eCryptfs: Don't encrypt file key with filename key
PATCH 1/1 eCryptfs: Don't encrypt file key with filename key
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the FNEK.
This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK from being encrypted with a FNEK.
--- fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 2 ++ fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 3 ++- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 3 ++- fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c +2 -0
@@ -946,6 +946,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(list_for_each_entry (global_auth_tok, &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, mount_crypt_stat_list) { +if (global_auth_tok->flags &ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK ) +continue ; rc =ecryptfs_add_keysig (crypt_stat, global_auth_tok->sig);if (rc) {printk (KERN_ERR "Error adding keysig; rc = [%d]\n" , rc);
fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h +2 -1
@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_dentry_info {*/ struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok {#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID 0x00000001 +#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK 0x00000002u32 flags;struct list_head mount_crypt_stat_list;struct key *global_auth_tok_key;
@@ -696,7 +697,7 @@ ecryptfs_write_header_metadata(char *virt,int ecryptfs_add_keysig (struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,char *sig);int ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok (struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, -char *sig); +char *sig,u32 global_auth_tok_flags);int ecryptfs_get_global_auth_tok_for_sig (struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok,struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,char *sig);
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +2 -1
@@ -2375,7 +2375,7 @@ struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache;int ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok (struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, -char *sig) +char *sig,u32 global_auth_tok_flags) {struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *new_auth_tok;int rc =0 ;
@@ -2389,6 +2389,7 @@ ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, goto out; }memcpy (new_auth_tok->sig, sig,ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX ); + new_auth_tok->flags = global_auth_tok_flags; new_auth_tok->sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX ] ='\0' ;mutex_lock (&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); list_add(&new_auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list,
fs/ecryptfs/main.c +3 -2
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig: sig_src = args[0 ].from; rc =ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok (mount_crypt_stat, - sig_src); + sig_src,0 );if (rc) {printk (KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register " "global sig; rc = [%d]\n" , rc);
@@ -370,7 +370,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0'; rc =ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok ( mount_crypt_stat, - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig); + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig, +ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK );if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register " "global fnek sig [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",
Signature · 1 line
1.5.3.7
Quoted 11 lines · Tyler Hicks
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the FNEK.
This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK from being encrypted with a FNEK.
Right, so the file name encryption key is the same for all the files, whereas you can have multiple file encryption key encryption keys. So this bug means that the ability to have multiple FEKEKs becomes completely worthless.
This makes me wonder if it's not worth doing a complete code-vs-design comparison to make sure there are no other such gems hidden away.
Tyler, do you have a user-space (hopefully easier-to-read) parser for encrypted ecryptfs files? (ISTR they were closely following a gpg format)
Quoted 88 lines
Signed-off-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>--- fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 2 ++ fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 3 ++- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 3 ++- fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c +2
-0@@ -946,6 +946,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(list_for_each_entry (global_auth_tok, &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, mount_crypt_stat_list) { +if (global_auth_tok->flags &ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK ) +continue ; rc =ecryptfs_add_keysig (crypt_stat, global_auth_tok->sig);if (rc) {printk (KERN_ERR "Error adding keysig; rc = [%d]\n" , rc);fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h +2
-1@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_dentry_info {*/ struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok {#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID 0x00000001 +#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK 0x00000002u32 flags;struct list_head mount_crypt_stat_list;struct key *global_auth_tok_key;@@ -696,7 +697,7 @@ ecryptfs_write_header_metadata(char *virt,int ecryptfs_add_keysig (struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,char *sig);int ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok (struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, -char *sig); +char *sig,u32 global_auth_tok_flags);int ecryptfs_get_global_auth_tok_for_sig (struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok,struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,char *sig);fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +2
-1@@ -2375,7 +2375,7 @@ struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache;int ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok (struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, -char *sig) +char *sig,u32 global_auth_tok_flags) {struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *new_auth_tok;int rc =0 ;@@ -2389,6 +2389,7 @@ ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, goto out; }memcpy (new_auth_tok->sig, sig,ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX ); + new_auth_tok->flags = global_auth_tok_flags; new_auth_tok->sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX ] ='\0' ;mutex_lock (&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); list_add(&new_auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list,fs/ecryptfs/main.c +3
-2@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig: sig_src = args[0 ].from; rc =ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok (mount_crypt_stat, - sig_src); + sig_src,0 );if (rc) {printk (KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register " "global sig; rc = [%d]\n" , rc);@@ -370,7 +370,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0'; rc =ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok ( mount_crypt_stat, - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig); + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig, +ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK );if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register " "global fnek sig [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",Signature · 1 line
1.5.3.7
Quoted 13 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Quoted 11 lines · Tyler Hicks
eCryptfs has file encryption keys (FEK), file encryption key encryption keys (FEKEK), and filename encryption keys (FNEK). The per-file FEK is encrypted with one or more FEKEKs and stored in the header of the encrypted file. I noticed that the FEK is also being encrypted by the FNEK. This is a problem if a user wants to use a different FNEK than their FEKEK, as their file contents will still be accessible with the FNEK.
This is a minimalistic patch which prevents the FNEKs signatures from being copied to the inode signatures list. Ultimately, it keeps the FEK from being encrypted with a FNEK.
