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file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill() (-git)

PATCH In review Serge E. Hallyn 5 participants 10 messages Mar 19, 2008 – Mar 20, 2008

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill() (-git)

(resending once against -git. I had sent against -stable in
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/28/225. Without this patch, atd is broken at least on some distros.)

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.

This patch removes cap_task_kill().

---
 include/linux/security.h |    3 +--
 security/capability.c    |    1 -
 security/commoncap.c     |   40 ----------------------------------------
 3 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -2
index b07357c..c673dfd 100644
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
 extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
 extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
 extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
@@ -2187,7 +2186,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
 				      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
 				      u32 secid)
 {
-	return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
security/capability.c +0 -1
index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
 	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
 	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 
-	.task_kill =			cap_task_kill,
 	.task_setscheduler =		cap_task_setscheduler,
 	.task_setioprio =		cap_task_setioprio,
 	.task_setnice =			cap_task_setnice,
security/commoncap.c +0 -40
index bb0c095..06d5c94 100644
@@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 	return cap_safe_nice(p);
 }
 
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
-	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
-	 * allowed.
-	 * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
-	 */
-	if (p->uid == current->uid)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
-	if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
-		return 0;
-
-	if (secid)
-		/*
-		 * Signal sent as a particular user.
-		 * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
-		 * only thing we can do at the moment.
-		 * Used only by usb drivers?
-		 */
-		return 0;
-	if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
-		return 0;
-	if (capable(CAP_KILL))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EPERM;
-}
-
 /*
  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
  * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
@@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
Signature · 1 line
1.5.2.5
Tested-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw

Em Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:56:35 -0500
"Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> escreveu:

| (resending once against -git.  I had sent against -stable in
| http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/28/225.  Without this patch,
| atd is broken at least on some distros.)
| 
| The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
| 
| 	check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
| 	However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
| 	unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
| 	resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
| 
| However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
| granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
| and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
| where it might still be called but return -EPERM.  Those cases
| are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
| as per the check in check_kill_permission().
| 
| One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
| 
| This patch removes cap_task_kill().
| 
| Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
| Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>

I've tested the -stable patch (no time to test this one, but it's
exactly the same patch), not sure if this applies to this but...

Signature · 1 line
Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino
#2 lore raw
In reply to Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 3 lines · On Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:56:35 -0500 "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:

(resending once against -git. I had sent against -stable in
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/28/225. Without this patch, atd is broken at least on some distros.)

So this fix is needed in 2.6.24.x?

Quoted 7 lines

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

Quoted 8 lines

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.

This 2.6.25-rc6 patch doesn't apply correctly to 2.6.24. I can't find a *formal* copy of your 2.6.24 patch on [email protected], so perhaps a resend for -stable is in order.

#3 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 3 lines · On Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:56:35 -0500 "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:

(resending once against -git. I had sent against -stable in
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/28/225. Without this patch, atd is broken at least on some distros.)

So this fix is needed in 2.6.24.x?

Yes it is.

Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.

This 2.6.25-rc6 patch doesn't apply correctly to 2.6.24. I can't find a *formal* copy of your 2.6.24 patch on [email protected], so perhaps a resend for -stable is in order.

Argh, yes, will do. Thanks.

-serge

#4 lore raw
In reply to Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 18 lines · On Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:56:35 -0500 "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:

(resending once against -git. I had sent against -stable in
http://lkml.org/lkml/2008/2/28/225. Without this patch, atd is broken at least on some distros.)

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

Quoted 3 lines

One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.

This patch removes cap_task_kill().

umm,

security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_task_kill':
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1122: error: implicit declaration of function 'cap_task_kill'

#5 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Morton

umm,

security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_task_kill':
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1122: error: implicit declaration of function 'cap_task_kill'

Serge, can you resend with that fixed and the tested-by added?

Linus

author Acked-by Andrew G. Morgan Tested-by Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino
#6 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Linus Torvalds
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Morton

umm,

security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_task_kill':
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1122: error: implicit declaration of function 'cap_task_kill'

Right, that was against
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
which doesn't yet have smack. I should've been clear about that.

