;
 	unsigned char tmp[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	char *page;
 	int rc;
 	int len;
+
 	if (!*passwd && !*sha1_passwd) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Attempt to password-unlock the "
 			      "seclvl module, but neither a plain text "

@@ -363,13 +250,26 @@ seclvl_write_passwd(struct seclvl_obj *o
 			      "maintainer about this event.\n");
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	len = strlen(buff);
+
+	if (count < 0 || count >= PAGE_SIZE)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (*ppos != 0) {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	page = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	len = -EFAULT;
+	if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count))
+		goto out;
+	
+	len = strlen(page);
 	/* ``echo "secret" > seclvl/passwd'' includes a newline */
-	if (buff[len - 1] == '\n') {
+	if (page[len - 1] == '\n') {
 		len--;
 	}
 	/* Hash the password, then compare the hashed values */
-	if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, buff, len))) {
+	if ((rc = plaintext_to_sha1(tmp, page, len))) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error hashing password: rc = "
 			      "[%d]\n", rc);
 		return rc;

@@ -382,13 +282,16 @@ seclvl_write_passwd(struct seclvl_obj *o
 	seclvl_printk(0, KERN_INFO,
 		      "Password accepted; seclvl reduced to 0.\n");
 	seclvl = 0;
-	return count;
+	len = count;
+
+out:
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+	return len;
 }
 
-/* Generate sysfs_attr_passwd */
-static struct seclvl_attribute sysfs_attr_passwd =
-__ATTR(passwd, (S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR), seclvl_read_passwd,
-       seclvl_write_passwd);
+static struct file_operations passwd_file_ops = {
+	.write = passwd_write_file,
+};
 
 /**
  * Explicitely disallow ptrace'ing the init process.

@@ -647,22 +550,34 @@ static int processPassword(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * Sysfs registrations
+ * securityfs registrations
  */
-static int doSysfsRegistrations(void)
+struct dentry *dir_ino, *seclvl_ino, *passwd_ino;
+
+static int seclvlfs_register(void)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
-	if ((rc = subsystem_register(&seclvl_subsys))) {
-		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_WARNING,
-			      "Error [%d] registering seclvl subsystem\n", rc);
-		return rc;
-	}
-	sysfs_create_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj, &sysfs_attr_seclvl.attr);
+	dir_ino = securityfs_create_dir("seclvl", NULL);
+	if (!dir_ino)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	seclvl_ino = securityfs_create_file("seclvl", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
+				dir_ino, &seclvl, &seclvl_file_ops);
+	if (!seclvl_ino)
+		goto out_deldir;
 	if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) {
-		sysfs_create_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj,
-				  &sysfs_attr_passwd.attr);
+		passwd_ino = securityfs_create_file("passwd", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
+				dir_ino, NULL, &passwd_file_ops);
+		if (!passwd_ino)
+			goto out_delf;
 	}
 	return 0;
+
+out_deldir:
+	securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
+out_delf:
+	securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
+
+	return -EFAULT;
 }
 
 /**

@@ -677,8 +592,6 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto exit;
 	}
-	sysfs_attr_seclvl.attr.owner = THIS_MODULE;
-	sysfs_attr_passwd.attr.owner = THIS_MODULE;
 	if (initlvl < -1 || initlvl > 2) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error: bad initial securelevel "
 			      "[%d].\n", initlvl);

@@ -706,7 +619,7 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
 		}		/* if primary module registered */
 		secondary = 1;
 	}			/* if we registered ourselves with the security framework */
-	if ((rc = doSysfsRegistrations())) {
+	if ((rc = seclvlfs_register())) {
 		seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR, "Error registering with sysfs\n");
 		goto exit;
 	}

