wan sdla: fix probable security hole
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PATCH 1/1 wan sdla: fix probable security hole
Quoted 33 lines
From: Chris Wright <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 19 Apr 2004 08:26:30 +0000 (-0400)
Subject: [PATCH] wan sdla: fix probable security hole
X-Git-Tag: v2.6.6-rc2
X-Git-Url: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git;a=commitdiff;h=98cd917c1ac348d5cd94beabecc3011dcaa0a0f2[PATCH] wan sdla: fix probable security hole
Quoted 14 lines
[BUG] minor /home/kash/linux/linux-2.6.5/drivers/net/wan/sdla.c:1206:sdla_xfer:
ERROR:TAINT: 1201:1206:Passing unbounded user value "(mem).len" as arg 0 to function "kmalloc", which uses it unsafely in model [SOURCE_MODEL=(lib,copy_from_user,user,taintscalar)] [SINK_MODEL=(lib,kmalloc,user,trustingsink)] [MINOR] [PATH=] [Also used at, line 1219 in argument 0 to function "kmalloc"] static intsdla_xfer(struct net_device *dev, struct sdla_mem *info, int read){ struct sdla_mem mem; char *temp;Start --->
Quoted 10 lines
if(copy_from_user(&mem, info, sizeof(mem))) return -EFAULT; if (read) { Error ---> temp = kmalloc(mem.len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!temp) return(-ENOMEM); sdla_read(dev, mem.addr, temp, mem.len);
Quoted 7 lines
Hrm, I believe you could use this to read 128k of kernel memory.
sdla_read()takes len as a short, whereas mem.len is an int. So, if mem.len ==0x20000, the allocation could still succeed. When cast to short, len will be0x0, causing the read loop to copy nothing into the buffer. At least it's protected by acapable()check. I don't know what proper upper bound is for this hardware, or how much it's used/cared about. Simplememset()is trivial fix.
This seems to be applicable to 2.4
drivers/net/wan/sdla.c +1 -0
@@ -1201,6 +1201,7 @@ static int sdla_xfer(struct net_device * temp =kmalloc (mem.len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!temp)return (-ENOMEM ); +memset (temp,0 , mem.len);sdla_read (dev, mem.addr, temp, mem.len);if (copy_to_user (mem.data, temp, mem.len)) {