Skip to contentSkip to conversation

IBAC Patch

RFC PATCH In review Mimi Zohar 2 participants 3 messages Jun 18, 2007 – Jun 20, 2007

Subsystems (2)
lore
Share & tools
lore

Mimi Zohar

author
#0 lore raw

RFC PATCH 1/1 IBAC Patch

This is a re-release of Integrity Based Access Control(IBAC) LSM module which bases access control decisions on the new integrity framework services. IBAC is a sample LSM module to help clarify the interaction between LSM and Linux Integrity Modules(LIM).

New to this release of IBAC is digsig's functionality of preventing files open for write to be mmapped, and files that are mmapped from being opened for write.

IBAC originally verified/measured executables only in the bprm_check_security() hook. By only doing the verification/measurement in bprm_check_security(), libraries could be loaded without first being verified/measured. This release of IBAC, files are also verified/measured in the file_mmap() hook, which catches the libraries, and inode_permission() hook, which verifies/measures files tagged, by a userspace application, with the extended attribute 'security.measure'.

IBAC can be included or excluded in the kernel configuration. If included in the kernel and IBAC_BOOTPARAM is enabled, IBAC can also be enabled/disabled on the kernel command line with 'ibac='.

IBAC can be configured to either verify and enforce integrity or to just log integrity failures on the kernel command line with 'ibac_enforce='. When IBAC_BOOTPARAM is enabled, the default is only to log integrity failures.

---

security/ibac/Kconfig new file +54 -0
Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/ibac/Kconfig
===================================================================
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+config SECURITY_IBAC
+	boolean "IBAC support"
+	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_NETWORK && INTEGRITY
+	help
+	  Integrity Based Access Control(IBAC) uses the Linux
+	  Integrity Module(LIM) API calls to verify an executable's
+	  metadata and data's integrity.  Based on the results,
+	  execution permission is permitted/denied.  Integrity
+	  providers may implement the LIM hooks differently.  For
+	  more information on integrity verification refer to the
+	  specific integrity provider documentation.
+
+config SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM
+	bool "IBAC boot parameter"
+	depends on SECURITY_IBAC
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'ibac', which allows IBAC
+	  to be disabled at boot.  If this option is selected, IBAC
+	  functionality can be disabled with ibac=0 on the kernel
+	  command line.  The purpose of this option is to allow a
+	  single kernel image to be distributed with IBAC built in,
+	  but not necessarily enabled.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
+	int "IBAC boot parameter default value"
+	depends on SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM
+	range 0 1
+	default 0
+	help
+	  This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
+	  'ibac', which allows IBAC to be enabled at boot.  If this
+	  option is set to 1 (one), the IBAC kernel parameter will
+	  default to 1, enabling IBAC at bootup.  If this option is
+	  set to 0 (zero), the IBAC kernel parameter will default to 0,
+	  disabling IBAC at bootup.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
+
+config SECURITY_IBAC_ENFORCE
+	bool "IBAC integrity enforce boot parameter"
+	depends on SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'ibac_enforce', which
+	  allows integrity enforcement to be enabled/disabled at boot.
+	  If this option is selected, integrity enforcement can be
+	  enabled with ibac_enforce=1 on the kernel command line.
+	  The default is not to enforce integrity, but simply log
+	  integrity verification errors.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
security/ibac/Makefile new file +6 -0
Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/ibac/Makefile
===================================================================
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building IBAC
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IBAC) += ibac.o
+ibac-y 	:= ibac_main.o
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +434 -0

434 lines not on this page · raw message

security/Kconfig +1 -0
Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/Kconfig
===================================================================
@@ -114,5 +114,6 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 
+source security/ibac/Kconfig
 endmenu
 
security/Makefile +1 -0
Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/Makefile
===================================================================
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o dummy.o inode.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY)		+= integrity.o integrity_dummy.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE)		+= ima/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IBAC)		+= ibac/
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)	+= commoncap.o capability.o
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +12 -0
Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
===================================================================
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ parameter is applicable:
 	FB	The frame buffer device is enabled.
 	HW	Appropriate hardware is enabled.
 	IA-64	IA-64 architecture is enabled.
+	IBAC	Integrity Based Access Control support is enabled.
 	IMA	Integrity measurement architecture is enabled.
 	IOSCHED	More than one I/O scheduler is enabled.
 	IP_PNP	IP DHCP, BOOTP, or RARP is enabled.
@@ -761,6 +762,17 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. 
 	ihash_entries=	[KNL]
 			Set number of hash buckets for inode cache.
 
