user namespace: Introduction
Subsystems (5)
cover user namespace: Introduction
This patchset adds a user namespace, which allows a process to unshare it's user_struct table, allowing for separate accounting per user namespace. It appends a user namespace to vfsmounts and fown_structs, so that uid1==uid2 checks can be extended to be false if uid1 and uid2 are in different namespaces.
A vfsmount generally cannot be accessed by another user namespace than that in which it was mounted. A vfsmount can be mounted "shared-ns", in which case it can be accessed by any user namespace. This is needed at least to bootstrap a container so it can get far enough to create it's own private file system tree, and can be used in conjunction with read-only bind mounts to provide shared /usr trees, for instance. However, for more useful, more fine-grained sharing accross user namespaces, it has been suggested that a new filesystem specifying global userid's be used.
Patches are as follows:
1. make exit_task_namespaces extern to prevent future compile failure.
2. add userns framework.
3. add userns pointer to vfsmount
4. hook permission to check current against vfsmount userns
5. prepare for copy_mnt and copy_tree to return -EPERM
6. implement shared mounts which can cross user namespaces
7. implement user ns checks for file sigio
8. implement user namespace unshare
#include <unistd.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#ifndef MNT_DETACH
#define MNT_DETACH 2
#endif
#ifndef MS_SHARE_NS
#define MS_SHARE_NS 1<<22
#endif
#ifndef CLONE_NEWUSER
#define CLONE_NEWUSER 0x10000000
#endif
#define PIPEREAD 0
#define PIPEWRITE 1
static inline _syscall2(int, clone, int, flags, int, foo) int to1[2], from1[1], to2[2], from2[2];
void do_test1(void)
{
int ret;
int fd;
char buf[100];
rmdir("/mnt1");
ret = mkdir("/mnt1", 0666);
if (ret == -1) {
perror("mkdir mnt1");
_exit(1);
}
ret = mount("/", "/mnt1", "none", MS_BIND, "");
if (ret == -1) {
perror("mount mnt1");
_exit(1);
}
fd = open("/mnt1/testme", O_RDWR|O_CREAT);
if (fd == -1) {
printf("thread 1: unable to write /testme: ERROR\n");
} else {
write(fd, "a", 1);
printf("thread 1: able to write /testme: GOOD\n");
close(fd);
}
write(from1[PIPEWRITE], "mount", 6);
read(to1[PIPEREAD], buf, 2);
umount("/mnt1");
printf("thread 1: exiting.\n");
write(from1[PIPEWRITE], "done", 5);
rmdir("/mnt1");
}void do_test2(void)
{
int ret;
char buf[100];
int fd;
rmdir("/mnt2");
ret = mkdir("/mnt2", 0666);
if (ret == -1) {
perror("mkdir mnt2");
_exit(1);
}
ret = read(to2[PIPEREAD], buf, 10);
fd = open("/testme", O_RDWR|O_CREAT);
if (fd == -1) {
printf("thread 2: unable to write /testme: ERROR\n");
} else {
write(fd, "b", 1);
printf("thread 2: able to write /testme: GOOD\n");
close(fd);
}
fd = open("/mnt1/testme", O_RDWR|O_CREAT);
if (fd == -1) {
printf("thread 2: unable to open /mnt1/testme: GOOD\n");
} else {
write(fd, "c", 1);
printf("thread 2: able to open /mnt1/testme: ERROR\n");
close(fd);
}
/* now try remounting /mnt1 to /mnt2 */
ret = mount("/mnt1", "/mnt2", "none", MS_BIND, "");
if (ret == -1) {
printf("thread2: unable to remount /mnt1 to /mnt2: GOOD\n");
} else {
perror("thread2: able to remount /mnt1 to /mnt2: BAD\n");
fd = open("/mnt2/testme", O_RDWR|O_CREAT);
if (fd == -1) {
printf("thread 2: unable to open /mnt2/testme: GOOD\n");
} else {
write(fd, "d", 1);
printf("thread 2: able to open /mnt2/testme: ERROR\n");
close(fd);
}
umount ("/mnt2");
}
write(from2[PIPEWRITE], "done", 5);
printf("thread 2: exiting\n");
rmdir("/mnt2");
}int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int childpid1, childpid2;
int ret;
char buf[100];
ret = mount("/", "/mnt", "none", MS_SHARE_NS | MS_BIND, "");
if (ret == -1) {
perror("failed to mount /mnt shared_ns.\n");
_exit(1);
}
chdir("/mnt");
chroot("/mnt");
ret = pipe(to1);
if (ret == -1) {
perror("failed to create child pipe 1\n");
_exit(1);
}
ret = pipe(to2);
if (ret == -1) {
perror("failed to create child pipe 2\n");
_exit(1);
}
ret = pipe(from1);
if (ret == -1) {
perror("failed to create child pipe 1\n");
_exit(1);
}
ret = pipe(from2);
if (ret == -1) {
perror("failed to create child pipe 2\n");
_exit(1);
}
childpid1 = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | SIGCHLD, 0);
if (childpid1 != 0) {
do_test1();
_exit(0);
}
childpid2 = clone(CLONE_NEWUSER | SIGCHLD, 0);
if (childpid2 != 0) {
do_test2();
_exit(0);
}
read(from1[PIPEREAD], buf, 5);
write(to2[PIPEWRITE], "go", 3);
read(from2[PIPEREAD], buf, 4);
write(to1[PIPEWRITE], "go", 3);
read(from1[PIPEREAD], buf, 4);
return 0;
}PATCH 1/8 nsproxy: externalizes exit_task_namespaces
From: Cedric Le Goater <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 1/8] nsproxy: externalizes exit_task_namespaces
this is required to remove a header dependency in sched.h which breaks next patches.
