dm-crypt: zero key before freeing it
PATCH 1/1 dm-crypt: zero key before freeing it
Hi Andrew,
dm-crypt does not clear struct crypt_config before freeing it. Thus, information on the key could leak f.e. to a swsusp image even after the encrypted device has been removed. The attached patch against 2.6.14 / 2.6.15 fixes it.
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c renamed from drivers/md/dm-crypt.c.old +2 -0
@@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ bad3: bad2:crypto_free_tfm (tfm); bad1: +memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8));kfree (cc);return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -710,6 +711,7 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target * cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr (cc);crypto_free_tfm (cc->tfm);dm_put_device (ti, cc->dev); +memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8));kfree (cc); }
Quoted 6 lines · Stefan Rompf
Hi Andrew,
dm-crypt does not clear struct
crypt_configbefore freeing it. Thus, information on the key could leak f.e. to a swsusp image even after the encrypted device has been removed. The attached patch against 2.6.14 / 2.6.15 fixes it.
since a memset right before a free is a very unusual code pattern in the kernel it may well be worth putting a short comment around it to prevent someone later removing it as "optimization"
Stefan Rompf
Acked-by Clemens FruhwirthAm Mittwoch 04 Januar 2006 21:09 schrieb Arjan van de Ven:
Quoted 3 lines
since a memset right before a free is a very unusual code pattern in the kernel it may well be worth putting a short comment around it to prevent someone later removing it as "optimization"
Valid objection, here is an update (and see, I'm running 2.6.15 now ;-)
Stefan
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c renamed from drivers/md/dm-crypt.c.orig +5 -0
@@ -690,6 +690,8 @@ bad2:crypto_free_tfm (tfm); bad1: +/* Must zero key material before freeing */ +memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8));kfree (cc);return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -706,6 +708,9 @@ cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr (cc);crypto_free_tfm (cc->tfm);dm_put_device (ti, cc->dev); + +/* Must zero key material before freeing */ +memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8));kfree (cc); }
Quoted 7 lines · Stefan Rompf
Am Mittwoch 04 Januar 2006 21:09 schrieb Arjan van de Ven:
Quoted 3 lines
since a memset right before a free is a very unusual code pattern in the kernel it may well be worth putting a short comment around it to prevent someone later removing it as "optimization"
Valid objection, here is an update (and see, I'm running 2.6.15 now ;-)
A reason "why" would be more helpful that a "what".
Quoted 25 lines
Signed-off-by Stefan Rompf <[email protected]>drivers/md/dm-crypt.c renamed from drivers/md/dm-crypt.c.orig +5
-1@@ -690,6 +690,8 @@ bad2:crypto_free_tfm (tfm); bad1: +/* Must zero key material before freeing */ +memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8));kfree (cc);return -EINVAL ; }@@ -706,6 +708,9 @@ cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr (cc);crypto_free_tfm (cc->tfm);dm_put_device (ti, cc->dev); + +/* Must zero key material before freeing */ +memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8));kfree (cc); } -
Signature · 1 line
~Randy
Quoted 10 lines · Randy.Dunlap
Quoted 7 lines · Stefan Rompf
Am Mittwoch 04 Januar 2006 21:09 schrieb Arjan van de Ven:
Quoted 3 lines
since a memset right before a free is a very unusual code pattern in the kernel it may well be worth putting a short comment around it to prevent someone later removing it as "optimization"
Valid objection, here is an update (and see, I'm running 2.6.15 now ;-)
A reason "why" would be more helpful that a "what".
"prevent information leak"
This is still a "what", but at least not a "how".
Jörn
Signature · 4 lines
Linux is more the core point of a concept that surrounds "open source" which, in turn, is based on a false concept. This concept is that people actually want to look at source code. -- Rob Enderle
Quoted 8 lines · Jörn Engel
Quoted 7 lines · Randy.Dunlap
Quoted 6 lines · Stefan Rompf
Am Mittwoch 04 Januar 2006 21:09 schrieb Arjan van de Ven:
Quoted 3 lines
since a memset right before a free is a very unusual code pattern in the kernel it may well be worth putting a short comment around it to prevent someone later removing it as "optimization"
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Valid objection, here is an update (and see, I'm running 2.6.15 now ;-)
A reason "why" would be more helpful that a "what".
"prevent information leak"
This is still a "what", but at least not a "how".
OK, that's a much better changelog entry or source code comment... if it could be put in one of those places.
Thanks.
Signature · 1 line
~Randy
Quoted 12 lines · Randy.Dunlap
Quoted 10 lines · J?rn Engel
Quoted 9 lines · Randy.Dunlap
Quoted 7 lines · Stefan Rompf
Am Mittwoch 04 Januar 2006 21:09 schrieb Arjan van de Ven:
Quoted 3 lines
since a memset right before a free is a very unusual code pattern in the kernel it may well be worth putting a short comment around it to prevent someone later removing it as "optimization"
Valid objection, here is an update (and see, I'm running 2.6.15 now ;-)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
A reason "why" would be more helpful that a "what".
"prevent information leak"
This is still a "what", but at least not a "how".
OK, that's a much better changelog entry or source code comment... if it could be put in one of those places.
