SELinux: create new open permission
PATCH 1/1 SELinux: create new open permission
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to /tmp/output than if the program tried to directly open /tmp/output. This should allow policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so good at catching today.
---
As an example, process1 in httpd_t opened a bunch of files of type user_tmp_t. It then called process2 running as ntpd_t which did nothing but accept those open fd's and terminate. Notice proc1 needed open perms and proc2 only needed read and write.
#============= httpd_t ==============
allow httpd_t tmp_t:dir open;
allow httpd_t user_tmp_t:blk_file { read write open }; allow httpd_t user_tmp_t:chr_file { read write open }; allow httpd_t user_tmp_t:dir { read open };
allow httpd_t user_tmp_t:fifo_file { read write open }; allow httpd_t user_tmp_t:file { read write execute entrypoint open }; allow httpd_t user_tmp_t:lnk_file read;
#============= ntpd_t ==============
allow ntpd_t user_tmp_t:blk_file { read write }; allow ntpd_t user_tmp_t:chr_file { read write }; allow ntpd_t user_tmp_t:dir read;
allow ntpd_t user_tmp_t:fifo_file { read write }; allow ntpd_t user_tmp_t:file { read write entrypoint };
security/selinux/hooks.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 5 ++++ security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 5 ++++ security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 + security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 ++ 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +30 -1
@@ -1599,6 +1599,35 @@ static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)return av; } +/* +* Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open +* open permission. +*/ +static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av (int mode,int mask) +{ +u32 av =file_mask_to_av (mode, mask); + +if (selinux_policycap_openperm) { +/* +* lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open' +*/ +if (S_ISREG (mode)) + av |=FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISCHR (mode)) + av |=CHR_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISBLK (mode)) + av |=BLK_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISFIFO (mode)) + av |=FIFO_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISDIR (mode)) + av |=DIR__OPEN ; +else +printk (KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside open_file_to_av " +"with unknown mode:%x\n" , mode); + } +return av; +} +/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ static inline u32 file_to_av (struct file *file) {
@@ -2517,7 +2546,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, }return inode_has_perm (current, inode, -file_mask_to_av (inode->i_mode, mask),NULL ); +open_file_mask_to_av (inode->i_mode, mask),NULL ); }static int selinux_inode_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *iattr)
security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h +5 -0
@@ -14,12 +14,17 @@ S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REPARENT, "reparent") S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, "search") S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__RMDIR, "rmdir") + S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__OPEN, "open") S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans") S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint") S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod") + S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__OPEN, "open") S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans") S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint") S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod") + S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__OPEN, "open") + S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, BLK_FILE__OPEN, "open") + S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, FIFO_FILE__OPEN, "open") S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use") S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")S_ (SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ,TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN ,"newconn" )
security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h +5 -0
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@#define DIR__REPARENT 0x00080000UL#define DIR__SEARCH 0x00100000UL#define DIR__RMDIR 0x00200000UL +#define DIR__OPEN 0x00400000UL#define FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@#define FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS 0x00020000UL#define FILE__ENTRYPOINT 0x00040000UL#define FILE__EXECMOD 0x00080000UL +#define FILE__OPEN 0x00100000UL#define LNK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define LNK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define LNK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
@@ -136,6 +138,7 @@#define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS 0x00020000UL#define CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT 0x00040000UL#define CHR_FILE__EXECMOD 0x00080000UL +#define CHR_FILE__OPEN 0x00100000UL#define BLK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define BLK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define BLK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
@@ -153,6 +156,7 @@#define BLK_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL#define BLK_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL#define BLK_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL +#define BLK_FILE__OPEN 0x00020000UL#define SOCK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define SOCK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define SOCK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
@@ -187,6 +191,7 @@#define FIFO_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL#define FIFO_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL#define FIFO_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL +#define FIFO_FILE__OPEN 0x00020000UL#define FD__USE 0x00000001UL#define SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
security/selinux/include/security.h +2 -0
@@ -43,11 +43,13 @@ extern int selinux_mls_enabled;/* Policy capabilities */ enum {POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER , +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM , __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer; +extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;int security_load_policy (void * data,size_t len);
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +2 -1
@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@/* Policy capability filenames */ static char *policycap_names[] = { -"network_peer_controls" +"network_peer_controls" , +"open_perms" };unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot =CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE ;
