linux capabilities oddity
I sent this to linux-privs-discuss, but that list appears to be dead. Perhaps someone here can help me?
While debugging an odd problem where /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound wasn't working, I came across the following code at linux-2.6.x/security/commoncap.c:140:
void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
{
/* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working; new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
current->cap_inheritable);
new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working);
...Here the new permitted set gets limited to the bits in cap_bset, which is as it should be, but then the intersection of the of the current and exec inheritable masks get added to that set, whereas as I understand it, cap_bset should always be the bounding set.
This triggered a problem where the /sbin/init on a gentoo install disk (which I was using as an quick&dirty UML root disk for testing) for some reason did something to set its inheritable mask to ~0, which then propagated to all the processes that ran as root, which meant that the cap bound didn't apply to them.
I took out the cap_combine and didn't notice any ill effects on some quick tests, though I don't know POSIX capabilities well enough to say all the behaviour was per the standard. If someone could tell me what those lines are for, and if its foiling of cap-bound limits is on purpose, I'd be most grateful.
Signature · 3 lines
Frank v Waveren Key fingerprint: BDD7 D61E [email protected] 5D39 CF05 4BFC F57A Public key: hkp://wwwkeys.pgp.net/468D62C8 FA00 7D51 468D 62C8
Quoted 30 lines · Frank v Waveren
I sent this to linux-privs-discuss, but that list appears to be dead. Perhaps someone here can help me?
While debugging an odd problem where
/proc/sys/kernel/cap-boundwasn't working, I came across the following code atlinux-2.6.x/security/commoncap.c:140:void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) { /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */ kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset); working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable, current->cap_inheritable); new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working); ...Here the new permitted set gets limited to the bits in
cap_bset, which is as it should be, but then the intersection of the of the current and exec inheritable masks get added to that set, whereas as I understand it,cap_bsetshould always be the bounding set.This triggered a problem where the
/sbin/initon a gentoo install disk (which I was using as an quick&dirty UML root disk for testing) for some reason did something to set its inheritable mask to ~0, which then propagated to all the processes that ran as root, which meant that the cap bound didn't apply to them.
Quoted 5 lines
I took out the
cap_combineand didn't notice any ill effects on some quick tests, though I don't know POSIX capabilities well enough to say all the behaviour was per the standard. If someone could tell me what those lines are for, and if its foiling of cap-bound limits is on purpose, I'd be most grateful.
Actually going by the faq
(http://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.4/capfaq-0.2.txt)
it seems like the cap_intersect with current->cap_inheritable is *too* limiting. I haven't checked what the posix draft actually says, but the bprm->cap_inheritable is called the 'forced' set, and is supposed to be like setuid.
I suspect the reason why removing the cap_combine worked for you is because when the file is setuid 0, the bprm->cap_permitted is also set full on. For people actually using one of the patches implementing filesystem capabilities, I think you might in fact change behavior.
-serge
Quoted 20 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 15 lines · Frank v Waveren
While debugging an odd problem where
/proc/sys/kernel/cap-boundwasn't working, I came across the following code atlinux-2.6.x/security/commoncap.c:140:void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe) { /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */ kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset); working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable, current->cap_inheritable); new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working); ...Quoted 4 lines
Here the new permitted set gets limited to the bits in
cap_bset, which is as it should be, but then the intersection of the of the current and exec inheritable masks get added to that set, whereas as I understand it,cap_bsetshould always be the bounding set.
Quoted 8 lines
[...]
Actually going by the faq
(http://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.4/capfaq-0.2.txt)
it seems like thecap_intersectwithcurrent->cap_inheritableis *too* limiting. I haven't checked what the posix draft actually says, but thebprm->cap_inheritableis called the 'forced' set, and is supposed to be like setuid.
I don't think the force set should be able to override the cap bound though. Like the force/setuid analogy, I think we can compare the cap_bset to the old securelevel system, which means that it should be the bounding factor. Even if you have setuids on a system with a raised securelevel, they still can't do the restricted operations.
Once again, this is not based on what the POSIX 1003.1e says, as a matter of fact I can't find anything about lowering the systemwide bound externally (as opposed to by not having forced-set executables and dropping the caps from all processes) at all in a quick grep of the document, so I suspect this is entirely outside of the spec anyway.
Signature · 3 lines
Frank v Waveren Key fingerprint: BDD7 D61E [email protected] 5D39 CF05 4BFC F57A Public key: hkp://wwwkeys.pgp.net/468D62C8 FA00 7D51 468D 62C8