refactor capable() to one implementation, add __capable() helper
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/2 refactor capable() to one implementation, add __capable() helper
Move capable() to kernel/capability.c and eliminate duplicate implementations. Add __capable() function which can be used to check for capabiilty of any process.
Signed-off-by Chris Wright <[email protected]>
--- include/linux/capability.h | 3 ++- include/linux/security.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++------ kernel/capability.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ kernel/sys.c | 12 ------------ security/security.c | 23 ----------------------- 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +2 -1
@@ -357,7 +357,8 @@ static inline kernel_cap_t cap_invert(ke#define cap_is_fs_cap (c) (CAP_TO_MASK(c) & CAP_FS_MASK) -extern int capable (int cap); +int capable (int cap); +int __capable (struct task_struct *t,int cap);#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
include/linux/security.h +16 -6
@@ -1040,6 +1040,11 @@ struct swap_info_struct;* @effective contains the effective capability set. * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set. * @permitted contains the permitted capability set. +* @capable: +* Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability. +* @tsk contains the task_struct for the process. +* @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. +* Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk. * @acct: * Check permission before enabling or disabling process accounting. If * accounting is being enabled, then @file refers to the open file used to
@@ -1053,11 +1058,6 @@ struct swap_info_struct;* @table contains the ctl_table structure for the sysctl variable. * @op contains the operation (001 = search, 002 = write, 004 = read). * Return 0 if permission is granted. -* @capable: -* Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability. -* @tsk contains the task_struct for the process. -* @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. -* Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk. * @syslog: * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing * logging to the console.
@@ -1099,9 +1099,9 @@ struct security_operations { kernel_cap_t * effective, kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted); +int (*capable) (struct task_struct * tsk,int cap);int (*acct) (struct file * file);int (*sysctl) (struct ctl_table * table,int op); -int (*capable) (struct task_struct * tsk,int cap);int (*quotactl) (int cmds,int type,int id,struct super_block * sb);int (*quota_on) (struct dentry * dentry);int (*syslog) (int type);
@@ -1346,6 +1346,11 @@ static inline void security_capset_set ( security_ops->capset_set (target, effective, inheritable, permitted); } +static inline int security_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) +{ +return security_ops->capable (tsk, cap); +} +static inline int security_acct (struct file *file) {return security_ops->acct (file);
@@ -2049,6 +2054,11 @@ static inline void security_capset_set (cap_capset_set (target, effective, inheritable, permitted); } +static inline int security_capable (struct task_struct *tsk,int cap) +{ +return cap_capable (tsk, cap); +} +static inline int security_acct (struct file *file) {return 0 ;
kernel/capability.c +16 -0
@@ -233,3 +233,19 @@ out:return ret; } + +int __capable (struct task_struct *t,int cap) +{ +if (security_capable (t, cap) ==0 ) { + t->flags |=PF_SUPERPRIV ; +return 1 ; + } +return 0 ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__capable); + +int capable (int cap) +{ +return __capable (current, cap); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable);
kernel/sys.c +0 -12
@@ -224,18 +224,6 @@ int unregister_reboot_notifier(struct noEXPORT_SYMBOL (unregister_reboot_notifier); -#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY -int capable (int cap) -{ -if (cap_raised (current->cap_effective, cap)) { - current->flags |=PF_SUPERPRIV ; -return 1 ; - } -return 0 ; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable); -#endif -static int set_one_prio (struct task_struct *p,int niceval,int error) {int no_nice;
security/security.c +0 -23
@@ -174,31 +174,8 @@ int mod_unreg_security(const char *name,return security_ops->unregister_security (name, ops); } -/** -* capable - calls the currently loaded security module's capable() function with the specified capability -* @cap: the requested capability level. -* -* This function calls the currently loaded security module's capable() -* function with a pointer to the current task and the specified @cap value. -* -* This allows the security module to implement the capable function call -* however it chooses to. -*/ -int capable (int cap) -{ -if (security_ops->capable (current, cap)) { -/* capability denied */ -return 0 ; - } - -/* capability granted */ - current->flags |=PF_SUPERPRIV ; -return 1 ; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (register_security);EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (unregister_security);EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (mod_reg_security);EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (mod_unreg_security); -EXPORT_SYMBOL (capable);EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ops);
PATCH 2/2 make cap_ptrace enforce PTRACE_TRACME checks
PTRACE_TRACEME doesn't have proper capabilities validation when parent is less privileged than child. Issue pointed out by Ram Gupta <[email protected]>.
Signed-off-by Chris Wright <[email protected]>
Cc Ram Gupta <[email protected]>
---
Note: I haven't identified a strong security issue, and it's a small ABI change that could break apps that rely on existing behaviour (which allows parent that is less privileged than child to ptrace when child does PTRACE_TRACEME).
security/commoncap.c | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/commoncap.c +2 -2
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, strint cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent,struct task_struct *child) {/* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */ -if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) && - !capable (CAP_SYS_PTRACE )) +if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) && + !__capable (parent,CAP_SYS_PTRACE ))return -EPERM ;return 0 ; }