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intel_txt: Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support for Linux - Overview

RFC PATCH Superseded Joseph Cihula 3 participants 3 messages Jul 1, 2009 – Jul 2, 2009

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RFC PATCH v6 1/1 intel_txt: Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology support for Linux - Overview

Linux community,

The following patches are to add support for Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT) and the Trusted Boot open source project (tboot).

We request your feedback and suggestions.

This version of the patches renames the tboot_shared global (and associated struct, boot_params field, fixmap entry, etc.) to just 'tboot' in order to improve readability. It moves more code from existing Linux files into the tboot.c file and makes the flow much cleaner. It also has some stylistic and formatting changes to improve readability. Finally, a timeout has been added to the tboot_wait_for_aps() fn so that if the AP trampoline into tboot for entering the wait-for-sipi state fails for some reason that shutdown will continue (using the error path in the existing code).

Intel(R) TXT Overview:
=====================

Intel's technology for safer computing, Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT), defines platform-level enhancements that provide the building blocks for creating trusted platforms.

Intel TXT was formerly known by the code name LaGrande Technology (LT).

Intel TXT in Brief:

o  Provides dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM)
o  Data protection in case of improper shutdown
o  Measurement and verification of launched environment

Intel TXT is part of the vPro(TM) brand and is also available some non-vPro systems. It is currently available on desktop systems based on the Q35, X38, Q45, and Q43 Express chipsets (e.g. Dell Optiplex 755, HP dc7800, etc.) and mobile systems based on the GM45, PM45, and GS45 Express chipsets.

For more information, see http://www.intel.com/technology/security/.
This site also has a link to the Intel TXT MLE Developers Manual, which has been updated for the new released platforms.

Intel TXT has been presented at various events over the past few years, some of which are:

     LinuxTAG 2008: 

http://www.linuxtag.org/2008/en/conf/events/vp-donnerstag/details.html?talkid=110

     TRUST2008: 

http://www.trust2008.eu/downloads/Keynote-Speakers/3_David-Grawrock_The-Front-Door-of-Trusted-Computing.pdf

     IDF 2008, Shanghai: 

http://inteldeveloperforum.com.edgesuite.net/shanghai_2008/aep/PROS003/index.html

IDFs 2006, 2007 (I'm not sure if/where they are online)

Trusted Boot Project Overview:
=============================

Trusted Boot (tboot) is an open source, pre- kernel/VMM module that uses Intel TXT to perform a measured and verified launch of an OS kernel/VMM.

It is hosted on SourceForge at http://sourceforge.net/projects/tboot.
The mercurial source repo is available at
http://www.bughost.org/repos.hg/tboot.hg.

Tboot currently supports launching Xen (open source VMM/hypervisor w/ TXT support since v3.2), and now Linux kernels.

Value Proposition for Linux or "Why should you care?"
=====================================================

While there are many products and technologies that attempt to measure or protect the integrity of a running kernel, they all assume the kernel is "good" to begin with. The Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) and Linux Integrity Module interface are examples of such solutions.

To get trust in the initial kernel without using Intel TXT, a static root of trust must be used. This bases trust in BIOS starting at system reset and requires measurement of all code executed between system reset through the completion of the kernel boot as well as data objects used by that code. In the case of a Linux kernel, this means all of BIOS, any option ROMs, the bootloader and the boot config. In practice, this is a lot of code/data, much of which is subject to change from boot to boot (e.g. changing NICs may change option ROMs). Without reference hashes, these measurement changes are difficult to assess or confirm as benign. This process also does not provide DMA protection, memory configuration/alias checks and locks, crash protection, or policy support.

By using the hardware-based root of trust that Intel TXT provides, many of these issues can be mitigated. Specifically: many pre-launch components can be removed from the trust chain, DMA protection is provided to all launched components, a large number of platform configuration checks are performed and values locked, protection is provided for any data in the event of an improper shutdown, and there is support for policy-based execution/verification. This provides a more stable measurement and a higher assurance of system configuration and initial state than would be otherwise possible. Since the tboot project is open source, source code for almost all parts of the trust chain is available (excepting SMM and Intel-provided firmware).

Patchset:
========

These patches were tested on the latest linux-2.6.git and apply cleanly.

Patch 0a/4:  Overview and motivation (this email)
Patch 0b/4:  Details and how it works
Patch 1/4:   Boot, configuration, and documentation for TXT support
Patch 2/4:   TXT support for reboot/halt
Patch 3/4:   TXT support for S3/S4/S5
Patch 4/4:   Force DMAR enabled on TXT boot

Joseph Cihula
Shane Wang
Intel Corp.

#1 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines

Intel TXT has been presented at various events over the past few years, some of which are:

     LinuxTAG 2008: 

http://www.linuxtag.org/2008/en/conf/events/vp-donnerstag/details.html?talkid=110

     TRUST2008: 

http://www.trust2008.eu/downloads/Keynote-Speakers/3_David-Grawrock_The-Front-Door-of-Trusted-Computing.pdf

     IDF 2008, Shanghai: 

http://inteldeveloperforum.com.edgesuite.net/shanghai_2008/aep/PROS003/index.html

I may be doing something stupid, but AFAIK none of these links actually work; the trust2008.eu domain seems to be parked now, and the other two links are broken.

- R.

#2 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
     IDF 2008, Shanghai: 

http://inteldeveloperforum.com.edgesuite.net/shanghai_2008/aep/PROS003/index.html

I may be doing something stupid, but AFAIK none of these links actually work; the trust2008.eu domain seems to be parked now, and the other two links are broken.

IDF links expire unfortunately, you have to re-browse from the top of the website hierarchy. Wonders of dynamic websites ...

-Andi

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