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netlink: fix overrun in attribute iteration

PATCH Applied Vegard Nossum 5 participants 9 messages Sep 11, 2008 – Sep 12, 2008

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 netlink: fix overrun in attribute iteration

Quoted 1 line

From ca63375e8ed91d73d0c2abd1cb64a8b022ce2af8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 22:37:13 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] netlink: fix overrun in attribute iteration

kmemcheck reported this:

kmemcheck: Caught 16-bit read from uninitialized memory (f6c1ba30) 0500110001508abf050010000500000002017300140000006f72672e66726565
i i i i i i i i i i i i i u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u u

                                   ^

Pid: 3462, comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted (2.6.27-rc3-00054-g6397ab9-dirty #13)
EIP: 0060:[<c05de64a>] EFLAGS: 00010296 CPU: 0
EIP is at nla_parse+0x5a/0xf0
EAX: 00000008 EBX: fffffffd ECX: c06f16c0 EDX: 00000005
ESI: 00000010 EDI: f6c1ba30 EBP: f6367c6c ESP: c0a11e88
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: f781cc84 CR3: 3632f000 CR4: 000006d0
DR0: c0ead9bc DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff4ff0 DR7: 00000400

   [<c05d4b23>] rtnl_setlink+0x63/0x130
   [<c05d5f75>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x165/0x200
   [<c05ddf66>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x76/0xa0
   [<c05d5dfe>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x1e/0x30
   [<c05dda21>] netlink_unicast+0x281/0x290
   [<c05ddbe9>] netlink_sendmsg+0x1b9/0x2b0
   [<c05beef2>] sock_sendmsg+0xd2/0x100
   [<c05bf945>] sys_sendto+0xa5/0xd0
   [<c05bf9a6>] sys_send+0x36/0x40
   [<c05c03d6>] sys_socketcall+0x1e6/0x2c0
   [<c020353b>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x3f
   [<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff

This is the line in nla_ok():

/**
* nla_ok - check if the netlink attribute fits into the remaining bytes
* @nla: netlink attribute
* @remaining: number of bytes remaining in attribute stream */
static inline int nla_ok(const struct nlattr *nla, int remaining)

  {
          return remaining >= sizeof(*nla) &&
                 nla->nla_len >= sizeof(*nla) &&
                 nla->nla_len <= remaining;

}

It turns out that remaining can become negative due to alignment in nla_next(). But GCC promotes "remaining" to unsigned in the test against sizeof(*nla) above. Therefore the test succeeds, and the nla_for_each_attr() may access memory outside the received buffer.

A short example illustrating this point is here:

  #include <stdio.h>

  main(void)
  {
          printf("%d\n", -1 >= sizeof(int));
  }

...which prints "1".

This patch adds a cast in front of the sizeof so that GCC will make a signed comparison and fix the illegal memory dereference. With the patch applied, there is no kmemcheck report.

---
 include/net/netlink.h |    2 +-
 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
include/net/netlink.h +1 -1
index 18024b8..208fe5a 100644
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static inline int nla_len(const struct nlattr *nla)
  */
 static inline int nla_ok(const struct nlattr *nla, int remaining)
 {
-	return remaining >= sizeof(*nla) &&
+	return remaining >= (int) sizeof(*nla) &&
 	       nla->nla_len >= sizeof(*nla) &&
 	       nla->nla_len <= remaining;
 }
Signature · 1 line
1.5.5.1
maintainer
#1 lore raw

From: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 11 Sep 2008 22:59:33 +0200

Quoted 10 lines

A short example illustrating this point is here:

  #include <stdio.h>

  main(void)
  {
          printf("%d\n", -1 >= sizeof(int));
  }

...which prints "1".

Someone should print that out on a huge poster, it's a good example of why C promotion rules suck :)

Quoted 6 lines

This patch adds a cast in front of the sizeof so that GCC will make a signed comparison and fix the illegal memory dereference. With the patch applied, there is no kmemcheck report.

Thomas, please review.

Quoted 16 lines
include/net/netlink.h +1 -1
index 18024b8..208fe5a 100644
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static inline int nla_len(const struct nlattr *nla)
  */
 static inline int nla_ok(const struct nlattr *nla, int remaining)
 {
-	return remaining >= sizeof(*nla) &&
+	return remaining >= (int) sizeof(*nla) &&
 	       nla->nla_len >= sizeof(*nla) &&
 	       nla->nla_len <= remaining;
 }
Signature · 1 line
1.5.5.1
#2 lore raw

* David Miller <[email protected]> 2008-09-11 15:04

Quoted 16 lines

From: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Thomas, please review.

include/net/netlink.h static inline int nla_len(const struct nlattr *nla) · line 708

Quoted 13 lines
include/net/netlink.h +1 -1
index 18024b8..208fe5a 100644
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static inline int nla_len(const struct nlattr *nla)
  */
 static inline int nla_ok(const struct nlattr *nla, int remaining)
 {
-	return remaining >= sizeof(*nla) &&
+	return remaining >= (int) sizeof(*nla) &&
 	       nla->nla_len >= sizeof(*nla) &&
 	       nla->nla_len <= remaining;
 }

Very nice catch, would never have thought of that.

maintainer Applied
#3 lore raw

From: Thomas Graf <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 12 Sep 2008 02:35:23 +0200

Quoted 4 lines

* David Miller <[email protected]> 2008-09-11 15:04

Quoted 3 lines

From: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>
Thomas, please review.

Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
include/net/netlink.h +0 -0
index 18024b8..208fe5a 100644
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ static inline int nla_len(const struct nlattr *nla)
Quoted 8 lines

include/net/netlink.h static inline int nla_len(const struct nlattr *nla) · line 708

Quoted 8 lines
include/net/netlink.h +1 -1
  */
 static inline int nla_ok(const struct nlattr *nla, int remaining)
 {
-	return remaining >= sizeof(*nla) &&
+	return remaining >= (int) sizeof(*nla) &&
 	       nla->nla_len >= sizeof(*nla) &&
 	       nla->nla_len <= remaining;
 }

Very nice catch, would never have thought of that.

Applied, thanks everyone.

#4 lore raw
In reply to Vegard Nossum
Quoted 7 lines · On Thu, 11 Sep 2008 22:59:33 +0200 Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>…
  #include <stdio.h>

  main(void)
  {
          printf("%d\n", -1 >= sizeof(int));
  }

akpm:/home/akpm> gcc -W t.c
t.c: In function 'main':
t.c:5: warning: comparison between signed and unsigned

Make of that what you will :)

#5 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 7 lines · On Thu, 11 Sep 2008 22:59:33 +0200 Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>…
  #include <stdio.h>

  main(void)
  {
          printf("%d\n", -1 >= sizeof(int));
  }
Quoted 5 lines

akpm:/home/akpm> gcc -W t.c
t.c: In function 'main':
t.c:5: warning: comparison between signed and unsigned

Make of that what you will :)

It doesn't show up with -Wall and the kernel isn't compiled with -W (aka. -Wextra) as far as I can see. Should it be turned on?

Vegard

Signature · 4 lines
"The animistic metaphor of the bug that maliciously sneaked in while
the programmer was not looking is intellectually dishonest as it
disguises that the error is the programmer's own creation."
	-- E. W. Dijkstra, EWD1036
#6 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · On Fri, 12 Sep 2008 07:42:36 +0200 "Vegard Nossum" <[email protected]>…
Quoted 11 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 7 lines · On Thu, 11 Sep 2008 22:59:33 +0200 Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>…
  #include <stdio.h>

  main(void)
  {
          printf("%d\n", -1 >= sizeof(int));
  }
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines

akpm:/home/akpm> gcc -W t.c
t.c: In function 'main':
t.c:5: warning: comparison between signed and unsigned

Make of that what you will :)

It doesn't show up with -Wall and the kernel isn't compiled with -W (aka. -Wextra) as far as I can see. Should it be turned on?

Last time I turned on -W, a full kernel build emitted nearly 10MB of warnings.

Alas, some of them are useful, as we see here. They can be turned on piecemeal - this one is -Wsign-compare, I think.

I think it would be good if owners of particular parts of the kernel were to occasionally build their stuff with -W and spend half an hour contemplating the result. Ditto `make C=1', to see what sparse thinks.

#7 lore raw
In reply to Vegard Nossum
Quoted 11 lines · Vegard Nossum

/**
* nla_ok - check if the netlink attribute fits into the remaining bytes
* @nla: netlink attribute
* @remaining: number of bytes remaining in attribute stream */
static inline int nla_ok(const struct nlattr *nla, int remaining)

 {
         return remaining >= sizeof(*nla) &&
                nla->nla_len >= sizeof(*nla) &&
                nla->nla_len <= remaining;

}

If 'remaining' had been declared to be of type size_t, this would not have happened.

Guideline for secure programming: length values (and counts of bytes) should be declared as size_t, where possible.

This guideline eliminates many signed/unsigned bugs. If one also carefully avoids overflow (wraparound), other integer overflow bugs are avoided as well.

The code above violates the guideline so we shouldn't be terribly surprised if it happens to contain signed/unsigned vulnerabilities.

#8 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · David Wagner
Quoted 11 lines · Vegard Nossum

/**
* nla_ok - check if the netlink attribute fits into the remaining bytes
* @nla: netlink attribute
* @remaining: number of bytes remaining in attribute stream */
static inline int nla_ok(const struct nlattr *nla, int remaining)

 {
         return remaining >= sizeof(*nla) &&
                nla->nla_len >= sizeof(*nla) &&
                nla->nla_len <= remaining;

}

Quoted 2 lines

If 'remaining' had been declared to be of type size_t, this would not have happened.

Hm. Yes, it would!

The problem here is that "remaining" can legitimately contain negative values (see the pointer advancement in nla_next()). And size_t can't hold negative values.

Vegard

Signature · 4 lines
"The animistic metaphor of the bug that maliciously sneaked in while
the programmer was not looking is intellectually dishonest as it
disguises that the error is the programmer's own creation."
	-- E. W. Dijkstra, EWD1036