brk randomization breaks columns
Subsystems (6)
Hi!
Columns is very popular game of year about 1993, and brk randomization breaks it. (Along with my boot, but who cares about boot when game is broken?)
echo 1 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
breaks columns
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
fixes them.
root@amd:~# ls -al `which columns-bin`
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 100515 Aug 7 1997 /usr/local/bin/columns-bin*
root@amd:~# ldd `which columns-bin`
libc.so.5 => /lib/libc.so.5 (0xb7e22000)
root@amd:~#pavel@amd:~$ strace columns-bin
execve("/usr/local/bin/columns-bin", ["columns-bin"], [/* 31 vars */])
= 0
old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS,
-1, 0) = 0xb7f78000
mprotect(0xb7f79000, 21406, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC) = 0
mprotect(0x8048000, 31345, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC) = 0
stat("/etc/ld.so.cache", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=106939, ...})
= 0
open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY) = 3
old_mmap(NULL, 106939, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, 3, 0) = 0xb7f5d000
close(3) = 0
stat("/etc/ld.so.preload", 0xbf87f348) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or
directory)
open("/home/pavel/lib/libc.so.5", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file
or directory)
open("/lib/libc.so.5", O_RDONLY) = 3
read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\240\32"...,
4096) = 4096
old_mmap(NULL, 786432, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) =
0xb7e9d000
old_mmap(0xb7e9d000, 552787, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = 0xb7e9d000
old_mmap(0xb7f24000, 21848, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0x86000) = 0xb7f24000
old_mmap(0xb7f2a000, 204908, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7f2a000
close(3) = 0
mprotect(0xb7e9d000, 552787, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC) = 0
munmap(0xb7f5d000, 106939) = 0
mprotect(0x8048000, 31345, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC) = 0
mprotect(0xb7e9d000, 552787, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC) = 0
mprotect(0xb7f79000, 21406, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC) = 0
personality(PER_LINUX) = 4194304
geteuid() = 1000
getuid() = 1000
getgid() = 1002
getegid() = 1002
brk(0x8054098) = 0x8054098
brk(0x8055000) = 0x8055000
--- SIGSEGV (Segmentation fault) @ 0 (0) ---
+++ killed by SIGSEGV (core dumped) +++
Process 1517 detached
pavel@amd:~$columns die due to
Feb 4 12:29:32 amd kernel: columns-bin[4535]: segfault at 8052000 ip b7f08a9a sp bfb79628 error 6 in
libc.so.5.4.33[b7e99000+87000]
Just before death,
root@amd:~# cat /proc/4537/maps 08048000-08050000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 246209 /usr/local/bin/columns-bin 08050000-08051000 rwxp 00007000 08:04 246209 /usr/local/bin/columns-bin 08051000-08052000 rwxp 08051000 00:00 0 b7f00000-b7f87000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 373330 /lib/libc.so.5.4.33 b7f87000-b7f8d000 rwxp 00086000 08:04 373330 /lib/libc.so.5.4.33 b7f8d000-b7fc0000 rwxp b7f8d000 00:00 0 b7fdb000-b7fdc000 rwxp b7fdb000 00:00 0 b7fdc000-b7fe2000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 373339 /lib/ld-linux.so.1.9.11 b7fe2000-b7fe3000 rwxp 00005000 08:04 373339 /lib/ld-linux.so.1.9.11 bface000-bfae3000 rwxp bffeb000 00:00 0 [stack] ffffe000-fffff000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] root@amd:~#
...which is strange. Columns asked for brk, but kernel assigned it no heap. No wonder columns are crashing.
(gdb) bt
#0 0xb7f6fa60 in memset () from /lib/libc.so.5 #1 0xb7f7b4a3 in initialize () from /lib/libc.so.5 #2 0x00000024 in ?? () #3 0x00000000 in ?? () (gdb) (gdb) disassemble Dump of assembler code for function memset: 0xb7f6fa60 <memset+0>: push %ebp 0xb7f6fa61 <memset+1>: push %edi 0xb7f6fa62 <memset+2>: push %esi 0xb7f6fa63 <memset+3>: mov 0x10(%esp),%ebp 0xb7f6fa67 <memset+7>: mov 0x18(%esp),%esi 0xb7f6fa6b <memset+11>: mov %ebp,%edi 0xb7f6fa6d <memset+13>: movzbl 0x14(%esp),%eax 0xb7f6fa72 <memset+18>: cld 0xb7f6fa73 <memset+19>: cmp $0xb,%esi 0xb7f6fa76 <memset+22>: jbe 0xb7f6fa9f <memset+63> 0xb7f6fa78 <memset+24>: mov %eax,%edx 0xb7f6fa7a <memset+26>: shl $0x8,%edx 0xb7f6fa7d <memset+29>: or %edx,%eax 0xb7f6fa7f <memset+31>: mov %eax,%edx 0xb7f6fa81 <memset+33>: shl $0x10,%edx 0xb7f6fa84 <memset+36>: or %edx,%eax 0xb7f6fa86 <memset+38>: mov %ebp,%edx 0xb7f6fa88 <memset+40>: neg %edx 0xb7f6fa8a <memset+42>: and $0x3,%edx 0xb7f6fa8d <memset+45>: sub %edx,%esi 0xb7f6fa8f <memset+47>: mov %edx,%ecx 0xb7f6fa91 <memset+49>: rep stos %al,%es:(%edi) 0xb7f6fa93 <memset+51>: mov %esi,%edx 0xb7f6fa95 <memset+53>: shr $0x2,%edx 0xb7f6fa98 <memset+56>: mov %edx,%ecx
0xb7f6fa9a <memset+58>: rep stos %eax,%es:(%edi)0xb7f6fa9c <memset+60>: and $0x3,%esi0xb7f6fa9f <memset+63>: mov %esi,%ecx0xb7f6faa1 <memset+65>: rep stos %al,%es:(%edi)
0xb7f6faa3 <memset+67>: mov %ebp,%eax 0xb7f6faa5 <memset+69>: pop %esi 0xb7f6faa6 <memset+70>: pop %edi 0xb7f6faa7 <memset+71>: pop %ebp
0xb7f6faa8 <memset+72>: ret
End of assembler dump.
(gdb)
(gdb) i r
eax 0x3000 12288 ecx 0x8055000 134565888 edx 0xb7f8ac68 -1208439704 ebx 0xb7f8bb08 -1208435960 esp 0xbfae1db4 0xbfae1db4 ebp 0xb7fbf058 0xb7fbf058 esi 0xf68 3944 edi 0x8052000 134553600 eip 0xb7f6fa60 0xb7f6fa60 <memset> eflags 0x282 [ SF IF ] cs 0x73 115 ss 0x7b 123 ds 0x7b 123 es 0x7b 123 fs 0x0 0 gs 0x0 0
(gdb)
Hmm, code in binfmt_elf is really strange.
elf_bss += load_bias;
elf_brk += load_bias;
start_code += load_bias;
end_code += load_bias;
start_data += load_bias;
end_data += load_bias;
/* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need
* for the bss and break sections. We must do this before
* mapping in the interpreter, to make sure it doesn't wind
* up getting placed where the bss needs to go.
*/
retval = set_brk(elf_bss, elf_brk);... so we allocate non-randoimzed brk, but later we just overwrite bss variable with new, shiner and better randomized value... without unmapping the old one... The code in binfmt_elf.c is really a mess.