Quoted 3 lines

Serge, can you resend with that fixed and the tested-by added?

Linus

Following is the version against this morning's mmotm with the tested-by added.

thanks,
-serge

Quoted 1 line

From c50b1c9f7a9e9434c8ddb50cb81e6b342638b8e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:14:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill() (-mmotm)

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.

This patch removes cap_task_kill().

---
 include/linux/security.h   |    3 +--
 security/capability.c      |    1 -
 security/commoncap.c       |   33 ---------------------------------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |    5 -----
 4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -2
index 2231526..13fd76a 100644
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
 extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
 extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			  unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
 extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
@@ -2276,7 +2275,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
 				      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
 				      u32 secid)
 {
-	return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
security/capability.c +0 -1
index 8340655..38ac54e 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
 	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
 	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 
-	.task_kill =			cap_task_kill,
 	.task_setscheduler =		cap_task_setscheduler,
 	.task_setioprio =		cap_task_setioprio,
 	.task_setnice =			cap_task_setnice,
security/commoncap.c +0 -33
index 200361d..e8c3f5e 100644
@@ -537,34 +537,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 	return cap_safe_nice(p);
 }
 
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	/*
-	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
-	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
-	 * allowed.
-	 * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
-	 */
-	if (p->uid == current->uid)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (secid)
-		/*
-		 * Signal sent as a particular user.
-		 * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
-		 * only thing we can do at the moment.
-		 * Used only by usb drivers?
-		 */
-		return 0;
-	if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
-		return 0;
-	if (capable(CAP_KILL))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EPERM;
-}
-
 /*
  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
  * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
@@ -596,11 +568,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +0 -5
index 4365fad..2a5eb83 100644
@@ -1117,11 +1117,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
 	/*
 	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
 	 * can write the receiver.
Signature · 1 line
1.5.2.5
#7 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

Right, that was against
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
which doesn't yet have smack. I should've been clear about that.

Ok, now I'm _really_ confused. I have smack in my tree, it got merged before -rc1.

So any patch that is against some version without smack is not a patch against a -git tree for the last several weeks.

Me confused.

Linus

author Acked-by Andrew G. Morgan
#8 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Linus Torvalds
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn

Right, that was against
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
which doesn't yet have smack. I should've been clear about that.

Ok, now I'm _really_ confused. I have smack in my tree, it got merged before -rc1.

No clearly I'm the one confused/on drugs.

I see it now. I swear I checked my own freshly pulled tree and gitweb several times...

Quoted 6 lines

So any patch that is against some version without smack is not a patch against a -git tree for the last several weeks.

Me confused.

Linus

New patch against -git attached.

thanks,
-serge

Quoted 1 line

From a0e56351e00b7b7442723b7ca6247c267c2628fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:14:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill() (-git)

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.

This patch removes cap_task_kill().

---
 include/linux/security.h   |    3 +--
 security/capability.c      |    1 -
 security/commoncap.c       |   40 ----------------------------------------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |    5 -----
 4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -2
index b07357c..c673dfd 100644
@@ -57,7 +57,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid, int flags);
 extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
 extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp);
 extern int cap_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 extern int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
@@ -2187,7 +2186,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct task_struct *p,
 				      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
 				      u32 secid)
 {
-	return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)
security/capability.c +0 -1
index 9e99f36..2c6e06d 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
 	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
 	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 
-	.task_kill =			cap_task_kill,
 	.task_setscheduler =		cap_task_setscheduler,
 	.task_setioprio =		cap_task_setioprio,
 	.task_setnice =			cap_task_setnice,
security/commoncap.c +0 -40
index bb0c095..06d5c94 100644
@@ -540,41 +540,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 	return cap_safe_nice(p);
 }
 
