add policy for Icecream
PATCH 1/1 add policy for Icecream
Hello,
Icecream is a distributed compiler similar to distcc, but there are important differences:
- It uses a central scheduler (icecc-scheduler) which decides on which node each job will be compiled. Typically there are many nodes on the local network, all running iceccd.
- It automatically copies the local compiler binary with its dependencies to the other nodes to ensure they're all using the same compiler. The nodes execute the compiler in a chroot.
As you can see, running iceccd implies running arbitrary code from networked users. Confining Icecream with SELinux is a good idea.
This patch adds the policy for Icecream to refpolicy. It is based on the latest icecream policy module from the icecream RPM in Fedora.
Michal
modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in +2 -0
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ network_port(howl, tcp,5335,s0, udp,5353,s0) network_port(hplip, tcp,1782,s0, tcp,2207,s0, tcp,2208,s0, tcp, 8290,s0, tcp,50000,s0, tcp,50002,s0, tcp,8292,s0, tcp,9100,s0, tcp,9101,s0, tcp,9102,s0, tcp,9220,s0, tcp,9221,s0, tcp,9222,s0, tcp,9280,s0, tcp,9281,s0, tcp,9282,s0, tcp,9290,s0, tcp,9291,s0, tcp,9292,s0) network_port(i18n_input, tcp,9010,s0) +network_port(iceccd, tcp,10245,s0) +network_port(icecc_scheduler, tcp,8765,s0, tcp,8766,s0, udp,8765,s0) network_port(imaze, tcp,5323,s0, udp,5323,s0) network_port(inetd_child, tcp,1,s0, udp,1,s0, tcp,7,s0, udp,7,s0, tcp,9,s0, udp,9,s0, tcp,13,s0, udp,13,s0, tcp,19,s0, udp,19,s0, tcp,37,s0, udp,37,s0, tcp,512,s0, tcp,543,s0, tcp,544,s0, tcp,891,s0, udp,891,s0, tcp,892,s0, udp,892,s0, tcp,2105,s0, tcp,5666,s0) network_port(innd, tcp,119,s0)
modules/services/icecream.te +170 -0
170 lines not on this page · raw message
modules/services/icecream.fc +5 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +/usr/sbin/iceccd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib(64)?/icecc/icecc-create-env -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_createenv_exec_t,s0) +/var/cache/icecream(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_cache_t,s0) +/var/log/iceccd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_log_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/icecc-scheduler -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:icecc_scheduler_exec_t,s0)
modules/services/icecream.if +1 -0
@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +## <summary>Icecream distributed compiler daemon</summary>
PATCH 1/1 add policy for Icecream
Quoted 223 lines · Michal Schmidt
Hello,
Icecream is a distributed compiler similar to distcc, but there are important differences:
- It uses a central scheduler (icecc-scheduler) which decides on which node each job will be compiled. Typically there are many nodes on the local network, all running iceccd.
- It automatically copies the local compiler binary with its dependencies to the other nodes to ensure they're all using the same compiler. The nodes execute the compiler in a chroot.As you can see, running iceccd implies running arbitrary code from networked users. Confining Icecream with SELinux is a good idea.
This patch adds the policy for Icecream to refpolicy. It is based on the latest icecream policy module from the icecream RPM in Fedora.
Michal
Index: policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in
===================================================================modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in +2
-0@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ network_port(howl, tcp,5335,s0, udp,5353,s0) network_port(hplip, tcp,1782,s0, tcp,2207,s0, tcp,2208,s0, tcp, 8290,s0, tcp,50000,s0, tcp,50002,s0, tcp,8292,s0, tcp,9100,s0, tcp,9101,s0, tcp,9102,s0, tcp,9220,s0, tcp,9221,s0, tcp,9222,s0, tcp,9280,s0, tcp,9281,s0, tcp,9282,s0, tcp,9290,s0, tcp,9291,s0, tcp,9292,s0) network_port(i18n_input, tcp,9010,s0) +network_port(iceccd, tcp,10245,s0) +network_port(icecc_scheduler, tcp,8765,s0, tcp,8766,s0, udp,8765,s0) network_port(imaze, tcp,5323,s0, udp,5323,s0) network_port(inetd_child, tcp,1,s0, udp,1,s0, tcp,7,s0, udp,7,s0, tcp,9,s0, udp,9,s0, tcp,13,s0, udp,13,s0, tcp,19,s0, udp,19,s0, tcp,37,s0, udp,37,s0, tcp,512,s0, tcp,543,s0, tcp,544,s0, tcp,891,s0, udp,891,s0, tcp,892,s0, udp,892,s0, tcp,2105,s0, tcp,5666,s0) network_port(innd, tcp,119,s0)Index: policy/modules/services/icecream.te
===================================================================modules/services/icecream.te +170
-0@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ + +policy_module(icecream,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +# the compiler node daemon +type iceccd_t; +type iceccd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(iceccd_t, iceccd_exec_t) + +type iceccd_log_t; +logging_log_file(iceccd_log_t) + +type iceccd_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(iceccd_tmp_t) + +type iceccd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(iceccd_var_run_t) + +# the working area +type iceccd_cache_t; +files_type(iceccd_cache_t) + +# icecc-create-env script makes a tarball of the local compiler and its +# dependencies for other nodes to use +type iceccd_createenv_t; +type iceccd_createenv_exec_t; +domain_type(iceccd_createenv_t) +domain_entry_file(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t) +role system_r types iceccd_createenv_t; + +# foreign compilers +type iceccd_untrusted_t; +domain_type(iceccd_untrusted_t); +domain_entry_file(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t) +role system_r types iceccd_untrusted_t; + +# the scheduler +type icecc_scheduler_t; +type