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XFRM audit fixes/additions for net-2.6.25

PATCH Applied Paul Moore 3 participants 13 messages Dec 20, 2007 – Dec 21, 2007

Subsystems (3)
Networking Network drivers Networking IPsec
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Paul Moore

author
#0 lore raw

cover XFRM audit fixes/additions for net-2.6.25

Three patches backed against net-2.6.25 from today. Some of the audit messages are a little difficult to test by their nature but I've verified that I'm still able to send/receive IPsec protected traffic with the patches applied.

The first patch was posted before but David decided it best to split the patch so some parts could be pulled into 2.6.24; the patch was split and the 2.6.24 bits were accepted (the SPI byteorder fix) so patch #1 in the series is what is left for 2.6.25.

The second patch was posted before as an RFC patch without anyone complaining too loudly. Eric Paris made some suggestions about better handling of the "op=" audit field and I've tried to take that into account with this patch.

The final patch is the audit replay counter overflow issue fix that has been talked about on netdev. This sounded like the best course of action from the discussion but if I'm wrong, just drop this patch and I'll cook up something else to solve the problem.

Thanks.

--
paul moore
linux security @ hp

author
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 XFRM: Assorted IPsec fixups

This patch fixes a number of small but potentially troublesome things in the XFRM/IPsec code:

* Use the 'audit_enabled' variable already in include/linux/audit.h Removed the need for extern declarations local to each XFRM audit fuction

* Convert 'sid' to 'secid' everywhere we can
The 'sid' name is specific to SELinux, 'secid' is the common naming convention used by the kernel when refering to tokenized LSM labels, unfortunately we have to leave 'ctx_sid' in 'struct xfrm_sec_ctx' otherwise we risk breaking userspace

* Convert address display to use standard NIP* macros
Similar to what was recently done with the SPD audit code, this also also includes the removal of some unnecessary memcpy() calls

* Move common code to xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo()
Code consolidation from the "less is more" book on software development

* Proper spacing around commas in function arguments Minor style tweak since I was already touching the code

Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>

---

 include/net/xfrm.h     |   14 ++++++-------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c |   15 ++++++--------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c  |   53 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +7 -7
index 32b99e2..ac6cf09 100644
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ struct xfrm_audit
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
-static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(u32 auid, u32 sid)
+static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(u32 auid, u32 secid)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
 	char *secctx;

@@ -561,8 +561,8 @@ static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(u32 auid, u32 sid)
 
 	audit_log_format(audit_buf, "auid=%u", auid);
 
-	if (sid != 0 &&
-	    security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
+	if (secid != 0 &&
+	    security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
 		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
 	} else

@@ -571,13 +571,13 @@ static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(u32 auid, u32 sid)
 }
 
 extern void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
-				  u32 auid, u32 sid);
+				  u32 auid, u32 secid);
 extern void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
-				  u32 auid, u32 sid);
+				  u32 auid, u32 secid);
 extern void xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
-				 u32 auid, u32 sid);
+				 u32 auid, u32 secid);
 extern void xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
-				    u32 auid, u32 sid);
+				    u32 auid, u32 secid);
 #else
 #define xfrm_audit_policy_add(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
 #define xfrm_audit_policy_delete(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +7 -8
index d2084b1..c8f0656 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/cache.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <net/dst.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>

@@ -2317,15 +2318,14 @@ static inline void xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
 	}
 }
 
-void
-xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, u32 auid, u32 sid)
+void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
+			   u32 auid, u32 secid)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
-	extern int audit_enabled;
 
 	if (audit_enabled == 0)
 		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(sid, auid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
 	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SPD-add res=%u", result);

@@ -2334,15 +2334,14 @@ xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, u32 auid, u32 sid)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_policy_add);
 
-void
-xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, u32 auid, u32 sid)
+void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
+			      u32 auid, u32 secid)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
-	extern int audit_enabled;
 
 	if (audit_enabled == 0)
 		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(sid, auid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
 	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SPD-delete res=%u", result);
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +22 -31

97 lines not on this page · raw message

Acked-by on v1 1/3
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] XFRM: Assorted IPsec fixups

Quoted 16 lines · Paul Moore

This patch fixes a number of small but potentially troublesome things in the XFRM/IPsec code:

* Use the 'audit_enabled' variable already in include/linux/audit.h Removed the need for extern declarations local to each XFRM audit fuction

* Convert 'sid' to 'secid' everywhere we can
The 'sid' name is specific to SELinux, 'secid' is the common naming convention used by the kernel when refering to tokenized LSM labels, unfortunately we have to leave 'ctx_sid' in 'struct xfrm_sec_ctx' otherwise we risk breaking userspace

* Convert address display to use standard NIP* macros
Similar to what was recently done with the SPD audit code, this also also includes the removal of some unnecessary memcpy() calls

Quoted 7 lines

* Move common code to xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo()
Code consolidation from the "less is more" book on software development

* Proper spacing around commas in function arguments Minor style tweak since I was already touching the code

Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Acked-by James Morris <[email protected]>
Quoted 208 lines

