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SELinux: fix selinux to safely handle any bugs even when not CONFIG_BUG

PATCH Applied Eric Paris 4 participants 9 messages Feb 12, 2009 – Feb 13, 2009

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Eric Paris

author
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 SELinux: fix selinux to safely handle any bugs even when not CONFIG_BUG

If CONFIG_BUG is not set places in the code where BUG is called will not end execution. Look for places where this might result is system problems and keep the system running.

---

 kernel/capability.c            |    1 +
 security/selinux/avc.c         |    9 +++++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c       |    8 +++++-
 security/selinux/netnode.c     |    3 ++
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h  |   15 +++++++++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 security/selinux/xfrm.c        |   15 +++++++++--
 7 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
kernel/capability.c +1 -0
index 4e17041..e8bec6a 100644
@@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ int capable(int cap)
 	if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
 		printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
 		BUG();
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (security_capable(cap) == 0) {
security/selinux/avc.c +7 -2
index eb41f43..e5cda02 100644
@@ -220,8 +220,13 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
 		kfree(scontext);
 	}
 
-	BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string) || !class_to_string[tclass]);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", class_to_string[tclass]);
+	if (unlikely(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string) || !class_to_string[tclass])) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: with tclass=%d\n", __func__, tclass);
+		BUG();
+		audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%d", tclass);
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", class_to_string[tclass]);
+	}
 }
 
 /**
security/selinux/hooks.c +7 -1
index ae5bb64..44f2170 100644
@@ -995,7 +995,11 @@ static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 	if (!data)
 		goto out;
 
-	BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
+	if (unlikely(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)) {
+		BUG();
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
 
 	rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1042,6 +1046,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
 			continue;
 		default:
 			BUG();
+			continue;
 		};
 		/* we need a comma before each option */
 		seq_putc(m, ',');
@@ -1500,6 +1505,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		printk(KERN_ERR
 		       "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
 		BUG();
+		return -EPERM;
 	}
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
security/selinux/netnode.c +3 -0
index 7100072..42cc59a 100644
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family)
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
+		return NULL;
 	}
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list, list)
@@ -180,6 +181,7 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
+		return;
 	}
 
 	INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rcu);
@@ -240,6 +242,7 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
+		ret = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
 	}
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto out;
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +12 -3
index f283b43..3ef8c94 100644
@@ -85,7 +85,10 @@ static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
 	unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
 	unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
 
-	BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+	if (unlikely((index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS))) {
+		panic("index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS");
+		return 0;
+	}
 	if ((n->maps[index] & (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs)))
 		return 1;
 	return 0;
@@ -97,7 +100,10 @@ static inline void ebitmap_node_set_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
 	unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
 	unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
 
-	BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+	if (unlikely((index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS))) {
+		panic("index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS");
+		return;
+	}
 	n->maps[index] |= (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
 }
 
@@ -107,7 +113,10 @@ static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
 	unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
 	unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
 
-	BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+	if (unlikely((index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS))) {
+		panic("index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS");
+		return;
+	}
 	n->maps[index] &= ~(EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
 }
 
security/selinux/ss/services.c +39 -15

139 lines not on this page · raw message

security/selinux/xfrm.c +12 -3
index c0eb720..22413ec 100644
@@ -202,7 +202,10 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	char *ctx_str = NULL;
 	u32 str_len;
 
-	BUG_ON(uctx && sid);
+	if (unlikely(ctx && sid)) {
+		BUG();
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	if (!uctx)
 		goto not_from_user;
@@ -288,7 +291,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 {
 	int err;
 
-	BUG_ON(!uctx);
+	if (unlikely(!uctx)) {
+		BUG();
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(ctxp, uctx, 0);
 	if (err == 0)
@@ -356,7 +362,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uct
 {
 	int err;
 
-	BUG_ON(!x);
+	if (unlikely(!x)) {
+		BUG();
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 
 	err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&x->security, uctx, secid);
 	if (err == 0)

--
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author
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 SELinux: call capabilities code directory

For cleanliness and efficiency remove all calls to secondary-> and instead call capabilities code directly. capabilities are the only module that selinux stacks with and so the code should not indicate that other stacking might be possible.

