oops in choose_configuration()
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
Quoted 10 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 4 lines · Chuck Ebbert
At least one susbsystem rolls its own method of adding env vars to the uevent buffer, and it's so broken it triggers the
WARN_ON()in lib/vsprintf.c::vsnprintf() by passing a negative length to that function. Start at drivers/input/input.c::input_dev_uevent() and watch the fun.All of the
INPUT_ADD_HOTPLUG_VAR()calls do useadd_uevent_var(), so we should be safe there. The other calls also look safe, if not a bit wierd... So I don't see how we could change this to be any safer, do you?
input.c line 747+ was recently added and caused the error message:
[1]=> envp[i++] = buffer + len; [2]=> len += snprintf(buffer + len, buffer_size - len, "MODALIAS="); [2]=> len += print_modalias(buffer + len, buffer_size - len, dev) + 1;
[1]=> envp[i] = NULL;
return 0;[1] What is checking for enough space here? This didn't overflow AFAICT but it could.
[2] The snprintf() and print_modalias() calls don't check for errors and thus don't return -ENOMEM when the buffer does fill up. Shouldn't they do that instead of returning a truncated env string? Only the final sanity test in snprintf() keeps them from overrunning the buffer. (It was print_modalias_bits() that actually caused the overflow.)
Quoted 1 line
Are you still seeing problems now?
Wasn't me, it was Horst Schirmeier <[email protected]>
Signature · 2 lines
Chuck "Penguins don't come from next door, they come from the Antarctic!"
Quoted 24 lines · Chuck Ebbert
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
Quoted 10 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 4 lines · Chuck Ebbert
At least one susbsystem rolls its own method of adding env vars to the uevent buffer, and it's so broken it triggers the
WARN_ON()in lib/vsprintf.c::vsnprintf() by passing a negative length to that function. Start at drivers/input/input.c::input_dev_uevent() and watch the fun.All of the
INPUT_ADD_HOTPLUG_VAR()calls do useadd_uevent_var(), so we should be safe there. The other calls also look safe, if not a bit wierd... So I don't see how we could change this to be any safer, do you?
input.cline 747+ was recently added and caused the error message:[1]=> envp[i++] = buffer + len; [2]=> len += snprintf(buffer + len, buffer_size - len, "MODALIAS="); [2]=> len += print_modalias(buffer + len, buffer_size - len, dev) + 1;[1]=> envp[i] = NULL; return 0;
Quoted 9 lines
[1] What is checking for enough space here? This didn't overflow AFAICT but it could.
[2] The
snprintf()andprint_modalias()calls don't check for errors and thus don't return-ENOMEMwhen the buffer does fill up. Shouldn't they do that instead of returning a truncated env string? Only the final sanity test insnprintf()keeps them from overrunning the buffer. (It wasprint_modalias_bits()that actually caused the overflow.)
I agree with all of the above, it will be fixed.
Signature · 1 line
Dmitry
Quoted 4 lines · Chuck Ebbert
[2] The
snprintf()andprint_modalias()calls don't check for errors and thus don't return-ENOMEMwhen the buffer does fill up. Shouldn't they do that instead of returning a truncated env string?
They try to act like the standard says "snprintf()" should act.
And yes, the standard says to return the number of bytes you _would_ have written, had not the buffer been to small.
(Of course, giving a negative buffer length is not ok, and the kernel version checking for that is a kernel extension on the standard. In the standard, the buffer size is a "size_t", which doesn't have the notion of "negative", since it's an unsigned type. The kernel version is just being safe and nice).
Linus