@@ -724,12 +637,11 @@ static int __init seclvl_init(void)
  */
 static void __exit seclvl_exit(void)
 {
-	sysfs_remove_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj, &sysfs_attr_seclvl.attr);
+	securityfs_remove(seclvl_ino);
 	if (*passwd || *sha1_passwd) {
-		sysfs_remove_file(&seclvl_subsys.kset.kobj,
-				  &sysfs_attr_passwd.attr);
+		securityfs_remove(passwd_ino);
 	}
-	subsystem_unregister(&seclvl_subsys);
+	securityfs_remove(dir_ino);
 	if (secondary == 1) {
 		mod_unreg_security(MY_NAME, &seclvl_ops);
 	} else if (unregister_security(&seclvl_ops)) {

Index: linux-2.6.12/security/stacker.c
===================================================================
@@ -33,13 +33,13 @@
 
 struct module_entry {
 	struct list_head lsm_list;  /* list of active lsms */
-	struct list_head all_lsms; /* list of all lsms */
 	char *module_name;
 	int namelen;
 	struct security_operations module_operations;
+	struct rcu_head m_rcu;
+	atomic_t use;
 };
 static struct list_head stacked_modules;  /* list of stacked modules */
-static struct list_head all_modules;  /* list of all modules, including freed */
 
 static short sysfsfiles_registered;
 

@@ -84,6 +84,32 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Debug enabled o
  * We return as soon as an error is returned.
  */
 
+static inline void stacker_free_module(struct module_entry *m)
+{
+	kfree(m->module_name);
+	kfree(m);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Version of stacker_free_module called from call_rcu
+ */
+static void free_mod_fromrcu(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct module_entry *m;
+
+	m = container_of(head, struct module_entry, m_rcu);
+	stacker_free_module(m);
+}
+
+static void stacker_del_module(struct rcu_head *head)
+{
+	struct module_entry *m;
+	
+	m = container_of(head, struct module_entry, m_rcu);
+	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&m->use))
+		stacker_free_module(m);
+}
+
 #define stack_for_each_entry(pos, head, member)				\
 	for (pos = list_entry((head)->next, typeof(*pos), member);	\
 		&pos->member != (head);					\

@@ -93,16 +119,27 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Debug enabled o
 /* to make this safe for module deletion, we would need to
  * add a reference count to m as we had before
  */
+/*
+ * XXX We can't quite do this - we delete the module before we grab
+ * m->next?
+ * We could just do a call_rcu.  Then the call_rcu happens in same
+ * rcu cycle has dereference, so module won't be deleted until the
+ * next cycle.
+ * That's what I'm going to do.
+ */
 #define RETURN_ERROR_IF_ANY_ERROR(BASE_FUNC, FUNC_WITH_ARGS) do { \
 	int result = 0; \
 	struct module_entry *m; \
 	rcu_read_lock(); \
 	stack_for_each_entry(m, &stacked_modules, lsm_list) { \
-		if (!m->module_operations.BASE_FUNC) \
-			continue; \
-		rcu_read_unlock(); \
-		result = m->module_operations.FUNC_WITH_ARGS; \
-		rcu_read_lock(); \
+		if (m->module_operations.BASE_FUNC) { \
+			atomic_inc(&m->use); \
+			rcu_read_unlock(); \
+			result = m->module_operations.FUNC_WITH_ARGS; \
+			rcu_read_lock(); \
+			if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&m->use))) \
+				call_rcu(&m->m_rcu, free_mod_fromrcu); \
+		} \
 		if (result) \
 			break; \
 	} \

@@ -116,9 +153,12 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Debug enabled o
 	rcu_read_lock(); \
 	stack_for_each_entry(m, &stacked_modules, lsm_list) { \
 		if (m->module_operations.BASE_FUNC) { \
+			atomic_inc(&m->use); \
 			rcu_read_unlock(); \
 			m->module_operations.FUNC_WITH_ARGS; \
 			rcu_read_lock(); \
+			if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&m->use))) \
+				call_rcu(&m->m_rcu, free_mod_fromrcu); \
 		} \
 	} \
 	rcu_read_unlock(); \