icecc_scheduler_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(icecc_scheduler_t, icecc_scheduler_exec_t) + +######################################## +# +# Icecream policy +# + +allow iceccd_t self:process { signal_perms setsched setrlimit }; +allow iceccd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow iceccd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow iceccd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow iceccd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow iceccd_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid sys_chroot }; +allow iceccd_t iceccd_untrusted_t:process { siginh rlimitinh noatsecure signal }; + +files_read_etc_files(iceccd_t) +libs_use_ld_so(iceccd_t) +libs_use_shared_libs(iceccd_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(iceccd_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(iceccd_t) +kernel_read_system_state(iceccd_t) +sysnet_read_config(iceccd_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(iceccd_t) +corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(iceccd_t) + +files_getattr_tmp_dirs(iceccd_t) +files_search_tmp(iceccd_t) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(iceccd_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(iceccd_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(iceccd_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(iceccd_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_iceccd_port(iceccd_t) +corenet_sendrecv_iceccd_server_packets(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_icecc_scheduler_port(iceccd_t) + +domtrans_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t, iceccd_createenv_t) +domtrans_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_untrusted_t) + +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_log_t, iceccd_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_log_t, file) + +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_var_run_t, iceccd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_var_run_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, file) + + +allow iceccd_createenv_t iceccd_log_t:file { append }; +allow iceccd_createenv_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +# icecc-create-env looks for executable files to strip them. It does not +# really execute them, but the -x check would trigger a denial. Do not allow +# this, typically the binaries are already stripped anyway. Just silence it. +dontaudit iceccd_createenv_t iceccd_tmp_t:file { execute }; + +allow iceccd_untrusted_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow iceccd_untrusted_t self:process signal_perms; +allow iceccd_untrusted_t iceccd_t:unix_stream_socket rw_sock_file_perms; +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) +allow iceccd_untrusted_t iceccd_cache_t:file { execute_no_trans }; + +files_read_etc_files(iceccd_createenv_t) +libs_use_ld_so(iceccd_createenv_t) +libs_use_shared_libs(iceccd_createenv_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(iceccd_createenv_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) + +files_read_usr_files(iceccd_createenv_t) +libs_exec_ld_so(iceccd_createenv_t) +libs_exec_lib_files(iceccd_createenv_t) +libs_domtrans_ldconfig(iceccd_createenv_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(iceccd_createenv_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(iceccd_createenv_t) +dev_read_urand(iceccd_createenv_t) +kernel_read_system_state(iceccd_createenv_t) +# silence file(1) looking for /root/.magic +userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(iceccd_createenv_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t, file) +files_tmp_filetrans(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t, dir) + +optional_policy(` + nscd_socket_use(iceccd_createenv_t) +') + +# XXX: This could be avoided if iceccd only nuked the contents of +# /var/cache/icecream, not the directory itself. +files_var_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, dir) + + +allow icecc_scheduler_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow icecc_scheduler_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +files_read_etc_files(icecc_scheduler_t) +libs_use_ld_so(icecc_scheduler_t) +libs_use_shared_libs(icecc_scheduler_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(icecc_scheduler_t) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_icecc_scheduler_port(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_udp_bind_icecc_scheduler_port(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_sendrecv_icecc_scheduler_server_packets(icecc_scheduler_t)Index: policy/modules/services/icecream.fc
===================================================================modules/services/icecream.fc +5
-0@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +/usr/sbin/iceccd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib(64)?/icecc/icecc-create-env -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_createenv_exec_t,s0) +/var/cache/icecream(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_cache_t,s0) +/var/log/iceccd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_log_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/icecc-scheduler -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:icecc_scheduler_exec_t,s0)Index: policy/modules/services/icecream.if
===================================================================modules/services/icecream.if +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +## <summary>Icecream distributed compiler daemon</summary>
Quoted 4 lines
_______________________________________________
refpolicy mailing list
refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
Here is my take on the policy. It may or may not work but it may give you some ideas on how to clean it up a bit.
