Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c
Subsystems (7)
PATCH 1/3 Capabilities: move cap_file_mmap to commoncap.c
Currently we duplicate the mmap_min_addr test in cap_file_mmap and in security_file_mmap if !CONFIG_SECURITY. This patch moves cap_file_mmap into commoncap.c and then calls that function directly from security_file_mmap ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY like all of the other capability checks are done.
---
include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- security/capability.c | 9 --------- security/commoncap.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,extern int cap_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name);extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry);extern int cap_inode_killpriv (struct dentry *dentry); +extern int cap_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot, +unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only);extern int cap_task_fix_setuid (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,int flags);extern int cap_task_prctl (int option,unsigned long arg2,unsigned long arg3,unsigned long arg4,unsigned long arg5);
@@ -2197,9 +2200,7 @@ static inline int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only) { -if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) -return -EACCES ; -return 0 ; + return cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only); } static inline int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
security/capability.c +0 -9
@@ -330,15 +330,6 @@ static int cap_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int command,return 0 ; } -static int cap_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot, -unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only) -{ -if ((addr < mmap_min_addr) && !capable (CAP_SYS_RAWIO )) -return -EACCES ; -return 0 ; -} -static int cap_file_mprotect (struct vm_area_struct *vma,unsigned long reqprot,unsigned long prot) {
security/commoncap.c +30 -0
@@ -984,3 +984,33 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) cap_sys_admin =1 ;return __vm_enough_memory (mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); } + +/* +* cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr +* @file: unused +* @reqprot: unused +* @prot: unused +* @flags: unused +* @addr: address attempting to be mapped +* @addr_only: unused +* +* If the process is attempting to map memory below mmap_min_addr they need +* CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the +* capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed +* -EPERM if not. +*/ +int cap_file_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long reqprot, +unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, +unsigned long addr,unsigned long addr_only) +{ +int ret =0 ; + +if (addr < mmap_min_addr) { + ret =cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_RAWIO , +SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT ); +/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ +if (ret ==0 ) + current->flags |=PF_SUPERPRIV ; + } +return ret; +}
--
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PATCH 2/3 SELinux: call cap_file_mmap in selinux_file_mmap
Currently SELinux does not check CAP_SYS_RAWIO in the file_mmap hook. This means there is no DAC check on the ability to mmap low addresses in the memory space. This function adds the DAC check for CAP_SYS_RAWIO while maintaining the selinux check on mmap_zero. This means that processes which need to mmap low memory will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO and mmap_zero but will NOT need the SELinux sys_rawio capability.
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +13 -1
@@ -3034,9 +3034,21 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,int rc =0 ;u32 sid =current_sid (); -if (addr < mmap_min_addr) +/* +* notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before +* the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt +* at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even +* if DAC would have also denied the operation. +*/ +if (addr < mmap_min_addr) { rc =avc_has_perm (sid, sid,SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT ,MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO ,NULL ); +if (rc) +return rc; + } + +/* do DAC check on address space usage */ + rc =cap_file_mmap (file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);if (rc || addr_only)return rc;
--
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PATCH 3/3 Security/SELinux: seperate lsm specific mmap_min_addr
In reply to Eric ParisCurrently SELinux enforcement of controls on the ability to map low memory is determined by the mmap_min_addr tunable. This patch causes SELinux to ignore the tunable and instead use a seperate Kconfig option specific to how much space the LSM should protect.
The tunable will now only control the need for CAP_SYS_RAWIO and SELinux permissions will always protect the amount of low memory designated by CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR.
This allows users who need to disable the mmap_min_addr controls (usual reason being they run WINE as a non-root user) to do so and still have SELinux controls preventing confined domains (like a web server) from being able to map some area of low memory.