@@ -129,38 +169,47 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(debug, "Debug enabled o
 	rcu_read_lock(); \
 	stack_for_each_entry(m, &stacked_modules, lsm_list ) { \
 		if (m->module_operations.BASE_FREE) { \
+			atomic_inc(&m->use); \
 			rcu_read_unlock(); \
 			m->module_operations.FREE_WITH_ARGS; \
 			rcu_read_lock(); \
+			if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&m->use))) \
+				call_rcu(&m->m_rcu, free_mod_fromrcu); \
 		} \
 	} \
 	rcu_read_unlock(); \
 } while (0)
 
 #define ALLOC_SECURITY(BASE_FUNC,FUNC_WITH_ARGS,BASE_FREE,FREE_WITH_ARGS) do { \
-	int result; \
+	int result = 0; \
 	struct module_entry *m, *m2; \
 	rcu_read_lock(); \
 	stack_for_each_entry(m, &stacked_modules, lsm_list) { \
-		if (!m->module_operations.BASE_FUNC) \
-			continue; \
-		rcu_read_unlock(); \
-		result = m->module_operations.FUNC_WITH_ARGS; \
-		rcu_read_lock(); \
+		if (m->module_operations.BASE_FUNC) { \
+			atomic_inc(&m->use); \
+			rcu_read_unlock(); \
+			result = m->module_operations.FUNC_WITH_ARGS; \
+			rcu_read_lock(); \
+			if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&m->use))) \
+				call_rcu(&m->m_rcu, free_mod_fromrcu); \
+		} \
 		if (result) \
 			goto bad; \
 	} \
 	rcu_read_unlock(); \
 	return 0; \
 bad: \
-	stack_for_each_entry(m2, &all_modules, all_lsms) { \
+	stack_for_each_entry(m2, &stacked_modules, lsm_list) { \
 		if (m == m2) \
 			break; \
 		if (!m2->module_operations.BASE_FREE) \
 			continue; \
+		atomic_inc(&m2->use); \
 		rcu_read_unlock(); \
 		m2->module_operations.FREE_WITH_ARGS; \
 		rcu_read_lock(); \
+		if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&m2->use))) \
+			call_rcu(&m2->m_rcu, free_mod_fromrcu); \
 	} \
 	rcu_read_unlock(); \
 	return result; \

@@ -251,10 +300,16 @@ static int stacker_vm_enough_memory(long
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	stack_for_each_entry(m, &stacked_modules, lsm_list) {
-		if (!m->module_operations.vm_enough_memory)
+		if (!m->module_operations.vm_enough_memory) {
 			continue;
+		}
+		atomic_inc(&m->use);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		result = m->module_operations.vm_enough_memory(pages);
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&m->use)))
+			stacker_free_module(m);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
 		return result;
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();

@@ -281,9 +336,12 @@ static int stacker_netlink_send (struct 
 		if (!m->module_operations.netlink_send)
 			continue;
 		NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = ~0;
+		atomic_inc(&m->use);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		result = m->module_operations.netlink_send(sk, skb);
 		rcu_read_lock();
+		if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&m->use)))
+			call_rcu(&m->m_rcu, free_mod_fromrcu);
 		tmpcap &= NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap;
 		if (result)
 			break;

@@ -987,33 +1045,42 @@ stacker_getprocattr(struct task_struct *
 	stack_for_each_entry(m, &stacked_modules, lsm_list) {
 		if (!m->module_operations.getprocattr)
 			continue;
+		atomic_inc(&m->use);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		ret = m->module_operations.getprocattr(p, name,
 					value+len, size-len);
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		if (ret == -EINVAL)
-			continue;
-		found_noneinval = 1;
-		if (ret < 0) {
+		if (ret > 0) {
+			found_noneinval = 1;
+			len += ret;
+			if (len+m->namelen+4 < size) {
+				char *v = value;
+				if (v[len-1]=='\n')
+					len--;
+				len += sprintf(value+len, " (%s)\n",
+							m->module_name);
+			}
+		} else if (ret != -EINVAL) {
+			found_noneinval = 1;
 			memset(value, 0, len);
 			len = ret;
+		} else
+			ret = 0;
+
+		if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&m->use)))
+			call_rcu(&m->m_rcu, free_mod_fromrcu);
+
+		if (ret < 0)
 			break;
-		}
-		if (ret == 0)
-			continue;
-		len += ret;
-		if (len+m->namelen+4 < size) {
-			char *v = value;
-			if (v[len-1]=='\n')
-				len--;
-			len += sprintf(value+len, " (%s)\n", m->module_name);
-		}
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	return found_noneinval ? len : -EINVAL;
 }
 