---

 include/net/xfrm.h     |   14 ++++++-------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c |   15 ++++++--------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c  |   53 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +7 -7
index 32b99e2..ac6cf09 100644
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ struct xfrm_audit
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
-static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(u32 auid, u32 sid)
+static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(u32 auid, u32 secid)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
 	char *secctx;

@@ -561,8 +561,8 @@ static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(u32 auid, u32 sid)
 
 	audit_log_format(audit_buf, "auid=%u", auid);
 
-	if (sid != 0 &&
-	    security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
+	if (secid != 0 &&
+	    security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
 		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
 	} else

@@ -571,13 +571,13 @@ static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(u32 auid, u32 sid)
 }
 
 extern void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
-				  u32 auid, u32 sid);
+				  u32 auid, u32 secid);
 extern void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
-				  u32 auid, u32 sid);
+				  u32 auid, u32 secid);
 extern void xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
-				 u32 auid, u32 sid);
+				 u32 auid, u32 secid);
 extern void xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
-				    u32 auid, u32 sid);
+				    u32 auid, u32 secid);
 #else
 #define xfrm_audit_policy_add(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
 #define xfrm_audit_policy_delete(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +7 -8
index d2084b1..c8f0656 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <linux/netfilter.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/cache.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <net/dst.h>
 #include <net/xfrm.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>

@@ -2317,15 +2318,14 @@ static inline void xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
 	}
 }
 
-void
-xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, u32 auid, u32 sid)
+void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
+			   u32 auid, u32 secid)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
-	extern int audit_enabled;
 
 	if (audit_enabled == 0)
 		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(sid, auid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
 	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SPD-add res=%u", result);

@@ -2334,15 +2334,14 @@ xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, u32 auid, u32 sid)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_policy_add);
 
-void
-xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result, u32 auid, u32 sid)
+void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
+			      u32 auid, u32 secid)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
-	extern int audit_enabled;
 
 	if (audit_enabled == 0)
 		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(sid, auid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
 	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SPD-delete res=%u", result);
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +22 -32
index 95df01c..dd38e6f 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/ipsec.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/cache.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
 
 #include "xfrm_hash.h"

@@ -1996,69 +1997,59 @@ void __init xfrm_state_init(void)
 static inline void xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo(struct xfrm_state *x,
 					       struct audit_buffer *audit_buf)
 {
-	if (x->security)
+	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+	u32 spi = ntohl(x->id.spi);
+
+	if (ctx)
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " sec_alg=%u sec_doi=%u sec_obj=%s",
-				 x->security->ctx_alg, x->security->ctx_doi,
-				 x->security->ctx_str);
+				 ctx->ctx_alg, ctx->ctx_doi, ctx->ctx_str);
 
 	switch(x->props.family) {
 	case AF_INET:
-		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " src=%u.%u.%u.%u dst=%u.%u.%u.%u",
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf,
+				 " src=" NIPQUAD_FMT " dst=" NIPQUAD_FMT,
 				 NIPQUAD(x->props.saddr.a4),
 				 NIPQUAD(x->id.daddr.a4));
 		break;
 	case AF_INET6:
-		{
-			struct in6_addr saddr6, daddr6;
-
-			memcpy(&saddr6, x->props.saddr.a6,
-				sizeof(struct in6_addr));
-			memcpy(&daddr6, x->id.daddr.a6,
-				sizeof(struct in6_addr));
-			audit_log_format(audit_buf,
-					 " src=" NIP6_FMT " dst=" NIP6_FMT,
-					 NIP6(saddr6), NIP6(daddr6));
-		}
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf,
+				 " src=" NIP6_FMT " dst=" NIP6_FMT,
+				 NIP6(*(struct in6_addr *)x->props.saddr.a6),
+				 NIP6(*(struct in6_addr *)x->id.daddr.a6));
 		break;
 	}
+
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " spi=%u(0x%x)", spi, spi);
 }
 
-void
-xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, u32 auid, u32 sid)
+void xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
+			  u32 auid, u32 secid)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
-	u32 spi;
-	extern int audit_enabled;
 
 	if (audit_enabled == 0)
 		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(sid, auid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SAD-add res=%u",result);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SAD-add res=%u", result);
 	xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo(x, audit_buf);
-	spi = ntohl(x->id.spi);
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " spi=%u(0x%x)", spi, spi);
 	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_add);
 
-void
-xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result, u32 auid, u32 sid)
+void xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
+			     u32 auid, u32 secid)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
-	u32 spi;
-	extern int audit_enabled;
 
 	if (audit_enabled == 0)
 		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(sid, auid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SAD-delete res=%u",result);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SAD-delete res=%u", result);
 	xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo(x, audit_buf);
-	spi = ntohl(x->id.spi);
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " spi=%u(0x%x)", spi, spi);
 	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_delete);
 
--

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Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>
maintainer Applied
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] XFRM: Assorted IPsec fixups

From: James Morris <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2007 09:25:38 +1100 (EST)

Quoted 21 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 20 lines

This patch fixes a number of small but potentially troublesome things in the XFRM/IPsec code:

* Use the 'audit_enabled' variable already in include/linux/audit.h Removed the need for extern declarations local to each XFRM audit fuction

