2.6.30.6-stable review
Subsystems (41)
cover 2.6.30.6-stable review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.30.6 release. There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let us know. If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.
These patches are sent out with a number of different people on the Cc:
line. If you wish to be a reviewer, please email [email protected] to add your name to the list. If you want to be off the reviewer list, also email us.
Responses should be made by Sunday, Sept 6, 21:00:00 UTC. Anything Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/stable-review/patch-2.6.30.6-rc1.gz
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
------------
Makefile | 2 +- arch/ia64/kernel/pci-dma.c | 5 - arch/powerpc/platforms/ps3/time.c | 4 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_x86_emulate.h | 6 + arch/x86/kernel/apic/ipi.c | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 85 ++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 31 ++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 42 +++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 70 +++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/x86_emulate.c | 20 ++++ arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 21 ++-- drivers/acpi/processor_thermal.c | 6 +- drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c | 26 +++--- drivers/ata/libata-core.c | 3 + drivers/media/video/gspca/ov534.c | 4 +- drivers/net/ehea/ehea.h | 2 +- drivers/net/ehea/ehea_main.c | 3 + drivers/net/wireless/ar9170/main.c | 5 +- drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-rfkill.c | 26 +++-- drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-sta.c | 12 +++ drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt2x00.h | 6 +- drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c | 8 +- drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_base.c | 98 ++++++++++++++------ drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_base.h | 2 + drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_config.c | 91 +++++------------- drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_scsih.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++------- drivers/usb/core/hcd.h | 4 + drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 40 +++++--- drivers/usb/core/hub.h | 6 +- drivers/usb/host/ehci-au1xxx.c | 2 + drivers/usb/host/ehci-fsl.c | 2 + drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c | 5 +- drivers/usb/host/ehci-ixp4xx.c | 2 + drivers/usb/host/ehci-orion.c | 2 + drivers/usb/host/ehci-pci.c | 2 + drivers/usb/host/ehci-ppc-of.c | 2 + drivers/usb/host/ehci-ps3.c | 2 + drivers/usb/host/ehci-q.c | 97 ++++++++++++++----- drivers/usb/host/ehci.h | 2 + drivers/video/xen-fbfront.c | 8 +- fs/buffer.c | 7 +- fs/exec.c | 4 +- fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 20 +++-- fs/inode.c | 40 +++++--- fs/ocfs2/aops.c | 66 ++++++++++---- fs/select.c | 1 + fs/xfs/xfs_iget.c | 142 +++++++++++++++-------------- fs/xfs/xfs_inode.h | 17 ---- fs/xfs/xfs_log.c | 2 +- include/acpi/processor.h | 5 +- include/linux/bitmap.h | 18 ++-- include/linux/cpumask.h | 20 ++-- include/linux/fs.h | 5 +- include/linux/hugetlb.h | 6 +- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 1 + init/main.c | 7 +- ipc/shm.c | 8 +- kernel/fork.c | 20 +--- kernel/kthread.c | 2 +- kernel/signal.c | 15 ++-- lib/bitmap.c | 12 ++- mm/page_alloc.c | 4 +- net/appletalk/ddp.c | 1 + net/can/raw.c | 1 + net/econet/af_econet.c | 1 + net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 2 + net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 4 +- net/irda/af_irda.c | 1 + net/llc/af_llc.c | 1 + net/mac80211/agg-tx.c | 8 ++ net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 1 + net/rose/af_rose.c | 1 + net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 6 +- sound/core/pcm_lib.c | 39 ++------ sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 34 ++++--- virt/kvm/irq_comm.c | 4 +- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 4 + 80 files changed, 896 insertions(+), 521 deletions(-)
PATCH 1/71 ehea: Fix napi list corruption on ifconfig down
2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Hannes Hering <[email protected]>
commit 357eb46d8f275b4e8484541234ea3ba06065e258 upstream.
This patch fixes the napi list handling when an ehea interface is shut down to avoid corruption of the napi list.
--- drivers/net/ehea/ehea.h | 2 +- drivers/net/ehea/ehea_main.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ehea/ehea.h +1 -1
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@#include <asm/io.h> #define DRV_NAME "ehea" -#define DRV_VERSION "EHEA_0101" +#define DRV_VERSION "EHEA_0102"/* eHEA capability flags */ #define DLPAR_PORT_ADD_REM 1
drivers/net/ehea/ehea_main.c +3 -0
@@ -1545,6 +1545,9 @@ static int ehea_clean_portres(struct ehe {int ret, i; +if (pr->qp) +netif_napi_del (&pr->napi); + ret =ehea_destroy_qp (pr->qp);if (!ret) {
PATCH 2/71 poll/select: initialize triggered field of struct poll_wqueues
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Guillaume Knispel <[email protected]>
commit b2add73dbf93fd50f00564d7abc3e2b9aa9dd20c upstream.
The triggered field of struct poll_wqueues introduced in commit 5f820f648c92a5ecc771a96b3c29aa6e90013bba ("poll: allow f_op->poll to sleep").
It was first set to 1 in pollwake() (now __pollwake() ), tested and later set to 0 in poll_schedule_timeout(), but not initialized before.
As a result when the process needs to sleep, triggered was likely to be non-zero even if pollwake() is not called before the first poll_schedule_timeout(), meaning schedule_hrtimeout_range() would not be called and an extra loop calling all ->poll() would be done.
This patch initialize triggered to 0 in poll_initwait() so the ->poll() are not called twice before the process goes to sleep when it needs to.
--- fs/select.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/select.c +1 -0
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ void poll_initwait(struct poll_wqueues * {init_poll_funcptr (&pwq->pt, __pollwait); pwq->polling_task = current; + pwq->triggered =0 ; pwq->error =0 ; pwq->table =NULL ; pwq->inline_index =0 ;
PATCH 3/71 Make bitmask and operators return a result code
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit f4b0373b26567cafd421d91101852ed7a34e9e94 upstream.
When 'and'ing two bitmasks (where 'andnot' is a variation on it), some cases want to know whether the result is the empty set or not. In particular, the TLB IPI sending code wants to do cpumask operations and determine if there are any CPU's left in the final set.
So this just makes the bitmask (and cpumask) functions return a boolean for whether the result has any bits set.
--- include/linux/bitmap.h | 18 ++++++++---------- include/linux/cpumask.h | 20 ++++++++++---------- lib/bitmap.c | 12 ++++++++---- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
include/linux/bitmap.h +8 -10
@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ extern void __bitmap_shift_right(unsigne const unsigned long *src, int shift, int bits);extern void __bitmap_shift_left (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *src,int shift,int bits); -extern void __bitmap_and (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *bitmap1, +extern int __bitmap_and (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *bitmap1,const unsigned long *bitmap2,int bits);extern void __bitmap_or (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *bitmap1,const unsigned long *bitmap2,int bits);extern void __bitmap_xor (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *bitmap1,const unsigned long *bitmap2,int bits); -extern void __bitmap_andnot (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *bitmap1, +extern int __bitmap_andnot (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *bitmap1,const unsigned long *bitmap2,int bits);extern int __bitmap_intersects (const unsigned long *bitmap1,const unsigned long *bitmap2,int bits);
@@ -171,13 +171,12 @@ static inline void bitmap_copy(unsigned } } -static inline void bitmap_and (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *src1, +static inline int bitmap_and (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *src1,const unsigned long *src2,int nbits) {if (small_const_nbits (nbits)) - *dst = *src1 & *src2; -else -__bitmap_and (dst, src1, src2, nbits); +return (*dst = *src1 & *src2) !=0 ; +return __bitmap_and (dst, src1, src2, nbits); } static inline void bitmap_or(unsigned long *dst, const unsigned long *src1,
@@ -198,13 +197,12 @@ static inline void bitmap_xor(unsigned l__bitmap_xor (dst, src1, src2, nbits); } -static inline void bitmap_andnot (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *src1, +static inline int bitmap_andnot (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *src1,const unsigned long *src2,int nbits) {if (small_const_nbits (nbits)) - *dst = *src1 & ~(*src2); -else -__bitmap_andnot (dst, src1, src2, nbits); +return (*dst = *src1 & ~(*src2)) !=0 ; +return __bitmap_andnot (dst, src1, src2, nbits); } static inline void bitmap_complement(unsigned long *dst, const unsigned long *src,
include/linux/cpumask.h +10 -10
@@ -43,10 +43,10 @@* int cpu_isset(cpu, mask) true iff bit 'cpu' set in mask * int cpu_test_and_set(cpu, mask) test and set bit 'cpu' in mask * -* void cpus_and(dst, src1, src2) dst = src1 & src2 [intersection] +* int cpus_and(dst, src1, src2) dst = src1 & src2 [intersection] * void cpus_or(dst, src1, src2) dst = src1 | src2 [union] * void cpus_xor(dst, src1, src2) dst = src1 ^ src2 -* void cpus_andnot(dst, src1, src2) dst = src1 & ~src2 +* int cpus_andnot(dst, src1, src2) dst = src1 & ~src2 * void cpus_complement(dst, src) dst = ~src * * int cpus_equal(mask1, mask2) Does mask1 == mask2?
@@ -179,10 +179,10 @@ static inline int __cpu_test_and_set(int }#define cpus_and (dst, src1, src2) __cpus_and(&(dst), &(src1), &(src2), NR_CPUS) -static inline void __cpus_and (cpumask_t *dstp,const cpumask_t *src1p, +static inline int __cpus_and (cpumask_t *dstp,const cpumask_t *src1p,const cpumask_t *src2p,int nbits) { -bitmap_and (dstp->bits, src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); +return bitmap_and (dstp->bits, src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); }#define cpus_or (dst, src1, src2) __cpus_or(&(dst), &(src1), &(src2), NR_CPUS)
@@ -201,10 +201,10 @@ static inline void __cpus_xor(cpumask_t#define cpus_andnot (dst, src1, src2) \ __cpus_andnot(&(dst), &(src1), &(src2), NR_CPUS) -static inline void __cpus_andnot (cpumask_t *dstp,const cpumask_t *src1p, +static inline int __cpus_andnot (cpumask_t *dstp,const cpumask_t *src1p,const cpumask_t *src2p,int nbits) { -bitmap_andnot (dstp->bits, src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); +return bitmap_andnot (dstp->bits, src1p->bits, src2p->bits, nbits); }#define cpus_complement (dst, src) __cpus_complement(&(dst), &(src), NR_CPUS)
@@ -738,11 +738,11 @@ static inline void cpumask_clear(struct* @src1p: the first input * @src2p: the second input */ -static inline void cpumask_and (struct cpumask *dstp, +static inline int cpumask_and (struct cpumask *dstp,const struct cpumask *src1p,const struct cpumask *src2p) { -bitmap_and (cpumask_bits (dstp),cpumask_bits (src1p), +return bitmap_and (cpumask_bits (dstp),cpumask_bits (src1p),cpumask_bits (src2p), nr_cpumask_bits); }
@@ -779,11 +779,11 @@ static inline void cpumask_xor(struct cp* @src1p: the first input * @src2p: the second input */ -static inline void cpumask_andnot (struct cpumask *dstp, +static inline int cpumask_andnot (struct cpumask *dstp,const struct cpumask *src1p,const struct cpumask *src2p) { -bitmap_andnot (cpumask_bits (dstp),cpumask_bits (src1p), +return bitmap_andnot (cpumask_bits (dstp),cpumask_bits (src1p),cpumask_bits (src2p), nr_cpumask_bits); }
lib/bitmap.c +8 -4
@@ -179,14 +179,16 @@ void __bitmap_shift_left(unsigned long * }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__bitmap_shift_left); -void __bitmap_and (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *bitmap1, +int __bitmap_and (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *bitmap1,const unsigned long *bitmap2,int bits) {int k;int nr =BITS_TO_LONGS (bits); +unsigned long result =0 ;for (k =0 ; k < nr; k++) - dst[k] = bitmap1[k] & bitmap2[k]; + result |= (dst[k] = bitmap1[k] & bitmap2[k]); +return result !=0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__bitmap_and);
@@ -212,14 +214,16 @@ void __bitmap_xor(unsigned long *dst, co }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__bitmap_xor); -void __bitmap_andnot (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *bitmap1, +int __bitmap_andnot (unsigned long *dst,const unsigned long *bitmap1,const unsigned long *bitmap2,int bits) {int k;int nr =BITS_TO_LONGS (bits); +unsigned long result =0 ;for (k =0 ; k < nr; k++) - dst[k] = bitmap1[k] & ~bitmap2[k]; + result |= (dst[k] = bitmap1[k] & ~bitmap2[k]); +return result !=0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__bitmap_andnot);
PATCH 4/71 x86: dont send an IPI to the empty set of CPUs
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit 83d349f35e1ae72268c5104dbf9ab2ae635425d4 upstream.
