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affs_fill_super() %s abuses

PATCH In review Al Viro 3 participants 6 messages Jun 15, 2006 Affs file system

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Al Viro

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 affs_fill_super() %s abuses

%s is valid only on NUL-terminated arrays, damnit!

---

 fs/affs/super.c |   20 ++++++++++++++------
 1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

02cc7ba4e655dc01773f43e5324986188d42653d

fs/affs/super.c +14 -6
index 4d7e5b1..02aeb22 100644
@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ static int affs_fill_super(struct super_
 	int			 reserved;
 	unsigned long		 mount_flags;
 	int			 tmp_flags;	/* fix remount prototype... */
+	u8			 sig[4];
 
 	pr_debug("AFFS: read_super(%s)\n",data ? (const char *)data : "no options");
 
@@ -370,8 +371,9 @@ got_root:
 		printk(KERN_ERR "AFFS: Cannot read boot block\n");
 		goto out_error;
 	}
-	chksum = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)boot_bh->b_data);
+	memcpy(sig, boot_bh->b_data, 4);
 	brelse(boot_bh);
+	chksum = be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)sig);
 
 	/* Dircache filesystems are compatible with non-dircache ones
 	 * when reading. As long as they aren't supported, writing is
@@ -420,11 +422,17 @@ got_root:
 	}
 
 	if (mount_flags & SF_VERBOSE) {
-		chksum = cpu_to_be32(chksum);
-		printk(KERN_NOTICE "AFFS: Mounting volume \"%*s\": Type=%.3s\\%c, Blocksize=%d\n",
-			AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0],
-			AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name + 1,
-			(char *)&chksum,((char *)&chksum)[3] + '0',blocksize);
+		int len = AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0];
+		char name[32];
+
+		if (len > 31)
+			len = 31;
+		memcpy(name, AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name + 1, len);
+		name[len] = '\0';
+
+		printk(KERN_NOTICE "AFFS: Mounting volume \"%*s\": "
+			"Type=%c%c%c\\%c, Blocksize=%d\n",
+			len, name, sig[0], sig[1], sig[2], sig[3], blocksize);
 	}
 
 	sb->s_flags |= MS_NODEV | MS_NOSUID;
Signature · 1 line
1.3.GIT
#1 lore raw
Quoted 1 line · Al Viro

%s is valid only on NUL-terminated arrays, damnit!

Unless it specifies an approriate precision.

Andreas.

Signature · 4 lines
Andreas Schwab, SuSE Labs, [email protected]
SuSE Linux Products GmbH, Maxfeldstraße 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany
PGP key fingerprint = 58CA 54C7 6D53 942B 1756  01D3 44D5 214B 8276 4ED5
"And now for something completely different."
author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Andreas Schwab
Quoted 1 line · Al Viro

%s is valid only on NUL-terminated arrays, damnit!

Unless it specifies an approriate precision.

... and that precision does not exceed the size of array. Here we have AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0] as precision and AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name + 1 as pointer. Which is closer to the end of object than 256 bytes.

#3 lore raw
In reply to Al Viro

Hi,

Quoted 4 lines · Al Viro
fs/affs/super.c +0 -0
@@ -420,11 +422,17 @@ got_root:
 	}
 
 	if (mount_flags & SF_VERBOSE) {

fs/affs/super.c got_root: · line 429

Quoted 10 lines
fs/affs/super.c +5 -5
-		chksum = cpu_to_be32(chksum);
-		printk(KERN_NOTICE "AFFS: Mounting volume \"%*s\": Type=%.3s\\%c, Blocksize=%d\n",
-			AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0],
-			AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name + 1,
-			(char *)&chksum,((char *)&chksum)[3] + '0',blocksize);
+		int len = AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0];
+		char name[32];
+
+		if (len > 31)
+			len = 31;

You get the same effect by changing it above into "min(AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0], 31)" and makes the copying unnecessary. BTW since this is only active with SF_VERBOSE, I don't think it's critical enough for 2.6.17 at this point.

bye, Roman

author
#4 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Roman Zippel
Quoted 6 lines
fs/affs/super.c +2 -4
-		printk(KERN_NOTICE "AFFS: Mounting volume \"%*s\": Type=%.3s\\%c, Blocksize=%d\n",
-			AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0],
-			AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name + 1,
-			(char *)&chksum,((char *)&chksum)[3] + '0',blocksize);
+		int len = AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0];
+		char name[32];
Quoted 8 lines

fs/affs/super.c got_root: · line 429

Quoted 3 lines
fs/affs/super.c +3 -0
+
+		if (len > 31)
+			len = 31;

You get the same effect by changing it above into "min(AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0], 31)" and makes the copying unnecessary. BTW since this is only active with SF_VERBOSE, I don't think it's critical enough for 2.6.17 at this point.

Fine by me... I'd still prefer more explicit form (it's hardly a critical path), but yes, that would do.

#5 lore raw
In reply to Roman Zippel
Quoted 7 lines · Roman Zippel

Hi,

Quoted 3 lines · Al Viro
(quoted diff) +0 -0
@@ -420,11 +422,17 @@ got_root:
 	}
 
Quoted 14 lines

fs/affs/super.c got_root: · line 429

Quoted 11 lines
fs/affs/super.c +5 -5
 	if (mount_flags & SF_VERBOSE) {
-		chksum = cpu_to_be32(chksum);
-		printk(KERN_NOTICE "AFFS: Mounting volume \"%*s\": Type=%.3s\\%c, Blocksize=%d\n",
-			AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0],
-			AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name + 1,
-			(char *)&chksum,((char *)&chksum)[3] + '0',blocksize);
+		int len = AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0];
+		char name[32];
+
+		if (len > 31)
+			len = 31;

You get the same effect by changing it above into "min(AFFS_ROOT_TAIL(sb, root_bh)->disk_name[0], 31)" and makes the copying unnecessary.

And "%*s" needs to be changed to "%.*s" (the former still requires a NUL-terminated string).

Andreas.

Signature · 4 lines
Andreas Schwab, SuSE Labs, [email protected]
SuSE Linux Products GmbH, Maxfeldstraße 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany
PGP key fingerprint = 58CA 54C7 6D53 942B 1756  01D3 44D5 214B 8276 4ED5
"And now for something completely different."