CRED: Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against ptrace
Subsystems (6)
PATCH 1/2 CRED: Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against ptrace
Rename cred_exec_mutex to reflect that it's a guard against foreign intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made by ptrace(). The attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state.
---
fs/compat.c | 6 +++--- fs/exec.c | 10 +++++----- include/linux/init_task.h | 4 ++-- include/linux/sched.h | 4 +++- kernel/cred.c | 4 ++-- kernel/ptrace.c | 9 +++++---- 6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
fs/compat.c +3 -3
@@ -1488,7 +1488,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,if (!bprm) goto out_files; - retval =mutex_lock_interruptible (¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + retval =mutex_lock_interruptible (¤t->cred_guard_mutex);if (retval <0 ) goto out_free; current->in_execve =1 ;
@@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,/* execve succeeded */ current->fs->in_exec =0 ; current->in_execve =0 ; -mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_exec_mutex); +mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_guard_mutex);acct_update_integrals (current);free_bprm (bprm);if (displaced)
@@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ out_unmark: out_unlock: current->in_execve =0 ; -mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_exec_mutex); +mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_guard_mutex); out_free:free_bprm (bprm);
fs/exec.c +5 -5
@@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)commit_creds (bprm->cred); bprm->cred =NULL ; -/* cred_exec_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent +/* cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked */
@@ -1055,7 +1055,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds);/* * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program -* - the caller must hold current->cred_exec_mutex to protect against +* - the caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex to protect against * PTRACE_ATTACH */ int check_unsafe_exec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
@@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,if (!bprm) goto out_files; - retval =mutex_lock_interruptible (¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + retval =mutex_lock_interruptible (¤t->cred_guard_mutex);if (retval <0 ) goto out_free; current->in_execve =1 ;
@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,/* execve succeeded */ current->fs->in_exec =0 ; current->in_execve =0 ; -mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_exec_mutex); +mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_guard_mutex);acct_update_integrals (current);free_bprm (bprm);if (displaced)
@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ out_unmark: out_unlock: current->in_execve =0 ; -mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_exec_mutex); +mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_guard_mutex); out_free:free_bprm (bprm);
include/linux/init_task.h +2 -2
@@ -145,8 +145,8 @@ extern struct cred init_cred; .group_leader = &tsk, \ .real_cred = &init_cred, \ .cred = &init_cred, \ - .cred_exec_mutex = \ - __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tsk.cred_exec_mutex), \ + .cred_guard_mutex = \ + __MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tsk.cred_guard_mutex), \ .comm = "swapper", \ .thread = INIT_THREAD, \ .fs = &init_fs, \
include/linux/sched.h +3 -1
@@ -1247,7 +1247,9 @@ struct task_struct {* credentials (COW) */ const struct cred *cred;/* effective (overridable) subjective task * credentials (COW) */ -struct mutex cred_exec_mutex;/* execve vs ptrace cred calculation mutex */ +struct mutex cred_guard_mutex;/* guard against foreign influences on +* credential calculations +* (notably. ptrace) */ char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN ];/* executable name excluding path - access with [gs]et_task_comm (which lock
kernel/cred.c +2 -2
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);/* * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve() -* - The caller must hold current->cred_exec_mutex +* - The caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex */ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds (void ) {
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)struct cred *new;int ret; -mutex_init (&p->cred_exec_mutex); +mutex_init (&p->cred_guard_mutex); if (#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
kernel/ptrace.c +5 -4
@@ -185,10 +185,11 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)if (same_thread_group (task, current)) goto out; -/* Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference; -* SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently under ptrace. +/* Protect the target's credential calculations against our +* interference; SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently +* under ptrace. */ - retval =mutex_lock_interruptible (&task->cred_exec_mutex); + retval =mutex_lock_interruptible (&task->cred_guard_mutex);if (retval <0 ) goto out;
@@ -232,7 +233,7 @@ repeat: bad:write_unlock_irqrestore (&tasklist_lock, flags);task_unlock (task); -mutex_unlock (&task->cred_exec_mutex); +mutex_unlock (&task->cred_guard_mutex); out:return retval; }
PATCH 2/2 CRED: Guard the setprocattr security hook against ptrace
Guard the setprocattr security hook against ptrace by taking the target task's cred_guard_mutex around it. The problem is that setprocattr() may otherwise note the lack of a debugger, and then perform an action on that basis whilst letting a debugger attach between the two points. Holding cred_guard_mutex across the test and the action prevents ptrace_attach() from doing that.