The default_send_IPI_mask_logical() function uses the "flat" APIC mode to send an IPI to a set of CPU's at once, but if that set happens to be empty, some older local APIC's will apparently be rather unhappy. So just warn if a caller gives us an empty mask, and ignore it.
This fixes a regression in 2.6.30.x, due to commit 4595f9620 ("x86:
change flush_tlb_others to take a const struct cpumask"), documented here:
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13933
which causes a silent lock-up. It only seems to happen on PPro, P2, P3 and Athlon XP cores. Most developers sadly (or not so sadly, if you're a developer..) have more modern CPU's. Also, on x86-64 we don't use the flat APIC mode, so it would never trigger there even if the APIC didn't like sending an empty IPI mask.
--- arch/x86/kernel/apic/ipi.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/apic/ipi.c +3 -0
@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ void default_send_IPI_mask_logical(constunsigned long mask =cpumask_bits (cpumask)[0 ];unsigned long flags; +if (WARN_ONCE (!mask,"empty IPI mask" )) +return ; +local_irq_save (flags);WARN_ON (mask & ~cpumask_bits (cpu_online_mask)[0 ]);__default_send_IPI_dest_field (mask, vector, apic->dest_logical);
PATCH 5/71 x86: dont call ->send_IPI_mask() with an empty mask
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit b04e6373d694e977c95ae0ae000e2c1e2cf92d73 upstream.
As noted in 83d349f35e1ae72268c5104dbf9ab2ae635425d4 ("x86: don't send an IPI to the empty set of CPU's"), some APIC's will be very unhappy with an empty destination mask. That commit added a WARN_ON() for that case, and avoided the resulting problem, but didn't fix the underlying reason for why those empty mask cases happened.
This fixes that, by checking the result of 'cpumask_andnot()' of the current CPU actually has any other CPU's left in the set of CPU's to be sent a TLB flush, and not calling down to the IPI code if the mask is empty.
The reason this started happening at all is that we started passing just the CPU mask pointers around in commit 4595f9620 ("x86: change flush_tlb_others to take a const struct cpumask"), and when we did that, the cpumask was no longer thread-local.
Before that commit, flush_tlb_mm() used to create it's own copy of 'mm->cpu_vm_mask' and pass that copy down to the low-level flush routines after having tested that it was not empty. But after changing it to just pass down the CPU mask pointer, the lower level TLB flush routines would now get a pointer to that 'mm->cpu_vm_mask', and that could still change - and become empty - after the test due to other CPU's having flushed their own TLB's.
See
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13933
for details.
--- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 21 ++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +10 -11
@@ -183,18 +183,17 @@ static void flush_tlb_others_ipi(const s f->flush_mm = mm; f->flush_va = va; -cpumask_andnot (to_cpumask (f->flush_cpumask), - cpumask,cpumask_of (smp_processor_id ())); +if (cpumask_andnot (to_cpumask (f->flush_cpumask), cpumask,cpumask_of (smp_processor_id ()))) { +/* +* We have to send the IPI only to +* CPUs affected. +*/ + apic->send_IPI_mask (to_cpumask (f->flush_cpumask), +INVALIDATE_TLB_VECTOR_START + sender); -/* -* We have to send the IPI only to -* CPUs affected. -*/ - apic->send_IPI_mask (to_cpumask (f->flush_cpumask), -INVALIDATE_TLB_VECTOR_START + sender); - -while (!cpumask_empty (to_cpumask (f->flush_cpumask))) -cpu_relax (); +while (!cpumask_empty (to_cpumask (f->flush_cpumask))) +cpu_relax (); + } f->flush_mm =NULL ; f->flush_va =0 ;
PATCH 6/71 mm: build_zonelists(): move clear node_load[] to __build_all_zonelists()
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Bo Liu <[email protected]>
commit 7f9cfb31030737a7fc9a1cbca3fd01bec184c849 upstream.
If node_load[] is cleared everytime build_zonelists() is called,node_load[] will have no help to find the next node that should appear in the given node's fallback list.
Because of the bug, zonelist's node_order is not calculated as expected. This bug affects on big machine, which has asynmetric node distance.
[synmetric NUMA's node distance]
0 1 2 0 10 12 12 1 12 10 12 2 12 12 10
[asynmetric NUMA's node distance]
0 1 2 0 10 12 20 1 12 10 14 2 20 14 10
This (my bug) is very old but no one has reported this for a long time. Maybe because the number of asynmetric NUMA is very small and they use cpuset for customizing node memory allocation fallback.
--- mm/page_alloc.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/page_alloc.c +3 -1
@@ -2342,7 +2342,6 @@ static void build_zonelists(pg_data_t *p prev_node = local_node;nodes_clear (used_mask); -memset (node_load,0 ,sizeof (node_load));memset (node_order,0 ,sizeof (node_order)); j =0 ;
@@ -2451,6 +2450,9 @@ static int __build_all_zonelists(void *d {int nid; +#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA +memset (node_load,0 ,sizeof (node_load)); +#endif for_each_online_node (nid) {pg_data_t *pgdat =NODE_DATA (nid);
PATCH 7/71 rt2x00: fix memory corruption in rf cache, add a sanity check
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Pavel Roskin <[email protected]>
commit 6b26dead3ce97d016b57724b01974d5ca5c84bd5 upstream.
Change rt2x00_rf_read() and rt2x00_rf_write() to subtract 1 from the rf register number. This is needed because the rf registers are enumerated starting with one. The size of the rf register cache is just enough to hold all registers, so writing to the highest register was corrupting memory. Add a check to make sure that the rf register number is valid.
--- drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt2x00.h | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt2x00.h +4 -2
@@ -814,13 +814,15 @@ struct rt2x00_dev {static inline void rt2x00_rf_read (struct rt2x00_dev *rt2x00dev,const unsigned int word,u32 *data) { - *data = rt2x00dev->rf[word]; +BUG_ON (word <1 || word > rt2x00dev->ops->rf_size /sizeof (u32)); + *data = rt2x00dev->rf[word -1 ]; }static inline void rt2x00_rf_write (struct rt2x00_dev *rt2x00dev,const unsigned int word,u32 data) { - rt2x00dev->rf[word] = data; +BUG_ON (word <1 || word > rt2x00dev->ops->rf_size /sizeof (u32)); + rt2x00dev->rf[word -1 ] = data; }/*
PATCH 8/71 mac80211: fix panic when splicing unprepared TIDs
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Luis R. Rodriguez <[email protected]>
commit 416fbdff2137e8d8cc8f23f517bee3a26b11526f upstream.
We splice skbs from the pending queue for a TID onto the local pending queue when tearing down a block ack request. This is not necessary unless we actually have received a request to start a block ack request (rate control, for example). If we never received that request we should not be splicing the tid pending queue as it would be null, causing a panic.
Not sure yet how exactly we allowed through a call when the tid state does not have at least HT_ADDBA_REQUESTED_MSK set, that will require some further review as it is not quite obvious.
For more information see the bug report:
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13922
This fixes this oops:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000030 IP: [<f8806c70>] ieee80211_agg_splice_packets+0x40/0xc0 [mac80211] *pdpt = 0000000002d1e001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Thread overran stack, or stack corrupted Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/module/aes_generic/initstate Modules linked in: <bleh>
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted (2.6.31-rc5-wl #2) Dell DV051
EIP: 0060:[<f8806c70>] EFLAGS: 00010292 CPU: 0
EIP is at ieee80211_agg_splice_packets+0x40/0xc0 [mac80211]
EAX: 00000030 EBX: 0000004c ECX: 00000003 EDX: 00000000
ESI: c1c98000 EDI: f745a1c0 EBP: c076be58 ESP: c076be38
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068
Process swapper (pid: 0, ti=c076a000 task=c0709160 task.ti=c076a000)
Stack: <bleh2> Call Trace: [<f8806edb>] ? ieee80211_stop_tx_ba_cb+0xab/0x150 [mac80211] [<f8802f1e>] ? ieee80211_tasklet_handler+0xce/0x110 [mac80211] [<c04862ff>] ? net_rx_action+0xef/0x1d0 [<c0149378>] ? tasklet_action+0x58/0xc0 [<c014a0f2>] ? __do_softirq+0xc2/0x190 [<c018eb48>] ? handle_IRQ_event+0x58/0x140 [<c01205fe>] ? ack_apic_level+0x7e/0x270 [<c014a1fd>] ? do_softirq+0x3d/0x40 [<c014a345>] ? irq_exit+0x65/0x90 [<c010a6af>] ? do_IRQ+0x4f/0xc0 [<c014a35d>] ? irq_exit+0x7d/0x90 [<c011d547>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0x90 [<c01094a9>] ? common_interrupt+0x29/0x30 [<c010fd9e>] ? mwait_idle+0xbe/0x100 [<c0107e42>] ? cpu_idle+0x52/0x90 [<c054b1a5>] ? rest_init+0x55/0x60 [<c077492d>] ? start_kernel+0x315/0x37d [<c07743ce>] ? unknown_bootoption+0x0/0x1f9 [<c0774099>] ? i386_start_kernel+0x79/0x81 Code: <bleh3> EIP: [<f8806c70>] ieee80211_agg_splice_packets+0x40/0xc0 [mac80211] SS:ESP 0068:c076be38
CR2: 0000000000000030
--- net/mac80211/agg-tx.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
net/mac80211/agg-tx.c +8 -0
@@ -376,6 +376,14 @@ static void ieee80211_agg_splice_packets &local->hw, queue, IEEE80211_QUEUE_STOP_REASON_AGGREGATION); +if (!(sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_state_tx[tid] &HT_ADDBA_REQUESTED_MSK )) +return ; + +if (WARN (!sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[tid], +"TID %d gone but expected when splicing aggregates from" +"the pending queue\n" , tid)) +return ; +if (!skb_queue_empty (&sta->ampdu_mlme.tid_tx[tid]->pending)) {spin_lock_irqsave (&local->queue_stop_reason_lock, flags);/* mark queue as pending, it is stopped already */
PATCH 9/71 Re-introduce page mapping check in mark_buffer_dirty()
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit 8e9d78edea3ce5c0036f85b93091483f2f15443a upstream.
In commit a8e7d49aa7be728c4ae241a75a2a124cdcabc0c5 ("Fix race in create_empty_buffers() vs __set_page_dirty_buffers()"), I removed a test for a NULL page mapping unintentionally when some of the code inside __set_page_dirty() was moved to the callers.
That removal generally didn't matter, since a filesystem would serialize truncation (which clears the page mapping) against writing (which marks the buffer dirty), so locking at a higher level (either per-page or an inode at a time) should mean that the buffer page would be stable. And indeed, nothing bad seemed to happen.
Except it turns out that apparently reiserfs does something odd when under load and writing out the journal, and we have a number of bugzilla entries that look similar:
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13556 http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13756 http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13876
and it looks like reiserfs depended on that check (the common theme seems to be "data=journal", and a journal writeback during a truncate).
I suspect reiserfs should have some additional locking, but in the meantime this should get us back to the pre-2.6.29 behavior.
--- fs/buffer.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/buffer.c +5 -2
@@ -1165,8 +1165,11 @@ void mark_buffer_dirty(struct buffer_heaif (!test_set_buffer_dirty (bh)) {struct page *page = bh->b_page; -if (!TestSetPageDirty (page)) -__set_page_dirty (page,page_mapping (page),0 ); +if (!TestSetPageDirty (page)) { +struct address_space *mapping =page_mapping (page); +if (mapping) +__set_page_dirty (page, mapping,0 ); + } } }
PATCH 10/71 mm: fix hugetlb bug due to user_shm_unlock call
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
commit 353d5c30c666580347515da609dd74a2b8e9b828 upstream.
2.6.30's commit 8a0bdec194c21c8fdef840989d0d7b742bb5d4bc removed user_shm_lock() calls in hugetlb_file_setup() but left the user_shm_unlock call in shm_destroy().
In detail:
Assume that can_do_hugetlb_shm() returns true and hence user_shm_lock() is not called in hugetlb_file_setup(). However, user_shm_unlock() is called in any case in shm_destroy() and in the following atomic_dec_and_lock(&up->__count) in free_uid() is executed and if up->__count gets zero, also cleanup_user_struct() is scheduled.
Note that sched_destroy_user() is empty if CONFIG_USER_SCHED is not set. However, the ref counter up->__count gets unexpectedly non-positive and the corresponding structs are freed even though there are live references to them, resulting in a kernel oops after a lots of shmget(SHM_HUGETLB)/shmctl(IPC_RMID) cycles and CONFIG_USER_SCHED set.
Hugh changed Stefan's suggested patch: can_do_hugetlb_shm() at the time of shm_destroy() may give a different answer from at the time of hugetlb_file_setup(). And fixed newseg()'s no_id error path, which has missed user_shm_unlock() ever since it came in 2.6.9.
--- fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- include/linux/hugetlb.h | 6 ++++-- ipc/shm.c | 8 +++++--- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c +12 -8
@@ -934,26 +934,28 @@ static int can_do_hugetlb_shm(void)return capable (CAP_IPC_LOCK ) ||in_group_p (sysctl_hugetlb_shm_group); } -struct file *hugetlb_file_setup (const char *name,size_t size,int acctflag) +struct file *hugetlb_file_setup (const char *name,size_t size,int acctflag, +struct user_struct **user) {int error = -ENOMEM ; -int unlock_shm =0 ;struct file *file;struct inode *inode;struct dentry *dentry, *root;struct qstr quick_string; -struct user_struct *user =current_user (); + *user =NULL ;if (!hugetlbfs_vfsmount)return ERR_PTR (-ENOENT );if (!can_do_hugetlb_shm ()) { -if (user_shm_lock (size, user)) { - unlock_shm =1 ; + *user =current_user (); +if (user_shm_lock (size, *user)) {WARN_ONCE (1 ,"Using mlock ulimits for SHM_HUGETLB deprecated\n" ); - }else + }else { + *user =NULL ;return ERR_PTR (-EPERM ); + } } root = hugetlbfs_vfsmount->mnt_root;
@@ -994,8 +996,10 @@ out_inode: out_dentry:dput (dentry); out_shm_unlock: -if (unlock_shm) -user_shm_unlock (size, user); +if (*user) { +user_shm_unlock (size, *user); + *user =NULL ; + }return ERR_PTR (error); }
include/linux/hugetlb.h +4 -2
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#include <asm/tlbflush.h> struct ctl_table ; +struct user_struct ;static inline int is_vm_hugetlb_page (struct vm_area_struct *vma) {
@@ -139,7 +140,8 @@ static inline struct hugetlbfs_sb_info *extern const struct file_operations hugetlbfs_file_operations;extern struct vm_operations_struct hugetlb_vm_ops; -struct file *hugetlb_file_setup (const char *name,size_t ,int ); +struct file *hugetlb_file_setup (const char *name,size_t size,int acct, +struct user_struct **user);int hugetlb_get_quota (struct address_space *mapping,long delta);void hugetlb_put_quota (struct address_space *mapping,long delta);
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ static inline void set_file_hugepages(st#define is_file_hugepages (file) 0#define set_file_hugepages (file) BUG() -#define hugetlb_file_setup (name,size,acctflag) ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS) +#define hugetlb_file_setup (name,size,acct,user) ERR_PTR(-ENOSYS)#endif /* !CONFIG_HUGETLBFS */
ipc/shm.c +5 -3
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static void shm_destroy(struct ipc_namesshm_unlock (shp);if (!is_file_hugepages (shp->shm_file))shmem_lock (shp->shm_file,0 , shp->mlock_user); -else +else if (shp->mlock_user)user_shm_unlock (shp->shm_file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_size, shp->mlock_user);fput (shp->shm_file);
@@ -369,8 +369,8 @@ static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace */* hugetlb_file_setup applies strict accounting */ if (shmflg &SHM_NORESERVE ) acctflag =VM_NORESERVE ; - file =hugetlb_file_setup (name, size, acctflag); - shp->mlock_user =current_user (); + file =hugetlb_file_setup (name, size, acctflag, + &shp->mlock_user); }else {/* * Do not allow no accounting for OVERCOMMIT_NEVER, even
@@ -411,6 +411,8 @@ static int newseg(struct ipc_namespace *return error; no_id: +if (shp->mlock_user)/* shmflg & SHM_HUGETLB case */ +user_shm_unlock (size, shp->mlock_user);fput (file); no_file:security_shm_free (shp);
PATCH 11/71 ima: hashing large files bug fix
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
commit 16bfa38b1936212428cb38fbfbbb8f6c62b8d81f upstream.
Hashing files larger than INT_MAX causes process to loop. Dependent on redefining kernel_read() offset type to loff_t.
(http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13909)
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +4 -2
@@ -45,9 +45,9 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, cha {struct hash_desc desc;struct scatterlist sg[1 ]; -loff_t i_size; +loff_t i_size, offset =0 ;char *rbuf; -int rc, offset =0 ; +int rc; rc =init_desc (&desc);if (rc !=0 )
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, cha rc = rbuf_len;break ; } +if (rbuf_len ==0 ) +break ; offset += rbuf_len;sg_init_one (sg, rbuf, rbuf_len);
PATCH 12/71 kernel_read: redefine offset type
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
commit 6777d773a463ac045d333b989d4e44660f8d92ad upstream.
vfs_read() offset is defined as loff_t, but kernel_read() offset is only defined as unsigned long. Redefine kernel_read() offset as loff_t.
--- fs/exec.c | 4 ++-- include/linux/fs.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/exec.c +2 -2
@@ -677,8 +677,8 @@ exit: }EXPORT_SYMBOL (open_exec); -int kernel_read (struct file *file,unsigned long offset, -char *addr,unsigned long count) +int kernel_read (struct file *file,loff_t offset, +char *addr,unsigned long count) {mm_segment_t old_fs;loff_t pos = offset;
include/linux/fs.h +1 -1
@@ -2121,7 +2121,7 @@ extern struct file *do_filp_open(int dfd int open_flag, int mode, int acc_mode);extern int may_open (struct path *,int ,int ); -extern int kernel_read (struct file *,unsigned long ,char *,unsigned long ); +extern int kernel_read (struct file *,loff_t ,char *,unsigned long );extern struct file *open_exec (const char *);/* fs/dcache.c -- generic fs support functions */
PATCH 13/71 tracing: Fix too large stack usage in do_one_initcall()
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
commit 4a683bf94b8a10e2bb0da07aec3ac0a55e5de61f upstream.
One of my testboxes triggered this nasty stack overflow crash during SCSI probing:
[ 5.874004] sd 0:0:0:0: [sda] Write cache: enabled, read cache: enabled, doesn't support DPO or FUA [ 5.875004] device: 'sda': device_add [ 5.878004] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000a0c [ 5.878004] IP: [<b1008321>] print_context_stack+0x81/0x110 [ 5.878004] *pde = 00000000 [ 5.878004] Thread overran stack, or stack corrupted [ 5.878004] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC [ 5.878004] last sysfs file: [ 5.878004] [ 5.878004] Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted (2.6.31-rc6-tip-01272-g9919e28-dirty #5685) [ 5.878004] EIP: 0060:[<b1008321>] EFLAGS: 00010083 CPU: 0 [ 5.878004] EIP is at print_context_stack+0x81/0x110 [ 5.878004] EAX: cf8a3000 EBX: cf8a3fe4 ECX: 00000049 EDX: 00000000 [ 5.878004] ESI: b1cfce84 EDI: 00000000 EBP: cf8a3018 ESP: cf8a2ff4 [ 5.878004] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068 [ 5.878004] Process swapper (pid: 1, ti=cf8a2000 task=cf8a8000 task.ti=cf8a3000) [ 5.878004] Stack: [ 5.878004] b1004867 fffff000 cf8a3ffc [ 5.878004] Call Trace: [ 5.878004] [<b1004867>] ? kernel_thread_helper+0x7/0x10 [ 5.878004] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000a0c [ 5.878004] IP: [<b1008321>] print_context_stack+0x81/0x110 [ 5.878004] *pde = 00000000 [ 5.878004] Thread overran stack, or stack corrupted [ 5.878004] Oops: 0000 [#2] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
The oops did not reveal any more details about the real stack that we have and the system got into an infinite loop of recursive pagefaults.
So i booted with CONFIG_STACK_TRACER=y and the 'stacktrace' boot parameter. The box did not crash (timings/conditions probably changed a tiny bit to trigger the catastrophic crash), but the /debug/tracing/stack_trace file was rather revealing:
Depth Size Location (72 entries)
----- ---- --------
0) 3704 52 __change_page_attr+0xb8/0x290
1) 3652 24 __change_page_attr_set_clr+0x43/0x90
2) 3628 60 kernel_map_pages+0x108/0x120
3) 3568 40 prep_new_page+0x7d/0x130
4) 3528 84 get_page_from_freelist+0x106/0x420
5) 3444 116 __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xd7/0x550
6) 3328 36 allocate_slab+0xb1/0x100
7) 3292 36 new_slab+0x1c/0x160
8) 3256 36 __slab_alloc+0x133/0x2b0
9) 3220 4 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1bb/0x1d0
10) 3216 108 create_object+0x28/0x250
11) 3108 40 kmemleak_alloc+0x81/0xc0
12) 3068 24 kmem_cache_alloc+0x162/0x1d0
13) 3044 52 scsi_pool_alloc_command+0x29/0x70
14) 2992 20 scsi_host_alloc_command+0x22/0x70
15) 2972 24 __scsi_get_command+0x1b/0x90
16) 2948 28 scsi_get_command+0x35/0x90
17) 2920 24 scsi_setup_blk_pc_cmnd+0xd4/0x100
18) 2896 128 sd_prep_fn+0x332/0xa70
19) 2768 36 blk_peek_request+0xe7/0x1d0
20) 2732 56 scsi_request_fn+0x54/0x520
21) 2676 12 __generic_unplug_device+0x2b/0x40
22) 2664 24 blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x59/0x80
23) 2640 172 blk_execute_rq+0x6b/0xb0
24) 2468 32 scsi_execute+0xe0/0x140
25) 2436 64 scsi_execute_req+0x152/0x160
26) 2372 60 scsi_vpd_inquiry+0x6c/0x90
27) 2312 44 scsi_get_vpd_page+0x112/0x160
28) 2268 52 sd_revalidate_disk+0x1df/0x320
29) 2216 92 rescan_partitions+0x98/0x330
30) 2124 52 __blkdev_get+0x309/0x350
31) 2072 8 blkdev_get+0xf/0x20
32) 2064 44 register_disk+0xff/0x120
33) 2020 36 add_disk+0x6e/0xb0
34) 1984 44 sd_probe_async+0xfb/0x1d0
35) 1940 44 __async_schedule+0xf4/0x1b0
36) 1896 8 async_schedule+0x12/0x20
37) 1888 60 sd_probe+0x305/0x360
38) 1828 44 really_probe+0x63/0x170
39) 1784 36 driver_probe_device+0x5d/0x60
40) 1748 16 __device_attach+0x49/0x50
41) 1732 32 bus_for_each_drv+0x5b/0x80
42) 1700 24 device_attach+0x6b/0x70
43) 1676 16 bus_attach_device+0x47/0x60
44) 1660 76 device_add+0x33d/0x400
45) 1584 52 scsi_sysfs_add_sdev+0x6a/0x2c0
46) 1532 108 scsi_add_lun+0x44b/0x460
47) 1424 116 scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0x182/0x4e0
48) 1308 36 __scsi_add_device+0xd9/0xe0
49) 1272 44 ata_scsi_scan_host+0x10b/0x190
50) 1228 24 async_port_probe+0x96/0xd0
51) 1204 44 __async_schedule+0xf4/0x1b0
52) 1160 8 async_schedule+0x12/0x20
53) 1152 48 ata_host_register+0x171/0x1d0
54) 1104 60 ata_pci_sff_activate_host+0xf3/0x230
55) 1044 44 ata_pci_sff_init_one+0xea/0x100
56) 1000 48 amd_init_one+0xb2/0x190
57) 952 8 local_pci_probe+0x13/0x20
58) 944 32 pci_device_probe+0x68/0x90
59) 912 44 really_probe+0x63/0x170
60) 868 36 driver_probe_device+0x5d/0x60
61) 832 20 __driver_attach+0x89/0xa0
62) 812 32 bus_for_each_dev+0x5b/0x80
63) 780 12 driver_attach+0x1e/0x20
64) 768 72 bus_add_driver+0x14b/0x2d0
65) 696 36 driver_register+0x6e/0x150
66) 660 20 __pci_register_driver+0x53/0xc0
67) 640 8 amd_init+0x14/0x16
68) 632 572 do_one_initcall+0x2b/0x1d0
69) 60 12 do_basic_setup+0x56/0x6a
70) 48 20 kernel_init+0x84/0xce
71) 28 28 kernel_thread_helper+0x7/0x10There's a lot of fat functions on that stack trace, but the largest of all is do_one_initcall(). This is due to the boot trace entry variables being on the stack.
Fixing this is relatively easy, initcalls are fundamentally serialized, so we can move the local variables to file scope.
Note that this large stack footprint was present for a couple of months already - what pushed my system over the edge was the addition of kmemleak to the call-chain:
6) 3328 36 allocate_slab+0xb1/0x100 7) 3292 36 new_slab+0x1c/0x160 8) 3256 36 __slab_alloc+0x133/0x2b0 9) 3220 4 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1bb/0x1d0 10) 3216 108 create_object+0x28/0x250 11) 3108 40 kmemleak_alloc+0x81/0xc0 12) 3068 24 kmem_cache_alloc+0x162/0x1d0 13) 3044 52 scsi_pool_alloc_command+0x29/0x70
This pushes the total to ~3800 bytes, only a tiny bit more was needed to corrupt the on-kernel-stack thread_info.