Use it at your own risk
policy_module(icecream, 1.0.1)
########################################
#
# iceccd declarations #
type iceccd_t;
type iceccd_exec_t;init_daemon_domain(iceccd_t, iceccd_exec_t)
type iceccd_log_t;logging_log_file(iceccd_log_t)
type iceccd_tmp_t;files_tmp_file(iceccd_tmp_t)
type iceccd_var_run_t;files_pid_file(iceccd_var_run_t)
type iceccd_cache_t;files_type(iceccd_cache_t)
########################################
#
# iceccd-createenv declarations #
type iceccd_createenv_t;
type iceccd_createenv_exec_t; application_executable_file(iceccd_createenv_exec_t) application_domain(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t) role system_r types iceccd_createenv_t;
########################################
#
# iceccd-scheduler declarations #
type icecc_scheduler_t;
type icecc_scheduler_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(icecc_scheduler_t, icecc_scheduler_exec_t)
########################################
#
# iceccd-untrusted declarations #
type iceccd_untrusted_t; application_executable_file(iceccd_cache_t); application_domain(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t) role system_r types iceccd_untrusted_t;
########################################
#
# iceccd policy #
# this block in alphabetical order
allow iceccd_t self:process { signal_perms setsched setrlimit };
allow iceccd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
allow iceccd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow iceccd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow iceccd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow iceccd_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid kill
setgid setuid sys_chroot };# use interface: iceccd_untrusted_dontaudit...()
dontaudit iceccd_t iceccd_untrusted_t:process { siginh rlimitinh
noatsecure };# use interface: iceccd_untrusted_signal() allow iceccd_t iceccd_untrusted_t:process signal;
# use interface: iceccd_createenv_domtrans() domtrans_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t, iceccd_createenv_t)
# use interface: iceccd_untrusted_domtrans() domtrans_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_untrusted_t)
# can it search /var? manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_log_t, iceccd_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_log_t, file)
manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_var_run_t, iceccd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_var_run_t, file)
manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) files_var_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, { dir file })
files_search_tmp(iceccd_t) manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, { dir file })
corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(iceccd_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_iceccd_port(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_icecc_scheduler_port(iceccd_t) corenet_sendrecv_iceccd_server_packets(iceccd_t)
corecmd_exec_bin(iceccd_t)corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(iceccd_t)
files_read_etc_files(iceccd_t)
fs_getattr_all_fs(iceccd_t)
kernel_read_system_state(iceccd_t)
sysnet_read_config(iceccd_t)
libs_use_ld_so(iceccd_t)libs_use_shared_libs(iceccd_t)
miscfiles_read_localization(iceccd_t)
########################################
#
# iceccd-createenv policy #
allow iceccd_createenv_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
# use interface: iceccd_dontaudit_exec_tmp()
dontaudit iceccd_createenv_t iceccd_tmp_t:file { execute };# use interface: iceccd_append_log()
allow iceccd_createenv_t iceccd_log_t:file { append };# use interface: iceccd_manage_cache()
# can it search /var?
manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t)
manage_files_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t)
files_var_filetrans(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_cache_t, { dir file })# use interface: iceccd_manage_tmp()
# can it search /tmp?
manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t)
manage_files_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t)
files_tmp_filetrans(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t, { dir file })corecmd_exec_bin(iceccd_createenv_t)corecmd_exec_shell(iceccd_createenv_t)
dev_read_urand(iceccd_createenv_t)
files_read_etc_files(iceccd_createenv_t)files_read_usr_files(iceccd_createenv_t)
kernel_read_system_state(iceccd_createenv_t)
libs_exec_ld_so(iceccd_createenv_t)libs_exec_lib_files(iceccd_createenv_t)
libs_domtrans_ldconfig(iceccd_createenv_t)
libs_use_ld_so(iceccd_createenv_t)libs_use_shared_libs(iceccd_createenv_t)
miscfiles_read_localization(iceccd_createenv_t)
userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(iceccd_createenv_t)
optional_policy(`
nscd_socket_use(iceccd_createenv_t)
')
########################################
#
# iceccd-untrusted policy #
allow iceccd_untrusted_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow iceccd_untrusted_t self:process signal_perms;
allow iceccd_untrusted_t iceccd_t:unix_stream_socket rw_sock_file_perms;
# use interface: iceccd_manage_cache() manage_files_pattern(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t)
# use interface: iceccd_can_exec_cache()
allow iceccd_untrusted_t iceccd_cache_t:file { execute_no_trans };########################################
#
# icecc-scheduler policy #
allow icecc_scheduler_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow icecc_scheduler_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_tcp_bind_icecc_scheduler_port(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_udp_bind_icecc_scheduler_port(icecc_scheduler_t) corenet_sendrecv_icecc_scheduler_server_packets(icecc_scheduler_t)
files_read_etc_files(icecc_scheduler_t)
libs_use_ld_so(icecc_scheduler_t)libs_use_shared_libs(icecc_scheduler_t)
miscfiles_read_localization(icecc_scheduler_t)
PATCH 1/1 add policy for Icecream
Dne Mon, 02 Mar 2009 14:16:54 +0100
Dominick Grift <[email protected]> napsal:
Quoted 2 lines
Here is my take on the policy. It may or may not work but it may give you some ideas on how to clean it up a bit.