* Convert 'sid' to 'secid' everywhere we can
The 'sid' name is specific to SELinux, 'secid' is the common naming convention used by the kernel when refering to tokenized LSM labels, unfortunately we have to leave 'ctx_sid' in 'struct xfrm_sec_ctx' otherwise we risk breaking userspace

* Convert address display to use standard NIP* macros
Similar to what was recently done with the SPD audit code, this also also includes the removal of some unnecessary memcpy() calls

* Move common code to xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo()
Code consolidation from the "less is more" book on software development

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

* Proper spacing around commas in function arguments Minor style tweak since I was already touching the code

Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Acked-by James Morris <[email protected]>

Applied.

author
#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 XFRM: RFC4303 compliant auditing

In reply to Paul Moore

This patch adds a number of new IPsec audit events to meet the auditing requirements of RFC4303. This includes audit hooks for the following events:

* Could not find a valid SA [sections 2.1, 3.4.2] . xfrm_audit_state_notfound()
. xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple()

* Sequence number overflow [section 3.3.3]
. xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow()

* Replayed packet [section 3.4.3]
. xfrm_audit_state_replay()

* Integrity check failure [sections 3.4.4.1, 3.4.4.2] . xfrm_audit_state_icvfail()

While RFC4304 deals only with ESP most of the changes in this patch apply to IPsec in general, i.e. both AH and ESP. The one case, integrity check failure, where ESP specific code had to be modified the same was done to the AH code for the sake of consistency.

Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>

---

 include/net/xfrm.h     |   33 ++++++++--
 net/ipv4/ah4.c         |    4 +
 net/ipv4/esp4.c        |    1 
 net/ipv6/ah6.c         |    2 -
 net/ipv6/esp6.c        |    1 
 net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c |    4 +
 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c  |    6 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c |    2 +
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c |   14 ++--
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c  |  153 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 10 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +26 -7
index ac6cf09..941d5cd 100644
@@ -548,26 +548,33 @@ struct xfrm_audit
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
-static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(u32 auid, u32 secid)
+static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(const char *op)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
-	char *secctx;
-	u32 secctx_len;
 
+	if (audit_enabled == 0)
+		return NULL;
 	audit_buf = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
-			      AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT);
+				    AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT);
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return NULL;
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, "op=%s", op);
+	return audit_buf;
+}
 
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, "auid=%u", auid);
+static inline void xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(u32 auid, u32 secid,
+					     struct audit_buffer *audit_buf)
+{
+	char *secctx;
+	u32 secctx_len;
 
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " auid=%u", auid);
 	if (secid != 0 &&
 	    security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
 		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
 	} else
 		audit_log_task_context(audit_buf);
-	return audit_buf;
 }
 
 extern void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,

@@ -578,11 +585,22 @@ extern void xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
 				 u32 auid, u32 secid);
 extern void xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
 				    u32 auid, u32 secid);
+extern void xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow(struct xfrm_state *x,
+					     struct sk_buff *skb);
+extern void xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family);
+extern void xfrm_audit_state_notfound(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family,
+				      __be32 net_spi, __be32 net_seq);
+extern void xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb, u8 proto);
 #else
 #define xfrm_audit_policy_add(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
 #define xfrm_audit_policy_delete(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
 #define xfrm_audit_state_add(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
 #define xfrm_audit_state_delete(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
+#define xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow(x, s)	do { ; } while (0)
+#define xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple(s, f)	do { ; } while (0)
+#define xfrm_audit_state_notfound(s, f, sp, sq)	do { ; } while (0)
+#define xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(x, s, p)	do { ; } while (0)
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
 
 static inline void xfrm_pol_hold(struct xfrm_policy *policy)

@@ -1193,7 +1211,8 @@ extern int xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
 extern int xfrm_state_flush(u8 proto, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info);
 extern void xfrm_sad_getinfo(struct xfrmk_sadinfo *si);
 extern void xfrm_spd_getinfo(struct xfrmk_spdinfo *si);
-extern int xfrm_replay_check(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 seq);
+extern int xfrm_replay_check(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			     struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 seq);
 extern void xfrm_replay_advance(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 seq);
 extern void xfrm_replay_notify(struct xfrm_state *x, int event);
 extern int xfrm_state_mtu(struct xfrm_state *x, int mtu);
net/ipv4/ah4.c +3 -1
index d76803a..ec8de0a 100644
@@ -179,8 +179,10 @@ static int ah_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		err = ah_mac_digest(ahp, skb, ah->auth_data);
 		if (err)
 			goto unlock;
-		if (memcmp(ahp->work_icv, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len))
+		if (memcmp(ahp->work_icv, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len)) {
+			xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(x, skb, IPPROTO_AH);
 			err = -EBADMSG;
+		}
 	}
 unlock:
 	spin_unlock(&x->lock);
net/ipv4/esp4.c +1 -0
index 28ea5c7..b334c76 100644
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			BUG();
 