The fix reduces the stack footprint from 572 bytes to 28 bytes.
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <[email protected]>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
LKML-Reference: <new-submission>
--- init/main.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
init/main.c +4 -3
@@ -702,13 +702,14 @@ asmlinkage void __init start_kernel(voidint initcall_debug;core_param (initcall_debug, initcall_debug, bool,0644 ); +static char msgbuf[64 ]; +static struct boot_trace_call call; +static struct boot_trace_ret ret; +int do_one_initcall (initcall_t fn) {int count =preempt_count ();ktime_t calltime, delta, rettime; -char msgbuf[64 ]; -struct boot_trace_call call; -struct boot_trace_ret ret;if (initcall_debug) { call.caller =task_pid_nr (current);
PATCH 14/71 sound: pcm_lib: fix unsorted list constraint handling
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Clemens Ladisch <[email protected]>
commit b1ddaf681e362ed453182ddee1699d7487069a16 upstream.
snd_interval_list() expected a sorted list but did not document this, so there are drivers that give it an unsorted list. To fix this, change the algorithm to work with any list.
This fixes the "Slave PCM not usable" error with USB devices that have multiple alternate settings with sample rates in decreasing order, such as the Philips Askey VC010 WebCam.
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14028
--- sound/core/pcm_lib.c | 39 ++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
sound/core/pcm_lib.c +8 -31
@@ -876,47 +876,24 @@ static int snd_interval_ratden(struct snint snd_interval_list (struct snd_interval *i,unsigned int count,unsigned int *list,unsigned int mask) {unsigned int k; -int changed =0 ; +struct snd_interval list_range;if (!count) { i->empty =1 ;return -EINVAL ; } +snd_interval_any (&list_range); + list_range.min =UINT_MAX ; + list_range.max =0 ;for (k =0 ; k < count; k++) {if (mask && !(mask & (1 << k)))continue ; -if (i->min == list[k] && !i->openmin) - goto _l1; -if (i->min < list[k]) { - i->min = list[k]; - i->openmin =0 ; - changed =1 ; - goto _l1; - } - } - i->empty =1 ; -return -EINVAL ; - _l1: -for (k = count; k-- >0 ;) { -if (mask && !(mask & (1 << k))) +if (!snd_interval_test (i, list[k]))continue ; -if (i->max == list[k] && !i->openmax) - goto _l2; -if (i->max > list[k]) { - i->max = list[k]; - i->openmax =0 ; - changed =1 ; - goto _l2; - } + list_range.min =min (list_range.min, list[k]); + list_range.max =max (list_range.max, list[k]); } - i->empty =1 ; -return -EINVAL ; - _l2: -if (snd_interval_checkempty (i)) { - i->empty =1 ; -return -EINVAL ; - } -return changed; +return snd_interval_refine (i, &list_range); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (snd_interval_list);
PATCH 15/71 clone(): fix race between copy_process() and de_thread()
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
commit 4ab6c08336535f8c8e42cf45d7adeda882eff06e upstream.
Spotted by Hiroshi Shimamoto who also provided the test-case below.
copy_process() uses signal->count as a reference counter, but it is not. This test case
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <pthread.h>
void *null_thread(void *p)
{
for (;;)
sleep(1);
return NULL;
}
void *exec_thread(void *p)
{
execl("/bin/true", "/bin/true", NULL);
return null_thread(p);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
for (;;) {
pid_t pid;
int ret, status;
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0)
break;
if (!pid) {
pthread_t tid;
pthread_create(&tid, NULL, exec_thread, NULL);
for (;;)
pthread_create(&tid, NULL, null_thread, NULL);
}
do {
ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
} while (ret == -1 && errno == EINTR);
}
return 0;
}quickly creates an unkillable task.
If copy_process(CLONE_THREAD) races with de_thread() copy_signal()->atomic(signal->count) breaks the signal->notify_count logic, and the execing thread can hang forever in kernel space.
Change copy_process() to increment count/live only when we know for sure we can't fail. In this case the forked thread will take care of its reference to signal correctly.
If copy_process() fails, check CLONE_THREAD flag. If it it set - do nothing, the counters were not changed and current belongs to the same thread group. If it is not set, ->signal must be released in any case (and ->count must be == 1), the forked child is the only thread in the thread group.
We need more cleanups here, in particular signal->count should not be used by de_thread/__exit_signal at all. This patch only fixes the bug.
--- kernel/fork.c | 20 +++++--------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
kernel/fork.c +5 -15
@@ -816,11 +816,8 @@ static int copy_signal(unsigned long clo {struct signal_struct *sig; -if (clone_flags &CLONE_THREAD ) { -atomic_inc (¤t->signal->count); -atomic_inc (¤t->signal->live); +if (clone_flags &CLONE_THREAD )return 0 ; - } sig =kmem_cache_alloc (signal_cachep,GFP_KERNEL ); tsk->signal = sig;
@@ -878,16 +875,6 @@ void __cleanup_signal(struct signal_strukmem_cache_free (signal_cachep, sig); } -static void cleanup_signal (struct task_struct *tsk) -{ -struct signal_struct *sig = tsk->signal; - -atomic_dec (&sig->live); - -if (atomic_dec_and_test (&sig->count)) -__cleanup_signal (sig); -} -static void copy_flags (unsigned long clone_flags,struct task_struct *p) {unsigned long new_flags = p->flags;
@@ -1237,6 +1224,8 @@ static struct task_struct *copy_process( }if (clone_flags &CLONE_THREAD ) { +atomic_inc (¤t->signal->count); +atomic_inc (¤t->signal->live); p->group_leader = current->group_leader;list_add_tail_rcu (&p->thread_group, &p->group_leader->thread_group); }
@@ -1281,7 +1270,8 @@ bad_fork_cleanup_mm:if (p->mm)mmput (p->mm); bad_fork_cleanup_signal: -cleanup_signal (p); +if (!(clone_flags &CLONE_THREAD )) +__cleanup_signal (p->signal); bad_fork_cleanup_sighand:__cleanup_sighand (p->sighand); bad_fork_cleanup_fs:
PATCH 16/71 wmi: fix kernel panic when stack protection enabled.
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Costantino Leandro <[email protected]>
commit f3d83e2415445e5b157bef404d38674e9e8de169 upstream.
Summary:
Kernel panic arise when stack protection is enabled, since strncat will
add a null terminating byte '\0'; So in functions
like this one (wmi_query_block):
char wc[4]="WC";
....
strncat(method, block->object_id, 2);
...the length of wc should be n+1 (wc[5]) or stack protection fault will arise. This is not noticeable when stack protection is disabled,but , isn't good either.
Config used: [CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_ALL=y,
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y]
Panic Trace
------------
.... stack-protector: kernel stack corrupted in : fa7b182c
2.6.30-rc8-obelisco-generic
call_trace:
[<c04a6c40>] ? panic+0x45/0xd9
[<c012925d>] ? __stack_chk_fail+0x1c/0x40
[<fa7b182c>] ? wmi_query_block+0x15a/0x162 [wmi]
[<fa7b182c>] ? wmi_query_block+0x15a/0x162 [wmi]
[<fa7e7000>] ? acer_wmi_init+0x00/0x61a [acer_wmi]
[<fa7e7135>] ? acer_wmi_init+0x135/0x61a [acer_wmi]
[<c0101159>] ? do_one_initcall+0x50+0x126Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13514
--- drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/x86/wmi.c +4 -4
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ u32 method_id, const struct acpi_bufferacpi_status status;struct acpi_object_list input;union acpi_object params[3 ]; -char method[4 ] ="WM" ; +char method[5 ] ="WM" ;if (!find_guid (guid_string, &wblock))return AE_ERROR ;
@@ -328,8 +328,8 @@ struct acpi_buffer *out)acpi_status status, wc_status =AE_ERROR ;struct acpi_object_list input, wc_input;union acpi_object wc_params[1 ], wq_params[1 ]; -char method[4 ]; -char wc_method[4 ] ="WC" ; +char method[5 ]; +char wc_method[5 ] ="WC" ;if (!guid_string || !out)return AE_BAD_PARAMETER ;
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ const struct acpi_buffer *in)acpi_handle handle;struct acpi_object_list input;union acpi_object params[2 ]; -char method[4 ] ="WS" ; +char method[5 ] ="WS" ;if (!guid_string || !in)return AE_BAD_DATA ;
PATCH 17/71 SUNRPC: Fix rpc_task_force_reencode
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
commit 2574cc9f4ffc6c681c9177111357efe5b76f0e36 upstream.
This patch fixes the bug that was reported in
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14053
If we're in the case where we need to force a reencode and then resend of the RPC request, due to xprt_transmit failing with a networking error, then we _must_ retransmit the entire request.
--- net/sunrpc/clnt.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/sunrpc/clnt.c +1 -0
@@ -876,6 +876,7 @@ static inline void rpc_task_force_reencode(struct rpc_task *task) { task->tk_rqstp->rq_snd_buf.len =0 ; + task->tk_rqstp->rq_bytes_sent =0 ; } static inline void
PATCH 14/16 KVM: MMU: limit rmap chain length
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 53a27b39ff4d2492f84b1fdc2f0047175f0b0b93)
Otherwise the host can spend too long traversing an rmap chain, which happens under a spinlock.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +28 -5
@@ -490,16 +490,20 @@ static unsigned long *gfn_to_rmap(struct* * If rmapp bit zero is one, (then rmap & ~1) points to a struct kvm_rmap_desc * containing more mappings. +* +* Returns the number of rmap entries before the spte was added or zero if +* the spte was not added. +* */ -static void rmap_add (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 *spte,gfn_t gfn,int lpage) +static int rmap_add (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 *spte,gfn_t gfn,int lpage) {struct kvm_mmu_page *sp;struct kvm_rmap_desc *desc;unsigned long *rmapp; -int i; +int i, count =0 ;if (!is_rmap_pte (*spte)) -return ; +return count; gfn =unalias_gfn (vcpu->kvm, gfn); sp =page_header (__pa (spte)); sp->gfns[spte - sp->spt] = gfn;
@@ -516,8 +520,10 @@ static void rmap_add(struct kvm_vcpu *vc }else {rmap_printk ("rmap_add: %p %llx many->many\n" , spte, *spte); desc = (struct kvm_rmap_desc *)(*rmapp & ~1ul ); -while (desc->shadow_ptes[RMAP_EXT -1 ] && desc->more) +while (desc->shadow_ptes[RMAP_EXT -1 ] && desc->more) { desc = desc->more; + count +=RMAP_EXT ; + }if (desc->shadow_ptes[RMAP_EXT -1 ]) { desc->more =mmu_alloc_rmap_desc (vcpu); desc = desc->more;
@@ -526,6 +532,7 @@ static void rmap_add(struct kvm_vcpu *vc ; desc->shadow_ptes[i] = spte; } +return count; } static void rmap_desc_remove_entry(unsigned long *rmapp,
@@ -755,6 +762,19 @@ static int kvm_age_rmapp(struct kvm *kvmreturn young; } +#define RMAP_RECYCLE_THRESHOLD 1000 + +static void rmap_recycle (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gfn_t gfn,int lpage) +{ +unsigned long *rmapp; + + gfn =unalias_gfn (vcpu->kvm, gfn); + rmapp =gfn_to_rmap (vcpu->kvm, gfn, lpage); + +kvm_unmap_rmapp (vcpu->kvm, rmapp); +kvm_flush_remote_tlbs (vcpu->kvm); +} +int kvm_age_hva (struct kvm *kvm,unsigned long hva) {return kvm_handle_hva (kvm, hva, kvm_age_rmapp);
@@ -1771,6 +1791,7 @@ static void mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpu {int was_rmapped =0 ;int was_writeble =is_writeble_pte (*shadow_pte); +int rmap_count; pgprintk("%s: spte %llx access %x write_fault %d" " user_fault %d gfn %lx\n",
@@ -1812,9 +1833,11 @@ static void mmu_set_spte(struct kvm_vcpupage_header_update_slot (vcpu->kvm, shadow_pte, gfn);if (!was_rmapped) { -rmap_add (vcpu, shadow_pte, gfn, largepage); + rmap_count =rmap_add (vcpu, shadow_pte, gfn, largepage);if (!is_rmap_pte (*shadow_pte))kvm_release_pfn_clean (pfn); +if (rmap_count >RMAP_RECYCLE_THRESHOLD ) +rmap_recycle (vcpu, gfn, largepage); }else {if (was_writeble)kvm_release_pfn_dirty (pfn);
PATCH 18/71 ALSA: hda - Fix MacBookPro 3,1/4,1 quirk with ALC889A
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit a3f730af7e33cea10ea66f05b2565fde1f9512df upstream.
This patch fixes the wrong headphone output routing for MacBookPro 3,1/4,1 quirk with ALC889A codec, which caused the silent headphone output. Also, this gives the individual Headphone and Speaker volume controls.