Thank you for your suggestions! I'll redo the policy accordingly. There are some bits, however, where I'd like some clarification. It's these pieces of the diff between my and your version of the .te file:
Quoted 14 lines
(quoted diff) +0
-3-# the compiler node daemon type iceccd_t; type iceccd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(iceccd_t, iceccd_exec_t)@@ -20,141 +311,182 @@ type iceccd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(iceccd_var_run_t) -# the working area type iceccd_cache_t; files_type(iceccd_cache_t) -# icecc-create-env script makes a tarball of the local compiler and
Quoted 1 line
its -# dependencies for other nodes to use
You removed most of my comments which were meant to give the reader some idea why the policy says what it says. Does it mean comments like these are really not wanted?
Review
Quoted 7 lines
type
iceccd_createenv_t;
typeiceccd_createenv_exec_t;(quoted diff) +2
-2-domain_type(iceccd_createenv_t) -domain_entry_file(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t) +application_executable_file(iceccd_createenv_exec_t) +application_domain(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t) role system_r types iceccd_createenv_t;
The application_* interfaces mark programs which are expected to be run by users from interactive shells? OK, it makes sense for icecc-create-env.
Review
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-2-domain_type(iceccd_untrusted_t); -domain_entry_file(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t) +application_executable_file(iceccd_cache_t); +application_domain(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t)
... however, I do not think it's useful to mark the untrusted foreign compilers as such. These should never be run by users.
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+dontaudit iceccd_t iceccd_untrusted_t:process { siginh rlimitinh +noatsecure };
In the original version, these three permissions were 'allow'. I don't know exactly what they mean, I got them by observing the AVC denials during normal operation of Icecream. If you think 'dontaudit' should be enough, I believe you. I'll test it.
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+# use interface: iceccd_untrusted_signal() +allow iceccd_t iceccd_untrusted_t:process signal;
You suggest "use interface: ..." several times. To make it absolutely clear - are you asking me to create the named interfaces in icecream.if and use them in icecream.te?
I thought interfaces were only useful for interaction with other policy modules. And at the moment I can't imagine any other users of these interfaces.
Review
Quoted 10 lines
corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(iceccd_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(iceccd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(iceccd_t)(quoted diff) +0
-3-corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(iceccd_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(iceccd_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_iceccd_port(iceccd_t)
iceccd sends UDP broadcasts to find the scheduler on the LAN. Won't removing these rules block it?
Michal
PATCH 1/1 add policy for Icecream
Quoted 10 lines · Michal Schmidt
Dne Mon, 02 Mar 2009 14:16:54 +0100
Dominick Grift <[email protected]> napsal:Quoted 2 lines
Here is my take on the policy. It may or may not work but it may give you some ideas on how to clean it up a bit.
Thank you for your suggestions! I'll redo the policy accordingly. There are some bits, however, where I'd like some clarification. It's these pieces of the diff between my and your version of the .te file:
[...]
Quoted 10 lines
Review
Quoted 7 lines
type
iceccd_createenv_t;
typeiceccd_createenv_exec_t;(quoted diff) +2
-2-domain_type(iceccd_createenv_t) -domain_entry_file(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t) +application_executable_file(iceccd_createenv_exec_t) +application_domain(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t) role system_r types iceccd_createenv_t;The application_* interfaces mark programs which are expected to be run by users from interactive shells?
Yes.
Quoted 9 lines
OK, it makes sense for icecc-create-env.
Review
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-2-domain_type(iceccd_untrusted_t); -domain_entry_file(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t) +application_executable_file(iceccd_cache_t); +application_domain(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t)... however, I do not think it's useful to mark the untrusted foreign compilers as such. These should never be run by users.
I agree in this case.
Quoted 7 lines
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+dontaudit iceccd_t iceccd_untrusted_t:process { siginh rlimitinh +noatsecure };In the original version, these three permissions were 'allow'. I don't know exactly what they mean, I got them by observing the AVC denials during normal operation of Icecream. If you think 'dontaudit' should be enough, I believe you. I'll test it.
With dontaudit, the transition to icecd_untrusted_t, signals and resource limits won't be inherited, and the environment variables will be cleansed. Its rare that these permissions need to be allowed.
Quoted 8 lines
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+# use interface: iceccd_untrusted_signal() +allow iceccd_t iceccd_untrusted_t:process signal;You suggest "use interface: ..." several times. To make it absolutely clear - are you asking me to create the named interfaces in icecream.if and use them in icecream.te?
I thought interfaces were only useful for interaction with other policy modules. And at the moment I can't imagine any other users of these interfaces.
I'd lean towards skipping the interface for now.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(iceccd_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(iceccd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(iceccd_t)
-corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(iceccd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(iceccd_t)
Quoted 8 lines
Review
Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +0
-2-corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(iceccd_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_iceccd_port(iceccd_t)iceccd sends UDP broadcasts to find the scheduler on the LAN. Won't removing these rules block it?
