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arch_ptrace_stop

PATCH Oleg Nesterov 3 participants 5 messages Dec 13, 2007 – Dec 16, 2007

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Quoted 7 lines · Roland McGrath
(quoted diff) +6 -0
+static int sigkill_pending(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	return ((sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGKILL) ||
+		 sigismember(&tsk->signal->shared_pending.signal, SIGKILL)) &&
+		!unlikely(sigismember(&tsk->blocked, SIGKILL)));
+}

How is it possible that SIGKILL is blocked?

Quoted 26 lines

static void ptrace_stop(int exit_code, int nostop_code, siginfo_t *info) {

(quoted diff) +20 -0
+	int killed = 0;
+
+	if (arch_ptrace_stop_needed(exit_code, info)) {
+		/*
+		 * The arch code has something special to do before a
+		 * ptrace stop.  This is allowed to block, e.g. for faults
+		 * on user stack pages.  We can't keep the siglock while
+		 * calling arch_ptrace_stop, so we must release it now.
+		 * To preserve proper semantics, we must do this before
+		 * any signal bookkeeping like checking group_stop_count.
+		 * Meanwhile, a SIGKILL could come in before we retake the
+		 * siglock.  That must prevent us from sleeping in TASK_TRACED.
+		 * So after regaining the lock, we must check for SIGKILL.
+		 */
+		spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+		arch_ptrace_stop(exit_code, info);
+		spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+		killed = sigkill_pending(current);
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * If there is a group stop in progress,
 	 * we must participate in the bookkeeping.

Review static void ptrace_stop(int exit_code, i · line 1638

Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +1 -1
@@ -1604,7 +1635,7 @@ static void ptrace_stop(int exit_code, i
 	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 	try_to_freeze();
 	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
-	if (may_ptrace_stop()) {
+	if (!unlikely(killed) && may_ptrace_stop()) {

Could you please explain this change in more details?

Currently ptrace_stop() schedules in TASK_TRACED state even if we have a pending SIGKILL. With this patch this is still possible, but unless arch_ptrace_stop_needed() is true and thus we will check sigkill_pending().

Suppose the task was SIGKILL'ed and does ptrace_notify(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT), now the resulting action depends on arch_ptrace_stop_needed().

I don't claim this is wrong, just trying to understand.

Thanks,

Oleg.

#1 lore raw
Quoted 1 line · Oleg Nesterov

How is it possible that SIGKILL is blocked?

I *think* it's possible that kernel threads may block SIGKILL. And I think init (pid 1) gets SIGKILL blocked.

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#2 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Matthew Wilcox
Quoted 1 line · Oleg Nesterov

How is it possible that SIGKILL is blocked?

I *think* it's possible that kernel threads may block SIGKILL. And I think init (pid 1) gets SIGKILL blocked.

Yes. But this shouldn't matter because we can't ptrace them. /sbin/init doesn't block SIGKILL, but it can't be ptraced either.

Also, SIGKILL is blocked only if kthread was created by kernel_thread() and then it does daemonize(). kthread_create()'ed kthreads don't block SIGKILL but ignore it. The latter behaviour is more correct, but we can't do the same for kernel_thread() threads.

Oleg.

#3 lore raw
In reply to Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 1 line

How is it possible that SIGKILL is blocked?

It is probably not possible here. It's impossible for normal user threads, and kernel threads or ones doing something weird inside the kernel can probably never get here. But I'm just not trying to rely on any fancy guarantees here. In this change I'm being conservative in just matching the low-level logic that affects get_signal_to_deliver directly. I'd prefer to get this in place now, where it's easy to be sure it's correct vis a vis current behavior. Later on we can convince ourselves about the correctness of simplifications to clean the logic up.

Quoted 1 line

Could you please explain this change in more details?

I'm glad to. I appreciate the review.

Quoted 3 lines

Currently ptrace_stop() schedules in TASK_TRACED state even if we have a pending SIGKILL. With this patch this is still possible, but unless arch_ptrace_stop_needed() is true and thus we will check sigkill_pending().

Currently the siglock is always held throughout. The case this change addresses is when no SIGKILL was already pending before we took the lock. Currently, a new SIGKILL cannot come in until we've released the lock, which is after we've set TASK_TRACED. The signal's sender will hold the lock while checking each thread's state, waking up any in TASK_TRACED.