Reference: kernel bug#14078
http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14078
--- sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
sound/pci/hda/patch_realtek.c +20 -14
@@ -6186,9 +6186,9 @@ static struct hda_verb alc885_mbp_ch2_in };/* -* 6ch mode +* 4ch mode */ -static struct hda_verb alc885_mbp_ch6_init[] = { +static struct hda_verb alc885_mbp_ch4_init[] = { {0x1a ,AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL ,PIN_OUT }, {0x1a ,AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE ,AMP_OUT_UNMUTE }, {0x1a ,AC_VERB_SET_CONNECT_SEL ,0x01 },
@@ -6197,9 +6197,9 @@ static struct hda_verb alc885_mbp_ch6_in { }/* end */ }; -static struct hda_channel_mode alc885_mbp_6ch_modes[2 ] = { +static struct hda_channel_mode alc885_mbp_4ch_modes[2 ] = { {2 , alc885_mbp_ch2_init }, - {6 , alc885_mbp_ch6_init }, + {4 , alc885_mbp_ch4_init }, };
@@ -6232,10 +6232,11 @@ static struct snd_kcontrol_new alc882_ba };static struct snd_kcontrol_new alc885_mbp3_mixer[] = { -HDA_CODEC_VOLUME ("Front Playback Volume" ,0x0c ,0x00 ,HDA_OUTPUT ), -HDA_BIND_MUTE ("Front Playback Switch" ,0x0c ,0x02 ,HDA_INPUT ), -HDA_CODEC_MUTE ("Speaker Playback Switch" ,0x14 ,0x00 ,HDA_OUTPUT ), -HDA_CODEC_VOLUME ("Line-Out Playback Volume" ,0x0d ,0x00 ,HDA_OUTPUT ), +HDA_CODEC_VOLUME ("Speaker Playback Volume" ,0x0c ,0x00 ,HDA_OUTPUT ), +HDA_BIND_MUTE ("Speaker Playback Switch" ,0x0c ,0x02 ,HDA_INPUT ), +HDA_CODEC_VOLUME ("Headphone Playback Volume" ,0x0e ,0x00 ,HDA_OUTPUT ), +HDA_BIND_MUTE ("Headphone Playback Switch" ,0x0e ,0x02 ,HDA_INPUT ), +HDA_CODEC_VOLUME ("Surround Playback Volume" ,0x0d ,0x00 ,HDA_OUTPUT ),HDA_CODEC_VOLUME ("Line Playback Volume" ,0x0b ,0x02 ,HDA_INPUT ),HDA_CODEC_MUTE ("Line Playback Switch" ,0x0b ,0x02 ,HDA_INPUT ),HDA_CODEC_VOLUME ("Mic Playback Volume" ,0x0b ,0x00 ,HDA_INPUT ),
@@ -6481,14 +6482,18 @@ static struct hda_verb alc885_mbp3_init_ {0x0d, AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_OUT_ZERO}, {0x0d, AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_IN_MUTE(0)}, {0x0d, AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_IN_MUTE(1)}, +/* HP mixer */ + {0x0e, AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_OUT_ZERO}, + {0x0e, AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_IN_MUTE(0)}, + {0x0e, AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_IN_MUTE(1)},/* Front Pin: output 0 (0x0c) */ {0x14, AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL, PIN_OUT}, {0x14, AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_OUT_UNMUTE}, {0x14, AC_VERB_SET_CONNECT_SEL, 0x00}, -/* HP Pin: output 0 (0x0d) */ +/* HP Pin: output 0 (0x0e) */ {0x15, AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL, 0xc4}, - {0x15, AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_OUT_MUTE}, - {0x15, AC_VERB_SET_CONNECT_SEL, 0x00}, + {0x15, AC_VERB_SET_AMP_GAIN_MUTE, AMP_OUT_UNMUTE}, + {0x15, AC_VERB_SET_CONNECT_SEL, 0x02}, {0x15, AC_VERB_SET_UNSOLICITED_ENABLE, ALC880_HP_EVENT | AC_USRSP_EN},/* Mic (rear) pin: input vref at 80% */ {0x18, AC_VERB_SET_PIN_WIDGET_CONTROL, PIN_VREF80},
@@ -6885,10 +6890,11 @@ static struct alc_config_preset alc882_p .mixers = { alc885_mbp3_mixer, alc882_chmode_mixer }, .init_verbs = { alc885_mbp3_init_verbs, alc880_gpio1_init_verbs }, - .num_dacs = ARRAY_SIZE(alc882_dac_nids), + .num_dacs = 2, .dac_nids = alc882_dac_nids, - .channel_mode = alc885_mbp_6ch_modes, - .num_channel_mode = ARRAY_SIZE(alc885_mbp_6ch_modes), + .hp_nid = 0x04, + .channel_mode = alc885_mbp_4ch_modes, + .num_channel_mode = ARRAY_SIZE(alc885_mbp_4ch_modes), .input_mux = &alc882_capture_source, .dig_out_nid = ALC882_DIGOUT_NID, .dig_in_nid = ALC882_DIGIN_NID,
PATCH 19/71 KVM: take mmu_lock when updating a deleted slot
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit b43b1901ad282aeb74161837fb403927102687a1)
kvm_handle_hva relies on mmu_lock protection to safely access the memslot structures.
--- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +2 -0
@@ -1055,8 +1055,10 @@ int __kvm_set_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm_free_physmem_slot (&old, npages ? &new :NULL );/* Slot deletion case: we have to update the current slot */ +spin_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock);if (!npages) *memslot = old; +spin_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock);#ifdef CONFIG_DMAR /* map the pages in iommu page table */ r =kvm_iommu_map_pages (kvm, base_gfn, npages);
PATCH 20/71 KVM: x86: check for cr3 validity in mmu_alloc_roots
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 8986ecc0ef58c96eec48d8502c048f3ab67fd8e2)
Verify the cr3 address stored in vcpu->arch.cr3 points to an existant memslot. If not, inject a triple fault.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +23 -4
@@ -1942,7 +1942,19 @@ static void mmu_free_roots(struct kvm_vc vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa =INVALID_PAGE ; } -static void mmu_alloc_roots (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) +static int mmu_check_root (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,gfn_t root_gfn) +{ +int ret =0 ; + +if (!kvm_is_visible_gfn (vcpu->kvm, root_gfn)) { +set_bit (KVM_REQ_TRIPLE_FAULT , &vcpu->requests); + ret =1 ; + } + +return ret; +} + +static int mmu_alloc_roots (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {int i;gfn_t root_gfn;
@@ -1957,13 +1969,15 @@ static void mmu_alloc_roots(struct kvm_vASSERT (!VALID_PAGE (root));if (tdp_enabled) direct =1 ; +if (mmu_check_root (vcpu, root_gfn)) +return 1 ; sp =kvm_mmu_get_page (vcpu, root_gfn,0 ,PT64_ROOT_LEVEL , direct,ACC_ALL ,NULL ); root =__pa (sp->spt); ++sp->root_count; vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa = root; -return ; +return 0 ; } direct = !is_paging (vcpu);if (tdp_enabled)
@@ -1980,6 +1994,8 @@ static void mmu_alloc_roots(struct kvm_v root_gfn = vcpu->arch.pdptrs[i] >>PAGE_SHIFT ; }else if (vcpu->arch.mmu.root_level ==0 ) root_gfn =0 ; +if (mmu_check_root (vcpu, root_gfn)) +return 1 ; sp =kvm_mmu_get_page (vcpu, root_gfn, i <<30 ,PT32_ROOT_LEVEL , direct,ACC_ALL ,NULL );
@@ -1988,6 +2004,7 @@ static void mmu_alloc_roots(struct kvm_v vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root[i] = root |PT_PRESENT_MASK ; } vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa =__pa (vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root); +return 0 ; }static void mmu_sync_roots (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
@@ -2006,7 +2023,7 @@ static void mmu_sync_roots(struct kvm_vcfor (i =0 ; i <4 ; ++i) {hpa_t root = vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root[i]; -if (root) { +if (root &&VALID_PAGE (root)) { root &=PT64_BASE_ADDR_MASK ; sp =page_header (root);mmu_sync_children (vcpu, sp);
@@ -2290,9 +2307,11 @@ int kvm_mmu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) goto out;spin_lock (&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock);kvm_mmu_free_some_pages (vcpu); -mmu_alloc_roots (vcpu); + r =mmu_alloc_roots (vcpu);mmu_sync_roots (vcpu);spin_unlock (&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); +if (r) + goto out; kvm_x86_ops->set_cr3 (vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu.root_hpa);kvm_mmu_flush_tlb (vcpu); out:
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -0
@@ -4433,6 +4433,7 @@ int kvm_arch_set_memory_region(struct kvvoid kvm_arch_flush_shadow (struct kvm *kvm) {kvm_mmu_zap_all (kvm); +kvm_reload_remote_mmus (kvm); }int kvm_arch_vcpu_runnable (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
PATCH 21/71 KVM: MMU: protect kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages with mmu_lock
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 7c8a83b75a38a807d37f5a4398eca2a42c8cf513)
kvm_handle_hva, called by MMU notifiers, manipulates mmu data only with the protection of mmu_lock.
Update kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages callers to take mmu_lock, thus protecting against kvm_handle_hva.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 2 -- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +0 -2
@@ -2729,7 +2729,6 @@ void kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(st {struct kvm_mmu_page *sp; -spin_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock);list_for_each_entry (sp, &kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages, link) {int i;u64 *pt;
@@ -2744,7 +2743,6 @@ void kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(st pt[i] &= ~PT_WRITABLE_MASK ; }kvm_flush_remote_tlbs (kvm); -spin_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock); }void kvm_mmu_zap_all (struct kvm *kvm)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +6 -0
@@ -1608,10 +1608,12 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_set_nr_mmu_pagesreturn -EINVAL ;down_write (&kvm->slots_lock); +spin_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock);kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages (kvm, kvm_nr_mmu_pages); kvm->arch.n_requested_mmu_pages = kvm_nr_mmu_pages; +spin_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock);up_write (&kvm->slots_lock);return 0 ; }
@@ -1787,7 +1789,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log(struct kv/* If nothing is dirty, don't bother messing with page tables. */ if (is_dirty) { +spin_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock);kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access (kvm, log->slot); +spin_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock);kvm_flush_remote_tlbs (kvm); memslot = &kvm->memslots[log->slot]; n =ALIGN (memslot->npages,BITS_PER_LONG ) /8 ;
@@ -4419,12 +4423,14 @@ int kvm_arch_set_memory_region(struct kv } } +spin_lock (&kvm->mmu_lock);if (!kvm->arch.n_requested_mmu_pages) {unsigned int nr_mmu_pages =kvm_mmu_calculate_mmu_pages (kvm);kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages (kvm, nr_mmu_pages); }kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access (kvm, mem->slot); +spin_unlock (&kvm->mmu_lock);kvm_flush_remote_tlbs (kvm);return 0 ;
PATCH 22/71 KVM: MMU: do not free active mmu pages in free_mmu_pages()
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit f00be0cae4e6ad0a8c7be381c6d9be3586800b3e)
free_mmu_pages() should only undo what alloc_mmu_pages() does. Free mmu pages from the generic VM destruction function, kvm_destroy_vm().
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 8 -------- virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +0 -8
@@ -2657,14 +2657,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_disable_tdp);static void free_mmu_pages (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { -struct kvm_mmu_page *sp; - -while (!list_empty (&vcpu->kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages)) { - sp =container_of (vcpu->kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages.next, - struct kvm_mmu_page, link); -kvm_mmu_zap_page (vcpu->kvm, sp); -cond_resched (); - }free_page ((unsigned long )vcpu->arch.mmu.pae_root); }
virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +2 -0
@@ -881,6 +881,8 @@ static void kvm_destroy_vm(struct kvm *k#endif #if defined(CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER ) && defined(KVM_ARCH_WANT_MMU_NOTIFIER )mmu_notifier_unregister (&kvm->mmu_notifier, kvm->mm); +#else +kvm_arch_flush_shadow (kvm);#endif kvm_arch_destroy_vm (kvm);mmdrop (mm);
PATCH 23/71 KVM: Introduce {set/get}_interrupt_shadow()
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Glauber Costa <[email protected]>
This patch introduces set/get_interrupt_shadow(), that does exactly what the name suggests. It also replaces open code that explicitly does it with the now existent functions. It differs slightly from upstream, because upstream merged it after gleb's interrupt rework, that we don't ship.