Yes. Sounds like you need to keep those lines.
Signature · 3 lines
Chris PeBenito Tresys Technology, LLC (410) 290-1411 x150
PATCH 1/1 add policy for Icecream
In reply to Michal SchmidtQuoted 23 lines · Michal Schmidt
Dne Mon, 02 Mar 2009 14:16:54 +0100
Dominick Grift <[email protected]> napsal:Quoted 2 lines
Here is my take on the policy. It may or may not work but it may give you some ideas on how to clean it up a bit.
Thank you for your suggestions! I'll redo the policy accordingly. There are some bits, however, where I'd like some clarification. It's these pieces of the diff between my and your version of the .te file:
Quoted 13 lines
(quoted diff) +0
-2-# the compiler node daemon type iceccd_t; type iceccd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(iceccd_t, iceccd_exec_t)@@ -20,141 +311,182 @@ type iceccd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(iceccd_var_run_t) -# the working area type iceccd_cache_t; files_type(iceccd_cache_t)
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +0
-1-# icecc-create-env script makes a tarball of the local compiler andits -# dependencies for other nodes to use
You removed most of my comments which were meant to give the reader some idea why the policy says what it says. Does it mean comments like these are really not wanted?
Comments are fine. If they are not too obvious. I removed them because that is my personal taste.
Quoted 10 lines
Review
Quoted 7 lines
type
iceccd_createenv_t;
typeiceccd_createenv_exec_t;(quoted diff) +2
-2-domain_type(iceccd_createenv_t) -domain_entry_file(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t) +application_executable_file(iceccd_createenv_exec_t) +application_domain(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t) role system_r types iceccd_createenv_t;The application_* interfaces mark programs which are expected to be run by users from interactive shells? OK, it makes sense for icecc-create-env.
If user have access to the executable type and have a transition set up.
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Review
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-2-domain_type(iceccd_untrusted_t); -domain_entry_file(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t) +application_executable_file(iceccd_cache_t); +application_domain(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t)... however, I do not think it's useful to mark the untrusted foreign compilers as such. These should never be run by users.
Alright you could also use domain_entry_type, but users wont be able to use application executables if they cannot access then or if no transition is set up.
Quoted 7 lines
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+dontaudit iceccd_t iceccd_untrusted_t:process { siginh rlimitinh +noatsecure };In the original version, these three permissions were 'allow'. I don't know exactly what they mean, I got them by observing the AVC denials during normal operation of Icecream. If you think 'dontaudit' should be enough, I believe you. I'll test it.
Try it, These permissions usually get silently denied.
Quoted 8 lines
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+# use interface: iceccd_untrusted_signal() +allow iceccd_t iceccd_untrusted_t:process signal;You suggest "use interface: ..." several times. To make it absolutely clear - are you asking me to create the named interfaces in icecream.if and use them in icecream.te?
I thought interfaces were only useful for interaction with other policy modules. And at the moment I can't imagine any other users of these interfaces.
Interface make it easier for you to maintain policy, be it local to the module or not. I suggested the use of interfaces but its a personal taste.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(iceccd_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(iceccd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(iceccd_t)
-corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(iceccd_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(iceccd_t)
Quoted 8 lines
Review
Quoted 5 lines
(quoted diff) +0
-2-corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(iceccd_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(iceccd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_iceccd_port(iceccd_t)iceccd sends UDP broadcasts to find the scheduler on the LAN. Won't removing these rules block it?
If you need them , add them.
Quoted 2 lines
Michal
PATCH 1/1 add policy for Icecream
In reply to Michal SchmidtQuoted 1 line · Michal Schmidt
+allow
iceccd_untrusted_ticeccd_cache_t:file {execute_no_trans};
This can be: can_exec(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t)
Quoted 4 lines
_______________________________________________
refpolicy mailing list
refpolicy at oss.tresys.com
http://oss.tresys.com/mailman/listinfo/refpolicy
PATCH 1/1 add policy for Icecream
Hello,
This patch adds the policy for Icecream, a distributed compiler.
Notable changes since the first version:
- as suggested by Dominick Grift:
- reordered lots of the lines
- removed the comments
- dontaudit siginh, rlimitinh, noatsecure
- use application_domain() for iceccd_createenv_t
- use can_exec()
I did not add any interfaces, I like it better without them.