---
include/linux/mm.h | 15 -------------- include/linux/security.h | 17 ++++++++++++++++ kernel/sysctl.c | 7 ++++--- mm/Kconfig | 6 +++--- mm/mmap.c | 3 --- mm/nommu.c | 3 --- security/Kconfig | 16 +++++++++++++++ security/Makefile | 2 +- security/commoncap.c | 2 +- security/min_addr.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- 11 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/min_addr.c
include/linux/mm.h +0 -15
@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@ extern int sysctl_legacy_va_layout;#define sysctl_legacy_va_layout 0#endif -extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr; -#include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -575,19 +573,6 @@ static inline void set_page_links(struct page *page, enum zone_type zone, }/* -* If a hint addr is less than mmap_min_addr change hint to be as -* low as possible but still greater than mmap_min_addr -*/ -static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min (unsigned long hint) -{ - hint &=PAGE_MASK ; -if (((void *)hint !=NULL ) && - (hint < mmap_min_addr)) -return PAGE_ALIGN (mmap_min_addr); -return hint; -} - -/* * Some inline functions in vmstat.h depend on page_zone() */ #include <linux/vmstat.h>
include/linux/security.h +17 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <linux/resource.h> #include <linux/sem.h> #include <linux/shm.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> /* PAGE_ALIGN */ #include <linux/msg.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/key.h>
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);extern int cap_netlink_recv (struct sk_buff *skb,int cap);extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr; +extern unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr;/* * Values used in the task_security_ops calls */
@@ -147,6 +149,21 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts) opts->num_mnt_opts =0 ; } +/* +* If a hint addr is less than mmap_min_addr change hint to be as +* low as possible but still greater than mmap_min_addr +*/ +static inline unsigned long round_hint_to_min (unsigned long hint) +{ + hint &=PAGE_MASK ; +if (((void *)hint !=NULL ) && + (hint < mmap_min_addr)) +return PAGE_ALIGN (mmap_min_addr); +return hint; +} + +extern int mmap_min_addr_handler (struct ctl_table *table,int write,struct file *filp, +void __user *buffer,size_t *lenp,loff_t *ppos);/** * struct security_operations - main security structure *
kernel/sysctl.c +4 -3
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@#include <linux/acpi.h> #include <linux/reboot.h> #include <linux/ftrace.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/slow-work.h> #include <linux/perf_counter.h>
@@ -1306,10 +1307,10 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = { { .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED, .procname = "mmap_min_addr", - .data = &mmap_min_addr, - .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long), + .data = &dac_mmap_min_addr, + .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = &proc_doulongvec_minmax, + .proc_handler = &mmap_min_addr_handler, },#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA {
mm/Kconfig +3 -3
@@ -225,9 +225,9 @@ config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. - Programs which use vm86 functionality would either need additional - permissions from either the LSM or the capabilities module or have - this protection disabled. + Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map + this low address space will need CAP_SYS_RAWIO or disable this + protection by setting the value to 0. This value can be changed after boot using the /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr tunable.
mm/mmap.c +0 -3
@@ -88,9 +88,6 @@ int sysctl_overcommit_ratio = 50; /* default is 50% */int sysctl_max_map_count__read_mostly =DEFAULT_MAX_MAP_COUNT ;struct percpu_counter vm_committed_as; -/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access */ -unsigned long mmap_min_addr =CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR ; -/* * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
mm/nommu.c +0 -3
@@ -69,9 +69,6 @@ int sysctl_max_map_count = DEFAULT_MAX_MAP_COUNT;int sysctl_nr_trim_pages =CONFIG_NOMMU_INITIAL_TRIM_EXCESS ;int heap_stack_gap =0 ; -/* amount of vm to protect from userspace access */ -unsigned long mmap_min_addr =CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR ; -atomic_long_t mmap_pages_allocated;EXPORT_SYMBOL (mem_map);
security/Kconfig +16 -0
@@ -113,6 +113,22 @@ config SECURITY_ROOTPLUG If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR + int "Low address space for LSM to from user allocation" + depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX + default 65535 + help + This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected + from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages + can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. + + For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space + a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. + On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. + Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map + this low address space will need the permission specific to the + systems running LSM. + source security/selinux/Kconfig source security/smack/Kconfig source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
security/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo # always enable default capabilities -obj-y += commoncap.o +obj-y += commoncap.o min_addr.o # Object file lists obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o capability.o
security/commoncap.c +1 -1
@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, {int ret =0 ; -if (addr < mmap_min_addr) { +if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { ret =cap_capable (current,current_cred (),CAP_SYS_RAWIO ,SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT );/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
security/min_addr.c new file +49 -0
49 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -1
@@ -3040,7 +3040,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,* at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even * if DAC would have also denied the operation. */ -if (addr < mmap_min_addr) { +if (addr <CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR ) { rc =avc_has_perm (sid, sid,SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT ,MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO ,NULL );if (rc)
--
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James Morris
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Eric Paris
Currently we duplicate the
mmap_min_addrtest incap_file_mmapand insecurity_file_mmapif !CONFIG_SECURITY. This patch movescap_file_mmapintocommoncap.cand then calls that function directly fromsecurity_file_mmapifndefCONFIG_SECURITYlike all of the other capability checks are done.
These patches could do with more review / ack / signoff. Anyone? Bueller?
However, if there are no further comments, I'll likely apply these to security-testing#next.
- James
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James Morris <[email protected]> -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 8 lines · Eric Paris
Currently we duplicate the
mmap_min_addrtest incap_file_mmapand insecurity_file_mmapif !CONFIG_SECURITY. This patch movescap_file_mmapintocommoncap.cand then calls that function directly fromsecurity_file_mmapifndefCONFIG_SECURITYlike all of the other capability checks are done.Signed-off-by Eric Paris <[email protected]>Acked-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>
All applied togit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6#next
Please test!
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James Morris <[email protected]> -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.