Just for reference, upstream changelog is
(2809f5d2c4cfad171167b131bb2a21ab65eba40f):
This patch replaces drop_interrupt_shadow with the more general set_interrupt_shadow, that can either drop or raise it, depending on its parameter. It also adds ->get_interrupt_shadow() for future use.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_x86_emulate.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
@@ -513,6 +513,8 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {void (*run)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,struct kvm_run *run);int (*handle_exit)(struct kvm_run *run,struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);void (*skip_emulated_instruction)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); +void (*set_interrupt_shadow)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int mask); +u32 (*get_interrupt_shadow)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int mask);void (*patch_hypercall)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,unsigned char *hypercall_addr);int (*get_irq)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_x86_emulate.h +3 -0
@@ -143,6 +143,9 @@ struct decode_cache {struct fetch_cache fetch; }; +#define X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS 1 +#define X86_SHADOW_INT_STI 2 +struct x86_emulate_ctxt {/* Register state before/after emulation. */ struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +24 -1
@@ -227,6 +227,27 @@ static int is_external_interrupt(u32 infreturn info == (SVM_EVTINJ_VALID |SVM_EVTINJ_TYPE_INTR ); } +static u32 svm_get_interrupt_shadow (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int mask) +{ +struct vcpu_svm *svm =to_svm (vcpu); +u32 ret =0 ; + +if (svm->vmcb->control.int_state &SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK ) + ret |=X86_SHADOW_INT_STI |X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS ; +return ret & mask; +} + +static void svm_set_interrupt_shadow (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int mask) +{ +struct vcpu_svm *svm =to_svm (vcpu); + +if (mask ==0 ) + svm->vmcb->control.int_state &= ~SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK ; +else + svm->vmcb->control.int_state |=SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK ; + +} +static void skip_emulated_instruction (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) {struct vcpu_svm *svm =to_svm (vcpu);
@@ -240,7 +261,7 @@ static void skip_emulated_instruction(st __func__, kvm_rip_read(vcpu), svm->next_rip);kvm_rip_write (vcpu, svm->next_rip); - svm->vmcb->control.int_state &= ~SVM_INTERRUPT_SHADOW_MASK ; +svm_set_interrupt_shadow (vcpu,0 ); vcpu->arch.interrupt_window_open = (svm->vcpu.arch.hflags &HF_GIF_MASK ); }
@@ -2667,6 +2688,8 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops = .run = svm_vcpu_run, .handle_exit = handle_exit, .skip_emulated_instruction = skip_emulated_instruction, + .set_interrupt_shadow = svm_set_interrupt_shadow, + .get_interrupt_shadow = svm_get_interrupt_shadow, .patch_hypercall = svm_patch_hypercall, .get_irq = svm_get_irq, .set_irq = svm_set_irq,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +33 -9
62 lines not on this page · raw message
PATCH 24/71 KVM: Deal with interrupt shadow state for emulated instructions
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Glauber Costa <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 310b5d306c1aee7ebe32f702c0e33e7988d50646)
We currently unblock shadow interrupt state when we skip an instruction, but failing to do so when we actually emulate one. This blocks interrupts in key instruction blocks, in particular sti; hlt; sequences
If the instruction emulated is an sti, we have to block shadow interrupts. The same goes for mov ss. pop ss also needs it, but we don't currently emulate it.
Without this patch, I cannot boot gpxe option roms at vmx machines. This is described at https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=494469
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_x86_emulate.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 6 +++++- arch/x86/kvm/x86_emulate.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_x86_emulate.h +3 -0
@@ -155,6 +155,9 @@ struct x86_emulate_ctxt {int mode;u32 cs_base; +/* interruptibility state, as a result of execution of STI or MOV SS */ +int interruptibility; +/* decode cache */ struct decode_cache decode; };
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +5 -1
@@ -2366,7 +2366,7 @@ int emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpuu16 error_code, int emulation_type) { - int r; + int r, shadow_mask;struct decode_cache *c;kvm_clear_exception_queue (vcpu);
@@ -2415,6 +2415,10 @@ int emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu } r =x86_emulate_insn (&vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt, &emulate_ops); + shadow_mask = vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt.interruptibility; + +if (r ==0 ) + kvm_x86_ops->set_interrupt_shadow (vcpu, shadow_mask);if (vcpu->arch.pio.string)return EMULATE_DO_MMIO ;
arch/x86/kvm/x86_emulate.c +20 -0
@@ -1349,6 +1349,20 @@ static inline int writeback(struct x86_ereturn 0 ; } +void toggle_interruptibility (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,u32 mask) +{ +u32 int_shadow = kvm_x86_ops->get_interrupt_shadow (ctxt->vcpu, mask); +/* +* an sti; sti; sequence only disable interrupts for the first +* instruction. So, if the last instruction, be it emulated or +* not, left the system with the INT_STI flag enabled, it +* means that the last instruction is an sti. We should not +* leave the flag on in this case. The same goes for mov ss +*/ +if (!(int_shadow & mask)) + ctxt->interruptibility = mask; +} +int x86_emulate_insn (struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,struct x86_emulate_ops *ops) {
@@ -1360,6 +1374,8 @@ x86_emulate_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxtint io_dir_in;int rc =0 ; + ctxt->interruptibility =0 ; +/* Shadow copy of register state. Committed on successful emulation. * NOTE: we can copy them from vcpu as x86_decode_insn() doesn't * modify them.
@@ -1609,6 +1625,9 @@ special_insn:int err; sel = c->src.val; +if (c->modrm_reg ==VCPU_SREG_SS ) +toggle_interruptibility (ctxt,X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS ); +if (c->modrm_reg <=5 ) { type_bits = (c->modrm_reg ==1 ) ?9 :1 ; err = kvm_load_segment_descriptor(ctxt->vcpu, sel,
@@ -1865,6 +1884,7 @@ special_insn: c->dst.type =OP_NONE ;/* Disable writeback. */ break ;case 0xfb :/* sti */ +toggle_interruptibility (ctxt,X86_SHADOW_INT_STI ); ctxt->eflags |=X86_EFLAGS_IF ; c->dst.type =OP_NONE ;/* Disable writeback. */ break ;
PATCH 25/71 KVM: MMU: Use different shadows when EFER.NXE changes
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 9645bb56b31a1b70ab9e470387b5264cafc04aa9)
A pte that is shadowed when the guest EFER.NXE=1 is not valid when EFER.NXE=0; if bit 63 is set, the pte should cause a fault, and since the shadow EFER always has NX enabled, this won't happen.
Fix by using a different shadow page table for different EFER.NXE bits. This allows vcpus to run correctly with different values of EFER.NXE, and for transitions on this bit to be handled correctly without requiring a full flush.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ union kvm_mmu_page_role { unsigned access:3; unsigned invalid:1; unsigned cr4_pge:1; + unsigned nxe:1; }; };
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +3 -0
@@ -523,6 +523,9 @@ static void set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vc efer |= vcpu->arch.shadow_efer &EFER_LMA ; vcpu->arch.shadow_efer = efer; + + vcpu->arch.mmu.base_role.nxe = (efer &EFER_NX ) && !tdp_enabled; +kvm_mmu_reset_context (vcpu); }void kvm_enable_efer_bits (u64 mask)
PATCH 26/71 KVM: x86: Ignore reads to EVNTSEL MSRs
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 7fe29e0faacb650d31b9e9f538203a157bec821d)
We ignore writes to the performance counters and performance event selector registers already. Kaspersky antivirus reads the eventsel MSR causing it to crash with the current behaviour.
Return 0 as data when the eventsel registers are read to stop the crash.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +2 -0
@@ -898,6 +898,8 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *case MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP :case MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP :case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA : +case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0 : +case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1 : data =0 ;break ;case MSR_MTRRcap:
PATCH 27/71 KVM: Ignore reads to K7 EVNTSEL MSRs
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Amit Shah <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 9e6996240afcbe61682eab8eeaeb65c34333164d)
In commit 7fe29e0faacb650d31b9e9f538203a157bec821d we ignored the reads to the P6 EVNTSEL MSRs. That fixed crashes on Intel machines.
Ignore the reads to K7 EVNTSEL MSRs as well to fix this on AMD hosts.
This fixes Kaspersky antivirus crashing Windows guests on AMD hosts.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +1 -0
@@ -900,6 +900,7 @@ int kvm_get_msr_common(struct kvm_vcpu *case MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA :case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0 :case MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1 : +case MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0 : data =0 ;break ;case MSR_MTRRcap:
PATCH 28/71 KVM: Fix cpuid feature misreporting
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Avi Kivity <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 8d753f369bd28fff1706ffe9fb9fea4fd88cf85b)
MTRR, PAT, MCE, and MCA are all supported (to some extent) but not reported. Vista requires these features, so if userspace relies on kernel cpuid reporting, it loses support for Vista.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +5 -2
@@ -1256,9 +1256,12 @@ static void do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuibit (X86_FEATURE_VME ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_DE ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_PSE ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_TSC ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_MSR ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_PAE ) | +bit (X86_FEATURE_MCE ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_CX8 ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_APIC ) | -bit (X86_FEATURE_SEP ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_PGE ) | -bit (X86_FEATURE_CMOV ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_PSE36 ) | +bit (X86_FEATURE_SEP ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_MTRR ) | +bit (X86_FEATURE_PGE ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_MCA ) | +bit (X86_FEATURE_CMOV ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_PAT ) | +bit (X86_FEATURE_PSE36 ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_CLFLSH ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_MMX ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_FXSR ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_XMM ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_XMM2 ) |bit (X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP );
PATCH 29/71 KVM: x86: verify MTRR/PAT validity
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit d6289b9365c3f622a8cfe62c4fb054bb70b5061a)
Do not allow invalid memory types in MTRR/PAT (generating a #GP otherwise).
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +38 -1
@@ -706,11 +706,48 @@ static bool msr_mtrr_valid(unsigned msr)return false; } +static bool valid_pat_type (unsigned t) +{ +return t <8 && (1 << t) &0xf3 ;/* 0, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 */ +} + +static bool valid_mtrr_type (unsigned t) +{ +return t <8 && (1 << t) &0x73 ;/* 0, 1, 4, 5, 6 */ +} + +static bool mtrr_valid (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 msr,u64 data) +{ +int i; + +if (!msr_mtrr_valid (msr)) +return false; + +if (msr ==MSR_IA32_CR_PAT ) { +for (i =0 ; i <8 ; i++) +if (!valid_pat_type ((data >> (i *8 )) &0xff )) +return false; +return true; + }else if (msr == MSR_MTRRdefType) { +if (data & ~0xcff ) +return false; +return valid_mtrr_type (data &0xff ); + }else if (msr >= MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000 && msr <= MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000) { +for (i =0 ; i <8 ; i++) +if (!valid_mtrr_type ((data >> (i *8 )) &0xff )) +return false; +return true; + } + +/* variable MTRRs */ +return valid_mtrr_type (data &0xff ); +} +static int set_msr_mtrr (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u32 msr,u64 data) {u64 *p = (u64 *)&vcpu->arch.mtrr_state.fixed_ranges; -if (!msr_mtrr_valid (msr)) +if (!mtrr_valid (vcpu, msr, data))return 1 ;if (msr == MSR_MTRRdefType) {
PATCH 30/71 KVM: SVM: force new asid on vcpu migration
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 4b656b1202498184a0ecef86b3b89ff613b9c6ab)
If a migrated vcpu matches the asid_generation value of the target pcpu, there will be no TLB flush via TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID.
The check for vcpu.cpu in pre_svm_run is meaningless since svm_vcpu_load already updated it on schedule in.
Such vcpu will VMRUN with stale TLB entries.
Based on original patch from Joerg Roedel (http://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10021/)
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +3 -3
@@ -736,6 +736,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcp svm->vmcb->control.tsc_offset += delta; vcpu->cpu = cpu;kvm_migrate_timers (vcpu); + svm->asid_generation =0 ; }for (i =0 ; i <NR_HOST_SAVE_USER_MSRS ; i++)
@@ -1046,7 +1047,6 @@ static void new_asid(struct vcpu_svm *sv svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl =TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ALL_ASID ; } - svm->vcpu.cpu = svm_data->cpu; svm->asid_generation = svm_data->asid_generation; svm->vmcb->control.asid = svm_data->next_asid++; }
@@ -2258,8 +2258,8 @@ static void pre_svm_run(struct vcpu_svmstruct svm_cpu_data *svm_data =per_cpu (svm_data, cpu); svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl =TLB_CONTROL_DO_NOTHING ; -if (svm->vcpu.cpu != cpu || - svm->asid_generation != svm_data->asid_generation) +/* FIXME: handle wraparound of asid_generation */ +if (svm->asid_generation != svm_data->asid_generation)new_asid (svm, svm_data); }
PATCH 31/71 KVM: MMU: handle n_free_mmu_pages > n_alloc_mmu_pages in kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 025dbbf36a7680bffe54d9dcbf0a8bc01a7cbd10)
kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages mishandles the case where n_alloc_mmu_pages is smaller then n_free_mmu_pages, by not checking if the result of the subtraction is negative.
Its a valid condition which can happen if a large number of pages has been recently freed.
--- arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +8 -7
@@ -1417,24 +1417,25 @@ static int kvm_mmu_zap_page(struct kvm **/ void kvm_mmu_change_mmu_pages (struct kvm *kvm,unsigned int kvm_nr_mmu_pages) { +int used_pages; + + used_pages = kvm->arch.n_alloc_mmu_pages - kvm->arch.n_free_mmu_pages; + used_pages =max (0 , used_pages); +/* * If we set the number of mmu pages to be smaller be than the * number of actived pages , we must to free some mmu pages before we * change the value */ -if ((kvm->arch.n_alloc_mmu_pages - kvm->arch.n_free_mmu_pages) > - kvm_nr_mmu_pages) { -int n_used_mmu_pages = kvm->arch.n_alloc_mmu_pages - - kvm->arch.n_free_mmu_pages; - -while (n_used_mmu_pages > kvm_nr_mmu_pages) { +if (used_pages > kvm_nr_mmu_pages) { +while (used_pages > kvm_nr_mmu_pages) {struct kvm_mmu_page *page; page =container_of (kvm->arch.active_mmu_pages.prev, struct kvm_mmu_page, link);kvm_mmu_zap_page (kvm, page); - n_used_mmu_pages--; + used_pages--; } kvm->arch.n_free_mmu_pages =0 ; }
PATCH 33/71 KVM: fix ack not being delivered when msi present
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 5116d8f6b977970ebefc1932c0f313163a6ec91f)
kvm_notify_acked_irq does not check irq type, so that it sometimes interprets msi vector as irq. As a result, ack notifiers are not called, which typially hangs the guest. The fix is to track and check irq type.
--- include/linux/kvm_host.h | 1 + virt/kvm/irq_comm.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot {struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry {u32 gsi; +u32 type;int (*set)(struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e,struct kvm *kvm,int level);union {
virt/kvm/irq_comm.c +3 -1
@@ -141,7 +141,8 @@ void kvm_notify_acked_irq(struct kvm *kvunsigned gsi = pin;list_for_each_entry (e, &kvm->irq_routing, link) -if (e->irqchip.irqchip == irqchip && +if (e->type ==KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP && + e->irqchip.irqchip == irqchip && e->irqchip.pin == pin) { gsi = e->gsi;break ;
@@ -240,6 +241,7 @@ static int setup_routing_entry(struct kvint delta; e->gsi = ue->gsi; + e->type = ue->type;switch (ue->type) {case KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_IRQCHIP : delta =0 ;
PATCH 34/71 KVM: Fix KVM_GET_MSR_INDEX_LIST
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
commit e125e7b6944898831b56739a5448e705578bf7e2 upstream.
So far, KVM copied the emulated_msrs (only MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE) to a wrong address in user space due to broken pointer arithmetic. This caused subtle corruption up there (missing MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE had probably no practical relevance). Moreover, the size check for the user-provided kvm_msr_list forgot about emulated MSRs.
--- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +2 -3
@@ -1117,14 +1117,13 @@ long kvm_arch_dev_ioctl(struct file *filif (copy_to_user (user_msr_list, &msr_list,sizeof msr_list)) goto out; r = -E2BIG ; -if (n < num_msrs_to_save) +if (n < msr_list.nmsrs) goto out; r = -EFAULT ;if (copy_to_user (user_msr_list->indices, &msrs_to_save, num_msrs_to_save *sizeof (u32))) goto out; -if (copy_to_user (user_msr_list->indices - + num_msrs_to_save *sizeof (u32), +if (copy_to_user (user_msr_list->indices + num_msrs_to_save, &emulated_msrs,ARRAY_SIZE (emulated_msrs) *sizeof (u32))) goto out;
PATCH 35/71 iwl3945: fix rfkill switch
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Stanislaw Gruszka <[email protected]>
(Not needed upstream, due to the major rewrite in 2.6.31)
Due to rfkill and iwlwifi mishmash of SW / HW killswitch representation, we have race conditions which make unable turn wifi radio on, after enable and disable again killswitch. I can observe this problem on my laptop with iwl3945 device.
In rfkill core HW switch and SW switch are separate 'states'. Device can be only in one of 3 states: RFKILL_STATE_SOFT_BLOCKED, RFKILL_STATE_UNBLOCKED, RFKILL_STATE_HARD_BLOCKED. Whereas in iwlwifi driver we have separate bits STATUS_RF_KILL_HW and STATUS_RF_KILL_SW for HW and SW switches - radio can be turned on, only if both bits are cleared.
In this particular race conditions, radio can not be turned on if in driver STATUS_RF_KILL_SW bit is set, and rfkill core is in state RFKILL_STATE_HARD_BLOCKED, because rfkill core is unable to call rfkill->toggle_radio(). This situation can be entered in case:
- killswitch is turned on
- rfkill core 'see' button change first and move to RFKILL_STATE_SOFT_BLOCKED also call ->toggle_radio() and STATE_RF_KILL_SW in driver is set
- iwl3945 get info about button from hardware to set STATUS_RF_KILL_HW bit and force rfkill to move to RFKILL_STATE_HARD_BLOCKED
- killsiwtch is turend off
- driver clear STATUS_RF_KILL_HW
- rfkill core is unable to clear STATUS_RF_KILL_SW in driver
Additionally call to rfkill_epo() when STATUS_RF_KILL_HW in driver is set cause move to the same situation.
In 2.6.31 this problem is fixed due to _total_ rewrite of rfkill subsystem. This is a quite small fix for 2.6.30.x in iwlwifi driver. We are changing internal rfkill state to always have below relations true:
STATUS_RF_KILL_HW=1 STATUS_RF_KILL_SW=1 <-> RFKILL_STATUS_SOFT_BLOCKED STATUS_RF_KILL_HW=0 STATUS_RF_KILL_SW=1 <-> RFKILL_STATUS_SOFT_BLOCKED STATUS_RF_KILL_HW=1 STATUS_RF_KILL_SW=0 <-> RFKILL_STATUS_HARD_BLOCKED STATUS_RF_KILL_HW=0 STATUS_RF_KILL_SW=0 <-> RFKILL_STATUS_UNBLOCKED
--- drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-rfkill.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-rfkill.c +16 -10
@@ -53,22 +53,31 @@ static int iwl_rfkill_soft_rf_kill(voidswitch (state) {case RFKILL_STATE_UNBLOCKED :if (iwl_is_rfkill_hw (priv)) { +/* pass error to rfkill core, make it state HARD +* BLOCKED (rfkill->mutex taken) and disable +* software kill switch */ err = -EBUSY ; - goto out_unlock; + priv->rfkill->state =RFKILL_STATE_HARD_BLOCKED ; }iwl_radio_kill_sw_enable_radio (priv);break ;case RFKILL_STATE_SOFT_BLOCKED :iwl_radio_kill_sw_disable_radio (priv); +/* rfkill->mutex is taken */ +if (priv->rfkill->state ==RFKILL_STATE_HARD_BLOCKED ) { +/* force rfkill core state to be SOFT BLOCKED, +* otherwise core will be unable to disable software +* kill switch */ + priv->rfkill->state =RFKILL_STATE_SOFT_BLOCKED ; + }break ;default :IWL_WARN (priv,"we received unexpected RFKILL state %d\n" , state);break ; } -out_unlock: -mutex_unlock (&priv->mutex); +mutex_unlock (&priv->mutex);return err; }
@@ -132,14 +141,11 @@ void iwl_rfkill_set_hw_state(struct iwl_if (!priv->rfkill)return ; -if (iwl_is_rfkill_hw (priv)) { +if (iwl_is_rfkill_sw (priv)) +rfkill_force_state (priv->rfkill,RFKILL_STATE_SOFT_BLOCKED ); +else if (iwl_is_rfkill_hw (priv))rfkill_force_state (priv->rfkill,RFKILL_STATE_HARD_BLOCKED ); -return ; - } - -if (!iwl_is_rfkill_sw (priv)) -rfkill_force_state (priv->rfkill,RFKILL_STATE_UNBLOCKED );else -rfkill_force_state (priv->rfkill,RFKILL_STATE_SOFT_BLOCKED ); +rfkill_force_state (priv->rfkill,RFKILL_STATE_UNBLOCKED ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (iwl_rfkill_set_hw_state);
PATCH 36/71 iwlagn: do not send key clear commands when rfkill enabled
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Reinette Chatre <[email protected]>
commit 99f1b01562b7dcae75b043114f76163fbf84fcab upstream.
Do all key clearing except sending sommands to device when rfkill enabled. When rfkill enabled the interface is brought down and will be brought back up correctly after rfkill is enabled again.
Same change is not needed for iwl3945 as it ignores return code when sending key clearing command to device.
This fixes http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13742
--- drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-sta.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-sta.c +12 -0
@@ -560,6 +560,8 @@ int iwl_remove_default_wep_key(struct iwunsigned long flags;spin_lock_irqsave (&priv->sta_lock, flags); +IWL_DEBUG_WEP (priv,"Removing default WEP key: idx=%d\n" , + keyconf->keyidx);if (!test_and_clear_bit (keyconf->keyidx, &priv->ucode_key_table)) IWL_ERR(priv, "index %d not used in uCode key table.\n",
@@ -567,6 +569,11 @@ int iwl_remove_default_wep_key(struct iw priv->default_wep_key--;memset (&priv->wep_keys[keyconf->keyidx],0 ,sizeof (priv->wep_keys[0 ])); +if (iwl_is_rfkill (priv)) { +IWL_DEBUG_WEP (priv,"Not sending REPLY_WEPKEY command due to RFKILL.\n" ); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&priv->sta_lock, flags); +return 0 ; + } ret =iwl_send_static_wepkey_cmd (priv,1 );IWL_DEBUG_WEP (priv,"Remove default WEP key: idx=%d ret=%d\n" , keyconf->keyidx, ret);
@@ -847,6 +854,11 @@ int iwl_remove_dynamic_key(struct iwl_pr priv->stations[sta_id].sta.sta.modify_mask =STA_MODIFY_KEY_MASK ; priv->stations[sta_id].sta.mode =STA_CONTROL_MODIFY_MSK ; +if (iwl_is_rfkill (priv)) { +IWL_DEBUG_WEP (priv,"Not sending REPLY_ADD_STA command because RFKILL enabled. \n" ); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&priv->sta_lock, flags); +return 0 ; + } ret =iwl_send_add_sta (priv, &priv->stations[sta_id].sta,CMD_ASYNC );spin_unlock_irqrestore (&priv->sta_lock, flags);return ret;
PATCH 37/71 libata: OCZ Vertex cant do HPA
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
commit 7831387bda72af3059be48d39846d3eb6d8ce2f6 upstream.
OCZ Vertex SSD can't do HPA and not in a usual way. It reports HPA, allows unlocking but then fails all IOs which fall in the unlocked area. Quirk it so that HPA unlocking is not used for the device.
Reported by Daniel Perup in bnc#522414.
https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=522414
--- drivers/ata/libata-core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/ata/libata-core.c +3 -0
@@ -4271,6 +4271,9 @@ static const struct ata_blacklist_entry { "WDC WD2500JD-00HBB0", "WD-WMAL71490727", ATA_HORKAGE_BROKEN_HPA }, { "MAXTOR 6L080L4", "A93.0500", ATA_HORKAGE_BROKEN_HPA }, +/* this one allows HPA unlocking but fails IOs on the area */ + { "OCZ-VERTEX", "1.30", ATA_HORKAGE_BROKEN_HPA }, +/* Devices which report 1 sector over size HPA */ { "ST340823A", NULL, ATA_HORKAGE_HPA_SIZE, }, { "ST320413A", NULL, ATA_HORKAGE_HPA_SIZE, },
PATCH 38/71 SCSI: mpt2sas: Introduced check for enclosure_handle to avoid crash
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Kashyap, Desai <[email protected]>
commit 15052c9e85bf0cdadcb69eb89623bf12bad8b4f8 upstream.
Kernel panic is seen because of enclosure_handle received from FW is zero.
Check is introduced before calling mpt2sas_config_get_enclosure_pg0.
--- drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_scsih.c | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_scsih.c +3 -4
@@ -3442,12 +3442,11 @@ _scsih_add_device(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER sas_device->hidden_raid_component = is_pd;/* get enclosure_logical_id */ -if (!(mpt2sas_config_get_enclosure_pg0 (ioc, &mpi_reply, &enclosure_pg0, -MPI2_SAS_ENCLOS_PGAD_FORM_HANDLE , - sas_device->enclosure_handle))) { +if (sas_device->enclosure_handle && !(mpt2sas_config_get_enclosure_pg0 ( + ioc, &mpi_reply, &enclosure_pg0,MPI2_SAS_ENCLOS_PGAD_FORM_HANDLE , + sas_device->enclosure_handle))) sas_device->enclosure_logical_id =le64_to_cpu (enclosure_pg0.EnclosureLogicalID); - }/* get device name */ sas_device->device_name =le64_to_cpu (sas_device_pg0.DeviceName);
PATCH 39/71 SCSI: mpt2sas: Expander fix oops saying "Already part of another port"
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Kashyap, Desai <[email protected]>
commit 20f5895d55d9281830bfb7819c5c5b70b05297a6 upstream.