Michal
modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in +2 -0
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ network_port(howl, tcp,5335,s0, udp,5353,s0) network_port(hplip, tcp,1782,s0, tcp,2207,s0, tcp,2208,s0, tcp, 8290,s0, tcp,50000,s0, tcp,50002,s0, tcp,8292,s0, tcp,9100,s0, tcp,9101,s0, tcp,9102,s0, tcp,9220,s0, tcp,9221,s0, tcp,9222,s0, tcp,9280,s0, tcp,9281,s0, tcp,9282,s0, tcp,9290,s0, tcp,9291,s0, tcp,9292,s0) network_port(i18n_input, tcp,9010,s0) +network_port(iceccd, tcp,10245,s0) +network_port(icecc_scheduler, tcp,8765,s0, tcp,8766,s0, udp,8765,s0) network_port(imaze, tcp,5323,s0, udp,5323,s0) network_port(inetd_child, tcp,1,s0, udp,1,s0, tcp,7,s0, udp,7,s0, tcp,9,s0, udp,9,s0, tcp,13,s0, udp,13,s0, tcp,19,s0, udp,19,s0, tcp,37,s0, udp,37,s0, tcp,512,s0, tcp,543,s0, tcp,544,s0, tcp,891,s0, udp,891,s0, tcp,892,s0, udp,892,s0, tcp,2105,s0, tcp,5666,s0) network_port(innd, tcp,119,s0)
modules/services/icecream.te +204 -0
204 lines not on this page · raw message
modules/services/icecream.fc +5 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +/usr/sbin/iceccd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib(64)?/icecc/icecc-create-env -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_createenv_exec_t,s0) +/var/cache/icecream(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_cache_t,s0) +/var/log/iceccd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_log_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/icecc-scheduler -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:icecc_scheduler_exec_t,s0)
modules/services/icecream.if +1 -0
@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +## <summary>Icecream distributed compiler daemon</summary>
PATCH 1/1 add policy for Icecream
Quoted 106 lines · Michal Schmidt
Hello,
This patch adds the policy for Icecream, a distributed compiler.
Notable changes since the first version:
- as suggested by Dominick Grift:
- reordered lots of the lines
- removed the comments
- dontaudit siginh, rlimitinh, noatsecure
- useapplication_domain()foriceccd_createenv_t
- usecan_exec()
I did not add any interfaces, I like it better without them.Michal
Index: policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in
===================================================================modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in +2
-0@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ network_port(howl, tcp,5335,s0, udp,5353,s0) network_port(hplip, tcp,1782,s0, tcp,2207,s0, tcp,2208,s0, tcp, 8290,s0, tcp,50000,s0, tcp,50002,s0, tcp,8292,s0, tcp,9100,s0, tcp,9101,s0, tcp,9102,s0, tcp,9220,s0, tcp,9221,s0, tcp,9222,s0, tcp,9280,s0, tcp,9281,s0, tcp,9282,s0, tcp,9290,s0, tcp,9291,s0, tcp,9292,s0) network_port(i18n_input, tcp,9010,s0) +network_port(iceccd, tcp,10245,s0) +network_port(icecc_scheduler, tcp,8765,s0, tcp,8766,s0, udp,8765,s0) network_port(imaze, tcp,5323,s0, udp,5323,s0) network_port(inetd_child, tcp,1,s0, udp,1,s0, tcp,7,s0, udp,7,s0, tcp,9,s0, udp,9,s0, tcp,13,s0, udp,13,s0, tcp,19,s0, udp,19,s0, tcp,37,s0, udp,37,s0, tcp,512,s0, tcp,543,s0, tcp,544,s0, tcp,891,s0, udp,891,s0, tcp,892,s0, udp,892,s0, tcp,2105,s0, tcp,5666,s0) network_port(innd, tcp,119,s0)Index: policy/modules/services/icecream.te
===================================================================modules/services/icecream.te +73
-0@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@ + +policy_module(icecream,1.0.2) + +######################################## +# +# iceccd declarations +# + +type iceccd_t; +type iceccd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(iceccd_t, iceccd_exec_t) + +type iceccd_log_t; +logging_log_file(iceccd_log_t) + +type iceccd_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(iceccd_tmp_t) + +type iceccd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(iceccd_var_run_t) + +type iceccd_cache_t; +files_type(iceccd_cache_t) + +######################################## +# +# iceccd_createenv declarations +# + +type iceccd_createenv_t; +type iceccd_createenv_exec_t; +application_domain(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t) +role system_r types iceccd_createenv_t; + +######################################## +# +# icecc_scheduler declarations +# + +type icecc_scheduler_t; +type icecc_scheduler_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(icecc_scheduler_t, icecc_scheduler_exec_t) + +######################################## +# +# iceccd_untrusted declarations +# + +type iceccd_untrusted_t; +domain_type(iceccd_untrusted_t); +domain_entry_file(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t) +role system_r types iceccd_untrusted_t; + +######################################## +# +# iceccd policy +# + +allow iceccd_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid kill + setgid setuid sys_chroot }; +allow iceccd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow iceccd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow iceccd_t self:process { signal_perms setsched setrlimit }; +allow iceccd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow iceccd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +dontaudit iceccd_t iceccd_untrusted_t:process { siginh rlimitinh + noatsecure }; + +allow iceccd_t iceccd_untrusted_t:process signal; + +domtrans_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_createenv_exec_t, iceccd_createenv_t) +domtrans_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_untrusted_t)
modules/services/icecream.te line 83
Quoted 10 lines
modules/services/icecream.te +10
-0+ +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_log_t, iceccd_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_log_t, file) + +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_var_run_t, iceccd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_var_run_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) +files_var_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, { dir file })
Does iceccd_t not need: files_search_var(iceccd_t)?
