2.4: [SCSI] aacraid: Fix security hole
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 2.4: [SCSI] aacraid: Fix security hole
This is a 2.4 backport of a linux-2.6 change by Alan Cox. (commit 60395bb60e0b5e4e0808ac8eb07a92f6c9cdea1f)
It has been build-tested only (I don't have the hardware). CVE-2007-4308 was assigned for this issue.
Commit log from 2.6 follows.
On the SCSI layer ioctl path there is no implicit permissions check for ioctls (and indeed other drivers implement unprivileged ioctls). aacraid however allows all sorts of very admin only things to be done so should check.
--- drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c | 2 ++ 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/aacraid/linit.c +2 -0
@@ -683,6 +683,8 @@ static int aac_cfg_release(struct inode * inode, struct file * file )static int aac_cfg_ioctl (struct inode * inode,struct file * file,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg ) {struct aac_dev *dev = aac_devices[MINOR (inode->i_rdev)]; +if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )) +return -EPERM ;return aac_do_ioctl (dev, cmd, (void *)arg); }
Signature · 1 line
1.5.4
Hi Dann,
Quoted 6 lines · dann frazier
This is a 2.4 backport of a linux-2.6 change by Alan Cox. (commit
60395bb60e0b5e4e0808ac8eb07a92f6c9cdea1f)It has been build-tested only (I don't have the hardware). CVE-2007-4308 was assigned for this issue.
Quoted 6 lines
Commit log from 2.6 follows.
On the SCSI layer ioctl path there is no implicit permissions check for ioctls (and indeed other drivers implement unprivileged ioctls). aacraid however allows all sorts of very admin only things to be done so should check.
OK, makes sense. I did not notice that one in 2.6, eventhough Alan clearly stated a security hole in the subject.
I'm applying it now, thanks!
Willy