don't raise all privs on setuid-root file with fE set (v2)
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 don't raise all privs on setuid-root file with fE set (v2)
Distributions face a backward compatibility problem with starting to use file capabilities. For instance, removing setuid root from ping and doing setcap cap_net_raw=pe means that booting with an older kernel or one compiled without file capabilities means ping won't work for non-root users.
In order to replace the setuid root bit on a capability-unaware program, one has to set the effective, or legacy, file capability, which makes the capability effective immediately. This patch uses the legacy bit as a queue to not automatically add full privilege to a setuid-root program.
So, with this patch, an ordinary setuid-root program will run with privilege. But if /bin/ping has both setuid-root and cap_net_raw in fP and fE, then ping (when run by non-root user) will not run with only cap_net_raw.
Changelog:
Apr 2 2009: Print a message once when such a binary is loaded,
as per James Morris' suggestion.
Apr 2 2009: Fix the condition to only catch uid!=0 && euid==0.
--- security/commoncap.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
security/commoncap.c +32 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,28 @@#include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/securebits.h> +/* +* If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in +* !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. +* However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only +* the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root +* bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or +* to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities +* support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities. +* +* Warn if that happens, once per boot. +*/ +static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed (char *fname) +{ +static int warned; +if (!warned) { +printk (KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and" +" effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all" +" capabilities.\n" , fname); + warned =1 ; + } +} +int cap_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) {NETLINK_CB (skb).eff_cap =current_cap ();
@@ -464,6 +486,15 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)if (!issecure (SECURE_NOROOT )) {/* +* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs +* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it +* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin. +*/ +if (effective && new->uid !=0 && new->euid ==0 ) { +warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed (bprm->filename); + goto skip; + } +/* * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root * executables under compatibility mode, we override the * capability sets for the file.
@@ -478,6 +509,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)if (new->euid ==0 ) effective = true; } +skip:/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
Signature · 1 line
1.5.4.3
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 7 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Changelog:
Apr 2 2009: Print a message once when such a binary is loaded,
as per James Morris' suggestion.
Apr 2 2009: Fix the condition to only catch uid!=0 && euid==0.Signed-off-by Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>Acked-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Applied togit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
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Quoted 10 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Distributions face a backward compatibility problem with starting to use file capabilities. For instance, removing setuid root from ping and doing setcap cap_net_raw=pe means that booting with an older kernel or one compiled without file capabilities means ping won't work for non-root users.
In order to replace the setuid root bit on a capability-unaware program, one has to set the effective, or legacy, file capability, which makes the capability effective immediately. This patch uses the legacy bit as a queue to not automatically add full
s/queue/cue/
Quoted 6 lines
privilege to a setuid-root program.
So, with this patch, an ordinary setuid-root program will run with privilege. But if
/bin/pinghas both setuid-root andcap_net_rawin fP and fE, then ping (when run by non-root user) will not run with onlycap_net_raw.
Cheers
Andrew
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Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerQuoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Distributions face a backward compatibility problem with starting to use file capabilities. For instance, removing setuid root from ping and doing setcap cap_net_raw=pe means that booting with an older kernel or one compiled without file capabilities means ping won't work for non-root users.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
In order to replace the setuid root bit on a capability-unaware program, one has to set the effective, or legacy, file capability, which makes the capability effective immediately. This patch uses the legacy bit as a queue to not automatically add full
s/queue/cue/
Oops.
(I wonder whether this is worth resending?)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
privilege to a setuid-root program.
So, with this patch, an ordinary setuid-root program will run with privilege. But if
/bin/pinghas both setuid-root andcap_net_rawin fP and fE, then ping (when run by non-root user) will not run with onlycap_net_raw.Acked-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
thanks,
-serge