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
-		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
-	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
-	 * allowed.
-	 * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
-	 */
-	if (p->uid == current->uid)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
-	if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
-		return 0;
-
-	if (secid)
-		/*
-		 * Signal sent as a particular user.
-		 * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
-		 * only thing we can do at the moment.
-		 * Used only by usb drivers?
-		 */
-		return 0;
-	if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
-		return 0;
-	if (capable(CAP_KILL))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EPERM;
-}
-
 /*
  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
  * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
@@ -605,11 +570,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +0 -5
index 38d7075..732ba27 100644
@@ -1117,11 +1117,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
 	/*
 	 * Special cases where signals really ought to go through
 	 * in spite of policy. Stephen Smalley suggests it may
Signature · 1 line
1.5.2.5
maintainer Acked-by
#9 lore raw
In reply to Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 45 lines · --- "Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 8 lines · Linus Torvalds
Quoted 5 lines · Andrew Morton

umm,

security/smack/smack_lsm.c: In function 'smack_task_kill':
security/smack/smack_lsm.c:1122: error: implicit declaration of function

'cap_task_kill'

Right, that was against
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6
which doesn't yet have smack. I should've been clear about that.

Quoted 3 lines

Serge, can you resend with that fixed and the tested-by added?

Linus

Following is the version against this morning's mmotm with the tested-by added.

thanks,
-serge

Quoted 1 line

From c50b1c9f7a9e9434c8ddb50cb81e6b342638b8e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 29 Feb 2008 15:14:57 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] file capabilities: remove cap_task_kill() (-mmotm)

The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:

check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks. However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.

However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless, and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent as per the check in check_kill_permission().

Quoted 7 lines

One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.

This patch removes cap_task_kill().

Quoted 112 lines
---
 include/linux/security.h   |    3 +--
 security/capability.c      |    1 -
 security/commoncap.c       |   33 ---------------------------------
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |    5 -----
 4 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +0 -1
index 2231526..13fd76a 100644
@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t
 old_suid, int flags);
 extern void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p);
-extern int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int
 sig, u32 secid);
 extern int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long

arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5, long *rc_p);
extern int cap_task_setscheduler (struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct
sched_param *lp);

include/linux/security.h +1 -1
@@ -2276,7 +2275,7 @@ static inline int security_task_kill (struct
 task_struct *p,
 				      struct siginfo *info, int sig,
 				      u32 secid)
 {
-	return cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+	return 0;
 }
 

static inline int security_task_wait (struct task_struct *p)

security/capability.c +0 -1
index 8340655..38ac54e 100644
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static struct security_operations capability_ops = {
 	.inode_need_killpriv =		cap_inode_need_killpriv,
 	.inode_killpriv =		cap_inode_killpriv,
 
-	.task_kill =			cap_task_kill,
 	.task_setscheduler =		cap_task_setscheduler,
 	.task_setioprio =		cap_task_setioprio,
 	.task_setnice =			cap_task_setnice,
security/commoncap.c +0 -33
index 200361d..e8c3f5e 100644
@@ -537,34 +537,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 	return cap_safe_nice(p);
 }
 
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	/*
-	 * Running a setuid root program raises your capabilities.
-	 * Killing your own setuid root processes was previously
-	 * allowed.
-	 * We must preserve legacy signal behavior in this case.
-	 */
-	if (p->uid == current->uid)
-		return 0;
-
-	if (secid)
-		/*
-		 * Signal sent as a particular user.
-		 * Capabilities are ignored.  May be wrong, but it's the
-		 * only thing we can do at the moment.
-		 * Used only by usb drivers?
-		 */
-		return 0;
-	if (cap_issubset(p->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted))
-		return 0;
-	if (capable(CAP_KILL))
-		return 0;
-
-	return -EPERM;
-}
-
 /*
  * called from kernel/sys.c for prctl(PR_CABSET_DROP)
  * done without task_capability_lock() because it introduces
@@ -596,11 +568,6 @@ int cap_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
-				int sig, u32 secid)
-{
-	return 0;
-}
 #endif
 
 int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +0 -5
index 4365fad..2a5eb83 100644
@@ -1117,11 +1117,6 @@ static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct
 *p)
 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
-	int rc;
-
-	rc = cap_task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		return rc;
 	/*
 	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
Quoted 12 lines

* can write the receiver.

Signature · 7 lines
1.5.2.5

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Casey Schaufler
[email protected]