sysctl: forbid too long numbers
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 sysctl: forbid too long numbers
For some file under /proc/sys/kernel, the valid values for them are < ULONG_MAX if they don't have they own max value defined. Thus, numbers longer than are invalid.
So use strict_strtoul() instead of simple_strtoul(), and make strict_strtoul() more strict.
---
kernel/sysctl.c +2 -1
@@ -2331,7 +2331,8 @@ static int __do_proc_dointvec(void *tbl_data, struct ctl_table *table,if (*p <'0' || *p >'9' )break ; - lval =simple_strtoul (p, &p,0 ); +if (strict_strtoul (p,0 , &lval)) +return -EINVAL ; len = p-buf;if ((len < left) && *p && !isspace (*p))
lib/vsprintf.c +3 -0
@@ -163,11 +163,14 @@ int strict_strtoul(const char *cp, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res)char *tail;unsigned long val;size_t len; +char tmp[32 ]; *res =0 ; len =strlen (cp);if (len ==0 )return -EINVAL ; +if (len >snprintf (tmp,"%ld" ,ULONG_MAX )) +return -EINVAL ; val =simple_strtoul (cp, &tail, base);if (tail == cp)
Andrew Morton
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · On Fri, 19 Jun 2009 03:19:57 -0400 Amerigo Wang <[email protected]> wrote:
For some file under
/proc/sys/kernel, the valid values for them are <ULONG_MAXif they don't have they own max value defined. Thus, numbers longer than are invalid.So use
strict_strtoul()instead ofsimple_strtoul(), and makestrict_strtoul()more strict.
The changelog is a bit puzzling.
I think that what you're saying is that we can do
echo 9999999999999999999999999999999999999999999 > /proc/whatever
and that the kernel will take the lower 32 (or 64) bits of that number and will accept this without error?
If so then I expect there are zillions of procfs/sysfs/debugfs/etc files which have the same problem?
Also, fixing this is a non-backward-compatible change which could break existing userspace. Although the chances of this seem fairly small.
Or are they? One could imagine a script which was tested and developed on a 64-bit system, which writes a >4G number into a pseudo file. That script happens to work on 32-bit systems (it might not work _well_, but it'll work). With this change, the write will fail on the 32-bit system and the entire application could bale out or something.
I'm not saying that this is a reason to avoid making the change, but it's all a worry and needs consideration.
Quoted 6 lines
---
kernel/sysctl.c +0
-0
kernel/sysctl.c static int __do_proc_dointvec(void *tbl_data, struct ctl_table *table, · line 2338
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/sysctl.c +2
-1@@ -2331,7 +2331,8 @@ static int __do_proc_dointvec(void *tbl_data, struct ctl_table *table,if (*p <'0' || *p >'9' )break ; - lval =simple_strtoul (p, &p,0 ); +if (strict_strtoul (p,0 , &lval)) +return -EINVAL ; len = p-buf;if ((len < left) && *p && !isspace (*p))
The other worrisome thing about this change is that there may well be existing userspace which does
echo 42foo > /proc/whatever
and the conversion to strict_strtoul() will cause that script to newly fail.
And the chances that there are scripts which do this are pretty darned good - it's fairly easy to accidentally leave junk like this in strings when hacking stuff together in scripting languages.
Quoted 9 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +1
-0@@ -163,11 +163,14 @@ int strict_strtoul(const char *cp, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res)char *tail;unsigned long val;size_t len; +char tmp[32 ];
lib/vsprintf.c int strict_strtoul(const char *cp, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res) · line 176
Quoted 10 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +2
-0*res =0 ; len =strlen (cp);if (len ==0 )return -EINVAL ; +if (len >snprintf (tmp,"%ld" ,ULONG_MAX )) +return -EINVAL ; val =simple_strtoul (cp, &tail, base);if (tail == cp)
And here we're doing a check for that overflow, yes?
- We don't need tmp[]. vsnprintf(NULL, ...) can be used to query the length of an sprintf. See how kvasprintf() does this.
- The strict_strtoul() documentation should be updated?
- The above change affects strict_strtol() too.
- The same change should be made to strict_strtoull() and hence strict_strtoll()?
Quoted 8 lines · Andrew Morton
Or are they? One could imagine a script which was tested and developed on a 64-bit system, which writes a >4G number into a pseudo file. That script happens to work on 32-bit systems (it might not work _well_, but it'll work). With this change, the write will fail on the 32-bit system and the entire application could bale out or something.
I'm not saying that this is a reason to avoid making the change, but it's all a worry and needs consideration.
This would break at least one existing setup that I know of. Consider an environment where shmmax is set to the value the biggest server needs (well over 4GB) on all database servers to simplify management. This change would cause the database to fail on the old 32 bit servers used for testing and QA.
Lee
Quoted 13 lines · Andrew Morton
Also, fixing this is a non-backward-compatible change which could break existing userspace. Although the chances of this seem fairly small.
Or are they? One could imagine a script which was tested and developed on a 64-bit system, which writes a >4G number into a pseudo file. That script happens to work on 32-bit systems (it might not work _well_, but it'll work). With this change, the write will fail on the 32-bit system and the entire application could bale out or something.
I'm not saying that this is a reason to avoid making the change, but it's all a worry and needs consideration.
Ah, I didn't consider this situation...
Hmm... but only taking the lower 32-bits really looks strange.
Quoted 13 lines
The other worrisome thing about this change is that there may well be existing userspace which does
echo 42foo >
/proc/whateverand the conversion to
strict_strtoul()will cause that script to newly fail.And the chances that there are scripts which do this are pretty darned good - it's fairly easy to accidentally leave junk like this in strings when hacking stuff together in scripting languages.
Yeah, maybe, but that is really tricky...
Quoted 28 lines
Quoted 12 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +1
-0@@ -163,11 +163,14 @@ int strict_strtoul(const char *cp, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res)char *tail;unsigned long val;size_t len; +char tmp[32 ];lib/vsprintf.c int strict_strtoul(const char *cp, unsigned int base, unsigned long *res) · line 176
Quoted 10 lines
lib/vsprintf.c +2
-0*res =0 ; len =strlen (cp);if (len ==0 )return -EINVAL ; +if (len >snprintf (tmp,"%ld" ,ULONG_MAX )) +return -EINVAL ; val =simple_strtoul (cp, &tail, base);if (tail == cp)And here we're doing a check for that overflow, yes?
- We don't need tmp[].
vsnprintf(NULL, ...)can be used to query the length of an sprintf. See howkvasprintf()does this.
Quoted 8 lines
- The
strict_strtoul()documentation should be updated?- The above change affects
strict_strtol()too.- The same change should be made to
strict_strtoull()and hencestrict_strtoll()?
Good points!
I agree, so maybe we only need to change this part? Hmm, I need to check the callers of strict_strtol()...
Thank you!