Quoted 7 lines
Right, so the file name encryption key is the same for all the files, whereas you can have multiple file encryption key encryption keys. So this bug means that the ability to have multiple FEKEKs becomes completely worthless.
This makes me wonder if it's not worth doing a complete code-vs-design comparison to make sure there are no other such gems hidden away.
After becoming the primary contact for the eCryptfs kernel code, I've slowly been doing this. That's sort of how I came across this problem.
Keep in mind that filename encryption is pretty new and 2.6.29 is the
first release it will be in.
Quoted 4 lines
Tyler, do you have a user-space (hopefully easier-to-read) parser for encrypted ecryptfs files? (ISTR they were closely following a gpg format)
This is very much needed! Especially with filename encryption. ecryptfs-stat exists in the ecryptfs-utils package, but it doesn't have too much functionality yet. I'll open a couple bugs against ecryptfs-stat and subscribe you so that you can stay updated.
Quoted 89 lines
Quoted 89 lines
Signed-off-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>--- fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 2 ++ fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h | 3 ++- fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 3 ++- fs/ecryptfs/main.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c +2
-0@@ -946,6 +946,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_copy_mount_wide_sigs_to_inode_sigs(list_for_each_entry (global_auth_tok, &mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list, mount_crypt_stat_list) { +if (global_auth_tok->flags &ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK ) +continue ; rc =ecryptfs_add_keysig (crypt_stat, global_auth_tok->sig);if (rc) {printk (KERN_ERR "Error adding keysig; rc = [%d]\n" , rc);fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h +2
-1@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ struct ecryptfs_dentry_info {*/ struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok {#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_INVALID 0x00000001 +#define ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK 0x00000002u32 flags;struct list_head mount_crypt_stat_list;struct key *global_auth_tok_key;@@ -696,7 +697,7 @@ ecryptfs_write_header_metadata(char *virt,int ecryptfs_add_keysig (struct ecryptfs_crypt_stat *crypt_stat,char *sig);int ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok (struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, -char *sig); +char *sig,u32 global_auth_tok_flags);int ecryptfs_get_global_auth_tok_for_sig (struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok **global_auth_tok,struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat,char *sig);fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c +2
-1@@ -2375,7 +2375,7 @@ struct kmem_cache *ecryptfs_global_auth_tok_cache;int ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok (struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, -char *sig) +char *sig,u32 global_auth_tok_flags) {struct ecryptfs_global_auth_tok *new_auth_tok;int rc =0 ;@@ -2389,6 +2389,7 @@ ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok(struct ecryptfs_mount_crypt_stat *mount_crypt_stat, goto out; }memcpy (new_auth_tok->sig, sig,ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX ); + new_auth_tok->flags = global_auth_tok_flags; new_auth_tok->sig[ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX ] ='\0' ;mutex_lock (&mount_crypt_stat->global_auth_tok_list_mutex); list_add(&new_auth_tok->mount_crypt_stat_list,fs/ecryptfs/main.c +3
-2@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options)case ecryptfs_opt_ecryptfs_sig: sig_src = args[0 ].from; rc =ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok (mount_crypt_stat, - sig_src); + sig_src,0 );if (rc) {printk (KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register " "global sig; rc = [%d]\n" , rc);@@ -370,7 +370,8 @@ static int ecryptfs_parse_options(struct super_block *sb, char *options) ECRYPTFS_SIG_SIZE_HEX] = '\0'; rc =ecryptfs_add_global_auth_tok ( mount_crypt_stat, - mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig); + mount_crypt_stat->global_default_fnek_sig, +ECRYPTFS_AUTH_TOK_FNEK );if (rc) { printk(KERN_ERR "Error attempting to register " "global fnek sig [%s]; rc = [%d]\n",Signature · 1 line
1.5.3.7
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Right, so the file name encryption key is the same for all the files, whereas you can have multiple file encryption key encryption keys. So this bug means that the ability to have multiple FEKEKs becomes completely worthless.
True, but only for files created up until this point with eCryptfs filename encryption enabled.
Considering 2.6.29 is in RC, and Ubuntu Jaunty is still in Alpha (which is carrying a backport of eCryptfs against 2.6.28), this should be a relatively controlled set of affected individuals who should be at least somewhat aware that they're running pre-release code.
+1, ACK on Tyler's patch. It's a good, simple fix. We're going to carry that against Ubuntu's kernel. I certainly hope that it will make it into 2.6.29 which should land on a lot more systems.
Quoted 2 lines
This makes me wonder if it's not worth doing a complete code-vs-design comparison to make sure there are no other such gems hidden away.
Definitely a good idea.
Quoted 3 lines
Tyler, do you have a user-space (hopefully easier-to-read) parser for encrypted ecryptfs files? (ISTR they were closely following a gpg format)
I'll take the to-do to fix this in userspace. I've file a bug for my own tracking purposes. I'll update this as I enhance the ecryptfs-stat utility:
* https://bugs.launchpad.net/ecryptfs/+bug/342398
Signature · 7 lines
:-Dustin Dustin Kirkland Ubuntu Server Developer Canonical, LTD [email protected] GPG: 1024D/83A61194