+	ibac=		[IBAC] Disable or enable IBAC at boot time.
+                        Format: { "0" | "1" }
+                        See security/ibac/Kconfig help text.
+                        0 -- disable.
+                        1 -- enable.
+                        Default value is set via kernel config option.
+
+	ibac_enforce=	[IBAC] Enable integrity enforcing at boot time.
+                        Format: { "0" | "1" }
+                        Default is 0 to disable integrity enforcing.
+
 	ima=		[IMA] Disable or enable IMA at boot time.
 			Format: { "0" | "1" }
 			See security/ima/Kconfig help text.
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 143 lines · Mimi Zohar

This is a re-release of Integrity Based Access Control(IBAC) LSM module which bases access control decisions on the new integrity framework services. IBAC is a sample LSM module to help clarify the interaction between LSM and Linux Integrity Modules(LIM).

New to this release of IBAC is digsig's functionality of preventing files open for write to be mmapped, and files that are mmapped from being opened for write.

IBAC originally verified/measured executables only in the bprm_check_security() hook. By only doing the verification/measurement in bprm_check_security(), libraries could be loaded without first being verified/measured. This release of IBAC, files are also verified/measured in the file_mmap() hook, which catches the libraries, and inode_permission() hook, which verifies/measures files tagged, by a userspace application, with the extended attribute 'security.measure'.

IBAC can be included or excluded in the kernel configuration. If included in the kernel and IBAC_BOOTPARAM is enabled, IBAC can also be enabled/disabled on the kernel command line with 'ibac='.

IBAC can be configured to either verify and enforce integrity or to just log integrity failures on the kernel command line with 'ibac_enforce='. When IBAC_BOOTPARAM is enabled, the default is only to log integrity failures.

---

Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/ibac/Kconfig
===================================================================

security/ibac/Kconfig new file +54 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+config SECURITY_IBAC
+	boolean "IBAC support"
+	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_NETWORK && INTEGRITY
+	help
+	  Integrity Based Access Control(IBAC) uses the Linux
+	  Integrity Module(LIM) API calls to verify an executable's
+	  metadata and data's integrity.  Based on the results,
+	  execution permission is permitted/denied.  Integrity
+	  providers may implement the LIM hooks differently.  For
+	  more information on integrity verification refer to the
+	  specific integrity provider documentation.
+
+config SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM
+	bool "IBAC boot parameter"
+	depends on SECURITY_IBAC
+	default n
+	help
+	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'ibac', which allows IBAC
+	  to be disabled at boot.  If this option is selected, IBAC
+	  functionality can be disabled with ibac=0 on the kernel
+	  command line.  The purpose of this option is to allow a
+	  single kernel image to be distributed with IBAC built in,
+	  but not necessarily enabled.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
+	int "IBAC boot parameter default value"
+	depends on SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM
+	range 0 1
+	default 0
+	help
+	  This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
+	  'ibac', which allows IBAC to be enabled at boot.  If this
+	  option is set to 1 (one), the IBAC kernel parameter will
+	  default to 1, enabling IBAC at bootup.  If this option is
+	  set to 0 (zero), the IBAC kernel parameter will default to 0,
+	  disabling IBAC at bootup.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
+
+config SECURITY_IBAC_ENFORCE
+	bool "IBAC integrity enforce boot parameter"
+	depends on SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'ibac_enforce', which
+	  allows integrity enforcement to be enabled/disabled at boot.
+	  If this option is selected, integrity enforcement can be
+	  enabled with ibac_enforce=1 on the kernel command line.
+	  The default is not to enforce integrity, but simply log
+	  integrity verification errors.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.

Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/ibac/Makefile
===================================================================

security/ibac/Makefile new file +6 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#
+# Makefile for building IBAC
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IBAC) += ibac.o
+ibac-y 	:= ibac_main.o

Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/ibac/ibac_main.c
===================================================================

security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +40 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+/*
+ * Integrity Based Access Control(IBAC) sample LSM module calling LIM hooks.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
+ *
+ *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *      the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/integrity.h>
+#include <linux/writeback.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM
+static int ibac_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_IBAC_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+
+static int __init ibac_enabled_setup(char *str)
+{
+	ibac_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+__setup("ibac=", ibac_enabled_setup);
+
+static int integrity_enforce;
+static int __init integrity_enforce_setup(char *str)
+{
+	integrity_enforce = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+__setup("ibac_enforce=", integrity_enforce_setup);
+

security/ibac/ibac_main.c line 50

Quoted 10 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +10 -0
+#else
+static int ibac_enabled = 1;
+static int integrity_enforce = 1;
+#endif
+
+#define get_file_security(file) ((unsigned long)(file->f_security))
+#define set_file_security(file, val) (file->f_security = (void *)val)
+
+#define get_task_security(task) ((unsigned long)(task->security))
+#define set_task_security(task, val) (task->security = (void *)val)

I understand the above are likely remnants of stacker lsm support, and I hate to say this, but not only is having those in there going to be frowned upon, it then leads you later on to do things like

	if (get_file_security(file)==0)

when using 0 for null upsets people in itself.

Quoted 10 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +10 -0
+
+#define XATTR_MEASURE_SUFFIX "measure"
+#define XATTR_MEASURE_SUFFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_MEASURE_SUFFIX) -1)
+
+struct ibac_isec_data {
+	int mmapped;		/* no. of times inode mmapped */
+	int measure;		/* inode tagged to be measured */
+	spinlock_t lock;	/* protect inode state */
+};
+

security/ibac/ibac_main.c line 70

Quoted 10 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +10 -0
+static int ibac_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ibac_isec_data *isec;
+
+	isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ibac_isec_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!isec)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
+	inode->i_security = isec;

Heh, for file and task security you use the above helpers, but for inode you do it like this? :) Please replace all x_security assignments and checks with this format.

Quoted 24 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +24 -0
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void ibac_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ibac_isec_data *isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	if (isec) {
+		inode->i_security = NULL;
+		kfree(isec);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * For all inodes allocate inode->i_security(isec), before the security
+ * subsystem is enabled.
+ */
+static void ibac_fixup_inodes(void)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb;
+
+	spin_lock(&sb_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(sb, &super_blocks, s_list) {
+		struct inode *inode;

security/ibac/ibac_main.c line 104

Quoted 10 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +10 -0
+
+		spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+
+		spin_lock(&inode_lock);
+		list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
+			spin_unlock(&inode_lock);
+
+			spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
+			if (!inode->i_security)
+				ibac_inode_alloc_security(inode);

since ibac_inode_alloc_security can return -ENOMEM, maybe you should at least check for that condition and warn the user?

Quoted 125 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +125 -0
+			spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+
+			spin_lock(&inode_lock);
+		}
+		spin_unlock(&inode_lock);
+
+		spin_lock(&sb_lock);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+}
+
+static void ibac_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ibac_isec_data *isec;
+	char *xattr_flags = XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_MEASURE_SUFFIX;
+
+	if (!inode)
+		return;
+
+	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
+		return;
+
+	if (vfs_getxattr(dentry, xattr_flags, NULL, 0) > 0) {
+		isec = inode->i_security;
+		spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+		isec->measure = 1;
+		spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline int is_kernel_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	return (!tsk->mm) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static int verify_metadata_integrity(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	int rc, status;
+
+	if (!dentry)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = integrity_verify_metadata(dentry, NULL, NULL, NULL, &status);
+	if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "ibac: verify_metadata %s failed"
+		       "(rc: %d - status: %d)\n",
+		       dentry->d_name.name, rc, status);
+		if (!integrity_enforce)
+			rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {	/* FAIL | NO_LABEL */
+		if (!is_kernel_thread(current)) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO "ibac: verify_metadata %s "
+			       "(Integrity status: %s)\n",
+			       dentry->d_name.name,
+			       status == INTEGRITY_FAIL ? "FAIL" : "NOLABEL");
+			if (integrity_enforce) {
+				rc = -EACCES;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int verify_and_measure_integrity(struct dentry *dentry,
+					struct file *file,
+					char *filename, int mask)
+{
+	int rc, status;
+
+	if (!dentry && !file)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = integrity_verify_data(dentry, file, &status);
+	if (rc < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_INFO "ibac: %s verify_data failed "
+		       "(rc: %d - status: %d)\n", filename, rc, status);
+		if (!integrity_enforce)
+			rc = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) {
+		if (!is_kernel_thread(current)) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO "ibac: verify_data %s "
+			       "(Integrity status: FAIL)\n", filename);
+			if (integrity_enforce) {
+				rc = -EACCES;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Only measure files that passed integrity verification. */
+	integrity_measure(dentry, file, filename, mask);
+	return 0;
+out:
+	/*
+	 * Verification failed, but as integrity is not being enforced,
+	 * we still need to measure.
+	 */
+	if (rc == 0)
+		integrity_measure(dentry, file, filename, mask);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int ibac_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+				 struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+	struct ibac_isec_data *isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	char *path = NULL;
+	char *fname = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+	int measure;
+
+	dentry = (!nd || !nd->dentry) ? d_find_alias(inode) : nd->dentry;
+	if (!dentry)