---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |   30 +++++++++++++-----------------
 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +13 -17
index 44f2170..e733fc1 100644
@@ -1863,7 +1863,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1880,7 +1880,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 {
 	int error;
 
-	error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+	error = cap_capset(new, old,
 				      effective, inheritable, permitted);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
@@ -1929,7 +1929,7 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+	rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+	rc = cap_syslog(type);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2086,10 +2086,6 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
  *
- * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
- * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
- * the capability is granted.
- *
  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
  * processes that allocate mappings.
  */
@@ -2116,7 +2112,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+	rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2233,7 +2229,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 					PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
 	}
 
-	return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+	return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
 }
 
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
@@ -3334,7 +3330,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3345,7 +3341,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3375,7 +3371,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct s
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -4633,7 +4629,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+	err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -4648,7 +4644,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
 	int err;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-	err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+	err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 

--
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Acked-by on v1 2/3
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH -v2 2/3] SELinux: call capabilities code directory

Quoted 6 lines · Eric Paris

For cleanliness and efficiency remove all calls to secondary-> and instead call capabilities code directly. capabilities are the only module that selinux stacks with and so the code should not indicate that other stacking might be possible.

Quoted 143 lines

---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |   30 +++++++++++++-----------------
 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +13 -18
index 44f2170..e733fc1 100644
@@ -1863,7 +1863,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1880,7 +1880,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 {
 	int error;
 
-	error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+	error = cap_capset(new, old,
 				      effective, inheritable, permitted);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
@@ -1929,7 +1929,7 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+	rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+	rc = cap_syslog(type);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2086,10 +2086,6 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
  *
- * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
- * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
- * the capability is granted.
- *
  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
  * processes that allocate mappings.
  */
@@ -2116,7 +2112,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+	rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2233,7 +2229,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 					PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
 	}
 
-	return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+	return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
 }
 
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
@@ -3334,7 +3330,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3345,7 +3341,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3375,7 +3371,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct s
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -4633,7 +4629,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+	err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -4648,7 +4644,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
 	int err;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-	err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+	err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
 
 
--

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Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


--
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the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH -v2 2/3] SELinux: call capabilities code directory

Stephen (Neil, Tony),

I keep following this, hoping it's going to be able to 'step up' for things, but it just
seems to be always 'not ready for primetime'. Any idea when it'll be ready to be
shown to us? r/HAL

Quoted 173 lines · Eric Paris
Quoted 8 lines

For cleanliness and efficiency remove all calls to secondary-> and instead
call capabilities code directly. capabilities are the only module that selinux stacks with and so the code should not indicate that other stacking
might be possible.

Quoted 153 lines

---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |   30 +++++++++++++-----------------
 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +3 -3
index 44f2170..e733fc1 100644
@@ -1863,7 +1863,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct
 task_struct *child,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -1880,7 +1880,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct
 task_struct *parent)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct
 *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable,
 permitted);
+	return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }

static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,

security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -1
@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const
 struct cred *old,
 {
 	int error;
 
-	error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+	error = cap_capset(new, old,
 				      effective, inheritable, permitted);
 	if (error)
security/selinux/hooks.c +4 -8
 		return error;
@@ -1929,7 +1929,7 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct
 *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+	rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+	rc = cap_syslog(type);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2086,10 +2086,6 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
  *
- * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
- * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
- * the capability is granted.
- *
  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
  * processes that allocate mappings.
  */
@@ -2116,7 +2112,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct
 linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+	rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -2233,7 +2229,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct
 linux_binprm *bprm)
 					PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
 	}
 
-	return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+	return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
 }
 

extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;

security/selinux/hooks.c +2 -2
@@ -3334,7 +3330,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct
 *p, int nice)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -3345,7 +3341,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct
 task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -3375,7 +3371,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct

task_struct *p, int policy, struct s
{

security/selinux/hooks.c +3 -4
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -4633,7 +4629,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk,
 struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+	err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -4648,7 +4644,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff
 *skb, int capability)
 	int err;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-	err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+	err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
 
 
--
Quoted 4 lines

This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with
the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

Quoted 7 lines

--
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the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.