Pavel
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(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
Quoted 16 lines · Pavel Machek
Hmm, code in
binfmt_elfis really strange.elf_bss += load_bias; elf_brk += load_bias; start_code += load_bias; end_code += load_bias; start_data += load_bias; end_data += load_bias; /* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need * for the bss and break sections. We must do this before * mapping in the interpreter, to make sure it doesn't wind * up getting placed where the bss needs to go. */ retval = set_brk(elf_bss, elf_brk);
Quoted 3 lines
... so we allocate non-randoimzed brk, but later we just overwrite bss variable with new, shiner and better randomized value... without unmapping the old one... The code in
binfmt_elf.cis really a mess.
hm, so it seems that it isnt even the randomization that causes the problem - but somehow the randomization code itself is broken, right?
Would you be interested in figuring out how to unbreak this? [if not, could you send me the binary?]
Ingo
Hi!
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 16 lines
Hmm, code in
binfmt_elfis really strange.elf_bss += load_bias; elf_brk += load_bias; start_code += load_bias; end_code += load_bias; start_data += load_bias; end_data += load_bias; /* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need * for the bss and break sections. We must do this before * mapping in the interpreter, to make sure it doesn't wind * up getting placed where the bss needs to go. */ retval = set_brk(elf_bss, elf_brk);Quoted 3 lines
... so we allocate non-randoimzed brk, but later we just overwrite bss variable with new, shiner and better randomized value... without unmapping the old one... The code in
binfmt_elf.cis really a mess.
Quoted 5 lines
hm, so it seems that it isnt even the randomization that causes the problem - but somehow the randomization code itself is broken, right?
Would you be interested in figuring out how to unbreak this? [if not, could you send me the binary?]
Not sure this helps... If I only randomize _end_ of heap, it still works. If I try to randomize beggining of heap, too, it will not even start recent binaries :-(.
Pavel
fs/binfmt_elf.c +10 -6
@@ -980,6 +983,16 @@ #endif } loc->elf_ex.e_entry += load_bias; + + +printk ("%d: %x\n" , current->pid, elf_brk); + +extern unsigned long randomize_range (unsigned long start,unsigned long end,unsigned long len); + +long random =randomize_range (0 ,0x200000 ,0 ); + elf_brk += random; +// elf_bss += random; + elf_bss += load_bias; elf_brk += load_bias; start_code += load_bias;
@@ -1076,12 +1093,6 @@ #endif /* ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGE current->mm->end_data = end_data; current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p; -#ifdef arch_randomize_brk -if (current->flags &PF_RANDOMIZE ) - current->mm->brk = current->mm->start_brk = -arch_randomize_brk (current->mm); -#endif -if (current->personality &MMAP_PAGE_ZERO ) {/* Why this, you ask??? Well SVr4 maps page 0 as read-only, and some applications "depend" upon this behavior.
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(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
Quoted 3 lines · Pavel Machek
Not sure this helps... If I only randomize _end_ of heap, it still works. If I try to randomize beggining of heap, too, it will not even start recent binaries :-(.
I don't uderstand this, sorry. Ehen the mapping for the new process is being established during loading of the binary, the beginning and the end of the heap are the same ...
Signature · 1 line
Jiri Kosina
Hi!
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Not sure this helps... If I only randomize _end_ of heap, it still works. If I try to randomize beggining of heap, too, it will not even start recent binaries :-(.
I don't uderstand this, sorry. Ehen the mapping for the new process is being established during loading of the binary, the beginning and the end of the heap are the same ...
Okay, I was assuming this is mapping heap..
/* Calling set_brk effectively mmaps the pages that we need
* for the bss and break sections. We must do this before
* mapping in the interpreter, to make sure it doesn't wind
* up getting placed where the bss needs to go. */
retval = set_brk(elf_bss, elf_brk);
If I add
+ elf_brk += random;
before set_brk() (and revert the brk randomization), it works, including columns.
If I add
+// elf_bss += random;
before set_brk(), I break everything.
Pavel
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(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
Quoted 4 lines · Ingo Molnar
hm, so it seems that it isnt even the randomization that causes the problem - but somehow the randomization code itself is broken, right? Would you be interested in figuring out how to unbreak this? [if not, could you send me the binary?]
I still don't seem to fully understand what is happening here -- aparently this is triggerable only with old programs linked against libc.so.5, and I am not able to trigger it with my trivial program when I link it against old libc.so.5, which just basically does brk() and checks whether /proc/<pid>/maps are OK. Seems to me that (at least certain versions) of libc.so.5 (wrongly) assume that end of the bss is the start of the heap, but I will try to investigate it more.
Ingo, the code in commit c1d171a0029 is IMHO funcionalli identical to your exec-shield in fedora kernels, so even libc.so.5-linked binaries on any Fedora distro should trigger this bug ... (or you can use the binary that Pavel supplied). Haven't tried this yet.
Thanks,
Signature · 1 line
Jiri Kosina
Quoted 7 lines · Jiri Kosina
I still don't seem to fully understand what is happening here -- aparently this is triggerable only with old programs linked against libc.so.5, and I am not able to trigger it with my trivial program when I link it against old libc.so.5, which just basically does
brk()and checks whether /proc/<pid>/maps are OK. Seems to me that (at least certain versions) of libc.so.5 (wrongly) assume that end of the bss is the start of the heap, but I will try to investigate it more.
And I really think that (at least Pavel's version of) libc.so.5 is making some strange assumptions about memory layout of the process, which could also explain the other failures.
Pavel, could you please link the source code below against libc.so.5 with brk randomization turned on, and show the output, and if it segfaults, send the backtrace at the time of the crash? I suspect that it will crash somewhere in exit path when calling .dtor functions, as it will try to perform some cleanup in unmapped area. Thanks.
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main()
{
int *curr_brk = sbrk(0);
char command[1024];
sprintf(command, "/bin/cat /proc/%d/maps", getpid());
printf("brk set to %p\n", curr_brk);
system(command);
brk(curr_brk + 0x00001000);
curr_brk = sbrk(0);
printf("brk set to %p\n", curr_brk);
system(command);
exit(0);
}Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
I still don't seem to fully understand what is happening here -- aparently this is triggerable only with old programs linked against libc.so.5, and I am not able to trigger it with my trivial program when I link it against old libc.so.5, which just basically does
brk()and checks whether /proc/<pid>/maps are OK. Seems to me that (at least certain versions) of libc.so.5 (wrongly) assume that end of the bss is the start of the heap, but I will try to investigate it more.
Quoted 6 lines
I think I am getting the some problem with brand new binaries produced by myself :(
Look at this report I posted days ago:
Your crash is in kernel, no? Anyway, I can workaround mine by disabling randomization...
Pavel
Signature · 2 lines
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
2008/2/4, Pavel Machek <[email protected]>:
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
I still don't seem to fully understand what is happening here -- aparently this is triggerable only with old programs linked against libc.so.5, and I am not able to trigger it with my trivial program when I link it against old libc.so.5, which just basically does
brk()and checks whether /proc/<pid>/maps are OK. Seems to me that (at least certain versions) of libc.so.5 (wrongly) assume that end of the bss is the start of the heap, but I will try to investigate it more.I think I am getting the some problem with brand new binaries produced by myself :(
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Look at this report I posted days ago:
Your crash is in kernel, no? Anyway, I can workaround mine by disabling randomization...
Yes, my crash happens at kernel space, but is due to the randomized params passed to set_brk (the same thing that makes your game crash later at runtime).
I did not understand why my kernel was crashing before reading your comments, but now I think is all happening because of the brk randomization. Sorry, I will not be able to try disabling randomization until tomorrow at office in order to confirm you this.