 		if (unlikely(memcmp(esp->auth.work_icv, sum, alen))) {
+			xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(x, skb, IPPROTO_ESP);
 			err = -EBADMSG;
 			goto unlock;
 		}
net/ipv6/ah6.c +1 -1
index 1b51d1e..2d32772 100644
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ static int ah6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		if (err)
 			goto unlock;
 		if (memcmp(ahp->work_icv, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len)) {
-			LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_WARNING "ipsec ah authentication error\n");
+			xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(x, skb, IPPROTO_AH);
 			err = -EBADMSG;
 		}
 	}
net/ipv6/esp6.c +1 -0
index 5bd5292..e10f10b 100644
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ static int esp6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			BUG();
 
 		if (unlikely(memcmp(esp->auth.work_icv, sum, alen))) {
+			xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(x, skb, IPPROTO_ESP);
 			ret = -EBADMSG;
 			goto unlock;
 		}
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +3 -1
index 74f3aac..08b850a 100644
@@ -136,8 +136,10 @@ int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr,
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (!xfrm_vec_one)
+	if (!xfrm_vec_one) {
+		xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple(skb, AF_INET6);
 		goto drop;
+	}
 
 	/* Allocate new secpath or COW existing one. */
 	if (!skb->sp || atomic_read(&skb->sp->refcnt) != 1) {
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +4 -2
index 8624cbd..87e1aac 100644
@@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
 			goto drop;
 
 		x = xfrm_state_lookup(daddr, spi, nexthdr, family);
-		if (x == NULL)
+		if (x == NULL) {
+			xfrm_audit_state_notfound(skb, family, spi, seq);
 			goto drop;
+		}
 
 		skb->sp->xvec[skb->sp->len++] = x;
 

@@ -151,7 +153,7 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
 		if ((x->encap ? x->encap->encap_type : 0) != encap_type)
 			goto drop_unlock;
 
-		if (x->props.replay_window && xfrm_replay_check(x, seq))
+		if (x->props.replay_window && xfrm_replay_check(x, skb, seq))
 			goto drop_unlock;
 
 		if (xfrm_state_check_expire(x))
net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c +2 -0
index 26fa0cb..eb3333b 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ static int xfrm_output_one(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
 
 		if (x->type->flags & XFRM_TYPE_REPLAY_PROT) {
 			XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ++x->replay.oseq;
+			if (unlikely(x->replay.oseq == 0))
+				xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow(x, skb);
 			if (xfrm_aevent_is_on())
 				xfrm_replay_notify(x, XFRM_REPLAY_UPDATE);
 		}
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +6 -8
index c8f0656..97cebfe 100644
@@ -2323,12 +2323,11 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 
-	if (audit_enabled == 0)
-		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SPD-add");
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SPD-add res=%u", result);
+	xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(auid, secid, audit_buf);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
 	xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(xp, audit_buf);
 	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
 }

@@ -2339,12 +2338,11 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 
-	if (audit_enabled == 0)
-		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SPD-delete");
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SPD-delete res=%u", result);
+	xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(auid, secid, audit_buf);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
 	xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(xp, audit_buf);
 	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
 }
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +137 -16

210 lines not on this page · raw message

Acked-by on v1 2/3
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] XFRM: RFC4303 compliant auditing

Quoted 16 lines · Paul Moore

This patch adds a number of new IPsec audit events to meet the auditing requirements of RFC4303. This includes audit hooks for the following events:

* Could not find a valid SA [sections 2.1, 3.4.2] . xfrm_audit_state_notfound()
. xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple()

* Sequence number overflow [section 3.3.3]
. xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow()

* Replayed packet [section 3.4.3]
. xfrm_audit_state_replay()

* Integrity check failure [sections 3.4.4.1, 3.4.4.2] . xfrm_audit_state_icvfail()

Quoted 6 lines

While RFC4304 deals only with ESP most of the changes in this patch apply to IPsec in general, i.e. both AH and ESP. The one case, integrity check failure, where ESP specific code had to be modified the same was done to the AH code for the sake of consistency.

Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Acked-by James Morris <[email protected]>
Quoted 460 lines

---

 include/net/xfrm.h     |   33 ++++++++--
 net/ipv4/ah4.c         |    4 +
 net/ipv4/esp4.c        |    1 
 net/ipv6/ah6.c         |    2 -
 net/ipv6/esp6.c        |    1 
 net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c |    4 +
 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c  |    6 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c |    2 +
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c |   14 ++--
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c  |  153 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 10 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +26 -7
index ac6cf09..941d5cd 100644
@@ -548,26 +548,33 @@ struct xfrm_audit
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
-static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(u32 auid, u32 secid)
+static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(const char *op)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf = NULL;
-	char *secctx;
-	u32 secctx_len;
 
+	if (audit_enabled == 0)
+		return NULL;
 	audit_buf = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
-			      AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT);
+				    AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT);
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return NULL;
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, "op=%s", op);
+	return audit_buf;
+}
 
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, "auid=%u", auid);
+static inline void xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(u32 auid, u32 secid,
+					     struct audit_buffer *audit_buf)
+{
+	char *secctx;
+	u32 secctx_len;
 