security/selinux/ss/services.c +3 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;int selinux_policycap_netpeer; +int selinux_policycap_openperm;/* * This is declared in avc.c
@@ -1306,6 +1307,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void) { selinux_policycap_netpeer =ebitmap_get_bit (&policydb.policycaps,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER ); + selinux_policycap_openperm =ebitmap_get_bit (&policydb.policycaps, +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM ); }extern void selinux_complete_init (void );
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Quoted 9 lines · Eric Paris
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to
/tmp/outputthan if the program tried to directly open/tmp/output. This should allow policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so good at catching today.Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Much better :)
Quoted 202 lines
---
As an example, process1 inhttpd_topened a bunch of files of typeuser_tmp_t. It then called process2 running asntpd_twhich did nothing but accept those open fd's and terminate. Notice proc1 needed open perms and proc2 only needed read and write.#=============
httpd_t==============
allowhttpd_ttmp_t:dir open;
allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:blk_file { read write open }; allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:chr_file { read write open }; allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:dir { read open };
allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:fifo_file { read write open }; allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:file { read write execute entrypoint open }; allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:lnk_file read;#=============
ntpd_t==============
allowntpd_tuser_tmp_t:blk_file { read write }; allowntpd_tuser_tmp_t:chr_file { read write }; allowntpd_tuser_tmp_t:dir read;
allowntpd_tuser_tmp_t:fifo_file { read write }; allowntpd_tuser_tmp_t:file { read write entrypoint };security/selinux/hooks.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 5 ++++ security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 5 ++++ security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 + security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 ++ 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)security/selinux/hooks.c +2
-0@@ -1599,6 +1599,35 @@ static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) return av; } +/* +* Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open + * open permission.
+ */security/selinux/hooks.c +26
-1+static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av (int mode,int mask) +{ +u32 av =file_mask_to_av (mode, mask); + +if (selinux_policycap_openperm) { +/* +* lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open' +*/ +if (S_ISREG (mode)) + av |=FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISCHR (mode)) + av |=CHR_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISBLK (mode)) + av |=BLK_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISFIFO (mode)) + av |=FIFO_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISDIR (mode)) + av |=DIR__OPEN ; +else +printk (KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside open_file_to_av " +"with unknown mode:%x\n" , mode); + } +return av; +} +/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ static inline u32 file_to_av (struct file *file) {@@ -2517,7 +2546,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, } return inode_has_perm(current, inode, - file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL); + open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL); } static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr*iattr) diff --git
a/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.hb/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.hindex d569669..1223b4f 100644security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h +5
-0@@ -14,12 +14,17 @@ S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REPARENT, "reparent") S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, "search") S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__RMDIR, "rmdir") + S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__OPEN, "open") S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans") S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint") S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod") + S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__OPEN, "open")S_ (SECCLASS_CHR_FILE ,CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS , "execute_no_trans") S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint") S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod") + S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__OPEN, "open") + S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, BLK_FILE__OPEN, "open") + S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, FIFO_FILE__OPEN, "open") S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use") S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")S_ (SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ,TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN ,"newconn" )(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.hindex 75b4131..c4c5116 100644security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h +5
-0@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@#define DIR__REPARENT 0x00080000UL#define DIR__SEARCH 0x00100000UL#define DIR__RMDIR 0x00200000UL +#define DIR__OPEN 0x00400000UL#define FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@#define FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS 0x00020000UL#define FILE__ENTRYPOINT 0x00040000UL#define FILE__EXECMOD 0x00080000UL +#define FILE__OPEN 0x00100000UL#define LNK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define LNK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define LNK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL@@ -136,6 +138,7 @@#define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS 0x00020000UL#define CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT 0x00040000UL#define CHR_FILE__EXECMOD 0x00080000UL +#define CHR_FILE__OPEN 0x00100000UL#define BLK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define BLK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define BLK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL@@ -153,6 +156,7 @@#define BLK_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL#define BLK_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL#define BLK_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL +#define BLK_FILE__OPEN 0x00020000UL#define SOCK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define SOCK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define SOCK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL@@ -187,6 +191,7 @@#define FIFO_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL#define FIFO_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL#define FIFO_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL +#define FIFO_FILE__OPEN 0x00020000UL#define FD__USE 0x00000001UL#define SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/security/selinux/include/security.hindex 837ce42..fa30f53 100644security/selinux/include/security.h +2