I am trying to figure out what is relation the brk randomization feature and my crash... but makes sense to me now, trying to find it.
Yours, Abel.
Quoted 9 lines · Abel Bernabeu
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I think I am getting the some problem with brand new binaries produced by myself :(
Look at this report I posted days ago:
http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=120169141603789&w=2Your crash is in kernel, no? Anyway, I can workaround mine by disabling randomization...
Yes, my crash happens at kernel space, but is due to the randomized params passed to
set_brk(the same thing that makes your game crash later at runtime).
[ please don't drop me from CC, thanks ]
Abel, I actually don't think you have chance to have any issues with randomization, as the mentioned post talks about 2.6.22.10, which doesn't randomize the brk start at all.
Thanks,
Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
2008/2/4, Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>:
Quoted 3 lines
Abel, I actually don't think you have chance to have any issues with randomization, as the mentioned post talks about 2.6.22.10, which doesn't randomize the brk start at all.
You are rigth, my kernel just randomizes stack top.
I've got a bit sick with this crash in the latest days, trying to understand the elf loader, trying toolchain configurations, etc... O:)
Yours, Abel.
Hi!
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Abel, I actually don't think you have chance to have any issues with randomization, as the mentioned post talks about 2.6.22.10, which doesn't randomize the brk start at all.
You are rigth, my kernel just randomizes stack top.
I've got a bit sick with this crash in the latest days, trying to understand the elf loader, trying toolchain configurations, etc... O:)
Well, elf loader is indeed evil.
Pavel
Signature · 2 lines
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
Quoted 25 lines · Jiri Kosina
Quoted 7 lines · Jiri Kosina
I still don't seem to fully understand what is happening here -- aparently this is triggerable only with old programs linked against libc.so.5, and I am not able to trigger it with my trivial program when I link it against old libc.so.5, which just basically does
brk()and checks whether /proc/<pid>/maps are OK. Seems to me that (at least certain versions) of libc.so.5 (wrongly) assume that end of the bss is the start of the heap, but I will try to investigate it more.And I really think that (at least Pavel's version of) libc.so.5 is making some strange assumptions about memory layout of the process, which could also explain the other failures.
Pavel, could you please link the source code below against libc.so.5 with brk randomization turned on, and show the output, and if it segfaults, send the backtrace at the time of the crash? I suspect that it will crash somewhere in exit path when calling .dtor functions, as it will try to perform some cleanup in unmapped area. Thanks.
#include <
unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>int
main()
Quoted 16 lines
{
int *curr_brk = sbrk(0);
char command[1024];
sprintf(command, "/bin/cat /proc/%d/maps", getpid());
printf("brk set to %p\n", curr_brk);
system(command);
brk(curr_brk + 0x00001000);
curr_brk = sbrk(0);
printf("brk set to %p\n", curr_brk);
system(command);
exit(0);
}This one seems to work, even with randomization:
guest@amd:~$ gcc test2.c -nostdlib /lib/libc.so.5.4.33 -o test2 /usr/bin/ld: warning: cannot find entry symbol _start; defaulting to 0000000008048340 guest@amd:~$ ./test2 brk set to 0x8b1b000 08048000-08049000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 423985 /home/guest/test2 08049000-0804a000 rwxp 00000000 08:04 423985 /home/guest/test2 b7eb7000-b7eb8000 rwxp b7eb7000 00:00 0 b7eb8000-b7f3f000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 373330 /lib/libc.so.5.4.33 b7f3f000-b7f45000 rwxp 00086000 08:04 373330 /lib/libc.so.5.4.33 b7f45000-b7f78000 rwxp b7f45000 00:00 0 b7f92000-b7f95000 rwxp b7f92000 00:00 0 b7f95000-b7fb1000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 194956 /lib/ld-2.7.so b7fb1000-b7fb3000 rwxp 0001b000 08:04 194956 /lib/ld-2.7.so bf89e000-bf8b2000 rwxp bffeb000 00:00 0 [stack] bf8b2000-bf8b3000 rw-p bffff000 00:00 0 ffffe000-fffff000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] brk set to 0x8b1f000 08048000-08049000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 423985 /home/guest/test2 08049000-0804a000 rwxp 00000000 08:04 423985 /home/guest/test2 08b1b000-08b1f000 rwxp 08b1b000 00:00 0 [heap] b7eb7000-b7eb8000 rwxp b7eb7000 00:00 0 b7eb8000-b7f3f000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 373330 /lib/libc.so.5.4.33 b7f3f000-b7f45000 rwxp 00086000 08:04 373330 /lib/libc.so.5.4.33 b7f45000-b7f78000 rwxp b7f45000 00:00 0 b7f92000-b7f95000 rwxp b7f92000 00:00 0 b7f95000-b7fb1000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 194956 /lib/ld-2.7.so b7fb1000-b7fb3000 rwxp 0001b000 08:04 194956 /lib/ld-2.7.so bf89e000-bf8b2000 rwxp bffeb000 00:00 0 [stack] bf8b2000-bf8b3000 rw-p bffff000 00:00 0 ffffe000-fffff000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] guest@amd:~$
But if I compile it on my system, test2 uses ld-linux.so.2, not ld-linux.so.1. columns use ld-linux.so.1, but I can't compile binary like that with my toolchain.
Pavel
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(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
[ some CCs added ]
Quoted 45 lines · Pavel Machek
pavel@amd:~$ strace columns-bin execve("/usr/local/bin/columns-bin", ["columns-bin"], [/* 31 vars */]) = 0 old_mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7f78000 mprotect(0xb7f79000, 21406, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC) = 0 mprotect(0x8048000, 31345, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC) = 0 stat("/etc/ld.so.cache", {st_mode=S_IFREG|0644, st_size=106939, ...}) = 0 open("/etc/ld.so.cache", O_RDONLY) = 3 old_mmap(NULL, 106939, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, 3, 0) = 0xb7f5d000 close(3) = 0 stat("/etc/ld.so.preload", 0xbf87f348) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/home/pavel/lib/libc.so.5", O_RDONLY) = -1 ENOENT (No such file or directory) open("/lib/libc.so.5", O_RDONLY) = 3 read(3, "\177ELF\1\1\1\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\3\0\3\0\1\0\0\0\240\32"..., 4096) = 4096 old_mmap(NULL, 786432, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7e9d000 old_mmap(0xb7e9d000, 552787, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0) = 0xb7e9d000 old_mmap(0xb7f24000, 21848, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED, 3, 0x86000) = 0xb7f24000 old_mmap(0xb7f2a000, 204908, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_FIXED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0) = 0xb7f2a000 close(3) = 0 mprotect(0xb7e9d000, 552787, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC) = 0 munmap(0xb7f5d000, 106939) = 0 mprotect(0x8048000, 31345, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC) = 0 mprotect(0xb7e9d000, 552787, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC) = 0 mprotect(0xb7f79000, 21406, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC) = 0 personality(PER_LINUX) = 4194304 geteuid() = 1000 getuid() = 1000 getgid() = 1002 getegid() = 1002 brk(0x8054098) = 0x8054098 brk(0x8055000) = 0x8055000killed by SIGSEGV (core dumped) +++ renamed from SIGSEGV (Segmentation fault) @ 0 (0) --- +0
-0Process 1517 detached
pavel@amd:~$
columns die due to
Quoted 16 lines
Feb 4 12:29:32 amd kernel: columns-bin[4535]: segfault at 8052000 ip b7f08a9a sp bfb79628 error 6 in libc.so.5.4.33[b7e99000+87000] Just before death, root@amd:~# cat /proc/4537/maps 08048000-08050000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 246209 /usr/local/bin/columns-bin 08050000-08051000 rwxp 00007000 08:04 246209 /usr/local/bin/columns-bin 08051000-08052000 rwxp 08051000 00:00 0 b7f00000-b7f87000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 373330 /lib/libc.so.5.4.33 b7f87000-b7f8d000 rwxp 00086000 08:04 373330 /lib/libc.so.5.4.33 b7f8d000-b7fc0000 rwxp b7f8d000 00:00 0 b7fdb000-b7fdc000 rwxp b7fdb000 00:00 0 b7fdc000-b7fe2000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 373339 /lib/ld-linux.so.1.9.11 b7fe2000-b7fe3000 rwxp 00005000 08:04 373339 /lib/ld-linux.so.1.9.11 bface000-bfae3000 rwxp bffeb000 00:00 0 [stack] ffffe000-fffff000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] root@amd:~#
Actually, this clearly shows that either prehistoric libc.so.5 or the program itself are broken.