--- include/linux/nsproxy.h | 15 ++++----------- kernel/nsproxy.c | 11 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/linux/nsproxy.h +4 -11
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ #ifndef _LINUX_NSPROXY_H#define _LINUX_NSPROXY_H#include <linux/spinlock.h> -#include <linux/sched.h> + +struct task_struct ;struct mnt_namespace ;struct uts_namespace ;
@@ -43,14 +44,6 @@ static inline void put_nsproxy(struct ns } } -static inline void exit_task_namespaces (struct task_struct *p) -{ -struct nsproxy *ns = p->nsproxy; -if (ns) { -task_lock (p); - p->nsproxy =NULL ; -task_unlock (p); -put_nsproxy (ns); - } -} +extern void exit_task_namespaces (struct task_struct *p); +#endif
kernel/nsproxy.c +11 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,17 @@ void get_task_namespaces(struct task_str } } +void exit_task_namespaces (struct task_struct *p) +{ +struct nsproxy *ns = p->nsproxy; +if (ns) { +task_lock (p); + p->nsproxy =NULL ; +task_unlock (p); +put_nsproxy (ns); + } +} +/* * creates a copy of "orig" with refcount 1. * This does not grab references to the contained namespaces,
Signature · 1 line
1.4.1
PATCH 2/8 user ns: add the framework
In reply to Serge E. HallynFrom: Cedric Le Goater <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 2/8] user ns: add the framework
This patch adds the user namespace struct and framework
Basically, it will allow a process to unshare its user_struct table, resetting at the same time its own user_struct and all the associated accounting.
A new root user (uid == 0) is added to the user namespace upon creation. Such root users have full privileges and it seems that theses privileges should be controlled through some means (process capabilities ?)
The unshare is not included in this patch.
Changes since [try #4]:
- Updated get_user_ns and put_user_ns to accept NULL, and get_user_ns to return the namespace.
Changes since [try #3]:
- moved struct user_namespace to files user_namespace.{c,h}
Changes since [try #2]:
- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()
Changes since [try #1]:
- removed struct user_namespace* argument from find_user()
- added a root_user per user namespace
--- include/linux/init_task.h | 2 ++ include/linux/nsproxy.h | 1 + include/linux/sched.h | 3 ++ include/linux/user_namespace.h | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ init/Kconfig | 8 ++++++ kernel/Makefile | 2 +- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- kernel/nsproxy.c | 12 +++++++++ kernel/sys.c | 5 ++-- kernel/user.c | 18 +++++++------- kernel/user_namespace.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 11 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
include/linux/init_task.h +2 -0
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <linux/utsname.h>#include <linux/lockdep.h> #include <linux/ipc.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #define INIT_FDTABLE \ { \
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ #define INIT_NSPROXY(nsproxy) { \ .uts_ns = &init_uts_ns, \ .mnt_ns = NULL, \ INIT_IPC_NS(ipc_ns) \ + .user_ns = &init_user_ns, \ }#define INIT_SIGHAND (sighand) { \
include/linux/nsproxy.h +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct nsproxy {struct ipc_namespace *ipc_ns;struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;struct pid_namespace *pid_ns; +struct user_namespace *user_ns; };extern struct nsproxy init_nsproxy;
include/linux/sched.h +2 -1
@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ extern signed long schedule_timeout_unin asmlinkage void schedule(void);struct nsproxy ; +struct user_namespace ;/* Maximum number of active map areas.. This is a random (large) number */ #define DEFAULT_MAX_MAP_COUNT 65536
@@ -1285,7 +1286,7 @@ extern struct task_struct *find_task_by_extern void __set_special_pids (pid_t session,pid_t pgrp);/* per-UID process charging. */ -extern struct user_struct *alloc_uid (uid_t ); +extern struct user_struct *alloc_uid (struct user_namespace *,uid_t );static inline struct user_struct *get_uid (struct user_struct *u) {atomic_inc (&u->__count);
include/linux/user_namespace.h new file +53 -0
53 lines not on this page · raw message
init/Kconfig +8 -0
@@ -222,6 +222,14 @@ config UTS_NS vservers, to use uts namespaces to provide different uts info for different servers. If unsure, say N. +config USER_NS + bool "User Namespaces" + default n + help + Support user namespaces. This allows containers, i.e. + vservers, to use user namespaces to provide different + user info for different servers. If unsure, say N. + config AUDIT bool "Auditing support" depends on NET
kernel/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # obj-y = sched.o fork.o exec_domain.o panic.o printk.o profile.o \ exit.o itimer.o time.o softirq.o resource.o \ - sysctl.o capability.o ptrace.o timer.o user.o \ + sysctl.o capability.o ptrace.o timer.o user.o user_namespace.o \ signal.o sys.o kmod.o workqueue.o pid.o \ rcupdate.o extable.o params.o posix-timers.o \ kthread.o wait.o kfifo.o sys_ni.o posix-cpu-timers.o mutex.o \
kernel/fork.c +1 -1
@@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ #endifif (atomic_read (&p->user->processes) >= p->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC ].rlim_cur) {if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RESOURCE ) && - p->user != &root_user) + p->user != current->nsproxy->user_ns->root_user) goto bad_fork_free; }
kernel/nsproxy.c +12 -0
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ struct nsproxy *dup_namespaces(struct nsget_ipc_ns (ns->ipc_ns);if (ns->pid_ns)get_pid_ns (ns->pid_ns); +if (ns->user_ns) +get_user_ns (ns->user_ns); }return ns;
@@ -127,10 +129,18 @@ int copy_namespaces(int flags, struct taif (err) goto out_pid; + err =copy_user_ns (flags, tsk); +if (err) + goto out_user; + out:put_nsproxy (old_ns);return err; +out_user: +if (new_ns->pid_ns) +put_pid_ns (new_ns->pid_ns); + out_pid:if (new_ns->ipc_ns)put_ipc_ns (new_ns->ipc_ns);
