Wondering: why capabilities system is broken?
Hopefully not a flamewar question...
Currently, capabilities of a process are reset during exec() system call. At least effective+permitted set.
1) In case new uid != 0, all the caps are cleared, so it is not possible to execute a program as non-root but still give it some capabilities (like, say, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE).
2) In case new uid == 0, effective and permitted sets are restored to all-ones.
This is regardless of other settings, like prctl(KEEPCAPS), or the current set of capabilities.
I partly understand why 2) is done - in case of setuid binary being executed, all the capabilities are set for it. But this breaks executing non-setuid binaries too -- for example, it'd be very nice to be able to chroot to some directory, and remove CAP_SYS_CHROOT (and other evil caps like CAP_SYS_MODULE, CAP_SETPCAP) -- this way, with minimal efforts, chroot will work almost (yes, I understand it's not entirely the same) the same as BSD jail(2) concept.
So the question is: why capability sets are being reinitialized during exec()? At least in 2.4 era, they weren't... and stuff like execcap, sucaps etc was working. Now they aren't anymore.
Thanks.
/mjt
Quoted 1 line · Michael Tokarev
Hopefully not a flamewar question...
nothing wrong with asking for clarification. Though you should have copied [email protected].
Quoted 6 lines
Currently, capabilities of a process are reset during
exec()system call. At least effective+permitted set.1) In case new uid != 0, all the caps are cleared, so it is not possible to execute a program as non-root but still give it some capabilities (like, say,
CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE).
With the introduction of file capabilities in -mm, you can assign CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE to a program not owned by root such that all users can run the program with that capabilities.
Even in mainline, you can make the program setuid 0 and code it such that it immediately specify keepcaps, change to nonroot, and drop all caps but CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE.
Quoted 5 lines
2) In case new uid == 0, effective and permitted sets are restored to all-ones.
This is regardless of other settings, like prctl(KEEPCAPS), or the current set of capabilities.
Look at the prctl(2) manpage - it is about keeping capabilities across setuid, not across exec.
Quoted 7 lines
I partly understand why 2) is done - in case of setuid binary being executed, all the capabilities are set for it. But this breaks executing non-setuid binaries too -- for example, it'd be very nice to be able to chroot to some directory, and remove
CAP_SYS_CHROOT(and other evil caps likeCAP_SYS_MODULE,CAP_SETPCAP) -- this way, with minimal efforts, chroot will work almost (yes, I understand it's not entirely the same) the same as BSD jail(2) concept.
Are you aware of the namespace/containers work going on right now to get full virtual server support into mainline? See
http://lists.linux-foundation.org/pipermail/containers/
for the archives of the main relevant mailing list.
Quoted 3 lines
So the question is: why capability sets are being reinitialized during
exec()? At least in 2.4 era, they weren't... and stuff like execcap, sucaps etc was working. Now they aren't anymore.
Please see the file capabilities support in -mm and let us know whether that does (not) meet your needs.
thanks,
-serge