- as you can easily see by repeated invocation of your program, the arguments to brk() are always the same, no matter to what offset the brk start gets randomized.
- i.e. the arguments passed to brk() strace shows clearly indicate that the binary (or library) is assuming that brk starts in the very next page after code+bss (i.e. at the page following 0x08052000). That is wrong. The program then accessess unmapped memory, which causes segfault.
Quoted 2 lines
...which is strange. Columns asked for brk, but kernel assigned it no heap. No wonder columns are crashing.
Now, you are right that the return value from brk() is bogus in these cases. The patch below should make it behave, as you can easily check with strace, right? Does anyone have any comments regarding this patch please?
Still, it will probably not fix your particular program crashes, just because it will always assume that brk starts immediately after the end of the bss, which is plain wrong and has never been assured. Could you please check whether there is any compat-* package available for you distribution, that upgrades libc.so.5 to any fixed version?
Thanks.
From: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
brk: check the lower bound properly
There is a check in sys_brk(), that tries to make sure that we do not underflow the area that is dedicated to brk heap.
The check is however wrong, as it assumes that brk area starts immediately after the end of the code (+bss), which is wrong for example in environments with randomized brk start. The proper way is to check whether the address is not below the start_brk address.
mm/mmap.c +1 -1
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sys_brk(unsigned long brk)down_write (&mm->mmap_sem); -if (brk < mm->end_code) +if (brk < mm->start_brk) goto out;/*
[some more CCs added]
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Feb 4 12:29:32 amd kernel: columns-bin[4535]: segfault at 8052000 ip b7f08a9a sp bfb79628 error 6 in libc.so.5.4.33[b7e99000+87000] Just before death, root@amd:~# cat /proc/4537/maps 08048000-08050000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 246209 /usr/local/bin/columns-bin 08050000-08051000 rwxp 00007000 08:04 246209 /usr/local/bin/columns-bin 08051000-08052000 rwxp 08051000 00:00 0 b7f00000-b7f87000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 373330 /lib/libc.so.5.4.33Quoted 8 lines
b7f87000-b7f8d000 rwxp 00086000 08:04 373330 /lib/libc.so.5.4.33 b7f8d000-b7fc0000 rwxp b7f8d000 00:00 0 b7fdb000-b7fdc000 rwxp b7fdb000 00:00 0 b7fdc000-b7fe2000 r-xp 00000000 08:04 373339 /lib/ld-linux.so.1.9.11 b7fe2000-b7fe3000 rwxp 00005000 08:04 373339 /lib/ld-linux.so.1.9.11 bface000-bfae3000 rwxp bffeb000 00:00 0 [stack] ffffe000-fffff000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso] root@amd:~#
Quoted 2 lines
Actually, this clearly shows that either prehistoric libc.so.5 or the program itself are broken.
I believe it shows clear regression in latest 2.6.25 kernel.
Quoted 8 lines
- as you can easily see by repeated invocation of your program, the arguments to
brk()are always the same, no matter to what offset the brk start gets randomized.- i.e. the arguments passed to
brk()strace shows clearly indicate that the binary (or library) is assuming that brk starts in the very next page after code+bss (i.e. at the page following0x08052000). That is wrong. The program then accessess unmapped memory, which causes segfault.
You say it is wrong. Manpages imply otherwise:
int brk(void *end_data_segment);
...
DESCRIPTION
brk() sets the end of the data segment to the value specified by end_data_segment, when that value is reasonable, the system does have enough memory and the process does not exceed its max data size (see setrlimit(2)).
...
Note it talks about data segment, not about heap, and that seems to imply that BSS and heap are actually one area. 2.6.25 broke that.
Now, maybe you are right and heap randomization is useful, but breaking 10year old executables is no-no. (And you should have posted man page update, too).
There are ways around this:
1) not enable heap randomization unless app asks for it by personality syscall
or
2) (hacky!) detect that app asks for brk() below its heap start, which means it assumes BSS+heap are contiguous, and just map the memory there.
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...which is strange. Columns asked for brk, but kernel assigned it no heap. No wonder columns are crashing.
Now, you are right that the return value from
brk()is bogus in these cases. The patch below should make it behave, as you can easily check with strace, right? Does anyone have any comments regarding this patch please?
Yep, will try, sound like a good idea.
Quoted 3 lines
Still, it will probably not fix your particular program crashes, just because it will always assume that brk starts immediately after the end of the bss, which is plain wrong and has never been assured. Could you please
Can you quote docs that tells me it is plain wrong? It was plain right in BSD unix, and in all linuxes up to 2.6.25-git. My man pages still imply it is right.
Hmm, and even the kernel code implies it is right.
Pavel
mm/mmap.c asmlinkage unsigned long sys_brk(unsigned long brk) · line 246
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mm/mmap.c +1
-1@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sys_brk(unsigned long brk)down_write (&mm->mmap_sem); -if (brk < mm->end_code) +if (brk < mm->start_brk) goto out;
You see? This assumed end_code == start_brk ;-).
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Quoted 3 lines · Pavel Machek
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Actually, this clearly shows that either prehistoric libc.so.5 or the program itself are broken.
I believe it shows clear regression in latest 2.6.25 kernel.
I am still not completely sure. It might be a regression, but it also might just trigger the bug in ancient version in libc.so.5 which might be fixed in some later version -- are you able to verify that?
Quoted 10 lines
You say it is wrong. Manpages imply otherwise:
int brk(void *end_data_segment);...
DESCRIPTION
brk()sets the end of the data segment to the value specified byend_data_segment, when that value is reasonable, the system does have enough memory and the process does not exceed its max data size (see setrlimit(2)).
Note it talks about data segment, not about heap, and that seems to imply that BSS and heap are actually one area. 2.6.25 broke that.
Single Unix Specification talks only about manipulating the break section, see http://opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007908775/xsh/brk.html
Quoted 2 lines
Now, maybe you are right and heap randomization is useful, but breaking 10year old executables is no-no.
Even if the bug is in 10year old library which might have been fixed by a later update? (I don't know how to verify this, libc.so.5 is so ancient that it's difficult to find anything about that).
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1) not enable heap randomization unless app asks for it by personality syscall
That (beyond other things) doesn't fit into the whole randomization picture, as all other aspect of memory space randomization are dependent only on 'randomize_va_space' and nothing else ... adding something special just for brk seems to be messy.
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2) (hacky!) detect that app asks for
brk()below its heap start, which means it assumes BSS+heap are contiguous, and just map the memory there.
