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linux capabilities oddity

DISCUSSION Frank v Waveren 2 participants 3 messages Jul 23, 2006 – Jul 27, 2006

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I sent this to linux-privs-discuss, but that list appears to be dead. Perhaps someone here can help me?

While debugging an odd problem where /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound wasn't working, I came across the following code at linux-2.6.x/security/commoncap.c:140:

   void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
   {
           /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
           kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
           new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
           working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
                                    current->cap_inheritable);
           new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working);
           ...

Here the new permitted set gets limited to the bits in cap_bset, which is as it should be, but then the intersection of the of the current and exec inheritable masks get added to that set, whereas as I understand it, cap_bset should always be the bounding set.

This triggered a problem where the /sbin/init on a gentoo install disk (which I was using as an quick&dirty UML root disk for testing) for some reason did something to set its inheritable mask to ~0, which then propagated to all the processes that ran as root, which meant that the cap bound didn't apply to them.

I took out the cap_combine and didn't notice any ill effects on some quick tests, though I don't know POSIX capabilities well enough to say all the behaviour was per the standard. If someone could tell me what those lines are for, and if its foiling of cap-bound limits is on purpose, I'd be most grateful.

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Frank v Waveren                                  Key fingerprint: BDD7 D61E
[email protected]                                              5D39 CF05 4BFC F57A
Public key: hkp://wwwkeys.pgp.net/468D62C8              FA00 7D51 468D 62C8
#1 lore raw
Quoted 30 lines · Frank v Waveren

I sent this to linux-privs-discuss, but that list appears to be dead. Perhaps someone here can help me?

While debugging an odd problem where /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound wasn't working, I came across the following code at linux-2.6.x/security/commoncap.c:140:

   void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
   {
           /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
           kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
           new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
           working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
                                    current->cap_inheritable);
           new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working);
           ...

Here the new permitted set gets limited to the bits in cap_bset, which is as it should be, but then the intersection of the of the current and exec inheritable masks get added to that set, whereas as I understand it, cap_bset should always be the bounding set.

This triggered a problem where the /sbin/init on a gentoo install disk (which I was using as an quick&dirty UML root disk for testing) for some reason did something to set its inheritable mask to ~0, which then propagated to all the processes that ran as root, which meant that the cap bound didn't apply to them.

Quoted 5 lines

I took out the cap_combine and didn't notice any ill effects on some quick tests, though I don't know POSIX capabilities well enough to say all the behaviour was per the standard. If someone could tell me what those lines are for, and if its foiling of cap-bound limits is on purpose, I'd be most grateful.

Actually going by the faq
(http://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.4/capfaq-0.2.txt)
it seems like the cap_intersect with current->cap_inheritable is *too* limiting. I haven't checked what the posix draft actually says, but the bprm->cap_inheritable is called the 'forced' set, and is supposed to be like setuid.

I suspect the reason why removing the cap_combine worked for you is because when the file is setuid 0, the bprm->cap_permitted is also set full on. For people actually using one of the patches implementing filesystem capabilities, I think you might in fact change behavior.

-serge

#2 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 15 lines · Frank v Waveren

While debugging an odd problem where /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound wasn't working, I came across the following code at linux-2.6.x/security/commoncap.c:140:

   void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
   {
           /* Derived from fs/exec.c:compute_creds. */
           kernel_cap_t new_permitted, working;
           new_permitted = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_permitted, cap_bset);
           working = cap_intersect (bprm->cap_inheritable,
                                    current->cap_inheritable);
           new_permitted = cap_combine (new_permitted, working);
           ...
Quoted 4 lines

Here the new permitted set gets limited to the bits in cap_bset, which is as it should be, but then the intersection of the of the current and exec inheritable masks get added to that set, whereas as I understand it, cap_bset should always be the bounding set.

Quoted 8 lines

[...]

Actually going by the faq
(http://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.4/capfaq-0.2.txt)
it seems like the cap_intersect with current->cap_inheritable is *too* limiting. I haven't checked what the posix draft actually says, but the bprm->cap_inheritable is called the 'forced' set, and is supposed to be like setuid.

I don't think the force set should be able to override the cap bound though. Like the force/setuid analogy, I think we can compare the cap_bset to the old securelevel system, which means that it should be the bounding factor. Even if you have setuids on a system with a raised securelevel, they still can't do the restricted operations.

Once again, this is not based on what the POSIX 1003.1e says, as a matter of fact I can't find anything about lowering the systemwide bound externally (as opposed to by not having forced-set executables and dropping the caps from all processes) at all in a quick grep of the document, so I suspect this is entirely outside of the spec anyway.

Signature · 3 lines
Frank v Waveren                                  Key fingerprint: BDD7 D61E
[email protected]                                              5D39 CF05 4BFC F57A
Public key: hkp://wwwkeys.pgp.net/468D62C8              FA00 7D51 468D 62C8