I expect that it needs to search /var to be able to find files/dirs with type iceccd_cache_t/iceccd_log_t/iceccd_var_run_t and i do not see where it is allowed to search /var
It might also need permission to search var_run_t, var_log_t?
It can be that the search perm is included in one of the interfaces below.
Quoted 38 lines
modules/services/icecream.te +38
-0+files_search_tmp(iceccd_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, { dir file }) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(iceccd_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(iceccd_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(iceccd_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(iceccd_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_iceccd_port(iceccd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_icecc_scheduler_port(iceccd_t) +corenet_sendrecv_iceccd_server_packets(iceccd_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(iceccd_t) +corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(iceccd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(iceccd_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(iceccd_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(iceccd_t) + +sysnet_read_config(iceccd_t) + +libs_use_ld_so(iceccd_t) +libs_use_shared_libs(iceccd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(iceccd_t) + +######################################## +# +# iceccd_createenv policy +#
modules/services/icecream.te line 132
Quoted 10 lines
modules/services/icecream.te +10
-0+ +allow iceccd_createenv_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +dontaudit iceccd_createenv_t iceccd_tmp_t:file { execute }; + +allow iceccd_createenv_t iceccd_log_t:file { append }; + +manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) +# no files_var_filetrans, createenv does not create the cache dir itself
Does iceccd_createenv_t not need: files_search_var(iceccd_createenv_t)? I expect that it needs to search /var to be able to find files/dirs with type iceccd_cache_t and i do not see where it is allowed to search /var
It can be that the search perm is included in one of the interfaces below
.
modules/services/icecream.te line 136
Quoted 4 lines
modules/services/icecream.te +4
-0+ +manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t, { dir file })
Does iceccd_createenv_t not need: files_search_tmp(iceccd_createenv_t)? I expect that it needs to search /tmp to be able to find files/dirs with type iceccd_tmp_t and i do not see where it is allowed to search /tmp.
It can be that the search perm is included in one of the interfaces below
Quoted 28 lines
modules/services/icecream.te +28
-0+ +corecmd_exec_bin(iceccd_createenv_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(iceccd_createenv_t) + +dev_read_urand(iceccd_createenv_t) + +files_read_etc_files(iceccd_createenv_t) +files_read_usr_files(iceccd_createenv_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(iceccd_createenv_t) + +libs_exec_ld_so(iceccd_createenv_t) +libs_exec_lib_files(iceccd_createenv_t) + +libs_domtrans_ldconfig(iceccd_createenv_t) + +libs_use_ld_so(iceccd_createenv_t) +libs_use_shared_libs(iceccd_createenv_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(iceccd_createenv_t) + +userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(iceccd_createenv_t) + +optional_policy(` + nscd_socket_use(iceccd_createenv_t) +') + +########################################
modules/services/icecream.te line 174
Quoted 10 lines
modules/services/icecream.te +10
-0+# +# iceccd_untrusted policy +# + +allow iceccd_untrusted_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow iceccd_untrusted_t self:process signal_perms; +allow iceccd_untrusted_t iceccd_t:unix_stream_socket rw_sock_file_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) +
Does iceccd_untrusted_t not need: files_search_var(iceccd_untrusted_t)? I expect that it needs to search /var to be able to find files/dirs with type iceccd_cache_t and i do not see where it is allowed to search /var
Quoted 46 lines
modules/services/icecream.te +30
-0+can_exec(iceccd_untrusted_t, iceccd_cache_t) + +######################################## +# +# icecc_scheduler policy +# + +allow icecc_scheduler_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow icecc_scheduler_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_icecc_scheduler_port(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_udp_bind_icecc_scheduler_port(icecc_scheduler_t) +corenet_sendrecv_icecc_scheduler_server_packets(icecc_scheduler_t) + +files_read_etc_files(icecc_scheduler_t) + +libs_use_ld_so(icecc_scheduler_t) +libs_use_shared_libs(icecc_scheduler_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(icecc_scheduler_t)Index: policy/modules/services/icecream.fc
===================================================================modules/services/icecream.fc +5
-0@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +/usr/sbin/iceccd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib(64)?/icecc/icecc-create-env -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_createenv_exec_t,s0) +/var/cache/icecream(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_cache_t,s0) +/var/log/iceccd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_log_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/icecc-scheduler -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:icecc_scheduler_exec_t,s0)Index: policy/modules/services/icecream.if
===================================================================modules/services/icecream.if +1
-0@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +## <summary>Icecream distributed compiler daemon</summary>
PATCH 1/1 add policy for Icecream
Quoted 19 lines · On Tue, 03 Mar 2009 01:08:46 +0100 Dominick Grift wrote:
Review
Quoted 12 lines · Michal Schmidt
+domtrans_pattern(iceccd_t,
iceccd_createenv_exec_t,iceccd_createenv_t) +domtrans_pattern(iceccd_t,iceccd_cache_t,iceccd_untrusted_t) +(quoted diff) +9
-0+manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_log_t, iceccd_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_log_t, file) + +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_var_run_t, iceccd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_var_run_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, iceccd_cache_t) +files_var_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_cache_t, { dir file })Does
iceccd_tnot need:files_search_var(iceccd_t)?
