New: lack of GNU_STACK header doesn't result in rwx stack on i386
Subsystems (2)
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(switched to email. Please respond via emailed reply-to-all, not via the bugzilla web interface).
Quoted 43 lines · On Wed, 9 Jul 2008 12:13:05 -0700 (PDT) [email protected] wrote:
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11063
Summary: lack of
GNU_STACKheader doesn't result in rwx stack on
i386
Product: Memory Management
Version: 2.5
Platform: All
OS/Version: Linux
Tree: Mainline
Status: NEW
Severity: normal
Priority: P1
Component: Other
AssignedTo: [email protected]
ReportedBy: [email protected]Latest working kernel version: unknown, probably before the introduction of unlimited argv
Earliest failing kernel version: unknown, probably after the introduction of unlimited argv, 2.6.26-rc9 definitely fails
Distribution:
Hardware Environment:
Software Environment:
Problem Description:
ELF/i386 traditionally has an executable stack which in thePT_GNU_STACKworld is provided two ways: if the ELF has a RWEPT_GNU_STACKprogram header or if it lacks that program header. due to this regression, the latter case results in a non-executable stack with corresponding breakage of (old) userland binaries that use nested function trampolines.this bug was probably introduced when the unlimited argv feature was merged: in that system the stack vma (and its
vm_flags) is initialized too early, before the incoming process' ELF header is consulted, which on i386 means that the personality used for determining the executable status of the stack is that of the old process, not the incoming one. later, insetup_arg_pages, only the explicit setting (disable/enable) of stack executability is honoured,EXSTACK_DEFAULTisn't consulted (i guess the assumption was that the initial ->vm_flags setting got it right).Steps to reproduce: run any ELF that lacks a
PT_GNU_STACKprogram header and check its stack vma, it'll be rw-, instead of rwx.
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
PATCH 1/1 exec: fix stack excutability without PT_GNU_STACK
Kernel Bugzilla #11063 points out that on some architectures (e.g. x86_32) exec'ing an ELF without a PT_GNU_STACK program header should default to an executable stack; but this got broken by the unlimited argv feature because stack vma is now created before the right personality has been established:
so breaking old binaries using nested function trampolines.
Therefore re-evaluate VM_STACK_FLAGS in setup_arg_pages, where stack vm_flags used to be set, before the mprotect_fixup. Checking through our existing VM_flags, none would have changed since insert_vm_struct:
so this seems safer than finding a way through the personality labyrinth.
---
fs/exec.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/exec.c +1 -1
@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm bprm->exec -= stack_shift;down_write (&mm->mmap_sem); - vm_flags = vma->vm_flags; + vm_flags =VM_STACK_FLAGS ;/* * Adjust stack execute permissions; explicitly enable for
Re: [Bug 11063][PATCH] exec: fix stack excutability without PT_GNU_STACK
Quoted 10 lines · Hugh Dickins
Kernel Bugzilla #11063 points out that on some architectures (e.g.
x86_32) exec'ing an ELF without aPT_GNU_STACKprogram header should default to an executable stack; but this got broken by the unlimited argv feature because stack vma is now created before the right personality has been established:
so breaking old binaries using nested function trampolines.Therefore re-evaluate
VM_STACK_FLAGSinsetup_arg_pages, where stackvm_flagsused to be set, before themprotect_fixup. Checking through our existingVM_flags, none would have changed sinceinsert_vm_struct:
so this seems safer than finding a way through the personality labyrinth.
alternatively, if there's a concern of stack_vma->vm_flags manipulation during execve (maybe not now, but in the future or in non-ELF formats that also want to rely on personality bits), you could opt for a safer
vm_flags = vma->vm_flags | (VM_STACK_FLAGS & (VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC));
to just recompute the exec rights related bits.
Quoted 20 lines
---
fs/exec.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/exec.c +1
-1@@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm bprm->exec -= stack_shift;down_write (&mm->mmap_sem); - vm_flags = vma->vm_flags; + vm_flags =VM_STACK_FLAGS ;/* * Adjust stack execute permissions; explicitly enable for
Re: [Bug 11063][PATCH] exec: fix stack excutability without PT_GNU_STACK
Quoted 7 lines · On Thu, 10 Jul 2008, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 4 lines · Hugh Dickins
Therefore re-evaluate
VM_STACK_FLAGSinsetup_arg_pages, where stackvm_flagsused to be set, before themprotect_fixup. Checking through our existingVM_flags, none would have changed sinceinsert_vm_struct:
so this seems safer than finding a way through the personality labyrinth.
Quoted 7 lines
alternatively, if there's a concern of
stack_vma->vm_flagsmanipulation during execve (maybe not now, but in the future or in non-ELF formats that also want to rely on personality bits), you could opt for a safervm_flags = vma->vm_flags | (VM_STACK_FLAGS & (VM_EXEC | VM_MAYEXEC));to just recompute the exec rights related bits.
True. It was a concern that crossed my mind (I was thinking particularly of the VM_ACCOUNT flag, which gets added in once we deal with a writable private mapping, but is set from the start here anyway), but I don't think it's worth changing my
Quoted 2 lines
fs/exec.c int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm · line 613
Quoted 2 lines
fs/exec.c +1
-1- vm_flags = vma->vm_flags; + vm_flags =VM_STACK_FLAGS ;
now that's already there in Linus' tree. If a VM_flag gets added that changes the picture, it might even need your line above to be changed.
Hugh