2.6.13: can kill X server but readlink of /proc/<pid>/exe et. al. says EACCES. feature?
While I have access to /proc/<pid>, readlink fails with EACCES on
/proc/<pid>/exe /proc/<pid>/cwd /proc/<pid>/root
even when I own <pid> though it runs with a different effective/saved/fs uid such as the X server. This is a bit uncomfortable and doesn't seem right.
Or is this to make /proc mounting inside a chroot jail safe?
Signature · 1 line
Frank
Quoted 11 lines · Frank van Maarseveen
While I have access to /proc/<pid>, readlink fails with EACCES on
/proc/<pid>/exe /proc/<pid>/cwd /proc/<pid>/rooteven when I own <pid> though it runs with a different effective/saved/fs uid such as the X server. This is a bit uncomfortable and doesn't seem right.
Or is this to make /proc mounting inside a chroot jail safe?
suid-root task does chdir() to place you shouldn't be able to access. You do cd /proc/<pid>/cwd and get there anyway. Bad Things Happen...
Quoted 7 lines · On Tue, Sep 06, 2005 at 06:57:37PM +0100, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 6 lines · Frank van Maarseveen
While I have access to /proc/<pid>, readlink fails with EACCES on
/proc/<pid>/exe /proc/<pid>/cwd /proc/<pid>/root
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
even when I own <pid> though it runs with a different effective/saved/fs uid such as the X server. This is a bit uncomfortable and doesn't seem right.
Or is this to make /proc mounting inside a chroot jail safe?
suid-root task does
chdir()to place you shouldn't be able to access. You do cd /proc/<pid>/cwd and get there anyway. Bad Things Happen...
Ok, but being able to do readlink() does not mean that one can chdir(), usually.
Signature · 1 line
Frank
Quoted 12 lines · Frank van Maarseveen
Quoted 11 lines · On Tue, Sep 06, 2005 at 06:57:37PM +0100, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 10 lines · Frank van Maarseveen
While I have access to /proc/<pid>, readlink fails with EACCES on
/proc/<pid>/exe /proc/<pid>/cwd /proc/<pid>/rooteven when I own <pid> though it runs with a different effective/saved/fs uid such as the X server. This is a bit uncomfortable and doesn't seem right.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Or is this to make /proc mounting inside a chroot jail safe?
suid-root task does
chdir()to place you shouldn't be able to access. You do cd /proc/<pid>/cwd and get there anyway. Bad Things Happen...Ok, but being able to do
readlink()does not mean that one canchdir(), usually.
follow_link on these guys does _not_ traverse parent directories. So chdir() checks are more relaxed that way. Even if we made checks on readlink work differently, we would still get an information leak - e.g. if task had created a directory with pathname derived from sensitive data and did chdir there. Being able to kill a task != being able to see pieces of its state...