That's really ugly :)
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Still, it will probably not fix your particular program crashes, just because it will always assume that brk starts immediately after the end of the bss, which is plain wrong and has never been assured. Could you please
Can you quote docs that tells me it is plain wrong?
See the Single Unix Specification. It doesn't seem to allow you to assume *anything* about start_brk location, seems to me.
Now, I am perfectly fine with reverting that patch for 2.6.25 unless someone is able to come up with something clever. It is quite unfortunate though, that we possibly give up quite reasonable security measure just because 10-year-old libc assumes something that it possibly isn't allowed to. Arjan, I know you have been working on brk randomization previously, do you have any input here?
Thanks,
Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
Quoted 9 lines · Jiri Kosina
Quoted 3 lines · Pavel Machek
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Actually, this clearly shows that either prehistoric libc.so.5 or the program itself are broken.
I believe it shows clear regression in latest 2.6.25 kernel.
I am still not completely sure. It might be a regression, but it also might just trigger the bug in ancient version in libc.so.5 which might be fixed in some later version [...]
which too is a regression ...
really, lets add a sysctl for this, and a .config option that either disables or enables it. Then we will default to disabled. (but users can enable it - and distros can build their kernels with this .config option enabled)
Ingo
Quoted 12 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 9 lines · Jiri Kosina
Quoted 3 lines · Pavel Machek
Quoted 2 lines
Actually, this clearly shows that either prehistoric libc.so.5 or the program itself are broken.
I believe it shows clear regression in latest 2.6.25 kernel.
I am still not completely sure. It might be a regression, but it also might just trigger the bug in ancient version in libc.so.5 which might be fixed in some later version [...]
Quoted 6 lines
which too is a regression ...
really, lets add a sysctl for this, and a .config option that either disables or enables it. Then we will default to disabled. (but users can enable it - and distros can build their kernels with this .config option enabled)
I don't think kernel should care about programs which are buggy and make invalid assumptions, and that's the case here. I remember we have been through this 5 years ago when brk randomization has been added to Red Hat kernels. There was one or two broken programs which made assumptions on what brk(0) is supposed to return at program startup, everything else was ok.
For the buggy apps there is always setarch i386 -R ./the_buggy_program so I don't think we need to add another sysctl for this.
Jakub
Quoted 15 lines · Jakub Jelinek
Quoted 14 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 9 lines · Jiri Kosina
Quoted 3 lines · Pavel Machek
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Actually, this clearly shows that either prehistoric libc.so.5 or the program itself are broken.
I believe it shows clear regression in latest 2.6.25 kernel.
I am still not completely sure. It might be a regression, but it also might just trigger the bug in ancient version in libc.so.5 which might be fixed in some later version [...]
which too is a regression ...
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really, lets add a sysctl for this, and a .config option that either disables or enables it. Then we will default to disabled. (but users can enable it - and distros can build their kernels with this .config option enabled)
I don't think kernel should care about programs which are buggy and make invalid assumptions, and that's the case here. I remember we have been
Those "invalid assumptions" crept into documentation. Everybody knew heap starts at the end of bss in 1995.
Quoted 3 lines
5 years ago when brk randomization has been added to Red Hat kernels. There was one or two broken programs which made assumptions on what brk(0) is supposed to return at program startup, everything else was ok.
That's not the problem. Problem is that programs assume brk(0x12345678) allocates space between end of bss and 0x12345678; which is no longer the case.
And actually even
http://opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007908775/xsh/brk.html only talks about "ammount of space"... implying begging of that space is well known.
Pavel
PS: It would be nice to fix linux man pages to say that it brk() moves end of the heap, only, and that any usage of brk() is invalid w/o doing brk(0) before.
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Quoted 11 lines · Pavel Machek
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I am still not completely sure. It might be a regression, but it also might just trigger the bug in ancient version in libc.so.5 which might be fixed in some later version [...]
which too is a regression ...
really, lets add a sysctl for this, and a .config option that either disables or enables it. Then we will default to disabled. (but users can enable it - and distros can build their kernels with this .config option enabled)
Quoted 6 lines
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I don't think kernel should care about programs which are buggy and make invalid assumptions, and that's the case here. I remember we have been
Those "invalid assumptions" crept into documentation. Everybody knew heap starts at the end of bss in 1995.
what matters most isnt really any documentation but what programs really do, and how it affects users.
in this case i think we should offer a .config option to set the randomization behavior, and should perhaps make the more conservative one the default.
New distros (with 10,000+ binaries that work just fine with randomization) will turn on max randomization by default, while people like you who mix 1996 binaries with a 2008 kernel will use a more conservative default.
Ingo
Quoted 9 lines · Jiri Kosina
Quoted 3 lines · Pavel Machek
Quoted 2 lines
Actually, this clearly shows that either prehistoric libc.so.5 or the program itself are broken.
I believe it shows clear regression in latest 2.6.25 kernel.
I am still not completely sure. It might be a regression, but it also might just trigger the bug in ancient version in libc.so.5 which might be fixed in some later version -- are you able to verify that?
I'm in same position as you here. I only have few old binaries :-(.
Quoted 11 lines
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You say it is wrong. Manpages imply otherwise:
int brk(void *end_data_segment);...
DESCRIPTION
brk()sets the end of the data segment to the value specified byend_data_segment, when that value is reasonable, the system does have enough memory and the process does not exceed its max data size (see setrlimit(2)).
Note it talks about data segment, not about heap, and that seems to imply that BSS and heap are actually one area. 2.6.25 broke that.
Quoted 2 lines
Single Unix Specification talks only about manipulating the break section, see http://opengroup.org/onlinepubs/007908775/xsh/brk.html
SuS:
# The brk() and sbrk() functions are used to change the amount of space
# allocated for the calling process.
It talks about "space for calling process". It does not talk about heap, and I think it implicitely assumes "bss and heap" are continuous...
(It also says return 0 or success, and we return address).
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Still, it will probably not fix your particular program crashes, just because it will always assume that brk starts immediately after the end of the bss, which is plain wrong and has never been assured. Could you please
Can you quote docs that tells me it is plain wrong?
See the Single Unix Specification. It doesn't seem to allow you to assume *anything* about
start_brklocation, seems to me.
I believe it implicitely assumes start_brk is well known, actually. Otherwise it should have told us how to get start_brk.
Pavel
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Hugh Dickins
Acked-byQuoted 3 lines · Jiri Kosina
Now, you are right that the return value from
brk()is bogus in these cases. The patch below should make it behave, as you can easily check with strace, right? Does anyone have any comments regarding this patch please?
Your patch below looks good to me, whatever the outcome of the randomize_brk debate. I can't imagine what end_code has to do with it: an ELF binary that specifies the code is to go up the top of the address space seems perfectly reasonable to me.
Quoted 5 lines
Still, it will probably not fix your particular program crashes, just because it will always assume that brk starts immediately after the end of the bss, which is plain wrong and has never been assured. Could you please check whether there is any compat-* package available for you distribution, that upgrades libc.so.5 to any fixed version?
But I was myself surprised by your randomize_brk patch: like the buggy program, I'd imagined that data immediately followed by bss immediately followed by brk was an invariant (whereas I never supposed the position of the code had anything to do with it). Just my ignorance, but not surprising if it's shared by others.
So, I didn't really expect the randomize_brk patch to get this far, thought it would hit trouble earlier. What to do now? On the one hand Pavel rightly regards this as a regression, on the other hand we've had programs which make bad assumptions about their address space layout before, and have not always deferred to them.
If such cases are few (can we be sure of that yet?), is it going to be good enough to rely on adding the ELF note to disable their randomization?
