CVE-2008-1514: s390 - prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 CVE-2008-1514: s390 - prevent ptrace padding area read/write in 31-bit mode
Hi there,
When running a 31-bit ptrace, on either an s390 or s390x kernel, reads and writes into a padding area in struct user_regs_struct32 will result in a kernel panic.
This is also known as CVE-2008-1514.
Test case available here:
http://sources.redhat.com/cgi-bin/cvsweb.cgi/~checkout~/tests/ptrace-tests/tests/user-area-padding.c?cvsroot=systemtap
Steps to reproduce:
1) wget the above
2) gcc -o user-area-padding-31bit user-area-padding.c -Wall -ggdb2 -D_GNU_SOURCE -m31
3) ./user-area-padding-31bit
<panic>
Test status
-----------
Without patch, both s390 and s390x kernels panic. With patch, the test case, as well as the gdb testsuite, pass without incident, padding area reads returning zero, writes ignored.
Nb: original version returned -EINVAL on write attempts, which broke the gdb test and made the test case slightly unhappy, Jan Kratochvil suggested the change to return 0 on write attempts.
---
arch/s390/kernel/compat_ptrace.h | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/compat_ptrace.h +1 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct user_regs_struct32u32 gprs[NUM_GPRS ];u32 acrs[NUM_ACRS ];u32 orig_gpr2; +/* nb: there's a 4-byte hole here */ s390_fp_regs fp_regs;/* * These per registers are in here so that gdb can modify them
arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c +28 -0
@@ -170,6 +170,13 @@ static unsigned long __peek_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr)*/ tmp = (addr_t )task_pt_regs (child)->orig_gpr2; + }else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs) { +/* +* prevent reads of padding hole between +* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390. +*/ + tmp =0 ; + }else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.fp_regs +1 )) {/* * floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
@@ -270,6 +277,13 @@ static int __poke_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr, addr_t data)*/ task_pt_regs (child)->orig_gpr2 = data; + }else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs) { +/* +* prevent writes of padding hole between +* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390. +*/ +return 0 ; + }else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy->regs.fp_regs +1 )) {/* * floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
@@ -428,6 +442,13 @@ static u32 __peek_user_compat(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr)*/ tmp = *(__u32 *)((addr_t ) &task_pt_regs (child)->orig_gpr2 +4 ); + }else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs) { +/* +* prevent reads of padding hole between +* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390. +*/ + tmp =0 ; + }else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.fp_regs +1 )) {/* * floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
@@ -514,6 +535,13 @@ static int __poke_user_compat(struct task_struct *child,*/ *(__u32 *)((addr_t ) &task_pt_regs (child)->orig_gpr2 +4 ) = tmp; + }else if (addr < (addr_t) &dummy->regs.fp_regs) { +/* +* prevent writess of padding hole between +* orig_gpr2 and fp_regs on s390. +*/ +return 0 ; + }else if (addr < (addr_t) (&dummy32->regs.fp_regs +1 )) {/* * floating point regs. are stored in the thread structure
Signature · 2 lines
Jarod Wilson [email protected]