capabilities: fix compilation with strict type checking
Subsystems (3)
RFC PATCH 1/1 capabilities: fix compilation with strict type checking
Quoted 1 line
From
cd7c384f76d2c0f6b12a1c0936d54ae9c5e7cb4cMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2007 15:39:10 -0400
Subject: [PATCH RFC] capabilities: fix compilation with strict type checking (v2)
Since at least 1998 the code under STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS option has not been used. (See
http://www.uwsg.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/9810.2/0705.html)
There are two options - we can remove this option altogether or, as this patch attempts to do, fix compilation with STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS so it can be enabled.
This patch replaces the always-undefined STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS with a Kconfig variable (CONFIG_CAP_STRICT_TYPECHECKS), and hopefully fixes all the places in the code which broke with that option set. This compiles with capabilities, selinux, and dummy modules. It passes ltp with capabilities and file capabilities.
However this patch is only for comment. Much more testing and proofreading is needed before considering applying. I will also be sending out the alternative patch which simply removes the strict typechecking.
--- fs/nfsd/auth.c | 2 +- include/linux/capability.h | 45 +++++++++++++++++++------------------------ kernel/capability.c | 12 ++++++++++- security/Kconfig | 12 +++++++++++ security/commoncap.c | 22 +++++++++++--------- security/dummy.c | 13 +++++++---- 6 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/auth.c +1 -1
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)cap_t (current->cap_effective) &= ~CAP_NFSD_MASK ; }else {cap_t (current->cap_effective) |= (CAP_NFSD_MASK & - current->cap_permitted); +cap_t (current->cap_permitted)); }return ret; }
include/linux/capability.h +20 -25
70 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/capability.c +11 -1
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@#include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> +kernel_cap_t cap_empty_set =CAP_EMPTY_SET ; +kernel_cap_t cap_full_set =CAP_FULL_SET ; +kernel_cap_t cap_init_eff_set =CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ; +kernel_cap_t cap_init_inh_set =CAP_INIT_INH_SET ; +kernel_cap_t cap_fs_mask_set =to_cap_t (CAP_FS_MASK ); +/* * This lock protects task->cap_* for all tasks including current. * Locking rule: acquire this prior to tasklist_lock.
@@ -43,6 +49,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)__u32 version;struct task_struct *target;struct __user_cap_data_struct data; +kernel_cap_t pE, pP, pI;if (get_user (version, &header->version))return -EFAULT ;
@@ -71,7 +78,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr) }else target = current; - ret =security_capget (target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, &data.permitted); + ret =security_capget (target, &pE, &pI, &pP); + data.effective =cap_t (pE); + data.inheritable =cap_t (pI); + data.permitted =cap_t (pP); out:read_unlock (&tasklist_lock);
security/Kconfig +12 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,18 @@ config KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. +config CAP_STRICT_TYPECHECKS + bool "Strict capability type checks" + default n + help + This option compiles the kernel with strict checks on + capability types. + + This results in no functional difference, but is useful for + verification of proper use of the in-kernel capability API. + + If you are unsure, answer N. + config SECURITY bool "Enable different security models" depends on SYSFS
security/commoncap.c +12 -10
@@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) {/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */ - *effective =cap_t (target->cap_effective); - *inheritable =cap_t (target->cap_inheritable); - *permitted =cap_t (target->cap_permitted); + *effective = target->cap_effective; + *inheritable = target->cap_inheritable; + *permitted = target->cap_permitted;return 0 ; }
@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ static inline int cap_from_disk(__le32 *caps, struct linux_binprm *bprm, bprm->cap_effective = true; else bprm->cap_effective = false; - bprm->cap_permitted =to_cap_t (le32_to_cpu (caps[1 ]) ); - bprm->cap_inheritable =to_cap_t (le32_to_cpu (caps[2 ]) ); +cap_assign (bprm->cap_permitted,le32_to_cpu (caps[1 ])); +cap_assign (bprm->cap_inheritable,le32_to_cpu (caps[2 ]));return 0 ;default :return -EINVAL ;