In my usual dither, I'm rather hoping Arjan will have a clear answer.
Hugh
Quoted 7 lines
From: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
brk: check the lower bound properly
There is a check in
sys_brk(), that tries to make sure that we do not underflow the area that is dedicated to brk heap.
Quoted 6 lines
The check is however wrong, as it assumes that brk area starts immediately after the end of the code (+bss), which is wrong for example in environments with randomized brk start. The proper way is to check whether the address is not below the
start_brkaddress.Signed-off-by Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
Quoted 14 lines
mm/mmap.c +1
-1@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sys_brk(unsigned long brk)down_write (&mm->mmap_sem); -if (brk < mm->end_code) +if (brk < mm->start_brk) goto out;/*
Quoted 6 lines
But I was myself surprised by your
randomize_brkpatch: like the buggy program, I'd imagined that data immediately followed by bss immediately followed by brk was an invariant (whereas I never supposed the position of the code had anything to do with it). Just my ignorance, but not surprising if it's shared by others.
the surprise also will be when gcc reorders your .data section for optimization, and the variable you think is last.. no longer isn't.
Quoted 8 lines
So, I didn't really expect the
randomize_brkpatch to get this far, thought it would hit trouble earlier. What to do now? On the one hand Pavel rightly regards this as a regression, on the other hand we've had programs which make bad assumptions about their address space layout before, and have not always deferred to them.If such cases are few (can we be sure of that yet?), is it going
it's for sure only few; this is the second known case is 5 years
that made this dicey assumption (RHEL/Fedora ship with this for 5 years or so now) Various "secure" distros ship with brk detached as well (albeit via other methods) for even longer.
Quoted 2 lines
to be good enough to rely on adding the ELF note to disable their randomization?
sadly elfnotes are a sparse commodity.
Quoted 2 lines
In my usual dither, I'm rather hoping Arjan will have a clear answer.
setarch works. If the apps come in source form they need fixing anyway (since I'd not be surprised of current gcc reorders variables), if not.. we only have 2 cases, the other case was the build process of emacs (which got fixed 5 years ago). My personal guess is, if there's nothing more than "columns", lets swallow it. If more show up, we need to rethink it. I somehow doubt more real apps will show up given how widespread and long this patch was deployed... but turning of randomization already exists via various methods, both global and per process.
Hi!
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
In my usual dither, I'm rather hoping Arjan will have a clear answer.
setarch works. If the apps come in source form they need fixing anyway (since I'd not be surprised of current gcc reorders variables), if not.. we only have 2 cases, the other case was the build process of emacs (which got fixed 5
years ago).
uemacs ... broken with randomization
colums, sss ... local programs, broken with randomization procinfo ... broken, randomization makes it die sooner. mikmod ... broken with randomization
bsdsed ... broken with randomization
...
Should I test few more?
Pavel
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Quoted 7 lines · Pavel Machek
uemacs ... broken with randomization
colums, sss ... local programs, broken with randomization procinfo ... broken, randomization makes it die sooner. mikmod ... broken with randomization
bsdsed ... broken with randomization
...
Should I test few more?
Just to make things clear -- are all of these linked against the 1996 version of libc.so.5?
Thanks,
Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
Quoted 10 lines · Jiri Kosina
Quoted 7 lines · Pavel Machek
uemacs ... broken with randomization
colums, sss ... local programs, broken with randomization procinfo ... broken, randomization makes it die sooner. mikmod ... broken with randomization
bsdsed ... broken with randomization
...
Should I test few more?
Quoted 2 lines
Just to make things clear -- are all of these linked against the 1996 version of libc.so.5?
Yes.
root@amd:~# ls -al /lib/libc.so.5.4.33 -rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 679259 Aug 2 1997 /lib/libc.so.5.4.33*
Pavel
(Hmm... I should really cleanup my system:
pavel@amd:/usr/local/bin$ ./archie -sh: ./archie: cannot execute binary file pavel@amd:/usr/local/bin$ file ./archie ./archie: Linux/i386 demand-paged executable (QMAGIC))
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Quoted 10 lines · Pavel Machek
Hi!
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
In my usual dither, I'm rather hoping Arjan will have a clear answer.
setarch works. If the apps come in source form they need fixing anyway (since I'd not be surprised of current gcc reorders variables), if not.. we only have 2 cases, the other case was the build process of emacs (which got fixed 5
years ago).
Quoted 7 lines
uemacs ... broken with randomization
colums, sss ... local programs, broken with randomization procinfo ... broken, randomization makes it die sooner. mikmod ... broken with randomization
bsdsed ... broken with randomization
...
Should I test few more?
just a quick debug question: do they all work if you start them via setarch?
Ingo
Quoted 21 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 10 lines · Pavel Machek
Hi!
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
In my usual dither, I'm rather hoping Arjan will have a clear answer.
setarch works. If the apps come in source form they need fixing anyway (since I'd not be surprised of current gcc reorders variables), if not.. we only have 2 cases, the other case was the build process of emacs (which got fixed 5
years ago).Quoted 7 lines
uemacs ... broken with randomization
colums, sss ... local programs, broken with randomization procinfo ... broken, randomization makes it die sooner. mikmod ... broken with randomization
bsdsed ... broken with randomization
...
Should I test few more?
Quoted 2 lines
just a quick debug question: do they all work if you start them via setarch?
I was actually toggling randomization with
echo 0|1 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
. Yes, setarch i386 -R /usr/local/bin/uemacs (etc) fixes them, too.
What about this?
Heap randomization breaks /lib/libc.so.5.4.33, make it possible to randomize normal stuff but leave the heap alone.
fs/binfmt_elf.c +1 -1
@@ -1077,7 +1077,7 @@ #endif /* ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGE current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p;#ifdef arch_randomize_brk -if (current->flags &PF_RANDOMIZE ) +if ((current->flags &PF_RANDOMIZE ) && (randomize_va_space >1 )) current->mm->brk = current->mm->start_brk =arch_randomize_brk (current->mm);#endif
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Quoted 6 lines · Pavel Machek
. Yes, setarch i386 -R
/usr/local/bin/uemacs(etc) fixes them, too.What about this?
Heap randomization breaks
/lib/libc.so.5.4.33, make it possible to randomize normal stuff but leave the heap alone.
certainly looks fine to me, but please also add a .config to make it default to 2. The reason is that a good portions of the overflows happen on the heap and 99.9% of the Linux users do not run 1996-era glibc anymore.
something like CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK=y, which would cause randomize_va_space to default to 1, and if a user or distro disables it, it will default to 2.
Ingo
Hi!
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
. Yes, setarch i386 -R
/usr/local/bin/uemacs(etc) fixes them, too.What about this?
Heap randomization breaks
/lib/libc.so.5.4.33, make it possible to randomize normal stuff but leave the heap alone.
Quoted 8 lines
certainly looks fine to me, but please also add a .config to make it default to 2. The reason is that a good portions of the overflows happen on the heap and 99.9% of the Linux users do not run 1996-era glibc anymore.
something like
CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK=y, which would causerandomize_va_spaceto default to 1, and if a user or distro disables it, it will default to 2.