-0@@ -43,11 +43,13 @@ extern int selinux_mls_enabled;/* Policy capabilities */ enum {POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER , +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM , __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer; +extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;int security_load_policy (void * data,size_t len);(quoted diff) +0
-0
b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.cindex 0341567..1d996bb 100644security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +2
-1@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@/* Policy capability filenames */ static char *policycap_names[] = { -"network_peer_controls" +"network_peer_controls" , +"open_perms" }; unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot =
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE; diff --gita/security/selinux/ss/services.cb/security/selinux/ss/services.cindex f374186..23a61f1 100644security/selinux/ss/services.c +3
-0@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;int selinux_policycap_netpeer; +int selinux_policycap_openperm;/* * This is declared in avc.c @@ -1306,6 +1307,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void) { selinux_policycap_netpeer =ebitmap_get_bit (&policydb.policycaps,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER ); + selinux_policycap_openperm =ebitmap_get_bit (&policydb.policycaps, +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM ); }extern void selinux_complete_init (void );
Signature · 7 lines
paul moore linux security @ hp -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 10 lines · Eric Paris
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to
/tmp/outputthan if the program tried to directly open/tmp/output. This should allow policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so good at catching today.Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>
What does open on a dir mean? Isn't that the same as the read perm?
Quoted 1 line
allow
httpd_tuser_tmp_t:dir { read open };
[...]
Quoted 28 lines
+ * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
+ * open permission.
+ */security/selinux/hooks.c +25
-0+static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av (int mode,int mask) +{ +u32 av =file_mask_to_av (mode, mask); + +if (selinux_policycap_openperm) { +/* +* lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open' +*/ +if (S_ISREG (mode)) + av |=FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISCHR (mode)) + av |=CHR_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISBLK (mode)) + av |=BLK_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISFIFO (mode)) + av |=FIFO_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISDIR (mode)) + av |=DIR__OPEN ; +else +printk (KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside open_file_to_av " +"with unknown mode:%x\n" , mode); + } +return av; +} +
Signature · 9 lines
Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC (410) 290-1411 x150 -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 9 lines · Christopher J. PeBenito
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Paris
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to
/tmp/outputthan if the program tried to directly open/tmp/output. This should allow policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so good at catching today.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>What does open on a dir mean? Isn't that the same as the read perm?
Admittedly there is very little distinction and I don't know the usefulness, but it is possible for a process to pass an open fd to a directory so I saw little reason to exclude it. lnk and socket files were excluded because they could not be 'opened.' Obvious for a socket, but lnk files are magically changed in the kernel to an open on the real file before the security check, so you couldn't ever pass an open lnk file.
Quoted 4 lines
#=============
httpd_t=============
allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:dir { read open };
#=============ntpd_t==============
allowntpd_tuser_tmp_t:dir read;
-Eric
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 1 line
allow
httpd_tuser_tmp_t:dir { read open };[...]
Quoted 20 lines
+ * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
+ * open permission.
+ */security/selinux/hooks.c +17
-0+static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av (int mode,int mask) +{ +u32 av =file_mask_to_av (mode, mask); + +if (selinux_policycap_openperm) { +/* +* lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open' +*/ +if (S_ISREG (mode)) + av |=FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISCHR (mode)) + av |=CHR_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISBLK (mode)) + av |=BLK_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISFIFO (mode)) + av |=FIFO_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISDIR (mode))
Quoted 9 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) · line 1630
Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +8
-0+ av |=DIR__OPEN ; + else + printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside open_file_to_av " + "with unknown mode:%x\n", mode); + } +return av; +} +
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Quoted 10 lines · Eric Paris
Quoted 9 lines · Christopher J. PeBenito
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Paris
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to
/tmp/outputthan if the program tried to directly open/tmp/output. This should allow policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so good at catching today.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>What does open on a dir mean? Isn't that the same as the read perm?
Admittedly there is very little distinction and I don't know the usefulness, but it is possible for a process to pass an open fd to a directory so I saw little reason to exclude it.
Also we have the *at() and fchdir() calls, so this distinction (between
open and read on dirs) is useful.
