security: revalidate rw permissions for sys_splice and sys_vmsplice
RFC PATCH 1/1 security: revalidate rw permissions for sys_splice and sys_vmsplice
Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case security policy has changed since the files were opened.
---
Please review. Note that this brings the splice code into line with other mechanisms for reading and writing files, where an LSM check is made on open, then revalidated on read or write as a form of partial revocation.
fs/splice.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/splice.c +14 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/syscalls.h> #include <linux/uio.h> +#include <linux/security.h> struct partial_page {unsigned int offset;
@@ -912,6 +913,10 @@ static long do_splice_from(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,if (unlikely (ret <0 ))return ret; + ret =security_file_permission (out,MAY_WRITE ); +if (unlikely (ret <0 )) +return ret; +return out->f_op->splice_write (pipe, out, ppos, len, flags); }
@@ -935,6 +940,10 @@ static long do_splice_to(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,if (unlikely (ret <0 ))return ret; + ret =security_file_permission (in,MAY_READ ); +if (unlikely (ret <0 )) +return ret; + isize =i_size_read (in->f_mapping->host);if (unlikely (*ppos >= isize))return 0 ;
@@ -1263,6 +1272,7 @@ static int get_iovec_page_array(const struct iovec __user *iov,static long do_vmsplice (struct file *file,const struct iovec __user *iov,unsigned long nr_segs,unsigned int flags) { +long err;struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;struct page *pages[PIPE_BUFFERS ];struct partial_page partial[PIPE_BUFFERS ];
@@ -1281,6 +1291,10 @@ static long do_vmsplice(struct file *file, const struct iovec __user *iov,else if (unlikely (!nr_segs))return 0 ; + err =security_file_permission (file,MAY_WRITE ); +if (unlikely (err <0 )) +return err; + spd.nr_pages =get_iovec_page_array (iov, nr_segs, pages, partial, flags &SPLICE_F_GIFT );if (spd.nr_pages <=0 )
Signature · 1 line
1.5.0.6
Quoted 2 lines · James Morris
Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case security policy has changed since the files were opened.
I guess it was inevitably going to happen :-)
Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe
Quoted 8 lines · On Wed, 30 May 2007 09:15:01 +0200 Jens Axboe <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · James Morris
Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case security policy has changed since the files were opened.
I guess it was inevitably going to happen :-)
Signed-off-by Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Probably acked-by was more appropriate.
James, is this considered needed-for-2.6.22?
fs/splice.c static long do_splice_from(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out, · line 918
Quoted 3 lines
fs/splice.c +3
-0+ ret =security_file_permission (out,MAY_WRITE ); +if (unlikely (ret <0 )) +return ret;
ot: all the unlikely()s are irksome. I wonder if there was some way of doing this in security_file_permission() instead. eg:
static inline int security_file_permission (struct file *file, int mask)
{
int ret = security_ops->file_permission (file, mask);
if (likely(ret == 0))
return 0;
return ret;
}Quoted 7 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 4 lines · On Wed, 30 May 2007 09:15:01 +0200 Jens Axboe <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · James Morris
Revalidate read/write permissions for splice(2) and vmslice(2), in case security policy has changed since the files were opened.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I guess it was inevitably going to happen :-)
Signed-off-by Jens Axboe <[email protected]>Probably acked-by was more appropriate.
James, is this considered needed-for-2.6.22?
No, it's tightening things up. We don't have full revocation in any case, and the primary security check is performed on open.
Quoted 7 lines
fs/splice.c static long do_splice_from(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out, · line 918
Quoted 3 lines
fs/splice.c +3
-0+ ret =security_file_permission (out,MAY_WRITE ); +if (unlikely (ret <0 )) +return ret;ot: all the unlikely()s are irksome. I wonder if there was some way of doing this in
security_file_permission()instead. eg:
This is the only place where we do this -- it's to remain consistent with the surrounding splice code, which does this for other checks. Given that it's calling out to a typically non-trivial security module, it may be better to remove the unlikelys here.
- James
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>