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " auid=%u", auid);
 	if (secid != 0 &&
 	    security_secid_to_secctx(secid, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {
 		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " subj=%s", secctx);
 		security_release_secctx(secctx, secctx_len);
 	} else
 		audit_log_task_context(audit_buf);
-	return audit_buf;
 }
 
 extern void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,

@@ -578,11 +585,22 @@ extern void xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
 				 u32 auid, u32 secid);
 extern void xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
 				    u32 auid, u32 secid);
+extern void xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow(struct xfrm_state *x,
+					     struct sk_buff *skb);
+extern void xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family);
+extern void xfrm_audit_state_notfound(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family,
+				      __be32 net_spi, __be32 net_seq);
+extern void xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb, u8 proto);
 #else
 #define xfrm_audit_policy_add(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
 #define xfrm_audit_policy_delete(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
 #define xfrm_audit_state_add(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
 #define xfrm_audit_state_delete(x, r, a, s)	do { ; } while (0)
+#define xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow(x, s)	do { ; } while (0)
+#define xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple(s, f)	do { ; } while (0)
+#define xfrm_audit_state_notfound(s, f, sp, sq)	do { ; } while (0)
+#define xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(x, s, p)	do { ; } while (0)
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
 
 static inline void xfrm_pol_hold(struct xfrm_policy *policy)

@@ -1193,7 +1211,8 @@ extern int xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
 extern int xfrm_state_flush(u8 proto, struct xfrm_audit *audit_info);
 extern void xfrm_sad_getinfo(struct xfrmk_sadinfo *si);
 extern void xfrm_spd_getinfo(struct xfrmk_spdinfo *si);
-extern int xfrm_replay_check(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 seq);
+extern int xfrm_replay_check(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			     struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 seq);
 extern void xfrm_replay_advance(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 seq);
 extern void xfrm_replay_notify(struct xfrm_state *x, int event);
 extern int xfrm_state_mtu(struct xfrm_state *x, int mtu);
net/ipv4/ah4.c +3 -1
index d76803a..ec8de0a 100644
@@ -179,8 +179,10 @@ static int ah_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		err = ah_mac_digest(ahp, skb, ah->auth_data);
 		if (err)
 			goto unlock;
-		if (memcmp(ahp->work_icv, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len))
+		if (memcmp(ahp->work_icv, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len)) {
+			xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(x, skb, IPPROTO_AH);
 			err = -EBADMSG;
+		}
 	}
 unlock:
 	spin_unlock(&x->lock);
net/ipv4/esp4.c +1 -0
index 28ea5c7..b334c76 100644
@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ static int esp_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			BUG();
 
 		if (unlikely(memcmp(esp->auth.work_icv, sum, alen))) {
+			xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(x, skb, IPPROTO_ESP);
 			err = -EBADMSG;
 			goto unlock;
 		}
net/ipv6/ah6.c +1 -1
index 1b51d1e..2d32772 100644
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ static int ah6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		if (err)
 			goto unlock;
 		if (memcmp(ahp->work_icv, auth_data, ahp->icv_trunc_len)) {
-			LIMIT_NETDEBUG(KERN_WARNING "ipsec ah authentication error\n");
+			xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(x, skb, IPPROTO_AH);
 			err = -EBADMSG;
 		}
 	}
net/ipv6/esp6.c +1 -0
index 5bd5292..e10f10b 100644
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ static int esp6_input(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			BUG();
 
 		if (unlikely(memcmp(esp->auth.work_icv, sum, alen))) {
+			xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(x, skb, IPPROTO_ESP);
 			ret = -EBADMSG;
 			goto unlock;
 		}
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +3 -1
index 74f3aac..08b850a 100644
@@ -136,8 +136,10 @@ int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr,
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (!xfrm_vec_one)
+	if (!xfrm_vec_one) {
+		xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple(skb, AF_INET6);
 		goto drop;
+	}
 
 	/* Allocate new secpath or COW existing one. */
 	if (!skb->sp || atomic_read(&skb->sp->refcnt) != 1) {
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +4 -2
index 8624cbd..87e1aac 100644
@@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
 			goto drop;
 
 		x = xfrm_state_lookup(daddr, spi, nexthdr, family);
-		if (x == NULL)
+		if (x == NULL) {
+			xfrm_audit_state_notfound(skb, family, spi, seq);
 			goto drop;
+		}
 
 		skb->sp->xvec[skb->sp->len++] = x;
 

@@ -151,7 +153,7 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
 		if ((x->encap ? x->encap->encap_type : 0) != encap_type)
 			goto drop_unlock;
 
-		if (x->props.replay_window && xfrm_replay_check(x, seq))
+		if (x->props.replay_window && xfrm_replay_check(x, skb, seq))
 			goto drop_unlock;
 
 		if (xfrm_state_check_expire(x))
net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c +2 -0
index 26fa0cb..eb3333b 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ static int xfrm_output_one(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
 
 		if (x->type->flags & XFRM_TYPE_REPLAY_PROT) {
 			XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ++x->replay.oseq;
+			if (unlikely(x->replay.oseq == 0))
+				xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow(x, skb);
 			if (xfrm_aevent_is_on())
 				xfrm_replay_notify(x, XFRM_REPLAY_UPDATE);
 		}
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +6 -8
index c8f0656..97cebfe 100644
@@ -2323,12 +2323,11 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_add(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 
-	if (audit_enabled == 0)
-		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SPD-add");
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SPD-add res=%u", result);
+	xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(auid, secid, audit_buf);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
 	xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(xp, audit_buf);
 	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
 }

