Skip to contentSkip to conversation

i386/x86-64: Don't randomize stack top when no randomization personality is set

PATCH In review Andi Kleen 2 participants 6 messages Jul 16, 2006

Subsystems (2)
lore
Share & tools
lore

Andi Kleen

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH 2/8 i386/x86-64: Don't randomize stack top when no randomization personality is set

Based on patch from Frank van Maarseveen <[email protected]>, but extended.

---
 arch/i386/kernel/process.c   |    3 ++-
 arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c |    2 +-
 fs/binfmt_elf.c              |    3 ++-
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c +1 -1
Index: linux/arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c
===================================================================
@@ -845,7 +845,7 @@ int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *t
 
 unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
 {
-	if (randomize_va_space)
+	if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
 		sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
 	return sp & ~0xf;
 }
arch/i386/kernel/process.c +2 -1
Index: linux/arch/i386/kernel/process.c
===================================================================
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 #include <linux/kallsyms.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
 #include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
 
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -905,7 +906,7 @@ asmlinkage int sys_get_thread_area(struc
 
 unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
 {
-	if (randomize_va_space)
+	if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
 		sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
 	return sp & ~0xf;
 }
fs/binfmt_elf.c +2 -1
Index: linux/fs/binfmt_elf.c
===================================================================
@@ -515,7 +515,8 @@ static unsigned long randomize_stack_top
 {
 	unsigned int random_variable = 0;
 
-	if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) {
+	if ((current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) &&
+		!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE)) {
 		random_variable = get_random_int() & STACK_RND_MASK;
 		random_variable <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
 	}
Acked-by on v1 2/8
#1 lore raw

arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *t · line 850

Quoted 6 lines · Andi Kleen

unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
{

arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c +1 -1
-	if (randomize_va_space)
+	if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
 		sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
 	return sp & ~0xf;

i'm not opposing this patch at all, but didnt the performance problems go away when the 0xf was changed to 0x7f?

looks good otherwise.

Ingo

author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Ingo Molnar

arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *t · line 850

Quoted 6 lines · Andi Kleen

unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
{

arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c +1 -1
-	if (randomize_va_space)
+	if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
 		sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
 	return sp & ~0xf;

i'm not opposing this patch at all, but didnt the performance problems go away when the 0xf was changed to 0x7f?

Yes, but i sent the patch before that other patch was available.

I guess it's a separate issue anyways - this patch is just concerned about disabling randomization consistently. Performance optimization can be done in another one.

-Andi

#3 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Andi Kleen
Quoted 10 lines · Ingo Molnar

arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c int dump_task_regs(struct task_struct *t · line 850

Quoted 6 lines · Andi Kleen

unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
{

arch/x86_64/kernel/process.c +1 -1
-	if (randomize_va_space)
+	if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
 		sp -= get_random_int() % 8192;
 	return sp & ~0xf;

i'm not opposing this patch at all, but didnt the performance problems go away when the 0xf was changed to 0x7f?

Quoted 1 line

Yes, but i sent the patch before that other patch was available.

excuses, excuses ;)

Quoted 3 lines

I guess it's a separate issue anyways - this patch is just concerned about disabling randomization consistently. Performance optimization can be done in another one.

yeah. There's one security issue: the 'dont randomize' flag must be cleared when we cross a protection domain. When for example suid-ing in exec().

Ingo

author
#4 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines

yeah. There's one security issue: the 'dont randomize' flag must be cleared when we cross a protection domain. When for example suid-ing in exec().

Good point.

-Andi

author
#5 lore raw

Re: [discuss] Re: [PATCH for 2.6.18-rc2] [2/8] i386/x86-64: Don't randomize stack top when no randomization personality is set II

In reply to Ingo Molnar
Quoted 4 lines

yeah. There's one security issue: the 'dont randomize' flag must be cleared when we cross a protection domain. When for example suid-ing in exec().

Just checked. It should be already done because ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE is in PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID which is cleared in exec.

-Andi