I named it slightly differently, but idea is same. Heap randomization breaks ancient binaries, so disable it by default.
fs/binfmt_elf.c +1 -1
@@ -1077,7 +1077,7 @@ #endif /* ARCH_HAS_SETUP_ADDITIONAL_PAGE current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p;#ifdef arch_randomize_brk -if (current->flags &PF_RANDOMIZE ) +if ((current->flags &PF_RANDOMIZE ) && (randomize_va_space >1 )) current->mm->brk = current->mm->start_brk =arch_randomize_brk (current->mm);#endif
init/Kconfig +10 -0
@@ -541,6 +541,16 @@ config ELF_CORE help Enable support for generating core dumps. Disabling saves about 4k. +config RANDOMIZE_HEAP + bool "Randomize heap placement" + help + Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it also + breaks old programs (including anything libc5 based). This only + changes default, and can be overriden in runtime by tweaking + /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space. + + N is safe choice here. + config BASE_FULL default y bool "Enable full-sized data structures for core" if EMBEDDED
mm/memory.c +6 -1
@@ -82,7 +82,12 @@ void * high_memory;EXPORT_SYMBOL (num_physpages);EXPORT_SYMBOL (high_memory); -int randomize_va_space__read_mostly =1 ; +int randomize_va_space __read_mostly = +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_HEAP +2 ; +#else +1 ; +#endif static int __init disable_randmaps (char *s) {
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Quoted 11 lines · On Tue, 5 Feb 2008 16:46:48 +0100 Pavel Machek <[email protected]> wrote:
Hi!
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
In my usual dither, I'm rather hoping Arjan will have a clear answer.
setarch works. If the apps come in source form they need fixing anyway (since I'd not be surprised of current gcc reorders variables), if not.. we only have 2 cases, the other case was the build process of emacs (which got fixed 5 years ago).
Quoted 7 lines
uemacs ... broken with randomization
colums, sss ... local programs, broken with randomization procinfo ... broken, randomization makes it die sooner. mikmod ... broken with randomization
bsdsed ... broken with randomization
...
Should I test few more?
ok throw that idea out of the window then
the combo of a config option + sysctl sounds the right way forward then ;(
Unless there's a way we can make sys_brk() detect this kind of behavior somehow...
we could track per process if brk(0) was called, and if not, do something fancy to work around stuff?
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Quoted 22 lines · Arjan van de Ven
Quoted 11 lines · On Tue, 5 Feb 2008 16:46:48 +0100 Pavel Machek <[email protected]> wrote:
Hi!
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
In my usual dither, I'm rather hoping Arjan will have a clear answer.
setarch works. If the apps come in source form they need fixing anyway (since I'd not be surprised of current gcc reorders variables), if not.. we only have 2 cases, the other case was the build process of emacs (which got fixed 5 years ago).
Quoted 7 lines
uemacs ... broken with randomization
colums, sss ... local programs, broken with randomization procinfo ... broken, randomization makes it die sooner. mikmod ... broken with randomization
bsdsed ... broken with randomization
...
Should I test few more?
Quoted 6 lines
ok throw that idea out of the window then
the combo of a config option + sysctl sounds the right way forward then ;(
Unless there's a way we can make
sys_brk()detect this kind of behavior somehow...
we could track per process if brk(0) was called, and if not, do something fancy to work around stuff?
That behaviour is indeed easy to detect. If someone does sys_brk() with value lower than heap_start, it means it is old binary (but I'd call that a hack).
But... older binaries call sys_personality(). Maybe it is cleaner not to base check on that?
Pavel
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Quoted 2 lines · Arjan van de Ven
the combo of a config option + sysctl sounds the right way forward then ;(
OK, so I propose the one below (unested yet, but should be trivial). Does anyone have any objections?
From: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
ASLR: add possibility for more fine-grained tweaking
Some prehistoric binaries don't like when start of brk area is located anywhere else than just after code+bss.
This patch adds possibility to configure the default behavior of address space randomization. In addition to that, randomize_va_space now can have value of '2', which means full randomization including brk space.
Also, documentation of randomize_va_space is added.
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +32 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: - pid_max - powersave-nap [ PPC only ] - printk +- randomize_va_space - real-root-dev ==> Documentation/initrd.txt - reboot-cmd [ SPARC only ] - rtsig-max
@@ -280,6 +281,37 @@ send before ratelimiting kicks in. ============================================================== +randomize-va-space: + +This option can be used to select the type of process address +space randomization is used in the system, for architectures +that support this feature. + +One of the following numeric values is possible: + +0 - [none] + Turn the process address space randomization off by default. + +1 - [conservative] + Conservative address space randomization makes the addresses of + mmap base and VDSO page randomized. This, among other things, + implies that shared libraries will be loaded to random addresses. + Also for PIE binaries, the location of code start is randomized. + +2 - [full] + + This includes all the features that Conservative randomization + provides. In addition to that, also start of the brk area is + randomized. + There a few legacy applications out there (such as some ancient + versions of libc.so.5 from 1996), that assume that brk area starts + just after the end of the code+bss. These applications break when + start of the brk area is randomized. There are however no known + non-legacy applications that would be broken this way, so for most + systems it is safe to chose Full randomization. + +============================================================== + reboot-cmd: (Sparc only) ??? This seems to be a way to give an argument to the Sparc
fs/binfmt_elf.c +1 -1
@@ -1077,7 +1077,7 @@ static int load_elf_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct pt_regs *regs) current->mm->start_stack = bprm->p;#ifdef arch_randomize_brk -if (current->flags &PF_RANDOMIZE ) +if (current->flags &PF_RANDOMIZE && randomize_va_space ==2 ) current->mm->brk = current->mm->start_brk =arch_randomize_brk (current->mm);#endif
init/Kconfig +40 -0
@@ -662,6 +662,46 @@ config SLOB endchoice +choice + prompt "Address space randomization type" + default RANDOMIZATION_CONSERVATIVE + help + This option allows to select the type of process address space + randomization that will be used by default (for those architectures + that support address space randomization). This option can be + overriden in runtime through kernel.randomize_va_space sysctl. + +config RANDOMIZATION_NONE + bool "NONE" + help + Turn the process address space randomization off by default. + Equivalent to sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space = 0. + +config RANDOMIZATION_CONSERVATIVE + bool "CONSERVATIVE" + help + Conservative address space randomization makes the addresses of + mmap base and VDSO page randomized. This, among other things, + implies that shared libraries will be loaded to random addresses. + Also for PIE binaries, the location of code start is randomized. + Equivalent to sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space = 1. + +config RANDOMIZATION_FULL + bool "FULL" + help + This includes all the features that Conservative randomization + provides. In addition to that, also start of the brk area is + randomized. + There a few legacy applications out there (such as some ancient + versions of libc.so.5 from 1996), that assume that brk area starts + just after the end of the code+bss. These applications break when + start of the brk area is randomized. There are however no known + non-legacy applications that would be broken this way, so for most + systems it is safe to chose Full randomization. + Equivalent to sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space = 2. + +endchoice + config PROFILING bool "Profiling support (EXPERIMENTAL)" help
mm/memory.c +8 -0
@@ -82,7 +82,15 @@ void * high_memory;EXPORT_SYMBOL (num_physpages);EXPORT_SYMBOL (high_memory); +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_CONSERVATIVE int randomize_va_space__read_mostly =1 ; +#else +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_FULL +int randomize_va_space__read_mostly =2 ; +#else +int randomize_va_space__read_mostly =0 ; +#endif +#endif static int __init disable_randmaps (char *s) {
Quoted 14 lines · On Tue, 5 Feb 2008 23:35:27 +0100 (CET) Jiri Kosina wrote:
Quoted 2 lines · Arjan van de Ven
the combo of a config option + sysctl sounds the right way forward then ;(
OK, so I propose the one below (unested yet, but should be trivial). Does anyone have any objections?
