+ execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid.patch added to -mm tree
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The patch titled
execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
has been added to the -mm tree. Its filename is
execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid.patch
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*** Remember to use Documentation/SubmitChecklist when testing your code ***
See http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/stuff/added-to-mm.txt to find out what to do about this
The current -mm tree may be found at http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/
------------------------------------------------------
Subject: execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report
(http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strange sys_futex call done from a dying "ps" program, we found following problem.
clone() syscall has special support for TID of created threads. This support includes two features.
One (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the TID value.
One (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created thread dies.
The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at clone() time.
kernel keeps this pointer value into current->clear_child_tid.
At execve() time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one.
As glibc fork() actually uses clone() syscall with CLONE_CHILD_SETTID and CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID set, chances are high that we might corrupt user memory in forked processes.
Following sequence could happen:
1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a fork() call that glibc maps to a clone( ... CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID ...) syscall
2) When new process starts, its current->clear_child_tid is set to a location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context (&THREAD_SELF->tid)
3) This new process does the execve() syscall to start a new program. current->clear_child_tid is left unchanged (a non NULL value)
4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits, kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by current->clear_child_tid from mm_release() :
if (tsk->clear_child_tid
&& !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED)
&& atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid;
tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;
/*
* We don't check the error code - if userspace has
* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
*/
<< here >> put_user(0, tidptr);
sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
}5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by /proc/pid users (ps command for example), mm_users > 1, and the exiting program could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped file)
If current->clear_child_tid points to a writeable portion of memory of the new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with unexpected effects.
Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program.
---
fs/compat.c | 1 + fs/exec.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/compat.c renamed from fs/compat.c~execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid +1 -0
@@ -1550,6 +1550,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_guard_mutex);acct_update_integrals (current);free_bprm (bprm); + current->clear_child_tid =NULL ;if (displaced)put_files_struct (displaced);return retval;
fs/exec.c renamed from fs/exec.c~execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid +1 -0
@@ -1343,6 +1343,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_guard_mutex);acct_update_integrals (current);free_bprm (bprm); + current->clear_child_tid =NULL ;if (displaced)put_files_struct (displaced);return retval;
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from [email protected] are
linux-next.patch
execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid.patch
Quoted 17 lines
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
diff -puN
fs/compat.c~execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tidfs/compat.cfs/compat.c renamed from fs/compat.c~execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid +1
-0@@ -1550,6 +1550,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename,mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_guard_mutex);acct_update_integrals (current);free_bprm (bprm); + current->clear_child_tid =NULL ;if (displaced)put_files_struct (displaced);return retval;diff -puN
fs/exec.c~execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tidfs/exec.c
fs/exec.c int do_execve(char * filename, · line 1349
Quoted 7 lines
fs/exec.c renamed from fs/exec.c~execve-must-clear-current-clear_child_tid +1
-0@@ -1343,6 +1343,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename,mutex_unlock (¤t->cred_guard_mutex);acct_update_integrals (current);free_bprm (bprm); + current->clear_child_tid =NULL ;if (displaced)put_files_struct (displaced);return retval;
Perhaps it is better to change mm_release() ? It has to play with ->clear_child_tid anyway.
Oleg.
kernel/fork.c +11 -11
@@ -568,18 +568,18 @@ void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk,* the value intact in a core dump, and to save the unnecessary * trouble otherwise. Userland only wants this done for a sys_exit. */ -if (tsk->clear_child_tid - && !(tsk->flags &PF_SIGNALED ) - &&atomic_read (&mm->mm_users) >1 ) { -u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid; +if (tsk->clear_child_tid) { +if (!(tsk->flags &PF_SIGNALED ) && +atomic_read (&mm->mm_users) >1 ) { +/* +* We don't check the error code - if userspace has +* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. +*/ +put_user (0 , tsk->clear_child_tid); +sys_futex (tsk->clear_child_tid,FUTEX_WAKE , +1 ,NULL ,NULL ,0 ); + } tsk->clear_child_tid =NULL ; - -/* -* We don't check the error code - if userspace has -* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. -*/ -put_user (0 , tidptr); -sys_futex (tidptr,FUTEX_WAKE ,1 ,NULL ,NULL ,0 ); } }
Quoted 3 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Perhaps it is better to change
mm_release()? It has to play with ->clear_child_tid anyway.
Ahh. I take back my previous Ack. Your patch is better. I'll ack that instead.
Linus
Andrew Morton
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · On Fri, 31 Jul 2009 17:38:14 -0700 (PDT) Linus Torvalds…
Quoted 3 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Perhaps it is better to change
mm_release()? It has to play with ->clear_child_tid anyway.Ahh. I take back my previous Ack. Your patch is better. I'll ack that instead.