Signature · 2 lines
James Antill <[email protected]> Red Hat
Quoted 8 lines · James Antill
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
What does open on a dir mean? Isn't that the same as the read perm?
Admittedly there is very little distinction and I don't know the usefulness, but it is possible for a process to pass an open fd to a directory so I saw little reason to exclude it.
Also we have the
*at()andfchdir()calls, so this distinction (between open and read on dirs) is useful.
This new open permission is being created specifically to allow file handles to be inherited across exec.
Inheriting a directory file handle for the purpose of fchdir() seems quite unlikely. In fact when fchdir() is mentioned in mailing list discussions it always seems to be in the context of allowing a process to break out of a chroot() jail.
Does anyone have a hypothetical example of how fchdir() could be used in a way which doesn't break the security of a system but yet need to have open and read access be differentiated?
As an aside, I'm concerned about the implications of this new file open permission for overall quality of SE Linux policy (both reference policy and custom policy). I anticipate many people writing policy that allows read and write access wildly with the idea that controls on open will prevent them being exploited.
Signature · 10 lines
[email protected] http://etbe.coker.com.au/ My Blog http://www.coker.com.au/sponsorship.html Sponsoring Free Software development -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 23 lines · Russell Coker
Quoted 8 lines · James Antill
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
What does open on a dir mean? Isn't that the same as the read perm?
Admittedly there is very little distinction and I don't know the usefulness, but it is possible for a process to pass an open fd to a directory so I saw little reason to exclude it.
Also we have the
*at()andfchdir()calls, so this distinction (between
open and read on dirs) is useful.This new open permission is being created specifically to allow file handles to be inherited across exec.
Inheriting a directory file handle for the purpose of
fchdir()seems quite unlikely. In fact whenfchdir()is mentioned in mailing list discussions it always seems to be in the context of allowing a process to break out of achroot()jail.Does anyone have a hypothetical example of how
fchdir()could be used in a way which doesn't break the security of a system but yet need to have open and read access be differentiated?
Quoted 5 lines
As an aside, I'm concerned about the implications of this new file open permission for overall quality of SE Linux policy (both reference policy and custom policy). I anticipate many people writing policy that allows read and write access wildly with the idea that controls on open will prevent them being exploited.
That is a concern, but on the other side of it, today we have to either allow or dontaudit many cases where a program only inherits a descriptor from the caller and should never directly open the file, so the new open check gives us a way to distinguish such attempts.
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 9 lines · Christopher J. PeBenito
Quoted 8 lines · Eric Paris
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to
/tmp/outputthan if the program tried to directly open/tmp/output. This should allow policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so good at catching today.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>What does open on a dir mean? Isn't that the same as the read perm?
open should only get checked at open(2) time, while read will get checked both at open(2) time and if the descriptor is inherited or transferred.
Quoted 32 lines
Quoted 2 lines
allow
httpd_tuser_tmp_t:dir { read open };[...]
Quoted 28 lines
+ * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
+ * open permission.
+ */security/selinux/hooks.c +25
-0+static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av (int mode,int mask) +{ +u32 av =file_mask_to_av (mode, mask); + +if (selinux_policycap_openperm) { +/* +* lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open' +*/ +if (S_ISREG (mode)) + av |=FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISCHR (mode)) + av |=CHR_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISBLK (mode)) + av |=BLK_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISFIFO (mode)) + av |=FIFO_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISDIR (mode)) + av |=DIR__OPEN ; +else +printk (KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside open_file_to_av " +"with unknown mode:%x\n" , mode); + } +return av; +} +
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 9 lines · Eric Paris
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to
/tmp/outputthan if the program tried to directly open/tmp/output. This should allow policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so good at catching today.Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Quoted 206 lines
---
As an example, process1 inhttpd_topened a bunch of files of typeuser_tmp_t. It then called process2 running asntpd_twhich did nothing but accept those open fd's and terminate. Notice proc1 needed open perms and proc2 only needed read and write.#=============
httpd_t==============
allowhttpd_ttmp_t:dir open;
allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:blk_file { read write open }; allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:chr_file { read write open }; allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:dir { read open };
allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:fifo_file { read write open }; allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:file { read write execute entrypoint open }; allowhttpd_tuser_tmp_t:lnk_file read;#=============
ntpd_t==============
allowntpd_tuser_tmp_t:blk_file { read write }; allowntpd_tuser_tmp_t:chr_file { read write }; allowntpd_tuser_tmp_t:dir read;
allowntpd_tuser_tmp_t:fifo_file { read write }; allowntpd_tuser_tmp_t:file { read write entrypoint };security/selinux/hooks.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 5 ++++ security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 5 ++++ security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 + security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 3 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 3 ++ 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)security/selinux/hooks.c +30