@@ -156,5 +166,7 @@ void free_nsproxy(struct nsproxy *ns)put_ipc_ns (ns->ipc_ns);if (ns->pid_ns)put_pid_ns (ns->pid_ns); +if (ns->user_ns) +put_user_ns (ns->user_ns);kfree (ns); }
kernel/sys.c +3 -2
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ #include <linux/getcpu.h>#include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/kprobes.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -1070,13 +1071,13 @@ static int set_user(uid_t new_ruid, int {struct user_struct *new_user; - new_user =alloc_uid (new_ruid); + new_user =alloc_uid (current->nsproxy->user_ns, new_ruid);if (!new_user)return -EAGAIN ;if (atomic_read (&new_user->processes) >= current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_NPROC ].rlim_cur && - new_user != &root_user) { + new_user != current->nsproxy->user_ns->root_user) {free_uid (new_user);return -EAGAIN ; }
kernel/user.c +9 -9
@@ -14,20 +14,19 @@ #include <linux/slab.h>#include <linux/bitops.h> #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> /* * UID task count cache, to get fast user lookup in "alloc_uid" * when changing user ID's (ie setuid() and friends). */ -#define UIDHASH_BITS (CONFIG_BASE_SMALL ? 3 : 8) -#define UIDHASH_SZ (1 << UIDHASH_BITS)#define UIDHASH_MASK (UIDHASH_SZ - 1)#define __uidhashfn (uid) (((uid >> UIDHASH_BITS) + uid) & UIDHASH_MASK) -#define uidhashentry (uid) (uidhash_table + __uidhashfn((uid))) +#define uidhashentry (ns, uid) ((ns)->uidhash_table + __uidhashfn((uid)))static struct kmem_cache *uid_cachep; -static struct list_head uidhash_table[UIDHASH_SZ ];/* * The uidhash_lock is mostly taken from process context, but it is
@@ -94,9 +93,10 @@ struct user_struct *find_user(uid_t uid) {struct user_struct *ret;unsigned long flags; +struct user_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->user_ns;spin_lock_irqsave (&uidhash_lock, flags); - ret =uid_hash_find (uid,uidhashentry (uid)); + ret =uid_hash_find (uid,uidhashentry (ns, uid));spin_unlock_irqrestore (&uidhash_lock, flags);return ret; }
@@ -120,9 +120,9 @@ void free_uid(struct user_struct *up) } } -struct user_struct *alloc_uid (uid_t uid) +struct user_struct *alloc_uid (struct user_namespace *ns,uid_t uid) { -struct list_head *hashent =uidhashentry (uid); +struct list_head *hashent =uidhashentry (ns, uid);struct user_struct *up;spin_lock_irq (&uidhash_lock);
@@ -211,11 +211,11 @@ static int __init uid_cache_init(void) 0, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL, NULL);for (n =0 ; n <UIDHASH_SZ ; ++n) -INIT_LIST_HEAD (uidhash_table + n); +INIT_LIST_HEAD (init_user_ns.uidhash_table + n);/* Insert the root user immediately (init already runs as root) */ spin_lock_irq (&uidhash_lock); -uid_hash_insert (&root_user,uidhashentry (0 )); +uid_hash_insert (&root_user,uidhashentry (&init_user_ns,0 ));spin_unlock_irq (&uidhash_lock);return 0 ;
kernel/user_namespace.c new file +44 -0
44 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
1.4.1
PATCH 3/8 user ns: add user_namespace ptr to vfsmount
In reply to Serge E. HallynFrom: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 3/8] user ns: add user_namespace ptr to vfsmount
Add user_namespace ptr to vfsmount, and define a helper to compare it to the task's user_ns.
--- fs/namespace.c | 3 +++ include/linux/mount.h | 2 ++ include/linux/sched.h | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/namespace.c +3 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ #include <linux/namei.h>#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/ramfs.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> #include <asm/unistd.h> #include "pnode.h"
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ struct vfsmount *alloc_vfsmnt(const charstruct vfsmount *mnt =kmem_cache_alloc (mnt_cache,GFP_KERNEL );if (mnt) {memset (mnt,0 ,sizeof (struct vfsmount )); + mnt->mnt_user_ns =get_user_ns (current->nsproxy->user_ns);atomic_set (&mnt->mnt_count,1 );INIT_LIST_HEAD (&mnt->mnt_hash);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&mnt->mnt_child);
@@ -88,6 +90,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(simple_set_mnt);void free_vfsmnt (struct vfsmount *mnt) { +put_user_ns (mnt->mnt_user_ns);kfree (mnt->mnt_devname);kmem_cache_free (mnt_cache, mnt); }
include/linux/mount.h +2 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ struct super_block;struct vfsmount ;struct dentry ;struct mnt_namespace ; +struct user_namespace ;#define MNT_NOSUID 0x01#define MNT_NODEV 0x02
@@ -54,6 +55,7 @@ struct vfsmount {struct list_head mnt_slave;/* slave list entry */ struct vfsmount *mnt_master;/* slave is on master->mnt_slave_list */ struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns;/* containing namespace */ +struct user_namespace *mnt_user_ns;/* namespace for uid interpretation */ int mnt_pinned; };
include/linux/sched.h +20 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ #include <linux/resource.h>#include <linux/timer.h> #include <linux/hrtimer.h> #include <linux/task_io_accounting.h> +#include <linux/nsproxy.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -1586,6 +1588,24 @@ extern int cond_resched_lock(spinlock_textern int cond_resched_softirq (void );/* +* Check whether a task and a vfsmnt belong to the same uidns. +* Since the initial namespace is exempt from these checks, +* return 1 if so. Also return 1 if the vfsmnt is exempt from +* such checking. Otherwise, if the uid namespaces are different, +* return 0. +*/ +static inline int task_mnt_same_uidns (struct task_struct *tsk, +struct vfsmount *mnt) +{ +if (tsk->nsproxy == init_task.nsproxy) +return 1 ; +if (mnt->mnt_user_ns == tsk->nsproxy->user_ns) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; +} + + +/* * Does a critical section need to be broken due to another * task waiting?: */
Signature · 1 line
1.4.1
PATCH 4/8 user ns: hook permission
In reply to Serge E. HallynFrom: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] user ns: hook permission
Hook permission to check vfsmnt->user_ns against current.