From: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
ASLR: add possibility for more fine-grained tweaking
Quoted 8 lines
Some prehistoric binaries don't like when start of brk area is located anywhere else than just after code+bss.
This patch adds possibility to configure the default behavior of address space randomization. In addition to that,
randomize_va_spacenow can have value of '2', which means full randomization including brk space.Also, documentation of
randomize_va_spaceis added.
Thanks.
Quoted 15 lines
Signed-off-by Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +1
-0@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel: - pid_max - powersave-nap [ PPC only ] - printk +- randomize_va_space - real-root-dev ==> Documentation/initrd.txt - reboot-cmd [ SPARC only ] - rtsig-max
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt send before ratelimiting kicks in. · line 287
Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +4
-0@@ -280,6 +281,37 @@ send before ratelimiting kicks in. ============================================================== +randomize-va-space: + +This option can be used to select the type of process address +space randomization is used in the system, for architectures
s/is used/that is used/
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +10
-0+that support this feature. + +One of the following numeric values is possible: + +0 - [none] + Turn the process address space randomization off by default. + +1 - [conservative] + Conservative address space randomization makes the addresses of + mmap base and VDSO page randomized. This, among other things,
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt send before ratelimiting kicks in. · line 307
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +10
-0+ implies that shared libraries will be loaded to random addresses. + Also for PIE binaries, the location of code start is randomized. + +2 - [full] + + This includes all the features that Conservative randomization + provides. In addition to that, also start of the brk area is + randomized. + There a few legacy applications out there (such as some ancient + versions of libc.so.5 from 1996), that assume that brk area starts
Drop comma ^ that the brk area
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt send before ratelimiting kicks in. · line 311
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +4
-0+ just after the end of the code+bss. These applications break when + start of the brk area is randomized. There are however no known + non-legacy applications that would be broken this way, so for most + systems it is safe to chose Full randomization.
choose
Quoted 37 lines
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +3
-0+ +============================================================== + reboot-cmd: (Sparc only) ??? This seems to be a way to give an argument to the Sparcinit/Kconfig +22
-0@@ -662,6 +662,46 @@ config SLOB endchoice +choice + prompt "Address space randomization type" + default RANDOMIZATION_CONSERVATIVE + help + This option allows to select the type of process address space + randomization that will be used by default (for those architectures + that support address space randomization). This option can be + overriden in runtime through kernel.randomize_va_space sysctl. + +config RANDOMIZATION_NONE + bool "NONE" + help + Turn the process address space randomization off by default. + Equivalent to sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space = 0. + +config RANDOMIZATION_CONSERVATIVE + bool "CONSERVATIVE" + help + Conservative address space randomization makes the addresses of + mmap base and VDSO page randomized. This, among other things, + implies that shared libraries will be loaded to random addresses. + Also for PIE binaries, the location of code start is randomized.
init/Kconfig config SLOB · line 696
Quoted 10 lines
init/Kconfig +10
-0+ Equivalent to sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space = 1. + +config RANDOMIZATION_FULL + bool "FULL" + help + This includes all the features that Conservative randomization + provides. In addition to that, also start of the brk area is + randomized. + There a few legacy applications out there (such as some ancient + versions of libc.so.5 from 1996), that assume that brk area starts
Drop comma. s/that brk/that the brk/
init/Kconfig config SLOB · line 700
Quoted 4 lines
init/Kconfig +4
-0+ just after the end of the code+bss. These applications break when + start of the brk area is randomized. There are however no known + non-legacy applications that would be broken this way, so for most + systems it is safe to chose Full randomization.
s/chose/choose/
init/Kconfig config SLOB · line 707
Quoted 7 lines
init/Kconfig +4
-0+ Equivalent to sysctl kernel.randomize_va_space = 2. + +endchoice + config PROFILING bool "Profiling support (EXPERIMENTAL)" help
---
~Randy
Hi!
Quoted 5 lines
Still, it will probably not fix your particular program crashes, just because it will always assume that brk starts immediately after the end of the bss, which is plain wrong and has never been assured. Could you please check whether there is any compat-* package available for you distribution, that upgrades libc.so.5 to any fixed version?
I got libc.so.5 as a binary from some Slackware-based system, IIRC, and I can't find any relevant compat-* packages :-(.
Quoted 7 lines
From: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
brk: check the lower bound properly
There is a check in
sys_brk(), that tries to make sure that we do not underflow the area that is dedicated to brk heap.
Quoted 6 lines
The check is however wrong, as it assumes that brk area starts immediately after the end of the code (+bss), which is wrong for example in environments with randomized brk start. The proper way is to check whether the address is not below the
start_brkaddress.Signed-off-by Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
ACK.
Quoted 13 lines
mm/mmap.c +1
-1@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sys_brk(unsigned long brk)down_write (&mm->mmap_sem); -if (brk < mm->end_code) +if (brk < mm->start_brk) goto out;/*
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Quoted 7 lines · Pavel Machek
Quoted 7 lines
From: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
brk: check the lower bound properly
There is a check in
sys_brk(), that tries to make sure that we do not underflow the area that is dedicated to brk heap.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The check is however wrong, as it assumes that brk area starts immediately after the end of the code (+bss), which is wrong for example in environments with randomized brk start. The proper way is to check whether the address is not below the
start_brkaddress.Signed-off-by Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>ACK.
actually, does the patch above from Jiri solve the problem with your 11 year old binaries too? (Sorry if it has been mentioned elsewhere, i could not decode it from this thread.)
Ingo
Quoted 15 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 12 lines · Pavel Machek
Quoted 12 lines
From: Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>
brk: check the lower bound properly
There is a check in
sys_brk(), that tries to make sure that we do not underflow the area that is dedicated to brk heap.The check is however wrong, as it assumes that brk area starts immediately after the end of the code (+bss), which is wrong for example in environments with randomized brk start. The proper way is to check whether the address is not below the
start_brkaddress.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Jiri Kosina <[email protected]>ACK.
actually, does the patch above from Jiri solve the problem with your 11 year old binaries too? (Sorry if it has been mentioned elsewhere, i could not decode it from this thread.)
No, it should just make the problem more obvious...
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Hi!
mm/mmap.c asmlinkage unsigned long sys_brk(unsigned long brk) · line 247
Quoted 13 lines
mm/mmap.c +1
-1@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long sys_brk(unsigned long brk)down_write (&mm->mmap_sem); -if (brk < mm->end_code) +if (brk < mm->start_brk) goto out;/*
Sorry, I now tested the patch. It looked good to my untrained eyes, but upon testing it on columns:
...
personality(PER_LINUX) = 4194304 geteuid() = 1000 getuid() = 1000 getgid() = 1002 getegid() = 1002 brk(0x8054098) = 0x922d000
--- SIGSEGV (Segmentation fault) @ 0 (0) ---
...it should have said -EINVAL or something like that.
Pavel
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Quoted 11 lines · Pavel Machek
Sorry, I now tested the patch. It looked good to my untrained eyes, but upon testing it on columns:
...personality(PER_LINUX) = 4194304 geteuid() = 1000 getuid() = 1000 getgid() = 1002 getegid() = 1002 brk(0x8054098) = 0x922d000--- SIGSEGV (Segmentation fault) @ 0 (0) --- ...it should have said
-EINVALor something like that.
I don't think so.
brk() should return the value of the current break when passed an unreasonable argument (as in the case you ilustrated -- it tried to set the brk lower than start_brk, which doesn't make sense). The only error values brk() is allowed to return are ENOMEM and EAGAIN, which don't fit into this situation. This is desgribed both in SUS and linux manpages.
Signature · 2 lines
Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs