kill_pid_info: don't take now unneeded tasklist_lock
Subsystems (2)
RFC PATCH 2/2 kill_pid_info: don't take now unneeded tasklist_lock
Previously handle_stop_signal(SIGCONT) could drop ->siglock. That is why kill_pid_info(SIGCONT) takes tasklist_lock to make sure the target task can't go away after unlock. Not needed now.
include/linux/signal.h renamed from include/linux/signal.h~1__KILL_NO_TASKLIST +0 -2
@@ -362,8 +362,6 @@ int unhandled_signal(struct task_struct#define sig_kernel_stop (sig) \ (((sig) < SIGRTMIN) && siginmask(sig, SIG_KERNEL_STOP_MASK)) -#define sig_needs_tasklist (sig) ((sig) == SIGCONT) -#define sig_user_defined (t, signr) \ (((t)->sighand->action[(signr)-1].sa.sa_handler != SIG_DFL) && \ ((t)->sighand->action[(signr)-1].sa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN))
kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~1__KILL_NO_TASKLIST +1 -6
@@ -1030,9 +1030,6 @@ int kill_pid_info(int sig, struct siginfstruct task_struct *p;rcu_read_lock (); -if (unlikely (sig_needs_tasklist (sig))) -read_lock (&tasklist_lock); - retry: p =pid_task (pid,PIDTYPE_PID );if (p) {
@@ -1046,10 +1043,8 @@ retry:*/ goto retry; } - -if (unlikely (sig_needs_tasklist (sig))) -read_unlock (&tasklist_lock);rcu_read_unlock (); +return error; }
A nice payoff for the earlier cleanups.
Maybe it even improves parallelism for a real workload someday.
Thanks,
Roland
Quoted 5 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Previously
handle_stop_signal(SIGCONT)could drop ->siglock. That is whykill_pid_info(SIGCONT)takestasklist_lockto make sure the target task can't go away after unlock. Not needed now.Signed-off-by Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Hi Oleg,
I tried your patches on vanila kernel 2.6.25-rc3 (ia64). Then, I got the NULL pointer dereference at task_session_nr(t) in check_kill_permission(). That is why t->signal->__session is accessed after t->signal was released. It is reproducible by sending many SIGCONT signals to exiting processes.
The trace is as follows:
Pid: 7807, CPU 9, comm: kill_sigcont
psr : 00001210085a6010 ifs : 800000000000030a ip : [<a0000001000ab441>] Not tainted (2.6.25-rc3-debug)
ip is at check_kill_permission+0x181/0x2a0
unat: 0000000000000000 pfs : 000000000000038a rsc : 0000000000000003
rnat: 0000000000000206 bsps: 0000000000000003 pr : 000000000056a999
ldrs: 0000000000000000 ccv : 0000000000000000 fpsr: 0009804c0270033f csd : 0000000000000000 ssd : 0000000000000000
b0 : a0000001000ad510 b6 : a00000010000eb80 b7 : a00000010000eb50 f6 : 000000000000000000000 f7 : 000000000000000000000 f8 : 000000000000000000000 f9 : 000000000000000000000 f10 : 000000000000000000000 f11 : 000000000000000000000 r1 : a000000100cc6a70 r2 : 0000000000000000 r3 : e000001f43f07dc8 r8 : a000000100add08c r9 : a000000100add08c r10 : 0000000000003dc4 r11 : e000001f49d901e4 r12 : e000001f43f07da0 r13 : e000001f43f00000 r14 : 0000000000000012 r15 : 0000000000000000 r16 : a000000100add0a8 r17 : a000000100add0a8 r18 : fb00000000000000 r19 : d800000000000000 r20 : e000001f4493de48 r21 : 0000000000001df6 r22 : 0000000000000100 r23 : e000001f424c5280 r24 : 0000000000000000 r25 : e000001f424c5180 r26 : e000001f49d90b08 r27 : e000001f43f00b08 r28 : 0000000000003dc4 r29 : a000000100adcec0 r30 : a000000100a73a28 r31 : e000001f4493de40
Call Trace:
[<a000000100014440>] show_stack+0x40/0xa0
sp=e000001f43f077f0 bsp=e000001f43f01060
[<a000000100014d50>] show_regs+0x850/0x8a0
sp=e000001f43f079c0 bsp=e000001f43f01008
[<a0000001000360b0>] die+0x1b0/0x2c0
sp=e000001f43f079c0 bsp=e000001f43f00fb8
[<a000000100036210>] die_if_kernel+0x50/0x80
sp=e000001f43f079c0 bsp=e000001f43f00f88
[<a0000001005ce7e0>] ia64_fault+0x11a0/0x12c0
sp=e000001f43f079c0 bsp=e000001f43f00f30
[<a00000010000ab00>] ia64_leave_kernel+0x0/0x270
sp=e000001f43f07bd0 bsp=e000001f43f00f30
[<a0000001000ab440>] check_kill_permission+0x180/0x2a0
sp=e000001f43f07da0 bsp=e000001f43f00ee0
[<a0000001000ad510>] group_send_sig_info+0x30/0x100
sp=e000001f43f07da0 bsp=e000001f43f00ea8
[<a0000001000ad620>] kill_pid_info+0x40/0x80
sp=e000001f43f07db0 bsp=e000001f43f00e70
[<a0000001000adb30>] sys_kill+0xd0/0x2e0
sp=e000001f43f07db0 bsp=e000001f43f00df0
[<a00000010000a960>] ia64_ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x20
sp=e000001f43f07e30 bsp=e000001f43f00df0
[<a000000000010720>] __kernel_syscall_via_break+0x0/0x20
sp=e000001f43f08000 bsp=e000001f43f00df0Thanks,
-Atsushi Tsuji.
Quoted 8 lines · Atsushi Tsuji
Quoted 5 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Previously
handle_stop_signal(SIGCONT)could drop ->siglock. That is whykill_pid_info(SIGCONT)takestasklist_lockto make sure the target task can't go away after unlock. Not needed now.Signed-off-by Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Hi Oleg,
I tried your patches on vanila kernel 2.6.25-rc3 (ia64). Then, I got the NULL pointer dereference at
task_session_nr(t)incheck_kill_permission(). That is whyt->signal->__sessionis accessed aftert->signalwas released. It is reproducible by sending many SIGCONT signals to exiting processes.
Ah. Indeed!!! Thanks a lot Atsushi.
Note that check_kill_permission() is the last user of the deprecated signal->__session/session, I was going to change this code later, but missed the issue you pointed out.
I'll make the patch tomorrow.
Thanks!
Oleg.
PATCH 1/1 signals: check_kill_permission: check session under tasklist_lock
(on top of signals-cleanup-security_task_kill-usage-implementation.patch)
This wasn't documented, but as Atsushi Tsuji <[email protected]> pointed out check_kill_permission() needs tasklist_lock for task_session_nr(). I missed this fact when removed tasklist from the callers.
Change check_kill_permission() to take tasklist_lock for the SIGCONT case. Re-order security checks so that we take tasklist_lock only if/when it is actually needed. This is a minimal fix for now, tasklist will be removed later.
Also change the code to use task_session() instead of task_session_nr().
Also, remove the SIGCONT check from cap_task_kill(), it is bogus (and the whole function is bogus. Serge, Eric, why it is still alive?).
kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +19 -5
@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static int rm_from_queue(unsigned long mstatic int check_kill_permission (int sig,struct siginfo *info,struct task_struct *t) { +struct pid *sid;int error;if (!valid_signal (sig))
@@ -545,11 +546,24 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sigif (error)return error; -if (((sig !=SIGCONT ) || (task_session_nr (current) !=task_session_nr (t))) - && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) - && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) - && !capable (CAP_KILL )) -return -EPERM ; +if ((current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) && + (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) && + !capable (CAP_KILL )) { +switch (sig) { +case SIGCONT : +read_lock (&tasklist_lock); + sid =task_session (t); +read_unlock (&tasklist_lock); +/* +* We don't return the error if sid == NULL. The +* task was unhashed, the caller must notice this. +*/ +if (!sid || sid ==task_session (current)) +break ; +default : +return -EPERM ; + } + }return security_task_kill (t, info, sig,0 ); }
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +0 -4
@@ -552,10 +552,6 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,if (p->uid == current->uid)return 0 ; -/* sigcont is permitted within same session */ -if (sig ==SIGCONT && (task_session_nr (current) ==task_session_nr (p))) -return 0 ; -if (secid)/* * Signal sent as a particular user.
Re: [PATCH] signals: check_kill_permission: check session under tasklist_lock
Quoted 10 lines · Oleg Nesterov
(on top of signals-cleanup-security_task_kill-usage-implementation.patch)
This wasn't documented, but as Atsushi Tsuji <[email protected]> pointed out
check_kill_permission()needstasklist_lockfortask_session_nr(). I missed this fact when removed tasklist from the callers.Change
check_kill_permission()to taketasklist_lockfor the SIGCONT case. Re-order security checks so that we taketasklist_lockonly if/when it is actually needed. This is a minimal fix for now, tasklist will be removed later.
Thanks, I confirmed the problem is fixed by this patch.
Quoted 7 lines
Also change the code to use
task_session()instead oftask_session_nr().Also, remove the SIGCONT check from
cap_task_kill(), it is bogus (and the whole function is bogus. Serge, Eric, why it is still alive?).Signed-off-by Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
Quoted 54 lines
kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +19
-5@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static int rm_from_queue(unsigned long mstatic int check_kill_permission (int sig,struct siginfo *info,struct task_struct *t) { +struct pid *sid;int error;if (!valid_signal (sig))@@ -545,11 +546,24 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sigif (error)return error; -if (((sig !=SIGCONT ) || (task_session_nr (current) !=task_session_nr (t))) - && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) - && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) - && !capable (CAP_KILL )) -return -EPERM ; +if ((current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) && + (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) && + !capable (CAP_KILL )) { +switch (sig) { +case SIGCONT : +read_lock (&tasklist_lock); + sid =task_session (t); +read_unlock (&tasklist_lock); +/* +* We don't return the error if sid == NULL. The +* task was unhashed, the caller must notice this. +*/ +if (!sid || sid ==task_session (current)) +break ; +default : +return -EPERM ; + } + }return security_task_kill (t, info, sig,0 ); }security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +0
-4@@ -552,10 +552,6 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,if (p->uid == current->uid)return 0 ; -/* sigcont is permitted within same session */ -if (sig ==SIGCONT && (task_session_nr (current) ==task_session_nr (p))) -return 0 ; -if (secid)/* * Signal sent as a particular user.
[email protected]
maintainerRe: [PATCH] signals: check_kill_permission: check session under tasklist_lock
In reply to Oleg NesterovQuoted 41 lines · Oleg Nesterov
(on top of signals-cleanup-security_task_kill-usage-implementation.patch)
This wasn't documented, but as Atsushi Tsuji <[email protected]> pointed out
check_kill_permission()needstasklist_lockfortask_session_nr(). I missed this fact when removed tasklist from the callers.Change
check_kill_permission()to taketasklist_lockfor the SIGCONT case. Re-order security checks so that we taketasklist_lockonly if/when it is actually needed. This is a minimal fix for now, tasklist will be removed later.Also change the code to use
task_session()instead oftask_session_nr().Also, remove the SIGCONT check from
cap_task_kill(), it is bogus (and the whole function is bogus. Serge, Eric, why it is still alive?).Signed-off-by Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +5
-5@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static int rm_from_queue(unsigned long mstatic int check_kill_permission (int sig,struct siginfo *info,struct task_struct *t) { +struct pid *sid;int error;if (!valid_signal (sig))@@ -545,11 +546,24 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sigif (error)return error; -if (((sig !=SIGCONT ) || (task_session_nr (current) !=task_session_nr (t))) - && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) - && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) - && !capable (CAP_KILL )) -return -EPERM ; +if ((current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) && + (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid) && + !capable (CAP_KILL )) { +switch (sig) {
kernel/signal.c static int check_kill_permission(int sig · line 562
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +10
-0+case SIGCONT : +read_lock (&tasklist_lock); + sid =task_session (t); +read_unlock (&tasklist_lock); +/* +* We don't return the error if sid == NULL. The +* task was unhashed, the caller must notice this. +*/ +if (!sid || sid ==task_session (current)) +break ;
Nice, in addition to a bugfix this is also far more readable.
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/signal.c renamed from kernel/signal.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +4
-0+default : +return -EPERM ; + } + }return security_task_kill (t, info, sig,0 ); }
security/commoncap.c int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, · line 557
Quoted 10 lines
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +0
-4@@ -552,10 +552,6 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,if (p->uid == current->uid)return 0 ; -/* sigcont is permitted within same session */ -if (sig ==SIGCONT && (task_session_nr (current) ==task_session_nr (p))) -return 0 ; -if (secid)/* * Signal sent as a particular user.
Note that cap_task_kill() should be gone anyway. What tree were you basing this on?
thanks,
-serge
Re: [PATCH] signals: check_kill_permission: check session under tasklist_lock
Quoted 8 lines · On 03/18, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 6 lines · Oleg Nesterov
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +0
-0@@ -552,10 +552,6 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,if (p->uid == current->uid)return 0 ;
Quoted 10 lines
security/commoncap.c int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, · line 557
Quoted 7 lines
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +0
-4-/* sigcont is permitted within same session */ -if (sig ==SIGCONT && (task_session_nr (current) ==task_session_nr (p))) -return 0 ; -if (secid)/* * Signal sent as a particular user. Note that
cap_task_kill()should be gone anyway. What tree were you basing this on?
Ah. I realy hoped that cap_task_kill() was already killed. And I googled this patch: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=120422062515386
But I checked 2.6.25-rc5-mm1.bz2, it is still here. And I didn't find anything related in http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/. I even checked
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=history;f=security/commoncap.c
So, is it still here or killed? If it is dead - great ;)
Oleg.
[email protected]
maintainerRe: [PATCH] signals: check_kill_permission: check session under tasklist_lock
Quoted 20 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 8 lines · On 03/18, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 6 lines · Oleg Nesterov
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +0
-0@@ -552,10 +552,6 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,if (p->uid == current->uid)return 0 ;Quoted 10 lines
security/commoncap.c int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, · line 557
Quoted 7 lines
security/commoncap.c renamed from security/commoncap.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST +0
-4-/* sigcont is permitted within same session */ -if (sig ==SIGCONT && (task_session_nr (current) ==task_session_nr (p))) -return 0 ; -if (secid)/* * Signal sent as a particular user. Note that
cap_task_kill()should be gone anyway. What tree were you basing this on?
Quoted 8 lines
Ah. I realy hoped that
cap_task_kill()was already killed. And I googled this patch: http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=120422062515386But I checked 2.6.25-rc5-mm1.bz2, it is still here. And I didn't find anything related in http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/. I even checked
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=history;f=security/commoncap.cSo, is it still here or killed? If it is dead - great ;)
Hmm, I thought it had been pulled in. I don't see it. I'll re-spin and re-send against -mm, -stable, and -git.
thanks,
-serge