+/*
+ * find an lsm by name.  If found, increment its use count and return it
+ */
 static struct module_entry *
 find_active_lsm(const char *name, int len)
 {

@@ -1022,6 +1089,7 @@ find_active_lsm(const char *name, int le
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	stack_for_each_entry(m, &stacked_modules, lsm_list) {
 		if (m->namelen == len && !strncmp(m->module_name, name, len)) {
+			atomic_inc(&m->use);
 			ret = m;
 			break;
 		}

@@ -1043,6 +1111,7 @@ stacker_setprocattr(struct task_struct *
 	char *realv = (char *)value;
 	size_t dsize = size;
 	int loc = 0, end_data = size;
+	int ret, free_module = 0;
 
 	if (list_empty(&stacked_modules))
 		return -EINVAL;

@@ -1063,7 +1132,7 @@ stacker_setprocattr(struct task_struct *
 	callm = find_active_lsm(realv+loc+1, dsize-loc-1);
 	if (!callm)
 		goto call;
-
+	free_module = 1;
 
 	loc--;
 	while (loc && realv[loc]==' ')

@@ -1074,8 +1143,14 @@ call:
 	if (!callm || !callm->module_operations.setprocattr)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return callm->module_operations.setprocattr(p, name, value, end_data) +
+	ret = callm->module_operations.setprocattr(p, name, value, end_data) +
 			(size-end_data);
+
+	if (free_module && atomic_dec_and_test(&callm->use))
+		stacker_free_module(callm);
+
+	return ret;
+
 }
 
 /*

@@ -1116,15 +1191,15 @@ static int stacker_register (const char 
 	new_module_entry->module_name = new_module_name;
 	new_module_entry->namelen = namelen;
 
+	atomic_set(&new_module_entry->use, 1);
+
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_module_entry->lsm_list);
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_module_entry->all_lsms);
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	if (!modules_registered) {
 		modules_registered++;
 		list_del_rcu(&default_module.lsm_list);
 	}
-	list_add_tail_rcu(&new_module_entry->all_lsms, &all_modules);
 	list_add_tail_rcu(&new_module_entry->lsm_list, &stacked_modules);
 	if (strcmp(name, "selinux") == 0)
 		selinux_module = new_module_entry;

@@ -1141,16 +1216,60 @@ out:
 }
 
 /*
- * Currently this version of stacker does not allow for module
- * unregistering.
- * Easy way to allow for this is using rcu ref counting like an older
- * version of stacker did.
- * Another way would be to force stacker_unregister to sleep between
- * removing the module from all_modules and free_modules and unloading it.
+ * find_lsm_module_by_name:
+ * Find a module by name.  Used by stacker_unregister.  Called with
+ * stacker spinlock held.
+ */
+static struct module_entry *
+find_lsm_with_namelen(const char *name, int len)
+{
+	struct module_entry *m, *ret = NULL;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &stacked_modules, lsm_list) {
+		atomic_inc(&m->use);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		if (m->namelen == len && !strncmp(m->module_name, name, len))
+			ret = m;
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		if (unlikely(atomic_dec_and_test(&m->use)))
+			call_rcu(&m->m_rcu, free_mod_fromrcu);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
  */
 static int stacker_unregister (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
 {
-	return -EPERM;
+	struct module_entry *m;
+	int len = strnlen(name, MAX_MODULE_NAME_LEN);
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	spin_lock(&stacker_lock);
+	m = find_lsm_with_namelen(name, len);
+
+	if (!m) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: could not find module %s.\n",
+				__FUNCTION__, name);
+		ret = -ENOENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	list_del_rcu(&m->lsm_list);
+
+	if (strcmp(m->module_name, "selinux") == 0)
+		selinux_module = NULL;
+	call_rcu(&m->m_rcu, stacker_del_module);
+
+out:
+	spin_unlock(&stacker_lock);
+
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static struct security_operations stacker_ops = {