@@ -2339,12 +2338,11 @@ void xfrm_audit_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp, int result,
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 
-	if (audit_enabled == 0)
-		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SPD-delete");
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SPD-delete res=%u", result);
+	xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(auid, secid, audit_buf);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
 	xfrm_audit_common_policyinfo(xp, audit_buf);
 	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
 }
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +137 -17
index dd38e6f..1f00aeb 100644
@@ -61,6 +61,13 @@ static unsigned int xfrm_state_genid;
 static struct xfrm_state_afinfo *xfrm_state_get_afinfo(unsigned int family);
 static void xfrm_state_put_afinfo(struct xfrm_state_afinfo *afinfo);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+static void xfrm_audit_state_replay(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				    struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 net_seq);
+#else
+#define xfrm_audit_state_replay(x, s, sq)	do { ; } while (0)
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
+
 static inline unsigned int xfrm_dst_hash(xfrm_address_t *daddr,
 					 xfrm_address_t *saddr,
 					 u32 reqid,

@@ -1609,13 +1616,14 @@ static void xfrm_replay_timer_handler(unsigned long data)
 	spin_unlock(&x->lock);
 }
 
-int xfrm_replay_check(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 net_seq)
+int xfrm_replay_check(struct xfrm_state *x,
+		      struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 net_seq)
 {
 	u32 diff;
 	u32 seq = ntohl(net_seq);
 
 	if (unlikely(seq == 0))
-		return -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
 
 	if (likely(seq > x->replay.seq))
 		return 0;

@@ -1624,14 +1632,18 @@ int xfrm_replay_check(struct xfrm_state *x, __be32 net_seq)
 	if (diff >= min_t(unsigned int, x->props.replay_window,
 			  sizeof(x->replay.bitmap) * 8)) {
 		x->stats.replay_window++;
-		return -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
 	}
 
 	if (x->replay.bitmap & (1U << diff)) {
 		x->stats.replay++;
-		return -EINVAL;
+		goto err;
 	}
 	return 0;
+
+err:
+	xfrm_audit_state_replay(x, skb, net_seq);
+	return -EINVAL;	
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_replay_check);
 

@@ -1994,8 +2006,8 @@ void __init xfrm_state_init(void)
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
-static inline void xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo(struct xfrm_state *x,
-					       struct audit_buffer *audit_buf)
+static inline void xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo(struct xfrm_state *x,
+					    struct audit_buffer *audit_buf)
 {
 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
 	u32 spi = ntohl(x->id.spi);

@@ -2022,18 +2034,45 @@ static inline void xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo(struct xfrm_state *x,
 	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " spi=%u(0x%x)", spi, spi);
 }
 
+static inline void xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family,
+					     struct audit_buffer *audit_buf)
+{
+	struct iphdr *iph4;
+	struct ipv6hdr *iph6;
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		iph4 = ip_hdr(skb);
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf,
+				 " src=" NIPQUAD_FMT " dst=" NIPQUAD_FMT,
+				 NIPQUAD(iph4->saddr),
+				 NIPQUAD(iph4->daddr));
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		iph6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf,
+				 " src=" NIP6_FMT " dst=" NIP6_FMT
+				 " flowlbl=0x%x%x%x",
+				 NIP6(iph6->saddr),
+				 NIP6(iph6->daddr),
+				 iph6->flow_lbl[0] & 0x0f,
+				 iph6->flow_lbl[1],
+				 iph6->flow_lbl[2]);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
 void xfrm_audit_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
 			  u32 auid, u32 secid)
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 
-	if (audit_enabled == 0)
-		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SAD-add");
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SAD-add res=%u", result);
-	xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo(x, audit_buf);
+	xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(auid, secid, audit_buf);
+	xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo(x, audit_buf);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
 	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_add);

@@ -2043,14 +2082,96 @@ void xfrm_audit_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x, int result,
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
 