--- fs/namei.c | 4 ++++ 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +4 -0
@@ -246,6 +246,8 @@ int permission(struct inode *inode, intreturn -EACCES ; } +if (nd && !task_mnt_same_uidns (current, nd->mnt)) +return -EACCES ;/* * MAY_EXEC on regular files requires special handling: We override
@@ -433,6 +435,8 @@ static int exec_permission_lite(struct i {umode_t mode = inode->i_mode; +if (!task_mnt_same_uidns (current, nd->mnt)) +return -EACCES ;if (inode->i_op && inode->i_op->permission)return -EAGAIN ;
Signature · 1 line
1.4.1
Re: [PATCH 4/8] user ns: hook permission
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] user ns: hook permissionHook permission to check
vfsmnt->user_nsagainst current.
This looks wrong on several levels.
- This should ultimately be inside generic_permission instead of permission as there are some distributed filesystems that know how to cope with multiple mount namespaces simultaneous.
- As implemented the test is not what I would expect. I would expect comparisons of uid X == uid Y and gid X == gid Y to be replaced by comparing the tuples of uid namesspace and uid. Which would allow access to world readable/writeable files, and it would allow users with CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE to be able to access everything.
All we are really saying as I understand a user namespace is that instead of uid's uniquely identifying a user the pair the pair uidns, uid is uniquely identifies a user.
Because you didn't pick what I would consider the obvious choice you now need an extra mount flag to disable the uid namespace all together, so you can transition through the intermediate uid namespace state. That really feels wrong.
All mounts should have an associated uid namespace and the only way you should be able to ignore that is to access filesystems that can cope with multiple uid namespaces simultaneously.
Eric
Re: [PATCH 4/8] user ns: hook permission
Quoted 12 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 4/8] user ns: hook permissionHook permission to check
vfsmnt->user_nsagainst current.This looks wrong on several levels.
- This should ultimately be insidegeneric_permissioninstead of permission as there are some distributed filesystems that know how to cope with multiple mount namespaces simultaneous.
Quoted 6 lines
- As implemented the test is not what I would expect. I would expect comparisons of uid X == uid Y and gid X == gid Y to be replaced by comparing the tuples of uid namesspace and uid. Which would allow access to world readable/writeable files, and it would allow users with
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDEto be able to access everything.
Whoa - why on earth would we want that?
Quoted 3 lines
All we are really saying as I understand a user namespace is that instead of uid's uniquely identifying a user the pair the pair uidns, uid is uniquely identifies a user.
Ok that would be one way to interpret it, but it is insufficient for preventing root in one vserver from messing with users in another vserver.
Quoted 4 lines
Because you didn't pick what I would consider the obvious choice you now need an extra mount flag to disable the uid namespace all together, so you can transition through the intermediate uid namespace state. That really feels wrong.
Some bit of required bootstrapping seems both acceptable and expected to me.
Quoted 1 line
All mounts should have an associated uid namespace and the only
check
Quoted 2 lines
way you should be able to ignore that is to access filesystems that can cope with multiple uid namespaces simultaneously.
But it's my fs on my box, why shouldn't i be able to say all uid namespaces can acces this subtree read-only, just bc you feel the fs is inadequate? :)
Note that the tiniest of trees, with just a statically compiled bash, mount, pivot_mount, and initrc, should suffice, mounted readonly for all uid namespaces to use to bootstrap.
-serge
PATCH 5/8 user ns: prepare copy_tree, copy_mnt, and their callers to handle errs
In reply to Serge E. HallynFrom: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 5/8] user ns: prepare copy_tree, copy_mnt, and their callers to handle errs
With shareduserns and non-shareduserns mounts, it will be possible for clone_mnt to return -EPERM if a namespace tries to bind mount a non-shareduserns vfsmnt from another user namespace. But currently they only return NULL, which is interpreted as -ENOMEM. Update the callers to handle other errors.
--- fs/namespace.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- fs/pnode.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/namespace.c +12 -8
@@ -709,8 +709,9 @@ struct vfsmount *copy_tree(struct vfsmoureturn NULL ; res = q =clone_mnt (mnt, dentry, flag); -if (!q) - goto Enomem; +if (!q ||IS_ERR (q)) { +return q; + } q->mnt_mountpoint = mnt->mnt_mountpoint; p = mnt;
@@ -731,8 +732,9 @@ struct vfsmount *copy_tree(struct vfsmou nd.mnt = q; nd.dentry = p->mnt_mountpoint; q =clone_mnt (p, p->mnt_root, flag); -if (!q) - goto Enomem; +if (!q ||IS_ERR (q)) { + goto Error; + }spin_lock (&vfsmount_lock);list_add_tail (&q->mnt_list, &res->mnt_list);attach_mnt (q, &nd);
@@ -740,7 +742,7 @@ struct vfsmount *copy_tree(struct vfsmou } }return res; -Enomem: +Error:if (res) {LIST_HEAD (umount_list);spin_lock (&vfsmount_lock);
@@ -748,7 +750,7 @@ Enomem:spin_unlock (&vfsmount_lock);release_mounts (&umount_list); } -return NULL ; +return q; }/*
@@ -928,8 +930,10 @@ static int do_loopback(struct nameidataelse mnt =clone_mnt (old_nd.mnt, old_nd.dentry,0 ); -if (!mnt) +if (!mnt ||IS_ERR (mnt)) { + err = mnt ?PTR_ERR (mnt) : -ENOMEM ; goto out; + } err =graft_tree (mnt, nd);if (err) {
@@ -1466,7 +1470,7 @@ struct mnt_namespace *dup_mnt_ns(struct/* First pass: copy the tree topology */ new_ns->root =copy_tree (mnt_ns->root, mnt_ns->root->mnt_root,CL_COPY_ALL |CL_EXPIRE ); -if (!new_ns->root) { +if (!new_ns->root ||IS_ERR (new_ns->root)) {up_write (&namespace_sem);kfree (new_ns);return NULL ;
fs/pnode.c +3 -2
@@ -187,8 +187,9 @@ int propagate_mnt(struct vfsmount *dest_ source =get_source (m, prev_dest_mnt, prev_src_mnt, &type); -if (!(child =copy_tree (source, source->mnt_root, type))) { - ret = -ENOMEM ; + child =copy_tree (source, source->mnt_root, type); +if (!child ||IS_ERR (child)) { + ret = child ?PTR_ERR (child) : -ENOMEM ;list_splice (tree_list, tmp_list.prev); goto out; }
Signature · 1 line
1.4.1
PATCH 6/8 user ns: implement shared mounts
In reply to Serge E. HallynFrom: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 6/8] user ns: implement shared mounts
Implement shared-ns mounts, which allow containers in different user namespaces to share mounts. Without this, containers can obviously never even be started.