@@ -1407,57 +1526,6 @@ static struct stacker_attribute stacker_
 	.show = listmodules_read,
 };
 
-/* respond to a request to unload a module */
-static ssize_t stacker_unload_write (struct stacker_kobj *obj, const char *name,
-					size_t count)
-{
-	struct module_entry *m;
-	int len = strnlen(name, MAX_MODULE_NAME_LEN);
-	int ret = count;
-
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
-
-	if (count <= 0)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (!modules_registered)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	spin_lock(&stacker_lock);
-	m = find_active_lsm(name, len);
-
-	if (!m) {
-		printk(KERN_INFO "%s: could not find module %s.\n",
-			__FUNCTION__, name);
-		ret = -ENOENT;
-		goto out;
-	}
-
-	if (strcmp(m->module_name, "selinux") == 0)
-		selinux_module = NULL;
-
-	rcu_read_lock();
-	list_del_rcu(&m->lsm_list);
-	if (list_empty(&stacked_modules)) {
-		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&default_module.lsm_list);
-		list_add_tail_rcu(&default_module.lsm_list, &stacked_modules);
-		modules_registered = 0;
-	}
-	rcu_read_unlock();
-
-out:
-	spin_unlock(&stacker_lock);
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static struct stacker_attribute stacker_attr_unload = {
-	.attr = {.name = "unload", .mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR},
-	.store = stacker_unload_write,
-};
-
-
 /* stop responding to sysfs */
 static ssize_t stop_responding_write (struct stacker_kobj *obj,
 					const char *buff, size_t count)

@@ -1483,7 +1551,6 @@ static void unregister_sysfs_files(void)
 	sysfs_remove_file(kobj, &stacker_attr_lockdown.attr);
 	sysfs_remove_file(kobj, &stacker_attr_listmodules.attr);
 	sysfs_remove_file(kobj, &stacker_attr_stop_responding.attr);
-	sysfs_remove_file(kobj, &stacker_attr_unload.attr);
 
 	sysfsfiles_registered = 0;
 }

@@ -1506,8 +1573,6 @@ static int register_sysfs_files(void)
 			&stacker_attr_listmodules.attr);
 	sysfs_create_file(&stacker_subsys.kset.kobj,
 			&stacker_attr_stop_responding.attr);
-	sysfs_create_file(&stacker_subsys.kset.kobj,
-			&stacker_attr_unload.attr);
 	sysfsfiles_registered = 1;
 	stacker_dbg("sysfs files registered\n");
 	return 0;

@@ -1524,13 +1589,13 @@ static int __init stacker_init (void)
 	sysfsfiles_registered = 0;
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&stacked_modules);
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&all_modules);
 	spin_lock_init(&stacker_lock);
 	default_module.module_name = DEFAULT_MODULE_NAME;
 	default_module.namelen = strlen(DEFAULT_MODULE_NAME);
 	memcpy(&default_module.module_operations, &dummy_security_ops,
 			sizeof(struct security_operations));
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&default_module.lsm_list);
+	atomic_set(&default_module.use, 1);
 	list_add_tail(&default_module.lsm_list, &stacked_modules);
 
 	if (register_security (&stacker_ops)) {

Index: linux-2.6.12/security/stacker.c
===================================================================
@@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ struct module_entry {
 };
 static struct list_head stacked_modules;  /* list of stacked modules */
 