'k, thanks. I shall compulsively watch my inbox awaiting the signed-off and tested version ;)
PATCH v2 1/1 execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
Quoted 10 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, 31 Jul 2009 17:38:14 -0700 (PDT) Linus Torvalds…
Quoted 3 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Perhaps it is better to change
mm_release()? It has to play with ->clear_child_tid anyway.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Ahh. I take back my previous Ack. Your patch is better. I'll ack that instead.
'k, thanks. I shall compulsively watch my inbox awaiting the signed-off and tested version ;)
I did some testing, but didn't try to check if this patches fixes the origianal problem. It obviously should... Still I removed Tested-by tag. But added Linus's ack, the patch is the same.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[PATCH v2] execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report
(http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strange sys_futex call done from a dying "ps" program, we found following problem.
clone() syscall has special support for TID of created threads. This support includes two features.
One (CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the TID value.
One (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created thread dies.
The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at clone() time.
kernel keeps this pointer value into current->clear_child_tid.
At execve() time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one.
As glibc fork() actually uses clone() syscall with CLONE_CHILD_SETTID and CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID set, chances are high that we might corrupt user memory in forked processes.
Following sequence could happen:
1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a fork() call that glibc maps to a clone( ... CLONE_CHILD_SETTID | CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID ...) syscall
2) When new process starts, its current->clear_child_tid is set to a location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context (&THREAD_SELF->tid)
3) This new process does the execve() syscall to start a new program. current->clear_child_tid is left unchanged (a non NULL value)
4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits, kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by current->clear_child_tid from mm_release() :
if (tsk->clear_child_tid
&& !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED)
&& atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) {
u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid;
tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL;
/*
* We don't check the error code - if userspace has
* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck.
*/
<< here >> put_user(0, tidptr);
sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0);
}5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by /proc/pid users (ps command for example), mm_users > 1, and the exiting program could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped file)
If current->clear_child_tid points to a writeable portion of memory of the new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with unexpected effects.
Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program.
---
kernel/fork.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
kernel/fork.c renamed from kernel/fork.c~CLEARTID +11 -11
@@ -568,18 +568,18 @@ void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk,* the value intact in a core dump, and to save the unnecessary * trouble otherwise. Userland only wants this done for a sys_exit. */ -if (tsk->clear_child_tid - && !(tsk->flags &PF_SIGNALED ) - &&atomic_read (&mm->mm_users) >1 ) { -u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid; +if (tsk->clear_child_tid) { +if (!(tsk->flags &PF_SIGNALED ) && +atomic_read (&mm->mm_users) >1 ) { +/* +* We don't check the error code - if userspace has +* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. +*/ +put_user (0 , tsk->clear_child_tid); +sys_futex (tsk->clear_child_tid,FUTEX_WAKE , +1 ,NULL ,NULL ,0 ); + } tsk->clear_child_tid =NULL ; - -/* -* We don't check the error code - if userspace has -* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. -*/ -put_user (0 , tidptr); -sys_futex (tidptr,FUTEX_WAKE ,1 ,NULL ,NULL ,0 ); } }
Re: [PATCH v2] execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
Quoted 121 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 11 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 7 lines · On Fri, 31 Jul 2009 17:38:14 -0700 (PDT) Linus Torvalds…
Quoted 2 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Perhaps it is better to change
mm_release()? It has to play with ->clear_child_tid anyway.Ahh. I take back my previous Ack. Your patch is better. I'll ack that instead.
'k, thanks. I shall compulsively watch my inbox awaiting the signed-off and tested version ;)
I did some testing, but didn't try to check if this patches fixes the origianal problem. It obviously should... Still I removed Tested-by tag. But added Linus's ack, the patch is the same.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[PATCH v2] execve: must clearcurrent->clear_child_tidFrom: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
While looking at Jens Rosenboom bug report
(http://lkml.org/lkml/2009/7/27/35) about strangesys_futexcall done from a dying "ps" program, we found following problem.