Here is a sample smount.c (based on Miklos' version) which only does a bind mount of arg1 onto arg2, but making the destination a shared-ns mount.
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int type;
if(argc != 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s src dest", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
fprintf(stdout, "%s %s %s\n", argv[0], argv[1], argv[2]);
type = MS_SHARE_NS | MS_BIND;
setfsuid(getuid());
if(mount(argv[1], argv[2], "none", type, "") == -1) {
perror("mount");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}--- fs/namespace.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ fs/pnode.h | 1 + include/linux/fs.h | 1 + include/linux/mount.h | 1 + include/linux/sched.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/namespace.c +24 -6
@@ -235,7 +235,14 @@ static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct int flag) {struct super_block *sb = old->mnt_sb; -struct vfsmount *mnt =alloc_vfsmnt (old->mnt_devname); +struct vfsmount *mnt; + +if (!(old->mnt_flags &MNT_SHARE_NS )) { +if (old->mnt_user_ns != current->nsproxy->user_ns) +return ERR_PTR (-EPERM ); + } + + mnt =alloc_vfsmnt (old->mnt_devname);if (mnt) { mnt->mnt_flags = old->mnt_flags;
@@ -258,6 +265,10 @@ static struct vfsmount *clone_mnt(struct }if (flag &CL_MAKE_SHARED )set_mnt_shared (mnt); +if (flag &CL_SHARE_NS ) + mnt->mnt_flags |=MNT_SHARE_NS ; +else + mnt->mnt_flags &= ~MNT_SHARE_NS ;/* stick the duplicate mount on the same expiry list * as the original if that was on one */
@@ -369,6 +380,7 @@ static int show_vfsmnt(struct seq_file * { MNT_NOSUID, ",nosuid" }, { MNT_NODEV, ",nodev" }, { MNT_NOEXEC, ",noexec" }, + { MNT_SHARE_NS, ",share_userns" }, { MNT_NOATIME, ",noatime" }, { MNT_NODIRATIME, ",nodiratime" }, { MNT_RELATIME, ",relatime" },
@@ -903,11 +915,14 @@ static int do_change_type(struct nameida/* * do loopback mount. */ -static int do_loopback (struct nameidata *nd,char *old_name,int recurse) +static int do_loopback (struct nameidata *nd,char *old_name,int recurse, +int uidns_share) {struct nameidata old_nd;struct vfsmount *mnt =NULL ;int err =mount_is_safe (nd); +int flag = (uidns_share ?CL_SHARE_NS :0 ); +if (err)return err;if (!old_name || !*old_name)
@@ -926,9 +941,9 @@ static int do_loopback(struct nameidata err = -ENOMEM ;if (recurse) - mnt =copy_tree (old_nd.mnt, old_nd.dentry,0 ); + mnt =copy_tree (old_nd.mnt, old_nd.dentry, flag);else - mnt =clone_mnt (old_nd.mnt, old_nd.dentry,0 ); + mnt =clone_mnt (old_nd.mnt, old_nd.dentry, flag);if (!mnt ||IS_ERR (mnt)) { err = mnt ?PTR_ERR (mnt) : -ENOMEM ;
@@ -1415,9 +1430,11 @@ long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_ mnt_flags |=MNT_NODIRATIME ;if (flags &MS_RELATIME ) mnt_flags |=MNT_RELATIME ; +if (flags &MS_SHARE_NS ) + mnt_flags |=MNT_SHARE_NS ; flags &= ~(MS_NOSUID |MS_NOEXEC |MS_NODEV |MS_ACTIVE | -MS_NOATIME |MS_NODIRATIME |MS_RELATIME ); +MS_NOATIME |MS_NODIRATIME |MS_RELATIME |MS_SHARE_NS );/* ... and get the mountpoint */ retval =path_lookup (dir_name,LOOKUP_FOLLOW , &nd);
@@ -1432,7 +1449,8 @@ long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_ retval =do_remount (&nd, flags & ~MS_REMOUNT , mnt_flags, data_page); else if (flags & MS_BIND) - retval =do_loopback (&nd, dev_name, flags &MS_REC ); + retval =do_loopback (&nd, dev_name, flags &MS_REC , + mnt_flags &MNT_SHARE_NS ); else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | MS_UNBINDABLE)) retval =do_change_type (&nd, flags); else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
fs/pnode.h +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #define CL_SLAVE 0x02#define CL_COPY_ALL 0x04#define CL_MAKE_SHARED 0x08#define CL_PROPAGATION 0x10 +#define CL_SHARE_NS 0x20static inline void set_mnt_shared (struct vfsmount *mnt) {
include/linux/fs.h +1 -0
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ #define MS_PRIVATE (1<<18) /* change to#define MS_SLAVE (1<<19)/* change to slave */ #define MS_SHARED (1<<20)/* change to shared */ #define MS_RELATIME (1<<21)/* Update atime relative to mtime/ctime. */ +#define MS_SHARE_NS (1<<22)/* ignore user namespaces for permission */ #define MS_ACTIVE (1<<30)#define MS_NOUSER (1<<31)
include/linux/mount.h +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ #define MNT_SHRINKABLE 0x100#define MNT_SHARED 0x1000/* if the vfsmount is a shared mount */ #define MNT_UNBINDABLE 0x2000/* if the vfsmount is a unbindable mount */ #define MNT_PNODE_MASK 0x3000/* propogation flag mask */ +#define MNT_SHARE_NS 0x4000/* ignore user namespaces for permission */ struct vfsmount {struct list_head mnt_hash;
include/linux/sched.h +2 -0
@@ -1599,6 +1599,8 @@ static inline int task_mnt_same_uidns(st {if (tsk->nsproxy == init_task.nsproxy)return 1 ; +if (mnt->mnt_flags &MNT_SHARE_NS ) +return 1 ;if (mnt->mnt_user_ns == tsk->nsproxy->user_ns)return 1 ;return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
1.4.1
PATCH 7/8 user ns: handle file sigio
In reply to Serge E. HallynFrom: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] user ns: handle file sigio
A process in one user namespace could set a fowner and sigio on a file in a shared vfsmount, ending up killing a task in another user namespace.
