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Fix user.* xattr permission check for sticky dirs

PATCH In review Andreas Gruenbacher 5 participants 7 messages Nov 2, 2006 – Nov 3, 2006 VFS

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 Fix user.* xattr permission check for sticky dirs

The user.* extended attributes are only allowed on regular files and directories. Sticky directories further restrict write access to the owner and privileged users. (See the attr(5) man page for an explanation.)

The original check in ext2/ext3 when user.* xattrs were merged was more restrictive than intended, and when the xattr permission checks were moved into the VFS, read access to user.* attributes on sticky directores ended up being denied in addition.

Originally-from: Gerard Neil <[email protected]>

fs/xattr.c +10 -3
Index: linux-2.6.19-rc4/fs/xattr.c
===================================================================
@@ -48,14 +48,21 @@ xattr_permission(struct inode *inode, co
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
-	 * The trusted.* namespace can only accessed by a privilegued user.
+	 * The trusted.* namespace can only be accessed by a privileged user.
 	 */
 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX_LEN))
 		return (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ? 0 : -EPERM);
 
+	/* In user.* namespace, only regular files and directories can have
+	 * extended attributes. For sticky directories, only the owner and
+	 * privileged user can write attributes.
+	 */
 	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_USER_PREFIX, XATTR_USER_PREFIX_LEN)) {
-		if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
-		    (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX))
+		if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
+			return -EPERM;
+		if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && (inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX) &&
+		    (mask & MAY_WRITE) && (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) &&
+		    !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
 			return -EPERM;
 	}
 
#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines

The user.* extended attributes are only allowed on regular files and directories. Sticky directories further restrict write access to the owner and privileged users. (See the attr(5) man page for an explanation.)

Does this effect ACL handling for sticky dirs in any way?

	-`J'
#2 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Jan Engelhardt
Quoted 6 lines

The user.* extended attributes are only allowed on regular files and directories. Sticky directories further restrict write access to the owner and privileged users. (See the attr(5) man page for an explanation.)

Does this effect ACL handling for sticky dirs in any way?

No. xattr_permission (which this patch hits) always returns 0 for system.* attributes and leaves it to the file system to handle.

Shaggy

Signature · 2 lines
David Kleikamp
IBM Linux Technology Center
#3 lore raw
In reply to Andreas Gruenbacher
Quoted 9 lines · On Thu, 2 Nov 2006 17:24:02 +0100 Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]> wrote:

The user.* extended attributes are only allowed on regular files and directories. Sticky directories further restrict write access to the owner and privileged users. (See the attr(5) man page for an explanation.)

The original check in ext2/ext3 when user.* xattrs were merged was more restrictive than intended, and when the xattr permission checks were moved into the VFS, read access to user.* attributes on sticky directores ended up being denied in addition.

Am struggling to understand the impact of this. I assume this problem was introduced on Jan 9 by e0ad7b073eb7317e5afe0385b02dcb1d52a1eedf "move xattr permission checks into the VFS"?

If so, the fix is applicable to 2.6.18, 2.6.19 and of course 2.6.20.

But to which of those should it be applied?

#4 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Andrew Morton

On Thu, 2 Nov 2006 17:24:02 +0100

Quoted 5 lines · Andreas Gruenbacher

The user.* extended attributes are only allowed on regular files and directories. Sticky directories further restrict write access to the owner and privileged users. (See the attr(5) man page for an explanation.)

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

The original check in ext2/ext3 when user.* xattrs were merged was more restrictive than intended, and when the xattr permission checks were moved into the VFS, read access to user.* attributes on sticky directores ended up being denied in addition.

Am struggling to understand the impact of this. I assume this problem was introduced on Jan 9 by e0ad7b073eb7317e5afe0385b02dcb1d52a1eedf "move xattr permission checks into the VFS"?

Commits e0ad7b073eb7317e5afe0385b02dcb1d52a1eedf and c37ef806a3e1c0bca65fd03b7590d56d19625da4 move the following check from ext3_xattr_user_set() to xattr_permission(), which is used in vfs_getxattr() as well as xfs_setxattr() and vfs_removexattr(), so this added the check to the xfs_getxattr() path by accident:

[] if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
[] (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX))
[] return -EPERM;

The check itself completely forbids user.* xattrs for sticky directories already though, and this conflicts with the xattr(5) manual page as well as the xfs code. It looks as if the ckeck was more strict than intended since forever. The patch I have sent relaxes the unintended restriction.

Quoted 1 line

If so, the fix is applicable to 2.6.18, 2.6.19 and of course 2.6.20.

... and further back.

Quoted 1 line

But to which of those should it be applied?

I don't think we'll need backports; this doesn't address a security problem.

Thanks,
Andreas

#5 lore raw

Hi Andreas,

Quoted 23 lines · --On 2 November 2006 10:51:21 PM +0100 Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>…
Quoted 8 lines · Andrew Morton

On Thu, 2 Nov 2006 17:24:02 +0100

Quoted 5 lines · Andreas Gruenbacher

The user.* extended attributes are only allowed on regular files and directories. Sticky directories further restrict write access to the owner and privileged users. (See the attr(5) man page for an explanation.)

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

The original check in ext2/ext3 when user.* xattrs were merged was more restrictive than intended, and when the xattr permission checks were moved into the VFS, read access to user.* attributes on sticky directores ended up being denied in addition.

Am struggling to understand the impact of this. I assume this problem was introduced on Jan 9 by e0ad7b073eb7317e5afe0385b02dcb1d52a1eedf "move xattr permission checks into the VFS"?

Commits e0ad7b073eb7317e5afe0385b02dcb1d52a1eedf and c37ef806a3e1c0bca65fd03b7590d56d19625da4 move the following check from ext3_xattr_user_set() to xattr_permission(), which is used in vfs_getxattr() as well as xfs_setxattr() and vfs_removexattr(),

Quoted 8 lines

so this added the check to
the xfs_getxattr() path by accident:

[] if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
[] (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX))
[] return -EPERM;

Now, I'm a bit confused.
xfs_getxattr?
I see the "correct" version of the test in xfs_attr.c/attr_user_capable().

--Tim

#6 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Timothy Shimmin
Quoted 5 lines

so this added the check to the xfs_getxattr() path by accident:

[] if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
[] (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || inode->i_mode & S_ISVTX))
[] return -EPERM;

Now, I'm a bit confused.
xfs_getxattr?
I see the "correct" version of the test in xfs_attr.c/attr_user_capable().

I meant to say fs/xattr.c:vfs_getxattr() and fs/xattr.c:vfs_setxattr(), sorry. The xfs code is fine, it just contains the same check once again in fs/xfs/xfs_attr.c:attr_user_capable().

Thanks,
Andreas