--
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Applied
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH -v2 2/3] SELinux: call capabilities code directory

In reply to Eric Paris
Quoted 6 lines · Eric Paris

For cleanliness and efficiency remove all calls to secondary-> and instead call capabilities code directly. capabilities are the only module that selinux stacks with and so the code should not indicate that other stacking might be possible.

Applied.

Quoted 138 lines

---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |   30 +++++++++++++-----------------
 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +13 -17
index 44f2170..e733fc1 100644
@@ -1863,7 +1863,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1880,7 +1880,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 
-	return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+	return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 {
 	int error;
 
-	error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+	error = cap_capset(new, old,
 				      effective, inheritable, permitted);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
@@ -1929,7 +1929,7 @@ static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+	rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2055,7 +2055,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+	rc = cap_syslog(type);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2086,10 +2086,6 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
  *
- * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
- * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
- * the capability is granted.
- *
  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
  * processes that allocate mappings.
  */
@@ -2116,7 +2112,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+	rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -2233,7 +2229,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 					PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
 	}
 
-	return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+	return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
 }
 
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
@@ -3334,7 +3330,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+	rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3345,7 +3341,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+	rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3375,7 +3371,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct s
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+	rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -4633,7 +4629,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+	err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -4648,7 +4644,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
 	int err;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 
-	err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+	err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
Signature · 7 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>

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author
#5 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 SELinux: better printk when file with invalid label found

In reply to Eric Paris

Currently when an inode is read into the kernel with an invalid label string (can often happen with removable media) we output a string like:

SELinux: inode_doinit_with_dentry: context_to_sid([SOME INVALID LABEL]) returned -22 dor dev=[blah] ino=[blah]

Which is all but incomprehensible to all but a couple of us. Instead, on EINVAL only, I plan to output a much more user friendly string and I plan to ratelimit the printk since many of these could be generated very rapidly.

---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |   17 +++++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +13 -4
index e733fc1..45e286c 100644
@@ -1335,10 +1335,19 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 							     sbsec->def_sid,
 							     GFP_NOFS);
 			if (rc) {
-				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
-				       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
-				       __func__, context, -rc,
-				       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+				char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+				unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+				if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+					if (printk_ratelimit())
+						printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
+							"context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
+							"filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
+				} else {
+					printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
+					       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+					       __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+				}
 				kfree(context);
 				/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
 				rc = 0;

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Acked-by on v1 3/3
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH -v2 3/3] SELinux: better printk when file with invalid label found

Quoted 11 lines · Eric Paris

Currently when an inode is read into the kernel with an invalid label string (can often happen with removable media) we output a string like:

SELinux: inode_doinit_with_dentry: context_to_sid([SOME INVALID LABEL]) returned -22 dor dev=[blah] ino=[blah]

Which is all but incomprehensible to all but a couple of us. Instead, on EINVAL only, I plan to output a much more user friendly string and I plan to ratelimit the printk since many of these could be generated very rapidly.

Quoted 39 lines

---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |   17 +++++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +13 -5
index e733fc1..45e286c 100644
@@ -1335,10 +1335,19 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 							     sbsec->def_sid,
 							     GFP_NOFS);
 			if (rc) {
-				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
-				       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
-				       __func__, context, -rc,
-				       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+				char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+				unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+				if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+					if (printk_ratelimit())
+						printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
+							"context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
+							"filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
+				} else {
+					printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
+					       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+					       __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+				}
 				kfree(context);
 				/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
 				rc = 0;
 
 
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Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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Applied
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH -v2 3/3] SELinux: better printk when file with invalid label found

In reply to Eric Paris
Quoted 11 lines · Eric Paris

Currently when an inode is read into the kernel with an invalid label string (can often happen with removable media) we output a string like:

SELinux: inode_doinit_with_dentry: context_to_sid([SOME INVALID LABEL]) returned -22 dor dev=[blah] ino=[blah]

Which is all but incomprehensible to all but a couple of us. Instead, on EINVAL only, I plan to output a much more user friendly string and I plan to ratelimit the printk since many of these could be generated very rapidly.