Prevent this by adding a user namespace pointer to the fown_struct, and enforcing that a process causing a signal to be sent be in the same user namespace as the file owner.
--- fs/fcntl.c | 14 +++++++++++--- fs/file_table.c | 2 ++ include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/fcntl.c +11 -3
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <linux/security.h>#include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/signal.h> #include <linux/rcupdate.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <asm/poll.h> #include <asm/siginfo.h>
@@ -250,15 +251,18 @@ static int setfl(int fd, struct file * f }static void f_modown (struct file *filp,struct pid *pid,enum pid_type type, -uid_t uid,uid_t euid,int force) +uid_t uid,uid_t euid,struct user_namespace *user_ns, +int force) {write_lock_irq (&filp->f_owner.lock);if (force || !filp->f_owner.pid) {put_pid (filp->f_owner.pid); +put_user_ns (filp->f_owner.user_ns); filp->f_owner.pid =get_pid (pid); filp->f_owner.pid_type = type; filp->f_owner.uid = uid; filp->f_owner.euid = euid; + filp->f_owner.user_ns =get_user_ns (user_ns); }write_unlock_irq (&filp->f_owner.lock); }
@@ -272,7 +276,8 @@ int __f_setown(struct file *filp, structif (err)return err; -f_modown (filp, pid, type, current->uid, current->euid, force); +f_modown (filp, pid, type, current->uid, current->euid, + current->nsproxy->user_ns, force);return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__f_setown);
@@ -298,7 +303,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(f_setown);void f_delown (struct file *filp) { -f_modown (filp,NULL ,PIDTYPE_PID ,0 ,0 ,1 ); +f_modown (filp,NULL ,PIDTYPE_PID ,0 ,0 ,NULL ,1 ); }pid_t f_getown (struct file *filp)
@@ -455,6 +460,9 @@ static const long band_table[NSIGPOLL] =static inline int sigio_perm (struct task_struct *p,struct fown_struct *fown,int sig) { +if (fown->user_ns != init_task.nsproxy->user_ns && + fown->user_ns != p->nsproxy->user_ns) +return 0 ; return (((fown->euid == 0) || (fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) || (fown->uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid == p->uid)) &&
fs/file_table.c +2 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include <linux/cdev.h>#include <linux/fsnotify.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/percpu_counter.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <asm/atomic.h>
@@ -175,6 +176,7 @@ void fastcall __fput(struct file *file)if (file->f_mode &FMODE_WRITE )put_write_access (inode);put_pid (file->f_owner.pid); +put_user_ns (file->f_owner.user_ns);file_kill (file); file->f_path.dentry =NULL ; file->f_path.mnt =NULL ;
include/linux/fs.h +1 -0
@@ -684,6 +684,7 @@ struct fown_struct {struct pid *pid;/* pid or -pgrp where SIGIO should be sent */ enum pid_type pid_type;/* Kind of process group SIGIO should be sent to */ uid_t uid, euid;/* uid/euid of process setting the owner */ +struct user_namespace *user_ns;/* namespace to which uid belongs */ int signum;/* posix.1b rt signal to be delivered on IO */ };
Signature · 1 line
1.4.1
Re: [PATCH 7/8] user ns: handle file sigio
Quoted 13 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] user ns: handle file sigioA process in one user namespace could set a fowner and sigio on a file in a shared vfsmount, ending up killing a task in another user namespace.
Prevent this by adding a user namespace pointer to the
fown_struct, and enforcing that a process causing a signal to be sent be in the same user namespace as the file owner.
fs/fcntl.c static const long band_table[NSIGPOLL] = · line 465
Quoted 6 lines
fs/fcntl.c +3
-0@@ -455,6 +460,9 @@ static const long band_table[NSIGPOLL] =static inline int sigio_perm (struct task_struct *p,struct fown_struct *fown,int sig) { +if (fown->user_ns != init_task.nsproxy->user_ns && + fown->user_ns != p->nsproxy->user_ns) +return 0 ;
Why is the initial user namespace being treated specially here? Especially when you start considering nested containers special treatment like this is semantically a real problem, to maintain.
If we need to I can see doing something special if the process setting fown has CAP_KILL and bypassing the security checks that way, but hard coding rules like that when it doesn't appear we have any experience to indicate we need the extra functionality looks premature.
fs/fcntl.c static const long band_table[NSIGPOLL] = · line 468
Quoted 3 lines
fs/fcntl.c +0
-0return (((fown->euid == 0) || (fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) || (fown->uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid == p->uid)) &&
Eric
Re: [PATCH 7/8] user ns: handle file sigio
Quoted 14 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 10 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] user ns: handle file sigioA process in one user namespace could set a fowner and sigio on a file in a shared vfsmount, ending up killing a task in another user namespace.
Prevent this by adding a user namespace pointer to the
fown_struct, and enforcing that a process causing a signal to be sent be in the same user namespace as the file owner.
Quoted 9 lines
fs/fcntl.c static const long band_table[NSIGPOLL] = · line 465
Quoted 7 lines
fs/fcntl.c +3
-0@@ -455,6 +460,9 @@ static const long band_table[NSIGPOLL] =static inline int sigio_perm (struct task_struct *p,struct fown_struct *fown,int sig) { +if (fown->user_ns != init_task.nsproxy->user_ns && + fown->user_ns != p->nsproxy->user_ns) +return 0 ;Why is the initial user namespace being treated specially here?
Because we haven't yet agreed upon any other security model. For now, although I know you really dislike it, the fact is that "the initial namespace has special privileges" is our basic security model.
If you want to have a discussion about an appropriate security model, or an infrastructure to support multiple models, I think this would be a good time, given that several namespaces are out there. And networkns, making its way up, also has concerns.
Three basic approaches I could see being simple to both implement and understand/use are
1. add a set of capabilities concerning cross-ns operations, not reassignable once they are removed. Simple to understand, very limited.
2. maintain that any cross-ns operation is allowed if and only if the target ns is a child of the subject ns.
3. cross-ns operations are not permitted. The only way to achieve them is using a (as-yet unimplemented, but i'm working on it) namespace enter feature to execute code in a child namespace.
Quoted 2 lines
Especially when you start considering nested containers special treatment like this is semantically a real problem, to maintain.
Yup.
Quoted 2 lines
If we need to I can see doing something special if the process setting fown has
CAP_KILL
Obviously CAP_KILL is insufficient :) I assume you mean a new CAP_XNS_CAP_KILL?
Quoted 4 lines
and bypassing the security checks that way, but
hard coding rules like that when it doesn't appear we have any experience to indicate we need the extra functionality looks premature.
Ok, in this case actually I suspect you're right and we can just ditch the exception. But in general the security discussion is one we should still have.
Quoted 5 lines
fs/fcntl.c static const long band_table[NSIGPOLL] = · line 468
Quoted 3 lines
fs/fcntl.c +0
-0return (((fown->euid == 0) || (fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) || (fown->uid == p->suid) || (fown->uid == p->uid)) &&Eric
Re: [PATCH 7/8] user ns: handle file sigio
Quoted 6 lines · On Wed, 24 Jan 2007 12:58:45 -0600 "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 2 lines
If we need to I can see doing something special if the process setting fown has
CAP_KILLObviously
CAP_KILLis insufficient :) I assume you mean a newCAP_XNS_CAP_KILL?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
and bypassing the security checks that way, but
hard coding rules like that when it doesn't appear we have any experience to indicate we need the extra functionality looks premature.Ok, in this case actually I suspect you're right and we can just ditch the exception. But in general the security discussion is one we should still have.
People like security.
Where do we now stand with this patch, and with "[PATCH 4/8] user ns: hook permission"?
Re: [PATCH 7/8] user ns: handle file sigio
Quoted 14 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 11 lines · On Wed, 24 Jan 2007 12:58:45 -0600 "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 2 lines
If we need to I can see doing something special if the process setting fown has
CAP_KILLObviously
CAP_KILLis insufficient :) I assume you mean a newCAP_XNS_CAP_KILL?Quoted 4 lines
and bypassing the security checks that way, but
hard coding rules like that when it doesn't appear we have any experience to indicate we need the extra functionality looks premature.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Ok, in this case actually I suspect you're right and we can just ditch the exception. But in general the security discussion is one we should still have.
People like security.
Where do we now stand with this patch, and with "[PATCH 4/8] user ns: hook permission"?
Later today I can send a patch against this set which removes the the init_task exceptions (out of patch 3 and patch 7), but I'd prefer to leave the MS_SHARED_NS option (patch 6) in.
thanks,
-serge
Re: [PATCH 7/8] user ns: handle file sigio
Quoted 21 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 20 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 6 lines · On Wed, 24 Jan 2007 12:58:45 -0600 "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 2 lines
If we need to I can see doing something special if the process setting fown has
CAP_KILLObviously
CAP_KILLis insufficient :) I assume you mean a newCAP_XNS_CAP_KILL?Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
and bypassing the security checks that way, but
hard coding rules like that when it doesn't appear we have any experience to indicate we need the extra functionality looks premature.Ok, in this case actually I suspect you're right and we can just ditch the exception. But in general the security discussion is one we should still have.
People like security.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Where do we now stand with this patch, and with "[PATCH 4/8] user ns: hook permission"?
Later today I can send a patch against this set which removes the the
init_taskexceptions (out of patch 3 and patch 7), but I'd prefer to leave theMS_SHARED_NSoption (patch 6) in.thanks,
-serge
Boots with USER_NS=n (given Cedric's patch to fix that original problem) and passes my testcases with USER_NS=y.
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH] user namespace: remove exceptions for initial namespace
Both sigio and file access checks for user namespace equivalence were being skipped for processes in the initial namespace. Remove these exceptions, enforcing the same cross-namespace checks for all processes in all user namespaces.
---
fs/fcntl.c | 3 +-- include/linux/sched.h | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
939c4da5209a2c00aca70048915007d0eef8ad75
fs/fcntl.c +1 -2
@@ -460,8 +460,7 @@ static const long band_table[NSIGPOLL] =static inline int sigio_perm (struct task_struct *p,struct fown_struct *fown,int sig) { -if (fown->user_ns != init_task.nsproxy->user_ns && - fown->user_ns != p->nsproxy->user_ns) +if (fown->user_ns != p->nsproxy->user_ns)return 0 ; return (((fown->euid == 0) || (fown->euid == p->suid) || (fown->euid == p->uid) ||
include/linux/sched.h +1 -3
@@ -1614,12 +1614,10 @@ extern int cond_resched_softirq(void);static inline int task_mnt_same_uidns (struct task_struct *tsk,struct vfsmount *mnt) { -if (tsk->nsproxy == init_task.nsproxy) +if (mnt->mnt_user_ns == tsk->nsproxy->user_ns)return 1 ;if (mnt->mnt_flags &MNT_SHARE_NS )return 1 ; -if (mnt->mnt_user_ns == tsk->nsproxy->user_ns) -return 1 ;return 0 ; }#else
Signature · 1 line
1.1.6
Re: [PATCH 7/8] user ns: handle file sigio
Quoted 3 lines · On Thu, 25 Jan 2007 23:38:08 -0600 "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:
fs/fcntl.c | 3 +-- include/linux/sched.h | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
My confidence in this lot:
introduce-and-use-get_task_mnt_ns.patch introduce-and-use-get_task_mnt_ns-tweaks.patch nsproxy-externalizes-exit_task_namespaces.patch user-namespace-add-the-framework.patch user-namespace-add-the-framework-fix.patch user-namespace-add-the-framework-fixes.patch user-ns-add-user_namespace-ptr-to-vfsmount.patch user-ns-add-user_namespace-ptr-to-vfsmount-fixes.patch
# user-ns-hook-permission.patch: Eric no like user-ns-hook-permission.patch user-ns-prepare-copy_tree-copy_mnt-and-their-callers-to-handle-errs.patch user-ns-prepare-copy_tree-copy_mnt-and-their-callers-to-handle-errs-fix.patch user-ns-implement-shared-mounts.patch user-ns-implement-shared-mounts-fixes.patch
# user_ns-handle-file-sigio.patch: Eric no like user_ns-handle-file-sigio.patch user_ns-handle-file-sigio-fix.patch user_ns-handle-file-sigio-fix-2.patch user-ns-implement-user-ns-unshare.patch user-ns-implement-user-ns-unshare-tidy.patch
#
rename-attach_pid-to-find_attach_pid.patch attach_pid-with-struct-pid-parameter.patch remove-find_attach_pid.patch statically-initialize-struct-pid-for-swapper.patch explicitly-set-pgid-sid-of-init.patch
#
uts-namespace-remove-config_uts_ns.patch ipc-namespace-remove-config_ipc_ns.patch
is very low. If I can by some miracle get all this gunk to compile and boot a bit, I'd ask that we all very carefully review the patches which landed and make sure that we're all happy with it.