-1@@ -1599,6 +1599,35 @@ static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)return av; } +/* +* Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open +* open permission. +*/ +static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av (int mode,int mask) +{ +u32 av =file_mask_to_av (mode, mask); + +if (selinux_policycap_openperm) { +/* +* lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open' +*/ +if (S_ISREG (mode)) + av |=FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISCHR (mode)) + av |=CHR_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISBLK (mode)) + av |=BLK_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISFIFO (mode)) + av |=FIFO_FILE__OPEN ; +else if (S_ISDIR (mode)) + av |=DIR__OPEN ; +else +printk (KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside open_file_to_av " +"with unknown mode:%x\n" , mode); + } +return av; +} +/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ static inline u32 file_to_av (struct file *file) {@@ -2517,7 +2546,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, }return inode_has_perm (current, inode, -file_mask_to_av (inode->i_mode, mask),NULL ); +open_file_mask_to_av (inode->i_mode, mask),NULL ); }static int selinux_inode_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *iattr)security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h +5
-0@@ -14,12 +14,17 @@ S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__REPARENT, "reparent") S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, "search") S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__RMDIR, "rmdir") + S_(SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__OPEN, "open") S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans") S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint") S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod") + S_(SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__OPEN, "open") S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, "execute_no_trans") S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT, "entrypoint") S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod") + S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__OPEN, "open") + S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, BLK_FILE__OPEN, "open") + S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, FIFO_FILE__OPEN, "open") S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use") S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")S_ (SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ,TCP_SOCKET__NEWCONN ,"newconn" )security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h +5
-0@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@#define DIR__REPARENT 0x00080000UL#define DIR__SEARCH 0x00100000UL#define DIR__RMDIR 0x00200000UL +#define DIR__OPEN 0x00400000UL#define FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@#define FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS 0x00020000UL#define FILE__ENTRYPOINT 0x00040000UL#define FILE__EXECMOD 0x00080000UL +#define FILE__OPEN 0x00100000UL#define LNK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define LNK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define LNK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL@@ -136,6 +138,7 @@#define CHR_FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS 0x00020000UL#define CHR_FILE__ENTRYPOINT 0x00040000UL#define CHR_FILE__EXECMOD 0x00080000UL +#define CHR_FILE__OPEN 0x00100000UL#define BLK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define BLK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define BLK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL@@ -153,6 +156,7 @@#define BLK_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL#define BLK_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL#define BLK_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL +#define BLK_FILE__OPEN 0x00020000UL#define SOCK_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define SOCK_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL#define SOCK_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL@@ -187,6 +191,7 @@#define FIFO_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL#define FIFO_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL#define FIFO_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL +#define FIFO_FILE__OPEN 0x00020000UL#define FD__USE 0x00000001UL#define SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL#define SOCKET__READ 0x00000002ULsecurity/selinux/include/security.h +2
-0@@ -43,11 +43,13 @@ extern int selinux_mls_enabled;/* Policy capabilities */ enum {POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER , +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM , __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer; +extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;int security_load_policy (void * data,size_t len);security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +2
-1@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@/* Policy capability filenames */ static char *policycap_names[] = { -"network_peer_controls" +"network_peer_controls" , +"open_perms" };unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot =CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE ;security/selinux/ss/services.c +3
-1@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;int selinux_policycap_netpeer; +int selinux_policycap_openperm;/* * This is declared in avc.c @@ -1306,6 +1307,8 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void) { selinux_policycap_netpeer =ebitmap_get_bit (&policydb.policycaps,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER ); + selinux_policycap_openperm =ebitmap_get_bit (&policydb.policycaps, +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM ); }extern void selinux_complete_init (void ); --This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 9 lines · Eric Paris
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to
/tmp/outputthan if the program tried to directly open/tmp/output. This should allow policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so good at catching today.Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>
Applied togit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6.git#next
Signature · 7 lines
James Morris <[email protected]> -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.