Applied.

Quoted 34 lines

---

 security/selinux/hooks.c |   17 +++++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +13 -4
index e733fc1..45e286c 100644
@@ -1335,10 +1335,19 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 							     sbsec->def_sid,
 							     GFP_NOFS);
 			if (rc) {
-				printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
-				       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
-				       __func__, context, -rc,
-				       inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+				char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+				unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+				if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+					if (printk_ratelimit())
+						printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
+							"context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
+							"filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
+				} else {
+					printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
+					       "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+					       __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+				}
 				kfree(context);
 				/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
 				rc = 0;
Signature · 7 lines
James Morris
<[email protected]>

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#8 lore raw
In reply to Eric Paris
Quoted 114 lines · Eric Paris

If CONFIG_BUG is not set places in the code where BUG is called will not end execution. Look for places where this might result is system problems and keep the system running.

---

 kernel/capability.c            |    1 +
 security/selinux/avc.c         |    9 +++++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c       |    8 +++++-
 security/selinux/netnode.c     |    3 ++
 security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h  |   15 +++++++++--
 security/selinux/ss/services.c |   54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 security/selinux/xfrm.c        |   15 +++++++++--
 7 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
kernel/capability.c +1 -0
index 4e17041..e8bec6a 100644
@@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ int capable(int cap)
 	if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
 		printk(KERN_CRIT "capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
 		BUG();
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (security_capable(cap) == 0) {
security/selinux/avc.c +7 -2
index eb41f43..e5cda02 100644
@@ -220,8 +220,13 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
 		kfree(scontext);
 	}
 
-	BUG_ON(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string) || !class_to_string[tclass]);
-	audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", class_to_string[tclass]);
+	if (unlikely(tclass >= ARRAY_SIZE(class_to_string) || !class_to_string[tclass])) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "%s: with tclass=%d\n", __func__, tclass);
+		BUG();
+		audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%d", tclass);
+	} else {
+		audit_log_format(ab, " tclass=%s", class_to_string[tclass]);
+	}
 }
 
 /**
security/selinux/hooks.c +7 -1
index ae5bb64..44f2170 100644
@@ -995,7 +995,11 @@ static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 	if (!data)
 		goto out;
 
-	BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
+	if (unlikely(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)) {
+		BUG();
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_err;
+	}
 
 	rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1042,6 +1046,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
 			continue;
 		default:
 			BUG();
+			continue;
 		};
 		/* we need a comma before each option */
 		seq_putc(m, ',');
@@ -1500,6 +1505,7 @@ static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
 		printk(KERN_ERR
 		       "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
 		BUG();
+		return -EPERM;
 	}
 
 	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
security/selinux/netnode.c +3 -0
index 7100072..42cc59a 100644
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family)
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
+		return NULL;
 	}
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &sel_netnode_hash[idx].list, list)
@@ -180,6 +181,7 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node)
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
+		return;
 	}
 
 	INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rcu);
@@ -240,6 +242,7 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 		break;
 	default:
 		BUG();
+		ret = -EPROTONOSUPPORT;
 	}
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto out;
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +0 -0
index f283b43..3ef8c94 100644

security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n, · line 90

Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +3 -1
@@ -85,7 +85,10 @@ static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
 	unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
 	unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
 
-	BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+	if (unlikely((index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS))) {
+		panic("index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS");
+		return 0;

Unlike BUG(), you don't need anything after panic(), right? It is a no-return function under all configurations, right?

Signature · 8 lines
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency


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