I expect that it needs to search /var to be able to find files/dirs with type iceccd_cache_t/iceccd_log_t/iceccd_var_run_t and i do not see where it is allowed to search /var
Quoted 4 lines
It might also need permission to search
var_run_t,var_log_t?It can be that the search perm is included in one of the interfaces below.
Permission to search /var is already implied:files_var_filetrans(iceccd_t, ..., ...) =>
filetrans_pattern(iceccd_t, var_t, ..., ...) =>
allow iceccd_t var_t:dir rw_dir_perms; (and rw_dir_perms contain the search permission.)
Similarly,files_pid_filetrans implies the permission to search var_run_t and logging_log_filetrans implies the permission to search var_log_t.
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Review
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-0+files_search_tmp(iceccd_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(iceccd_t, iceccd_tmp_t, { dir file })
I see that by the same logic I can remove the explicit files_search_tmp, because it's already given by files_tmp_filetrans.
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+manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t,
iceccd_cache_t,iceccd_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t,iceccd_cache_t,iceccd_cache_t) +# nofiles_var_filetrans, createenv does not create the cache dir itself
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Does
iceccd_createenv_tnot need:files_search_var(iceccd_createenv_t)? I expect that it needs to search /var to be able to find files/dirs with typeiceccd_cache_tand i do not see where it is allowed to search /varIt can be that the search perm is included in one of the interfaces below.
Ah, it gets included via nscd_socket_use. And since this is only in an optional_policy block, it's a bug. I must explicitly add files_search_var(iceccd_createenv_t)
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-0+ +manage_dirs_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t, iceccd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_createenv_t, iceccd_tmp_t,
iceccd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(iceccd_createenv_t,iceccd_tmp_t, { dir file })Does
iceccd_createenv_tnot need:files_search_tmp(iceccd_createenv_t)? I expect that it needs to search /tmp to be able to find files/dirs with typeiceccd_tmp_tand i do not see where it is allowed to search /tmp.
This is included via files_tmp_filetrans.
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-0+allow iceccd_untrusted_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow iceccd_untrusted_t self:process signal_perms; +allow iceccd_untrusted_t iceccd_t:unix_stream_socket
rw_sock_file_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(iceccd_untrusted_t,iceccd_cache_t,iceccd_cache_t) +Does
iceccd_untrusted_tnot need:files_search_var(iceccd_untrusted_t)? I expect that it needs to search /var to be able to find files/dirs with typeiceccd_cache_tand i do not see where it is allowed to search /var
iceccd_untrusted_t runs in a chroot, with iceccd_cache_t files and directories only. It never sees the leading components of the path (/var/cache/).
Updated patch below.
Michal
This adds the policy for Icecream, a distributed compiler.
modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in +2 -0
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ network_port(howl, tcp,5335,s0, udp,5353,s0) network_port(hplip, tcp,1782,s0, tcp,2207,s0, tcp,2208,s0, tcp, 8290,s0, tcp,50000,s0, tcp,50002,s0, tcp,8292,s0, tcp,9100,s0, tcp,9101,s0, tcp,9102,s0, tcp,9220,s0, tcp,9221,s0, tcp,9222,s0, tcp,9280,s0, tcp,9281,s0, tcp,9282,s0, tcp,9290,s0, tcp,9291,s0, tcp,9292,s0) network_port(i18n_input, tcp,9010,s0) +network_port(iceccd, tcp,10245,s0) +network_port(icecc_scheduler, tcp,8765,s0, tcp,8766,s0, udp,8765,s0) network_port(imaze, tcp,5323,s0, udp,5323,s0) network_port(inetd_child, tcp,1,s0, udp,1,s0, tcp,7,s0, udp,7,s0, tcp,9,s0, udp,9,s0, tcp,13,s0, udp,13,s0, tcp,19,s0, udp,19,s0, tcp,37,s0, udp,37,s0, tcp,512,s0, tcp,543,s0, tcp,544,s0, tcp,891,s0, udp,891,s0, tcp,892,s0, udp,892,s0, tcp,2105,s0, tcp,5666,s0) network_port(innd, tcp,119,s0)
modules/services/icecream.te +204 -0
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modules/services/icecream.fc +5 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +/usr/sbin/iceccd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib(64)?/icecc/icecc-create-env -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_createenv_exec_t,s0) +/var/cache/icecream(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_cache_t,s0) +/var/log/iceccd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceccd_log_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/icecc-scheduler -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:icecc_scheduler_exec_t,s0)
modules/services/icecream.if +1 -0
@@ -0,0 +1 @@ +## <summary>Icecream distributed compiler daemon</summary>