-static short sysfsfiles_registered;
-
 /*
  * when !modules_registered, the default_module, defined
  * below, will be stacked

@@ -104,7 +102,7 @@ static void free_mod_fromrcu(struct rcu_
 static void stacker_del_module(struct rcu_head *head)
 {
 	struct module_entry *m;
-	
+
 	m = container_of(head, struct module_entry, m_rcu);
 	if (atomic_dec_and_test(&m->use))
 		stacker_free_module(m);

@@ -1430,155 +1428,95 @@ static struct security_operations stacke
 #endif
 };
 
-
-/*
- * Functions to provide the sysfs interface
- */
-
-/* A structure to pass into sysfs through kobjects */
-struct stacker_kobj {
-	struct list_head		slot_list;
-	struct kobject			kobj;
-};
-
-struct stacker_attribute {
-	struct attribute attr;
-	ssize_t (*show)(struct stacker_kobj *, char *);
-	ssize_t (*store)(struct stacker_kobj *, const char *, size_t);
-};
-
-/* variables to hold kobject/sysfs data */
-static struct subsystem stacker_subsys;
-
-static void unregister_sysfs_files(void);
-
-static ssize_t stacker_attr_store(struct kobject *kobj,
-		struct attribute *attr, const char *buf, size_t len)
-{
-	struct stacker_kobj *obj = container_of(kobj,
-			struct stacker_kobj, kobj);
-	struct stacker_attribute *attribute = container_of(attr,
-			struct stacker_attribute, attr);
-
-	return attribute->store ? attribute->store(obj, buf, len) : 0;
-}
-
-static ssize_t stacker_attr_show(struct kobject *kobj,
-		struct attribute *attr, char *buf)
+static u64 stacker_u8_get(void *data)
 {
-	struct stacker_kobj *obj = container_of(kobj,
-			struct stacker_kobj, kobj);
-	struct stacker_attribute *attribute = container_of(attr,
-			struct stacker_attribute, attr);
-
-	return attribute->show ? attribute->show(obj, buf) : 0;
+	return *(u8 *)data;
 }
 
-static struct sysfs_ops stacker_sysfs_ops = {
-	.show = stacker_attr_show,
-	.store = stacker_attr_store,
-};
-
-static struct kobj_type stacker_ktype = {
-	.sysfs_ops = &stacker_sysfs_ops
-};
-
-static decl_subsys(stacker, &stacker_ktype, NULL);
-
 /* Set lockdown */
-static ssize_t lockdown_read (struct stacker_kobj *obj, char *buff)
-{
-	return sprintf(buff, "%d", forbid_stacker_register);
-}
-
-static ssize_t lockdown_write (struct stacker_kobj *obj, const char *buff, size_t count)
+static void lockdown_write(void *data, u64 val)
 {
-	if (count>0)
-		forbid_stacker_register = 1;
-
-	return count;
+	forbid_stacker_register = 1;
 }
 
-static struct stacker_attribute stacker_attr_lockdown = {
-	.attr = {.name = "lockdown", .mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR},
-	.show = lockdown_read,
-	.store = lockdown_write
-};
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(lockdown_fops, stacker_u8_get, lockdown_write, "%llu\n");
 
 /* list modules */
-static ssize_t listmodules_read (struct stacker_kobj *obj, char *buff)
+static ssize_t listmodules_read ( struct file *filp, char __user *user_buf,
+				       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	ssize_t len = 0;
 	struct module_entry *m;
+	char *page;
+
+	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!page)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	stack_for_each_entry(m, &stacked_modules, lsm_list) {
-		len += snprintf(buff+len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "%s\n",
+		len += snprintf(page+len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "%s\n",
 			m->module_name);
 	}
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
+	if (len >= 0)
+		len = simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, page, len);
+	free_page((unsigned long)page);
+
 	return len;
 }
 
-static struct stacker_attribute stacker_attr_listmodules = {
-	.attr = {.name = "list_modules", .mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR},
-	.show = listmodules_read,
+static struct file_operations listmodules_fops = {
+	.read =		listmodules_read,
 };
 