Yes, Stefan, care to redo this with an updated changelog command?
thanks,
greg k-h
PATCH 1/1 dm-crypt: Zero key material before free to avoid information leak
Am Mittwoch 04 Januar 2006 22:15 schrieb Greg KH:
Quoted 1 line
Yes, Stefan, care to redo this with an updated changelog command?
dm-crypt should clear struct crypt_config before freeing it to avoid information leak f.e. to a swsusp image.
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c renamed from drivers/md/dm-crypt.c.orig +5 -0
@@ -690,6 +690,8 @@ bad2:crypto_free_tfm (tfm); bad1: +/* Zero key material before free to avoid information leak */ +memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8));kfree (cc);return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -706,6 +708,9 @@ cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr (cc);crypto_free_tfm (cc->tfm);dm_put_device (ti, cc->dev); + +/* Zero key material before free to avoid information leak */ +memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8));kfree (cc); }
Quoted 19 lines
Hi Andrew,
dm-crypt does not clear struct
crypt_configbefore freeing it. Thus, information on the key could leak f.e. to a swsusp image even after the encrypted device has been removed. The attached patch against 2.6.14 / 2.6.15 fixes it.Signed-off-by Stefan Rompf <[email protected]>drivers/md/dm-crypt.c renamed from drivers/md/dm-crypt.c.old +0
-0@@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ bad3:bad2:
crypto_free_tfm(tfm);bad1:
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c renamed from drivers/md/dm-crypt.c.old +1
-0+memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8));
Quoted 3 lines
kfree(cc); return -EINVAL; }
There is a small problem with this patch.
If the 'goto bad1' branch is taken, then 'cc->key_size' will not be defined.
I think you need the following patch on top.
(Is that "sizeof(u8)" *really* necessary?? :-)
NeilBrown
### Diffstat output
./drivers/md/dm-crypt.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/dm-crypt.c renamed from drivers/md/dm-crypt.c~current~ +1 -1
@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ bad2:crypto_free_tfm (tfm); bad1:/* Must zero key material before freeing */ -memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8)); +memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + key_size *sizeof (u8));kfree (cc);return -EINVAL ; }
Am Dienstag 24 Januar 2006 05:49 schrieb Neil Brown:
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
--- linux-2.6.14.4/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c.old 2005-12-16 18:27:05.000000000
+0100 +++linux-2.6.14.4/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c2005-12-28
12:49:13.000000000 +0100 @@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ bad3:
bad2:crypto_free_tfm(tfm);bad1:
(quoted diff) +1
-0+ memset(cc, 0, sizeof(*cc) + cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
kfree(cc); return -EINVAL; }There is a small problem with this patch.
If the 'goto bad1' branch is taken, then 'cc->key_size' will not be defined.
I think you need the following patch on top.
Why? This is from today's git, just before the first goto bad1
559 cc->key_size = key_size;
560 if ((!key_size && strcmp(argv[1], "-") != 0) ||
561 (key_size && crypt_decode_key(cc->key, argv[1], key_size) <
0)) {
562 ti->error = PFX "Error decoding key";
563 goto bad1;
564 }
Stefan
Quoted 28 lines · On Tuesday January 24, [email protected] wrote:
Am Dienstag 24 Januar 2006 05:49 schrieb Neil Brown:
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
--- linux-2.6.14.4/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c.old 2005-12-16 18:27:05.000000000
+0100 +++linux-2.6.14.4/drivers/md/dm-crypt.c2005-12-28
12:49:13.000000000 +0100 @@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ bad3:
bad2:crypto_free_tfm(tfm);bad1:
(quoted diff) +1
-0+ memset(cc, 0, sizeof(*cc) + cc->key_size * sizeof(u8));Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
kfree(cc); return -EINVAL; }There is a small problem with this patch.
If the 'goto bad1' branch is taken, then 'cc->key_size' will not be defined.
I think you need the following patch on top.Why? This is from today's git, just before the first goto bad1
559
cc->key_size=key_size;
560 if ((!key_size &&strcmp(argv[1], "-")!= 0) ||
561 (key_size&&crypt_decode_key(cc->key, argv[1], key_size)<
0)) {
562ti->error= PFX "Error decoding key";
563 goto bad1;
564 }
Quoted 1 line
Stefan
Ahhh.... sorry, 'bout that. You are right. I was looking at an older kernel and assumed that bit of code hadn't been re-arrange... My bad. Pardon the noise.
NeilBrown
Once the page is placed on the free list, doesn't that prevent it from being swapped out? swsusp doesn't bother saving free pages and before the pages can be recycled, the kernel zeros them right?
Quoted 29 lines · Stefan Rompf
Hi Andrew,
dm-crypt does not clear struct
crypt_configbefore freeing it. Thus, information on the key could leak f.e. to a swsusp image even after the encrypted device has been removed. The attached patch against 2.6.14 / 2.6.15 fixes it.Signed-off-by Stefan Rompf <[email protected]>drivers/md/dm-crypt.c renamed from drivers/md/dm-crypt.c.old +2
-1@@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ bad3: bad2:crypto_free_tfm (tfm); bad1: +memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8));kfree (cc);return -EINVAL ; }@@ -710,6 +711,7 @@ static void crypt_dtr(struct dm_target * cc->iv_gen_ops->dtr (cc);crypto_free_tfm (cc->tfm);dm_put_device (ti, cc->dev); +memset (cc,0 ,sizeof (*cc) + cc->key_size *sizeof (u8));kfree (cc); } -