@@ -337,8 +337,10 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)* capability rules */ if (!is_global_init (current)) { current->cap_permitted = new_permitted; - current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_effective ? - new_permitted :0 ; +if (bprm->cap_effective) + current->cap_effective = new_permitted; +else + current->cap_effective = cap_empty_set; }/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
@@ -557,9 +559,9 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p) { - p->cap_effective =CAP_INIT_EFF_SET ; - p->cap_inheritable =CAP_INIT_INH_SET ; - p->cap_permitted =CAP_FULL_SET ; + p->cap_effective = cap_init_eff_set; + p->cap_inheritable = cap_init_inh_set; + p->cap_permitted = cap_full_set; p->keep_capabilities =0 ;return ; }
security/dummy.c +8 -5
@@ -36,14 +36,17 @@ static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target,kernel_cap_t * effective,kernel_cap_t * inheritable,kernel_cap_t * permitted) { - *effective = *inheritable = *permitted =0 ; +kernel_cap_t pcapmask =to_cap_t (CAP_TO_MASK (CAP_SETPCAP )); + + *effective = *inheritable = *permitted = cap_empty_set;if (target->euid ==0 ) { - *permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK ); - *effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK (CAP_SETPCAP ) & ~CAP_FS_MASK ); + *permitted =cap_drop (cap_full_set, cap_fs_mask_set); + *effective =cap_drop (cap_full_set, pcapmask); + *effective =cap_drop (*effective, cap_fs_mask_set); }if (target->fsuid ==0 ) { - *permitted |=CAP_FS_MASK ; - *effective |=CAP_FS_MASK ; + *permitted =cap_combine (*permitted, cap_fs_mask_set); + *effective =cap_combine (*effective, cap_fs_mask_set); }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
1.5.1.1.GIT
RFC PATCH 1/1 capabilities: remove STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
Quoted 5 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
From
cd7c384f76d2c0f6b12a1c0936d54ae9c5e7cb4cMon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 19 Oct 2007 15:39:10 -0400
Subject: [PATCH RFC] capabilities: fix compilation with strict type checking (v2)
Quoted 7 lines
Since at least 1998 the code under
STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKSoption has not been used. (See
http://www.uwsg.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/9810.2/0705.html)There are two options - we can remove this option altogether or, as this patch attempts to do, fix compilation with
STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKSso it can be enabled.
Here is the second alternative, simply removing the STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS option.
thanks,
-serge
Quoted 1 line
From
141626df6eaba12f5566f6bce7e72c1c3e627364Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2007 10:00:49 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] capabilities: remove STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
It appears STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS was introduced in 1998 - and
always undefined since then - because the STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS
behavior is broken. (See http://www.uwsg.iu.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/9810.2/0705.html)
Remove this code to simplify the capabilites code.
--- include/linux/capability.h | 21 --------------------- 1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
include/linux/capability.h +0 -21
@@ -64,20 +64,8 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {#ifdef __KERNEL__ -/* #define STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS */ - -#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS - -typedef struct kernel_cap_struct { -__u32 cap; -}kernel_cap_t ; - -#else -typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t ; -#endif -#define _USER_CAP_HEADER_SIZE (2*sizeof(__u32))#define _KERNEL_CAP_T_SIZE (sizeof(kernel_cap_t))
@@ -315,18 +303,9 @@ typedef __u32 kernel_cap_t;* Internal kernel functions only */ -#ifdef STRICT_CAP_T_TYPECHECKS - -#define to_cap_t (x) { x } -#define cap_t (x) (x).cap - -#else -#define to_cap_t (x) (x)#define cap_t (x) (x) -#endif -#define CAP_EMPTY_SET to_cap_t(0)#define CAP_FULL_SET to_cap_t(~0)#define CAP_INIT_EFF_SET to_cap_t(~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP))
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1.5.1.1.GIT