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devices cgroup: allow mkfifo

PATCH In review Serge E. Hallyn 3 participants 4 messages Dec 11, 2008 – Dec 13, 2008 Security (LSM)

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 devices cgroup: allow mkfifo

The devcgroup_inode_permission() hook in the devices whitelist cgroup has always bypassed access checks on fifos. But the mknod hook did not. The devices whitelist is only about block and char devices, and fifos can't even be added to the whitelist, so fifos can't be created at all except by tasks which have 'a' in their whitelist (meaning they have access to all devices).

Fix the behavior by bypassing access checks to mkfifo (and mksock).

(Thanks, Daniel, for finding this)

---
 security/device_cgroup.c |    3 +++
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
security/device_cgroup.c +3 -0
index 5ba7870..df9d491 100644
@@ -513,6 +513,9 @@ int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
 	struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
 	struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
 
+	if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
+		return 0;
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);
Signature · 1 line
1.5.4.3
#1 lore raw
Quoted 22 lines · On Thu, 11 Dec 2008 09:50:27 -0600 "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:

The devcgroup_inode_permission() hook in the devices whitelist cgroup has always bypassed access checks on fifos. But the mknod hook did not. The devices whitelist is only about block and char devices, and fifos can't even be added to the whitelist, so fifos can't be created at all except by tasks which have 'a' in their whitelist (meaning they have access to all devices).

Fix the behavior by bypassing access checks to mkfifo (and mksock).

(Thanks, Daniel, for finding this)

---
 security/device_cgroup.c |    3 +++
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
security/device_cgroup.c +0 -0
index 5ba7870..df9d491 100644

security/device_cgroup.c int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev) · line 521

Quoted 9 lines
security/device_cgroup.c +3 -0
@@ -513,6 +513,9 @@ int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
 	struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
 	struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
 
+	if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
+		return 0;
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
 	dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);

hm. I'd looked at your description and decided this was 2.6.29 material.

But you think it's for 2.6.28 and even for 2.6.27. How come?

(iow, your changelog sucked :)

#2 lore raw
Quoted 32 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 30 lines · On Thu, 11 Dec 2008 09:50:27 -0600 "Serge E. Hallyn" <[email protected]> wrote:

The devcgroup_inode_permission() hook in the devices whitelist cgroup has always bypassed access checks on fifos. But the mknod hook did not. The devices whitelist is only about block and char devices, and fifos can't even be added to the whitelist, so fifos can't be created at all except by tasks which have 'a' in their whitelist (meaning they have access to all devices).

Fix the behavior by bypassing access checks to mkfifo (and mksock).

(Thanks, Daniel, for finding this)

---
 security/device_cgroup.c |    3 +++
 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
security/device_cgroup.c +3 -0
index 5ba7870..df9d491 100644
@@ -513,6 +513,9 @@ int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev)
 	struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup;
 	struct dev_whitelist_item *wh;
 
+	if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode))
+		return 0;
+
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
Quoted 7 lines

security/device_cgroup.c int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev) · line 521

Quoted 1 line
security/device_cgroup.c +0 -0
 	dev_cgroup = task_devcgroup(current);

hm. I'd looked at your description and decided this was 2.6.29 material.

But you think it's for 2.6.28 and even for 2.6.27. How come?

(iow, your changelog sucked :)

Sorry, I should have put the exchange between Li and I in there. (Ouch, and I didn't cc: Li this time! Sorry, Li.)

Li thought it was 2.6.27/2.6.27 material. I thought not, but wanted to see what the -stable folks thought.

This is not a security hole, and since noone has complained before it doesn't appear to be too inconvenient. Until the fix goes up, container users can always create the fifos and socks on the root image while creating the container, before entering the device whitelist.

thanks,
-serge

#3 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines

hm. I'd looked at your description and decided this was 2.6.29 material.

But you think it's for 2.6.28 and even for 2.6.27. How come?

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

(iow, your changelog sucked :)

Sorry, I should have put the exchange between Li and I in there. (Ouch, and I didn't cc: Li this time! Sorry, Li.)

Li thought it was 2.6.27/2.6.27 material. I thought not, but wanted to see what the -stable folks thought.

I was not sure about this.

Quoted 6 lines

This is not a security hole, and since noone has complained before it doesn't appear to be too inconvenient. Until the fix goes up, container users can always create the fifos and socks on the root image while creating the container, before entering the device whitelist.

Now the explanation makes it clear for me, thx. :)