security/ibac/ibac_main.c line 239

Quoted 10 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +10 -0
+		return 0;
+	if (nd) {		/* preferably use fullname */
+		path = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (path)
+			fname = d_path(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, path, PAGE_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	if (!fname)		/* no choice, use short name */
+		fname = (!dentry->d_name.name) ? (char *)dentry->d_iname :
+		    (char *)dentry->d_name.name;

Please separate the above out into a helper function.

This name is only ever used for debugging, right? I didn't miss any place where the name is used for some security decision?

Quoted 255 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +195 -0
+
+	/* Measure labeled files */
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	measure = isec->measure;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
+	if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && (measure == 1)
+	    && (mask & MAY_READ)) {
+		rc = verify_metadata_integrity(dentry);
+		if (rc == 0)
+			rc = verify_and_measure_integrity(dentry, NULL,
+							  fname, mask);
+	}
+
+	/* Deny permission to write, if currently mmapped. */
+	if (inode && mask & MAY_WRITE) {
+		spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+		if (isec->mmapped > 0) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO "%s: %s - denied write access"
+			       " (isec=%d)\n",
+			       __FUNCTION__, fname, isec->mmapped);
+			rc = -EPERM;
+		}
+		spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	}
+
+	if (!nd || !nd->dentry)
+		dput(dentry);
+	if (path)
+		free_page((unsigned long)path);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the file is opened for writing, deny mmap(PROT_EXEC) access.
+ * Otherwise, increment the inode->i_security, which is our own
+ * writecount.  When the file is closed, f->f_security will be 1,
+ * and so we will decrement the inode->i_security.
+ * Just to be clear:
+ * 	file->f_security is 1 or 0.
+ * 	inode->i_security->mmapped is the *number* of processes which
+ * 		have this file mmapped(PROT_EXEC), so it can be >1.
+ */
+static int ibac_deny_write_access(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct ibac_isec_data *isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
+	if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) {
+		spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+		return -ETXTBSY;
+	}
+
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	isec->mmapped += 1;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	set_file_security(file, 1);
+	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * decrement our writer count on the inode.  When it hits 0, we will
+ * again allow opening the inode for writing.
+ */
+static void ibac_allow_write_access(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+	struct ibac_isec_data *isec = inode->i_security;
+
+	spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	isec->mmapped -= 1;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	set_file_security(file, 0);
+	spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * the file is being closed.  If we ever mmaped it for exec, then
+ * file->f_security>0, and we decrement the inode usage count to
+ * show that we are done with it.
+ */
+static void ibac_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	if (file->f_security)
+		ibac_allow_write_access(file);
+}
+
+/*
+ * We don't want to validate files which can be written while they are
+ * being executed.
+ * This means NFS.
+ */
+static inline int is_unprotected_file(struct file *file)
+{
+	if (strcmp(file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_type->name, "nfs") == 0)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify data integrity, metadata integrity and measure it.
+ */
+static int ibac_file_mmap(struct file *file,
+			  unsigned long reqprot,
+			  unsigned long calcprot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	unsigned long prot = reqprot;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!(prot & VM_EXEC))
+		return 0;
+	if (!file || !file->f_dentry)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (is_unprotected_file(file))
+		return (-EPERM);
+	/*
+	 * if file_security is set, then this process has already
+	 * incremented the writer count on this inode, don't do
+	 * it again.
+	 */
+	if (get_file_security(file) == 0) {
+		rc = ibac_deny_write_access(file);
+		if (rc) {
+			if (S_ISCHR(file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+				rc = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = verify_metadata_integrity(file->f_dentry);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		char *fname = NULL;
+		char *path = NULL;
+
+		path = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (path)
+			fname = d_path(file->f_dentry, file->f_path.mnt,
+				       path, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+		if (!fname)	/* no choice, use short name */
+			fname = (!file->f_dentry->d_name.name) ?
+			    (char *)file->f_dentry->d_iname :
+			    (char *)file->f_dentry->d_name.name;
+
+		rc = verify_and_measure_integrity(NULL, file, fname, MAY_EXEC);
+		if (path)
+			free_page((unsigned long)path);
+	}
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int ibac_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct dentry *dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
+	int rc;
+
+	rc = verify_metadata_integrity(dentry);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		rc = verify_and_measure_integrity(dentry,
+						  bprm->file, bprm->filename,
+						  MAY_EXEC);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static struct security_operations ibac_security_ops = {
+	.bprm_check_security = ibac_bprm_check_security,
+	.file_mmap = ibac_file_mmap,
+	.file_free_security = ibac_file_free_security,
+	.inode_alloc_security = ibac_inode_alloc_security,
+	.inode_free_security = ibac_inode_free_security,
+	.inode_permission = ibac_inode_permission,
+	.d_instantiate = ibac_d_instantiate
+};
+
+static int __init init_ibac(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!ibac_enabled)
+		return 0;
+
+	ibac_fixup_inodes();
+	rc = register_security(&ibac_security_ops);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		panic("ibac: unable to register with kernel\n");
+	return rc;
+}
+
+security_initcall(init_ibac);

Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/Kconfig
===================================================================

security/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -114,5 +114,6 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG
 
 source security/selinux/Kconfig
 
+source security/ibac/Kconfig
 endmenu
 

Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/security/Makefile
===================================================================

security/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ endif
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY)			+= security.o dummy.o inode.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY)		+= integrity.o integrity_dummy.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE)		+= ima/
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IBAC)		+= ibac/
 # Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)		+= selinux/built-in.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES)	+= commoncap.o capability.o

Index: linux-2.6.22-rc4-mm2/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
===================================================================

Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +12 -1
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ parameter is applicable:
 	FB	The frame buffer device is enabled.
 	HW	Appropriate hardware is enabled.
 	IA-64	IA-64 architecture is enabled.
+	IBAC	Integrity Based Access Control support is enabled.
 	IMA	Integrity measurement architecture is enabled.
 	IOSCHED	More than one I/O scheduler is enabled.
 	IP_PNP	IP DHCP, BOOTP, or RARP is enabled.
@@ -761,6 +762,17 @@ and is between 256 and 4096 characters. 
 	ihash_entries=	[KNL]
 			Set number of hash buckets for inode cache.
 
+	ibac=		[IBAC] Disable or enable IBAC at boot time.
+                        Format: { "0" | "1" }
+                        See security/ibac/Kconfig help text.
+                        0 -- disable.
+                        1 -- enable.
+                        Default value is set via kernel config option.
+
+	ibac_enforce=	[IBAC] Enable integrity enforcing at boot time.
+                        Format: { "0" | "1" }
+                        Default is 0 to disable integrity enforcing.
+
 	ima=		[IMA] Disable or enable IMA at boot time.
 			Format: { "0" | "1" }
 			See security/ima/Kconfig help text.
 
 
-

To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected]
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/

author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

security/ibac/ibac_main.c line 50

Quoted 5 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +5 -0
+#define get_file_security(file) ((unsigned long)(file->f_security))
+#define set_file_security(file, val) (file->f_security = (void *)val)
+
+#define get_task_security(task) ((unsigned long)(task->security))
+#define set_task_security(task, val) (task->security = (void *)val)

I understand the above are likely remnants of stacker lsm support, and I hate to say this, but not only is having those in there going to be frowned upon, it then leads you later on to do things like

Quoted 3 lines
	if (get_file_security(file)==0)

when using 0 for null upsets people in itself.

Instead of allocating memory for file->f_security, it uses file->f_security itself, for storing 0 or 1. So it isn't checking to see if it is NULL per se.

Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +16 -0
+
+#define XATTR_MEASURE_SUFFIX "measure"
+#define XATTR_MEASURE_SUFFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_MEASURE_SUFFIX) -1)
+
+struct ibac_isec_data {
+	int mmapped;		/* no. of times inode mmapped */
+	int measure;		/* inode tagged to be measured */
+	spinlock_t lock;	/* protect inode state */
+};
+
+static int ibac_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct ibac_isec_data *isec;
+
+	isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ibac_isec_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!isec)
Quoted 8 lines

security/ibac/ibac_main.c line 70

Quoted 4 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +4 -0
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
+	inode->i_security = isec;

Heh, for file and task security you use the above helpers, but for inode you do it like this? :) Please replace all x_security assignments and checks with this format.

For file and task, the code uses the security field itself to store
information as opposed to allocating storage for it. In the case of
inode, it is using it for both the original digsig mmap tracking and now to tag the inode that it needs to be measured. Tagging the inode to be measured is based on the existence of the security.measure xattr, which is controlled by a userspace application. The difference is that storage is allocated for inode->i_security.

Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +16 -0
+/*
+ * For all inodes allocate inode->i_security(isec), before the security
+ * subsystem is enabled.
+ */
+static void ibac_fixup_inodes(void)
+{
+	struct super_block *sb;
+
+	spin_lock(&sb_lock);
+	list_for_each_entry(sb, &super_blocks, s_list) {
+		struct inode *inode;
+
+		spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+
+		spin_lock(&inode_lock);
+		list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
Quoted 8 lines

security/ibac/ibac_main.c line 104

Quoted 5 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +5 -0
+			spin_unlock(&inode_lock);
+
+			spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
+			if (!inode->i_security)
+				ibac_inode_alloc_security(inode);

since ibac_inode_alloc_security can return -ENOMEM, maybe you should at least check for that condition and warn the user?

Yes, that definitely is a good idea. Will do.

Quoted 28 lines
Quoted 28 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +27 -0
+			spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
+
+			spin_lock(&inode_lock);
+		}
+		spin_unlock(&inode_lock);
+
+		spin_lock(&sb_lock);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
+}
+
 
+static int ibac_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+				 struct nameidata *nd)
+{
+	struct ibac_isec_data *isec = inode->i_security;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	char *path = NULL;
+	char *fname = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+	int measure;
+
+	dentry = (!nd || !nd->dentry) ? d_find_alias(inode) : nd->dentry;
+	if (!dentry)
+		return 0;
+	if (nd) {		/* preferably use fullname */
+		path = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (path)
Quoted 8 lines

security/ibac/ibac_main.c line 239

Quoted 6 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +6 -0
+			fname = d_path(nd->dentry, nd->mnt, path, PAGE_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	if (!fname)		/* no choice, use short name */
+		fname = (!dentry->d_name.name) ? (char *)dentry->d_iname :
+		    (char *)dentry->d_name.name;

Please separate the above out into a helper function.

Ok.

Quoted 2 lines

This name is only ever used for debugging, right? I didn't miss any place where the name is used for some security decision?

Correct, the filename is not used for any security decision, but it is passed to integrity_measure(), which the IMA integrity provider associates with the given hash value. To see the filename hints 'cat /sys/kernel/security/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements'.

Quoted 32 lines
Quoted 32 lines
security/ibac/ibac_main.c new file +32 -0
+
+	/* Measure labeled files */
+	spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+	measure = isec->measure;
+	spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+
+	if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && (measure == 1)
+	    && (mask & MAY_READ)) {
+		rc = verify_metadata_integrity(dentry);
+		if (rc == 0)
+			rc = verify_and_measure_integrity(dentry, NULL,
+							  fname, mask);
+	}
+
+	/* Deny permission to write, if currently mmapped. */
+	if (inode && mask & MAY_WRITE) {
+		spin_lock(&isec->lock);
+		if (isec->mmapped > 0) {
+			printk(KERN_INFO "%s: %s - denied write access"
+			       " (isec=%d)\n",
+			       __FUNCTION__, fname, isec->mmapped);
+			rc = -EPERM;
+		}
+		spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
+	}
+
+	if (!nd || !nd->dentry)
+		dput(dentry);
+	if (path)
+		free_page((unsigned long)path);
+	return rc;
+}