That's still a couple of days away, I expect.
PATCH 8/8 user ns: implement user ns unshare
In reply to Serge E. HallynFrom: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 8/8] user ns: implement user ns unshare
Implement CLONE_NEWUSER flag useable at clone and unshare.
--- include/linux/sched.h | 1 + include/linux/user_namespace.h | 10 +++++ kernel/fork.c | 22 ++++++++++-- kernel/nsproxy.c | 2 + kernel/user_namespace.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/sched.h +1 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ #define CLONE_CHILD_SETTID 0x01000000 /*#define CLONE_STOPPED 0x02000000/* Start in stopped state */ #define CLONE_NEWUTS 0x04000000/* New utsname group? */ #define CLONE_NEWIPC 0x08000000/* New ipcs */ +#define CLONE_NEWUSER 0x10000000/* New user namespace */ /* * Scheduling policies
include/linux/user_namespace.h +10 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ static inline struct user_namespace *get }extern int copy_user_ns (int flags,struct task_struct *tsk); +extern int unshare_user_ns (unsigned long flags,struct user_namespace **new_user);extern void free_user_ns (struct kref *kref);static inline void put_user_ns (struct user_namespace *ns)
@@ -40,6 +41,15 @@ static inline struct user_namespace *getreturn NULL ; } +static inline int unshare_user_ns (unsigned long flags, +struct user_namespace **new_user) +{ +if (flags &CLONE_NEWUSER ) +return -EINVAL ; + +return 0 ; +} +static inline int copy_user_ns (int flags,struct task_struct *tsk) {return 0 ;
kernel/fork.c +18 -4
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ #include <linux/cn_proc.h>#include <linux/delayacct.h> #include <linux/taskstats_kern.h> #include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/pgalloc.h>
@@ -1620,6 +1621,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_unshare(unsigned lonstruct nsproxy *new_nsproxy =NULL , *old_nsproxy =NULL ;struct uts_namespace *uts, *new_uts =NULL ;struct ipc_namespace *ipc, *new_ipc =NULL ; +struct user_namespace *user, *new_user =NULL ;check_unshare_flags (&unshare_flags);
@@ -1627,7 +1629,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_unshare(unsigned lon err = -EINVAL ;if (unshare_flags & ~(CLONE_THREAD |CLONE_FS |CLONE_NEWNS |CLONE_SIGHAND |CLONE_VM |CLONE_FILES |CLONE_SYSVSEM | -CLONE_NEWUTS |CLONE_NEWIPC )) +CLONE_NEWUTS |CLONE_NEWIPC |CLONE_NEWUSER )) goto bad_unshare_out;if ((err =unshare_thread (unshare_flags)))
@@ -1648,18 +1650,20 @@ asmlinkage long sys_unshare(unsigned lon goto bad_unshare_cleanup_semundo;if ((err =unshare_ipcs (unshare_flags, &new_ipc))) goto bad_unshare_cleanup_uts; +if ((err =unshare_user_ns (unshare_flags, &new_user))) + goto bad_unshare_cleanup_ipc; -if (new_ns || new_uts || new_ipc) { +if (new_ns || new_uts || new_ipc || new_user) { old_nsproxy = current->nsproxy; new_nsproxy =dup_namespaces (old_nsproxy);if (!new_nsproxy) { err = -ENOMEM ; - goto bad_unshare_cleanup_ipc; + goto bad_unshare_cleanup_user; } }if (new_fs || new_ns || new_mm || new_fd || new_ulist || - new_uts || new_ipc) { + new_uts || new_ipc || new_user) {task_lock (current);
@@ -1707,12 +1711,22 @@ asmlinkage long sys_unshare(unsigned lon new_ipc = ipc; } +if (new_user) { + user = current->nsproxy->user_ns; + current->nsproxy->user_ns = new_user; + new_user = user; + } +task_unlock (current); }if (new_nsproxy)put_nsproxy (new_nsproxy); +bad_unshare_cleanup_user: +if (new_user) +put_user_ns (new_user); + bad_unshare_cleanup_ipc:if (new_ipc)put_ipc_ns (new_ipc);
kernel/nsproxy.c +1 -1
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(int flags, struct taget_nsproxy (old_ns); -if (!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS |CLONE_NEWUTS |CLONE_NEWIPC ))) +if (!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS |CLONE_NEWUTS |CLONE_NEWIPC |CLONE_NEWUSER )))return 0 ; new_ns =clone_namespaces (old_ns);
kernel/user_namespace.c +72 -2
89 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
1.4.1