clone()syscall has special support for TID of created threads. This support includes two features.One (
CLONE_CHILD_SETTID) is to set an integer into user memory with the TID value.One (
CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID) is to clear this same integer once the created thread dies.The integer location is a user provided pointer, provided at
clone()time.kernel keeps this pointer value into
current->clear_child_tid.At
execve()time, we should make sure kernel doesnt keep this user provided pointer, as full user memory is replaced by a new one.As glibc
fork()actually usesclone()syscall withCLONE_CHILD_SETTIDandCLONE_CHILD_CLEARTIDset, chances are high that we might corrupt user memory in forked processes.Following sequence could happen:
1) bash (or any program) starts a new process, by a
fork()call that glibc maps to a clone( ...CLONE_CHILD_SETTID|CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID...) syscall2) When new process starts, its
current->clear_child_tidis set to a location that has a meaning only in bash (or initial program) context (&THREAD_SELF->tid)3) This new process does the
execve()syscall to start a new program.current->clear_child_tidis left unchanged (a non NULL value)4) If this new program creates some threads, and initial thread exits, kernel will attempt to clear the integer pointed by
current->clear_child_tidfrommm_release():if (tsk->clear_child_tid && !(tsk->flags & PF_SIGNALED) && atomic_read(&mm->mm_users) > 1) { u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid; tsk->clear_child_tid = NULL; /* * We don't check the error code - if userspace has * not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. */ << here >> put_user(0, tidptr); sys_futex(tidptr, FUTEX_WAKE, 1, NULL, NULL, 0); }5) OR : if new program is not multi-threaded, but spied by
/proc/pidusers (ps command for example),mm_users> 1, and the exiting program could corrupt 4 bytes in a persistent memory area (shm or memory mapped file)If
current->clear_child_tidpoints to a writeable portion of memory of the new program, kernel happily and silently corrupts 4 bytes of memory, with unexpected effects.Fix is straightforward and should not break any sane program.
Reported-by Jens Rosenboom <[email protected]>Acked-by Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>---
kernel/fork.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)kernel/fork.c renamed from kernel/fork.c~CLEARTID +11
-4@@ -568,18 +568,18 @@ void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk,* the value intact in a core dump, and to save the unnecessary * trouble otherwise. Userland only wants this done for a sys_exit. */ -if (tsk->clear_child_tid - && !(tsk->flags &PF_SIGNALED ) - &&atomic_read (&mm->mm_users) >1 ) { -u32 __user * tidptr = tsk->clear_child_tid; +if (tsk->clear_child_tid) { +if (!(tsk->flags &PF_SIGNALED ) && +atomic_read (&mm->mm_users) >1 ) { +/* +* We don't check the error code - if userspace has +* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. +*/ +put_user (0 , tsk->clear_child_tid); +sys_futex (tsk->clear_child_tid,FUTEX_WAKE , +1 ,NULL ,NULL ,0 ); + } tsk->clear_child_tid =NULL ;
kernel/fork.c void mm_release(struct task_struct *tsk, · line 585
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/fork.c renamed from kernel/fork.c~CLEARTID +0
-7- -/* -* We don't check the error code - if userspace has -* not set up a proper pointer then tough luck. -*/ -put_user (0 , tidptr); -sys_futex (tidptr,FUTEX_WAKE ,1 ,NULL ,NULL ,0 ); } }
Thanks Oleg, you are right this seems cleaner.
I only wonder about core dumping, since mm_release() is also used by exiting tasks.
Isnt clear_child_tid used by gdb or other debugger ?
(The tid value is carefuly untouched in case of a core dump, but maybe gdb needs the current->clear_child_tid for whatever reason, for example to get TID address in user memory ?
Re: [PATCH v2] execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
Quoted 4 lines · Eric Dumazet
I only wonder about core dumping, since
mm_release()is also used by exiting tasks.Isnt
clear_child_tidused by gdb or other debugger ?
Afaics it is not...
At least, I can't see how gdb (or any other user-space app) can figure out the value of ->clear_child_tid.
Not that this really matters, but please note also that it is possible that the coredumping task has ->clear_child_tid == NULL anyway, even without this change. The PF_SIGNALED check in mm_release() is not 100& reliable.
Suppose a thread T sleeps in do_exit()->ptrace_event(PT_TRACE_EXIT) path. Another thread starts a coredump and kills T via zap_process(). This wakes up T, it calls exit_mm()->mm_release() without PF_SIGNALED.
Oleg.
Re: [PATCH v2] execve: must clear current->clear_child_tid
Quoted 10 lines · Oleg Nesterov
Quoted 3 lines · Eric Dumazet
I only wonder about core dumping, since
mm_release()is also used by exiting tasks.Isnt
clear_child_tidused by gdb or other debugger ?Afaics it is not...
At least, I can't see how gdb (or any other user-space app) can figure out the value of ->clear_child_tid.
Yep, this was from old Unixes time, when core file included the 'u' structure ...
Dont worry ;)
Quoted 13 lines
Not that this really matters, but please note also that it is possible that the coredumping task has ->clear_child_tid == NULL anyway, even without this change. The
PF_SIGNALEDcheck inmm_release()is not 100& reliable.Suppose a thread T sleeps in do_exit()->ptrace_event(PT_TRACE_EXIT) path. Another thread starts a coredump and kills T via
zap_process(). This wakes up T, it calls exit_mm()->mm_release() withoutPF_SIGNALED.Oleg.