When arch_ptrace_stop_needed() is true, we release the siglock for an unknown period (might block, etc). If a SIGKILL is sent there, it becomes pending while we are in TASK_RUNNING or a normal blocked state. Next we finish arch_ptrace_stop() and reacquire the siglock. Now entering TASK_TRACED would leave us unkillable because SIGKILL is already pending and nothing else (except PTRACE_CONT et al) will try to wake us up.

This was tested on ia64 by inserting an explicit sleep in arch_ptrace_stop to simulate a very long block in a page fault, and then sending SIGKILL in this interval. It was verified that this left the thread unkillable, and that the sigkill_pending() check fixed that.

Quoted 2 lines

Suppose the task was SIGKILL'ed and does ptrace_notify(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT), now the resulting action depends on arch_ptrace_stop_needed().

For a SIGKILL that caused the exit to happen, then that SIGKILL was already dequeued and is no longer pending by the time we get here, so nothing is different.

For a new SIGKILL racing with an exit already in progress, then either it comes before ptrace_notify(PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT) has taken the siglock, or after it's released it (in ptrace_stop). If it comes after ptrace_stop releases the siglock, then it wakes the thread up from that ptrace stop. If it comes before ptrace_notify takes the siglock, then the thread stops anyway with a pending SIGKILL. (That may be a problem, but it is not new. We can discuss that case separately.)

The new third possibility is that it comes after ptrace_stop releases the siglock to call arch_ptrace_stop. Then the new code will notice the pending SIGKILL and skip the stop. The only way this differs from the SIGKILL having arrived immediately after the stop is that the parent SIGCHLD/wait notification with CLD_TRAPPED didn't happen. It's a race for the parent even to notice that, since exit_code and the queued SIGCHLD's siginfo_t will very quickly be replaced by the fresh notification sent for the child's death.

Quoted 1 line

I don't claim this is wrong, just trying to understand.

I don't claim the logic is now perfect, just that this change is better for the case it's intended for and not materially worse for others. We can certainly do more to clean things up. But I don't want that complex subject to delay the fixing and cleaning up of ia64 that this change enables.

Thanks,
Roland

#4 lore raw

Roland, I am sorry for delay,

Quoted 11 lines · Roland McGrath
Quoted 4 lines

Currently ptrace_stop() schedules in TASK_TRACED state even if we have a pending SIGKILL. With this patch this is still possible, but unless arch_ptrace_stop_needed() is true and thus we will check sigkill_pending().

Currently the siglock is always held throughout. The case this change addresses is when no SIGKILL was already pending before we took the lock. Currently, a new SIGKILL cannot come in until we've released the lock, which is after we've set TASK_TRACED. The signal's sender will hold the lock while checking each thread's state, waking up any in TASK_TRACED.

Quoted 4 lines

When arch_ptrace_stop_needed() is true, we release the siglock for an unknown period (might block, etc). If a SIGKILL is sent there, it becomes pending while we are in TASK_RUNNING or a normal blocked state. Next we finish arch_ptrace_stop() and reacquire the siglock.

Yes, yes, I see.

Quoted 3 lines

Now entering
TASK_TRACED would leave us unkillable because SIGKILL is already pending and nothing else (except PTRACE_CONT et al) will try to wake us up.

But this doesn't differ from the case when SIGKILL was already pending when we enter ptrace_stop, and arch_ptrace_stop_needed() == false, that was my point.

Yes, arch_ptrace_stop() can take a long time, might block, etc. But what about TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE ? The task can recieve SIGKILL while executing the syscall which can also block and so on, but do_syscall_trace(entryexit == 1) doesn't check the pending signal.

I should clarify my question. What I can't understand is the subtle dependency on the result of arch_ptrace_stop_needed(). This means that it is hard to predict the behaviour.

IOW, can't we

- ignore the pending SIGKILL (current behaviour) -- OR --
- always check it unconditionally, before setting TASK_TRACED

? This looks a bit more consistent to me.

Please also note "before setting TASK_TRACED" above. With this patch we set TASK_TRACED under ->siglock, and then change the ->state to TASK_RUNNING if killed == 1. Minor, but this doesn't look correct, we can fool the tracer which does ptrace_check_attach().

Oleg.