---
fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
fs/proc/base.c +6 -0
@@ -2128,9 +2128,15 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,if (copy_from_user (page, buf, count)) goto out_free; +/* Guard against adverse ptrace interaction */ + length =mutex_lock_interruptible (&task->cred_guard_mutex); +if (length <0 ) + goto out_free; + length =security_setprocattr (task, (char *)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, (void *)page, count); +mutex_unlock (&task->cred_guard_mutex); out_free:free_page ((unsigned long ) page); out:
Re: [PATCH 2/2] CRED: Guard the setprocattr security hook against ptrace
Quoted 7 lines · David Howells
Guard the setprocattr security hook against ptrace by taking the target task's
cred_guard_mutexaround it. The problem is thatsetprocattr()may otherwise note the lack of a debugger, and then perform an action on that basis whilst letting a debugger attach between the two points. Holdingcred_guard_mutexacross the test and the action preventsptrace_attach()from doing that.Signed-off-by David Howells <[email protected]>
Applied togit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Oleg Nesterov
maintainerSorry for delay,
Quoted 17 lines · David Howells
kernel/ptrace.c +4
-3@@ -185,10 +185,11 @@ int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task)if (same_thread_group (task, current)) goto out; -/* Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference; -* SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently under ptrace. +/* Protect the target's credential calculations against our +* interference; SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently +* under ptrace. */ - retval =mutex_lock_interruptible (&task->cred_exec_mutex); + retval =mutex_lock_interruptible (&task->cred_guard_mutex);if (retval <0 ) goto out;
kernel/ptrace.c repeat: · line 236
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/ptrace.c +1
-1@@ -232,7 +233,7 @@ repeat: bad:write_unlock_irqrestore (&tasklist_lock, flags);task_unlock (task); -mutex_unlock (&task->cred_exec_mutex); +mutex_unlock (&task->cred_guard_mutex);
This rename is obviously fine, but conflicts with ptrace-do-not-use-task_lock-for-attach.patch in -mm tree:
-bad:
- write_unlock_irqrestore(&tasklist_lock, flags);
- task_unlock(task);
+unlock_tasklist:
+ write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+unlock_creds:
mutex_unlock(&task->cred_exec_mutex);
out:
return retval;Hmm. Ingo's "rename ptrace_may_access => ptrace_access_check" conflicts with my patch too.
Andrew, Roland, I guess I should re-send
ptrace-ptrace_attach-check-pf_kthread-exit_state-instead-of-mm.patch ptrace-cleanup-check-set-of-pt_ptraced-during-attach.patch ptrace-do-not-use-task_lock-for-attach.patch
patches?
Oleg.
Quoted 2 lines
Hmm. Ingo's "rename
ptrace_may_access=>ptrace_access_check" conflicts with my patch too.
Andrew seemed to want a different name choice too, so that will have to be resolved before we worry about patch conflicts.
Quoted 7 lines
Andrew, Roland, I guess I should re-send
ptrace-ptrace_attach-check-pf_kthread-exit_state-instead-of-mm.patch ptrace-cleanup-check-set-of-pt_ptraced-during-attach.patch ptrace-do-not-use-task_lock-for-attach.patch
patches?
I guess so too. Your series of changes is more substantial and potentially controversial or problematic than the various renamings, so I think it makes sense to settle and merge the renamings first.
Thanks,
Roland
Quoted 12 lines · Roland McGrath
Quoted 2 lines
Hmm. Ingo's "rename
ptrace_may_access=>ptrace_access_check" conflicts with my patch too.Andrew seemed to want a different name choice too, so that will have to be resolved before we worry about patch conflicts.
Quoted 6 lines
Andrew, Roland, I guess I should re-send
ptrace-ptrace_attach-check-pf_kthread-exit_state-instead-of-mm.patch ptrace-cleanup-check-set-of-pt_ptraced-during-attach.patch ptrace-do-not-use-task_lock-for-attach.patch
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
patches?
I guess so too. Your series of changes is more substantial and potentially controversial or problematic than the various renamings, so I think it makes sense to settle and merge the renamings first.
yeah, cleanups first is generally the better strategy. Not only does it make reverts easier, it also makes it easier to review (and potentially fix) later patches.
Ingo
Quoted 6 lines · David Howells
Rename
cred_exec_mutexto reflect that it's a guard against foreign intervention on a process's credential state, such as is made byptrace(). The attachment of a debugger to a process affects execve()'s calculation of the new credential state - _and_ also setprocattr()'s calculation of that state.Signed-off-by David Howells <[email protected]>
Applied togit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>