+static void unregister_stacker_files(void);
+
 /* stop responding to sysfs */
-static ssize_t stop_responding_write (struct stacker_kobj *obj,
-					const char *buff, size_t count)
+static void stop_responding_write(void *data, u64 val)
 {
-	if (count>0)
-		unregister_sysfs_files();
-	return count;
+	unregister_stacker_files();
 }
 
-static struct stacker_attribute stacker_attr_stop_responding = {
-	.attr = {.name = "stop_responding", .mode = S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR},
-	.store = stop_responding_write
-};
-
-static void unregister_sysfs_files(void)
-{
-	struct kobject *kobj;
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(stopresp_fops, NULL, stop_responding_write, "%llu\n");
 
-	if (!sysfsfiles_registered)
-		return;
+struct dentry   * stacker_dir_ino,
+		* lockdown_ino,
+		* listmodules_ino,
+		* stopresp_ino,
+		* modunload_ino;
 
-	kobj = &stacker_subsys.kset.kobj;
-	sysfs_remove_file(kobj, &stacker_attr_lockdown.attr);
-	sysfs_remove_file(kobj, &stacker_attr_listmodules.attr);
-	sysfs_remove_file(kobj, &stacker_attr_stop_responding.attr);
-
-	sysfsfiles_registered = 0;
+static void unregister_stacker_files(void)
+{
+	securityfs_remove(stacker_dir_ino);
+	securityfs_remove(lockdown_ino);
+	securityfs_remove(listmodules_ino);
+	securityfs_remove(stopresp_ino);
 }
 
-static int register_sysfs_files(void)
+static int register_stacker_files(void)
 {
-	int result;
+	stacker_dir_ino = securityfs_create_dir("stacker", NULL);
+	if (!stacker_dir_ino)
+		return -EFAULT;
 
-	result = subsystem_register(&stacker_subsys);
-	if (result) {
-		printk(KERN_WARNING
-			"Error (%d) registering stacker sysfs subsystem\n",
-			result);
-		return result;
-	}
+	lockdown_ino = securityfs_create_file("lockdown", S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR,
+			stacker_dir_ino, &forbid_stacker_register,
+			&lockdown_fops);
+	listmodules_ino = securityfs_create_file("listmodules", S_IRUGO,
+			stacker_dir_ino, NULL, &listmodules_fops);
+	stopresp_ino = securityfs_create_file("stop_responding", S_IWUSR,
+			stacker_dir_ino, NULL, &stopresp_fops);
 
-	sysfs_create_file(&stacker_subsys.kset.kobj,
-			&stacker_attr_lockdown.attr);
-	sysfs_create_file(&stacker_subsys.kset.kobj,
-			&stacker_attr_listmodules.attr);
-	sysfs_create_file(&stacker_subsys.kset.kobj,
-			&stacker_attr_stop_responding.attr);
-	sysfsfiles_registered = 1;
-	stacker_dbg("sysfs files registered\n");
+	if (!lockdown_ino || !listmodules_ino || !stopresp_ino) {
+		unregister_stacker_files();
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 
-module_init(register_sysfs_files);
+module_init(register_stacker_files);
 
 extern struct security_operations dummy_security_ops;
 #define DEFAULT_MODULE_NAME "dummy"

@@ -1586,7 +1524,6 @@ extern struct security_operations dummy_
 static int __init stacker_init (void)
 {
 	forbid_stacker_register = 0;
-	sysfsfiles_registered = 0;
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&stacked_modules);
 	spin_lock_init(&stacker_lock);

@@ -1620,7 +1557,7 @@ static void __exit stacker_exit (void)
 	 * Should probably force all child modules to exit somehow...
 	 */
 
-	unregister_sysfs_files();
+	unregister_stacker_files();
 	if (unregister_security (&stacker_ops))
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "Error unregistering LSM stacker.\n");
 	else