Fix mem.c so that X Windows can restart
PATCH 1/1 Fix mem.c so that X Windows can restart
This patch fixes the problem where you cannot start X Windows on Dom0 after you have created an HVM guest. The problem is that X uses mmap' to map 1 page at physical address 0 with read/write permission. Before an HVM guest is created this check at around line 1496 of mm.c':
if ( unlikely((x & (PGT_type_mask|PGT_va_mask)) != type) )
causes the offending code from this patch to be bypassed and X's mmap' call works. After an HVM guest is created the check at 1496 of mm.c' is now true and the code from this patch is executed, causing the `mmap' call to erroneously fail.
I'd be curious if someone can explain what this code is trying to do and, if this patch is appropriate, it should be applied.
Signature · 21 lines
Don Dugger "Censeo Toto nos in Kansa esse decisse." - D. Gale [email protected] Ph: (303)440-1368 diff -r ad33b3882867 xen/arch/x86/mm.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c Wed May 24 19:41:47 2006 +0100 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c Thu May 25 10:47:51 2006 -0600 @@ -1537,9 +1537,7 @@ int get_page_type(struct page_info *page return 0; #endif /* Fixme: add code to propagate va_unknown to subtables. */ - if ( ((type & PGT_type_mask) >= PGT_l2_page_table) && - !shadow_mode_refcounts(page_get_owner(page)) ) - return 0; + /* This table is possibly mapped at multiple locations. */ nx &= ~PGT_va_mask; nx |= PGT_va_unknown;
Quoted 11 lines · Donald D. Dugger
This patch fixes the problem where you cannot start X Windows on Dom0 after you have created an HVM guest. The problem is that X uses
mmap' to map 1 page at physical address 0 with read/write permission. Before an HVM guest is created this check at around line 1496 ofmm.c':if ( unlikely((x & (PGT_type_mask|PGT_va_mask)) != type) )causes the offending code from this patch to be bypassed and X's
mmap' call works. After an HVM guest is created the check at 1496 ofmm.c' is now true and the code from this patch is executed, causing the `mmap' call to erroneously fail.
This is totally bogus. That test (line 1496) should *never* be true for pages that are not type PGT_l*_page_table. I think some HVM code is indexing frame_table with a zero frame number and then fiddling with fields in that very first page_info structure. That's very bad -- in fact it's tempting to add some assertions about page 0 to be tested at various suitable moments to prevent this sort of bad behaviour.
-- Keir
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On 5/25/2006 at 2:52 PM, in message
<[email protected]>, Keir Fraser
Quoted 3 lines · <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 1 line · Donald D. Dugger
This patch fixes the problem where you cannot start X Windows on
Dom0
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after
you have created an HVM guest. The problem is that X uses `mmap' tomap
1 page at physical address 0 with read/write permission. Before an
HVM
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guest is created this check at around line 1496 of `mm.c':
if ( unlikely((x & (PGT_type_mask|PGT_va_mask)) != type) )causes the offending code from this patch to be bypassed and X's
`mmap'
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call works. After an HVM guest is created the check at 1496 of
`mm.c'
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is
now true and the code from this patch is executed, causing the
`mmap'
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call to
erroneously fail.This is totally bogus. That test (line 1496) should *never* be true
for
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pages that are not type PGT_l*_page_table. I think some HVM code is indexing
frame_tablewith a zero frame number and then fiddling withfields in that very first
page_infostructure. That's very bad -- infact it's tempting to add some assertions about page 0 to be tested
at
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various suitable moments to prevent this sort of bad behaviour.
Keir,
We hit this very frequently. Any chance you could put together a patch with the asserts in place so we can throw it into our code base to try and catch the problem?
Clyde
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-- Keir
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