-	if (audit_enabled == 0)
-		return;
-	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start(auid, secid);
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SAD-delete");
 	if (audit_buf == NULL)
 		return;
-	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " op=SAD-delete res=%u", result);
-	xfrm_audit_common_stateinfo(x, audit_buf);
+	xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(auid, secid, audit_buf);
+	xfrm_audit_helper_sainfo(x, audit_buf);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " res=%u", result);
 	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_delete);
+
+void xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow(struct xfrm_state *x,
+				      struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+	u32 spi;
+
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-replay-overflow");
+	if (audit_buf == NULL)
+		return;
+	xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(skb, x->props.family, audit_buf);
+	/* don't record the sequence number because it's inherent in this kind
+	 * of audit message */
+	spi = ntohl(x->id.spi);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " spi=%u(0x%x)", spi, spi);
+	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow);
+
+static void xfrm_audit_state_replay(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			     struct sk_buff *skb, __be32 net_seq)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+	u32 spi;
+
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-replayed-pkt");
+	if (audit_buf == NULL)
+		return;
+	xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(skb, x->props.family, audit_buf);
+	spi = ntohl(x->id.spi);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " spi=%u(0x%x) seqno=%u",
+			 spi, spi, ntohl(net_seq));
+	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+}
+
+void xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-notfound");
+	if (audit_buf == NULL)
+		return;
+	xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(skb, family, audit_buf);
+	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple);
+
+void xfrm_audit_state_notfound(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family,
+			       __be32 net_spi, __be32 net_seq)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+	u32 spi;
+
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-notfound");
+	if (audit_buf == NULL)
+		return;
+	xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(skb, family, audit_buf);
+	spi = ntohl(net_spi);
+	audit_log_format(audit_buf, " spi=%u(0x%x) seqno=%u",
+			 spi, spi, ntohl(net_seq));
+	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_notfound);
+
+void xfrm_audit_state_icvfail(struct xfrm_state *x,
+			      struct sk_buff *skb, u8 proto)
+{
+	struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;
+	__be32 net_spi;
+	__be32 net_seq;
+
+	audit_buf = xfrm_audit_start("SA-icv-failure");
+	if (audit_buf == NULL)
+		return;
+	xfrm_audit_helper_pktinfo(skb, x->props.family, audit_buf);
+	if (xfrm_parse_spi(skb, proto, &net_spi, &net_seq) == 0) {
+		u32 spi = ntohl(net_spi);
+		audit_log_format(audit_buf, " spi=%u(0x%x) seqno=%u",
+				 spi, spi, ntohl(net_seq));
+	}
+	audit_log_end(audit_buf);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xfrm_audit_state_icvfail);
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
 
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Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>
maintainer
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] XFRM: RFC4303 compliant auditing

In reply to Paul Moore

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2007 16:42:25 -0500

Quoted 16 lines

This patch adds a number of new IPsec audit events to meet the auditing requirements of RFC4303. This includes audit hooks for the following events:

* Could not find a valid SA [sections 2.1, 3.4.2] . xfrm_audit_state_notfound()
. xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple()

* Sequence number overflow [section 3.3.3]
. xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow()

* Replayed packet [section 3.4.3]
. xfrm_audit_state_replay()

* Integrity check failure [sections 3.4.4.1, 3.4.4.2] . xfrm_audit_state_icvfail()

Quoted 6 lines

While RFC4304 deals only with ESP most of the changes in this patch apply to IPsec in general, i.e. both AH and ESP. The one case, integrity check failure, where ESP specific code had to be modified the same was done to the AH code for the sake of consistency.

Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>

This doesn't apply at all to net-2.6.25, in particular xfrm6_input_addr() doesn't even have a local variable named "xfrm_vec_one" let alone the conditional where you're adding the state notfound audit hook.

Please respin this and the third patch, thanks.

author
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] XFRM: RFC4303 compliant auditing

Quoted 25 lines · David Miller

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2007 16:42:25 -0500

Quoted 22 lines

This patch adds a number of new IPsec audit events to meet the auditing requirements of RFC4303. This includes audit hooks for the following events:

* Could not find a valid SA [sections 2.1, 3.4.2] . xfrm_audit_state_notfound()
. xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple()

* Sequence number overflow [section 3.3.3]
. xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow()

* Replayed packet [section 3.4.3]
. xfrm_audit_state_replay()

* Integrity check failure [sections 3.4.4.1, 3.4.4.2] . xfrm_audit_state_icvfail()

While RFC4304 deals only with ESP most of the changes in this patch apply to IPsec in general, i.e. both AH and ESP. The one case, integrity check failure, where ESP specific code had to be modified the same was done to the AH code for the sake of consistency.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>

This doesn't apply at all to net-2.6.25, in particular xfrm6_input_addr() doesn't even have a local variable named "xfrm_vec_one" let alone the conditional where you're adding the state notfound audit hook.

Please respin this and the third patch, thanks.

Sorry about that, I must have missed something (or probably just updated the wrong tree on accident). I'll respin the patches and send them out today.

Signature · 2 lines
paul moore
linux security @ hp
author
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] XFRM: RFC4303 compliant auditing

Quoted 33 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 32 lines · David Miller

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2007 16:42:25 -0500

Quoted 17 lines

This patch adds a number of new IPsec audit events to meet the auditing requirements of RFC4303. This includes audit hooks for the following events:

* Could not find a valid SA [sections 2.1, 3.4.2] . xfrm_audit_state_notfound()
. xfrm_audit_state_notfound_simple()

* Sequence number overflow [section 3.3.3]
. xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow()

* Replayed packet [section 3.4.3]
. xfrm_audit_state_replay()

* Integrity check failure [sections 3.4.4.1, 3.4.4.2] . xfrm_audit_state_icvfail()

Quoted 6 lines

While RFC4304 deals only with ESP most of the changes in this patch apply to IPsec in general, i.e. both AH and ESP. The one case, integrity check failure, where ESP specific code had to be modified the same was done to the AH code for the sake of consistency.

Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>

This doesn't apply at all to net-2.6.25, in particular xfrm6_input_addr() doesn't even have a local variable named "xfrm_vec_one" let alone the conditional where you're adding the state notfound audit hook.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

Please respin this and the third patch, thanks.

Sorry about that, I must have missed something (or probably just updated the wrong tree on accident). I'll respin the patches and send them out today.

Ah, looks like I may not be crazy after all! It looks like the XFRM patches from Masahide NAKAMURA were pulled into net-2.6.25 just before mine last night which caused my patches to conflict ...

Signature · 2 lines
paul moore
linux security @ hp
maintainer
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] XFRM: RFC4303 compliant auditing

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2007 08:51:22 -0500

Quoted 3 lines

Ah, looks like I may not be crazy after all! It looks like the XFRM patches from Masahide NAKAMURA were pulled into net-2.6.25 just before mine last night which caused my patches to conflict ...

Sorry. I had double checked and was going to rework your patches by hand if that was the case, but for some reason I didn't see his patches as being the culprit causing the rejects when I checked things out.

I must have looked over the history correctly.

author
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/3] XFRM: RFC4303 compliant auditing

Quoted 7 lines · David Miller

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2007 08:51:22 -0500

Quoted 3 lines

Ah, looks like I may not be crazy after all! It looks like the XFRM patches from Masahide NAKAMURA were pulled into net-2.6.25 just before mine last night which caused my patches to conflict ...

Quoted 6 lines

Sorry. I had double checked and was going to rework your patches by hand if that was the case, but for some reason I didn't see his patches as being the culprit causing the rejects when I checked things out.

I must have looked over the history correctly.

No harm, no foul. I've just about finished respining the patches, expect them shortly ...

Signature · 2 lines
paul moore
linux security @ hp
author
#11 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 XFRM: Drop packets when replay counter would overflow

In reply to Paul Moore

According to RFC4303, section 3.3.3 we need to drop outgoing packets which cause the replay counter to overflow:

3.3.3. Sequence Number Generation

The sender's counter is initialized to 0 when an SA is established. The sender increments the sequence number (or ESN) counter for this SA and inserts the low-order 32 bits of the value into the Sequence Number field. Thus, the first packet sent using a given SA will contain a sequence number of 1.

If anti-replay is enabled (the default), the sender checks to ensure that the counter has not cycled before inserting the new value in the Sequence Number field. In other words, the sender MUST NOT send a packet on an SA if doing so would cause the sequence number to cycle. An attempt to transmit a packet that would result in sequence number overflow is an auditable event. The audit log entry for this event SHOULD include the SPI value, current date/time, Source Address, Destination Address, and (in IPv6) the cleartext Flow ID.

Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>

---

 net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c |    5 ++++-
 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c +4 -1
index eb3333b..284eeef 100644
@@ -57,8 +57,11 @@ static int xfrm_output_one(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
 
 		if (x->type->flags & XFRM_TYPE_REPLAY_PROT) {
 			XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ++x->replay.oseq;
-			if (unlikely(x->replay.oseq == 0))
+			if (unlikely(x->replay.oseq == 0)) {
+				x->replay.oseq--;
 				xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow(x, skb);
+				goto error;
+			}
 			if (xfrm_aevent_is_on())
 				xfrm_replay_notify(x, XFRM_REPLAY_UPDATE);
 		}
Acked-by on v1 3/3
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 3/3] XFRM: Drop packets when replay counter would overflow

Quoted 20 lines · Paul Moore

According to RFC4303, section 3.3.3 we need to drop outgoing packets which cause the replay counter to overflow:

3.3.3. Sequence Number Generation

The sender's counter is initialized to 0 when an SA is established. The sender increments the sequence number (or ESN) counter for this SA and inserts the low-order 32 bits of the value into the Sequence Number field. Thus, the first packet sent using a given SA will contain a sequence number of 1.

If anti-replay is enabled (the default), the sender checks to ensure that the counter has not cycled before inserting the new value in the Sequence Number field. In other words, the sender MUST NOT send a packet on an SA if doing so would cause the sequence number to cycle. An attempt to transmit a packet that would result in sequence number overflow is an auditable event. The audit log entry for this event SHOULD include the SPI value, current date/time, Source Address, Destination Address, and (in IPv6) the cleartext Flow ID.

Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>
Acked-by James Morris <[email protected]>
Quoted 28 lines

---

 net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c |    5 ++++-
 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_output.c +4 -2
index eb3333b..284eeef 100644
@@ -57,8 +57,11 @@ static int xfrm_output_one(struct sk_buff *skb, int err)
 
 		if (x->type->flags & XFRM_TYPE_REPLAY_PROT) {
 			XFRM_SKB_CB(skb)->seq = ++x->replay.oseq;
-			if (unlikely(x->replay.oseq == 0))
+			if (unlikely(x->replay.oseq == 0)) {
+				x->replay.oseq--;
 				xfrm_audit_state_replay_overflow(x, skb);
+				goto error;
+			}
 			if (xfrm_aevent_is_on())
 				xfrm_replay_notify(x, XFRM_REPLAY_UPDATE);
 		}
 
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Signature · 2 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>