Kernel panic is seen because driver did not tear down the port which should
be dnoe using mpt2sas_transport_port_remove(). without this fix When expander is added back we would oops inside sas_port_add_phy.
--- drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_scsih.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_scsih.c +15 -6
@@ -3205,7 +3205,7 @@ _scsih_expander_add(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPT__le64 sas_address;int i;unsigned long flags; -struct _sas_port *mpt2sas_port; +struct _sas_port *mpt2sas_port =NULL ;int rc =0 ;if (!handle)
@@ -3297,12 +3297,20 @@ _scsih_expander_add(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPT &expander_pg1, i, handle))) {printk (MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "failure at %s:%d/%s()!\n" , ioc->name, __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); -continue ; + rc =-1 ; + goto out_fail; } sas_expander->phy[i].handle = handle; sas_expander->phy[i].phy_id = i; -mpt2sas_transport_add_expander_phy (ioc, &sas_expander->phy[i], - expander_pg1, sas_expander->parent_dev); + +if ((mpt2sas_transport_add_expander_phy (ioc, + &sas_expander->phy[i], expander_pg1, + sas_expander->parent_dev))) { +printk (MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "failure at %s:%d/%s()!\n" , + ioc->name, __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); + rc =-1 ; + goto out_fail; + } }if (sas_expander->enclosure_handle) {
@@ -3319,8 +3327,9 @@ _scsih_expander_add(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPT out_fail: -if (sas_expander) -kfree (sas_expander->phy); +if (mpt2sas_port) +mpt2sas_transport_port_remove (ioc, sas_expander->sas_address, + sas_expander->parent_handle);kfree (sas_expander);return rc; }
PATCH 40/71 SCSI: mpt2sas: Raid 10 Value is showing as Raid 1E in /va/log/messages
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Kashyap, Desai <[email protected]>
commit 62727a7ba43c0abf2673e3877079c136a9721792 upstream.
When a volume is activated, the driver will recieve a pair of ir config change events to remove the foreign volume, then add the native.
In the process of the removal event, the hidden raid componet is removed from the parent.When the disks is added back, the adding of the port fails becuase there is no instance of the device in its parent.
To fix this issue, the driver needs to call mpt2sas_transport_update_links() prior to calling _scsih_add_device. In addition, we added sanity checks on volume add and removal to ignore events for foreign volumes.
--- drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_scsih.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_scsih.c +64 -26
@@ -4037,12 +4037,6 @@ _scsih_sas_volume_add(struct MPT2SAS_ADAu16 handle =le16_to_cpu (element->VolDevHandle);int rc; -#if 0 /* RAID_HACKS */ -if (le32_to_cpu (event_data->Flags) & -MPI2_EVENT_IR_CHANGE_FLAGS_FOREIGN_CONFIG ) -return ; -#endif -mpt2sas_config_get_volume_wwid (ioc, handle, &wwid);if (!wwid) { printk(MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT
@@ -4097,12 +4091,6 @@ _scsih_sas_volume_delete(struct MPT2SAS_unsigned long flags;struct MPT2SAS_TARGET *sas_target_priv_data; -#if 0 /* RAID_HACKS */ -if (le32_to_cpu (event_data->Flags) & -MPI2_EVENT_IR_CHANGE_FLAGS_FOREIGN_CONFIG ) -return ; -#endif -spin_lock_irqsave (&ioc->raid_device_lock, flags); raid_device =_scsih_raid_device_find_by_handle (ioc, handle);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ioc->raid_device_lock, flags);
@@ -4215,14 +4203,38 @@ _scsih_sas_pd_add(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTERstruct _sas_device *sas_device;unsigned long flags;u16 handle =le16_to_cpu (element->PhysDiskDevHandle); +Mpi2ConfigReply_t mpi_reply; +Mpi2SasDevicePage0_t sas_device_pg0; +u32 ioc_status;spin_lock_irqsave (&ioc->sas_device_lock, flags); sas_device =_scsih_sas_device_find_by_handle (ioc, handle);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ioc->sas_device_lock, flags); -if (sas_device) +if (sas_device) { sas_device->hidden_raid_component =1 ; -else -_scsih_add_device (ioc, handle,0 ,1 ); +return ; + } + +if ((mpt2sas_config_get_sas_device_pg0 (ioc, &mpi_reply, &sas_device_pg0, +MPI2_SAS_DEVICE_PGAD_FORM_HANDLE , handle))) { +printk (MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "failure at %s:%d/%s()!\n" , + ioc->name, __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); +return ; + } + + ioc_status =le16_to_cpu (mpi_reply.IOCStatus) & +MPI2_IOCSTATUS_MASK ; +if (ioc_status !=MPI2_IOCSTATUS_SUCCESS ) { +printk (MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "failure at %s:%d/%s()!\n" , + ioc->name, __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); +return ; + } + +_scsih_link_change (ioc, +le16_to_cpu (sas_device_pg0.ParentDevHandle), + handle, sas_device_pg0.PhyNum,MPI2_SAS_NEG_LINK_RATE_1_5 ); + +_scsih_add_device (ioc, handle,0 ,1 ); }#ifdef CONFIG_SCSI_MPT2SAS_LOGGING
@@ -4322,12 +4334,15 @@ _scsih_sas_ir_config_change_event(struct {Mpi2EventIrConfigElement_t *element;int i; +u8 foreign_config;#ifdef CONFIG_SCSI_MPT2SAS_LOGGING if (ioc->logging_level &MPT_DEBUG_EVENT_WORK_TASK )_scsih_sas_ir_config_change_event_debug (ioc, event_data);#endif + foreign_config = (le32_to_cpu (event_data->Flags) & +MPI2_EVENT_IR_CHANGE_FLAGS_FOREIGN_CONFIG ) ?1 :0 ; element = (Mpi2EventIrConfigElement_t *)&event_data->ConfigElement[0 ];for (i =0 ; i < event_data->NumElements; i++, element++) {
@@ -4335,11 +4350,13 @@ _scsih_sas_ir_config_change_event(structswitch (element->ReasonCode) {case MPI2_EVENT_IR_CHANGE_RC_VOLUME_CREATED :case MPI2_EVENT_IR_CHANGE_RC_ADDED : -_scsih_sas_volume_add (ioc, element); +if (!foreign_config) +_scsih_sas_volume_add (ioc, element);break ;case MPI2_EVENT_IR_CHANGE_RC_VOLUME_DELETED :case MPI2_EVENT_IR_CHANGE_RC_REMOVED : -_scsih_sas_volume_delete (ioc, element); +if (!foreign_config) +_scsih_sas_volume_delete (ioc, element);break ;case MPI2_EVENT_IR_CHANGE_RC_PD_CREATED :_scsih_sas_pd_hide (ioc, element);
@@ -4458,6 +4475,9 @@ _scsih_sas_ir_physical_disk_event(structu32 state;struct _sas_device *sas_device;unsigned long flags; +Mpi2ConfigReply_t mpi_reply; +Mpi2SasDevicePage0_t sas_device_pg0; +u32 ioc_status;if (event_data->ReasonCode !=MPI2_EVENT_IR_PHYSDISK_RC_STATE_CHANGED )return ;
@@ -4474,22 +4494,40 @@ _scsih_sas_ir_physical_disk_event(structspin_unlock_irqrestore (&ioc->sas_device_lock, flags);switch (state) { -#if 0 -case MPI2_RAID_PD_STATE_OFFLINE : -if (sas_device) -_scsih_remove_device (ioc, handle); -break ; -#endif case MPI2_RAID_PD_STATE_ONLINE :case MPI2_RAID_PD_STATE_DEGRADED :case MPI2_RAID_PD_STATE_REBUILDING :case MPI2_RAID_PD_STATE_OPTIMAL : -if (sas_device) +if (sas_device) { sas_device->hidden_raid_component =1 ; -else -_scsih_add_device (ioc, handle,0 ,1 ); +return ; + } + +if ((mpt2sas_config_get_sas_device_pg0 (ioc, &mpi_reply, + &sas_device_pg0,MPI2_SAS_DEVICE_PGAD_FORM_HANDLE , + handle))) { +printk (MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "failure at %s:%d/%s()!\n" , + ioc->name, __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); +return ; + } + + ioc_status =le16_to_cpu (mpi_reply.IOCStatus) & +MPI2_IOCSTATUS_MASK ; +if (ioc_status !=MPI2_IOCSTATUS_SUCCESS ) { +printk (MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "failure at %s:%d/%s()!\n" , + ioc->name, __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); +return ; + } + +_scsih_link_change (ioc, +le16_to_cpu (sas_device_pg0.ParentDevHandle), + handle, sas_device_pg0.PhyNum,MPI2_SAS_NEG_LINK_RATE_1_5 ); + +_scsih_add_device (ioc, handle,0 ,1 ); +break ; +case MPI2_RAID_PD_STATE_OFFLINE :case MPI2_RAID_PD_STATE_NOT_CONFIGURED :case MPI2_RAID_PD_STATE_NOT_COMPATIBLE :case MPI2_RAID_PD_STATE_HOT_SPARE :
PATCH 41/71 SCSI: mpt2sas: Excessive log info causes sas iounit page time out
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Kashyap, Desai <[email protected]>
commit be9e8cd75ce8d94ae4aab721fdcc337fa78a9090 upstream.
Inhibit 0x3117 loginfos - during cable pull, there are too many printks going to the syslog, this is have impact on how fast the interrupt routine can handle keeping up with command completions; this was the root cause to the config pages timeouts.
--- drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_base.c | 4 ++++ drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_scsih.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_base.c +4 -0
@@ -440,6 +440,10 @@ _base_sas_log_info(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTEif (sas_loginfo.dw.bus_type !=3 /*SAS*/ )return ; +/* each nexus loss loginfo */ +if (log_info ==0x31170000 ) +return ; +/* eat the loginfos associated with task aborts */ if (ioc->ignore_loginfos && (log_info ==30050000 || log_info ==0x31140000 || log_info ==0x31130000 ))
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_scsih.c +4 -0
@@ -2560,6 +2560,10 @@ _scsih_scsi_ioc_info(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPchar *desc_ioc_state =NULL ;char *desc_scsi_status =NULL ;char *desc_scsi_state = ioc->tmp_string; +u32 log_info =le32_to_cpu (mpi_reply->IOCLogInfo); + +if (log_info ==0x31170000 ) +return ;switch (ioc_status) {case MPI2_IOCSTATUS_SUCCESS :
PATCH 42/71 SCSI: mpt2sas: fix infinite loop inside config request
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Kashyap, Desai <[email protected]>
commit 6bd4e1e4d6023f4da069fd68729c502cc4e6dfd0 upstream.
This restriction is introduced just to avoid loop of config_request. Retry must be limited so we have restricted config request to maximum 2 times.
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_config.c +6 -0
@@ -247,6 +247,12 @@ _config_request(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc, Mpi2ConfigRequest_t retry_count =0 ; retry_config: +if (retry_count) { +if (retry_count >2 )/* attempt only 2 retries */ +return -EFAULT ; +printk (MPT2SAS_INFO_FMT "%s: attempting retry (%d)\n" , + ioc->name, __func__, retry_count); + } wait_state_count =0 ; ioc_state =mpt2sas_base_get_iocstate (ioc,1 );while (ioc_state !=MPI2_IOC_STATE_OPERATIONAL ) {
PATCH 43/71 SCSI: mpt2sas: fix crash due to Watchdog is active while OS in standby mode
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Kashyap, Desai <[email protected]>
commit e4750c989f732555fca86dd73d488c79972362db upstream.
Fix oops ocurring at hibernation time. This oops was due to the firmware fault watchdog timer still running after we freed resources. To fix the issue we need to terminate the watchdog timer at hibernation time.
--- drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_base.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------ drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_base.h | 2 drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_scsih.c | 2 3 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_base.c +60 -28
@@ -119,6 +119,64 @@ _base_fault_reset_work(struct work_strucspin_unlock_irqrestore (&ioc->ioc_reset_in_progress_lock, flags); } +/** +* mpt2sas_base_start_watchdog - start the fault_reset_work_q +* @ioc: pointer to scsi command object +* Context: sleep. +* +* Return nothing. +*/ +void +mpt2sas_base_start_watchdog (struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc) +{ +unsigned long flags; + +if (ioc->fault_reset_work_q) +return ; + +/* initialize fault polling */ +INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&ioc->fault_reset_work, _base_fault_reset_work); +snprintf (ioc->fault_reset_work_q_name, +sizeof (ioc->fault_reset_work_q_name),"poll_%d_status" , ioc->id); + ioc->fault_reset_work_q = +create_singlethread_workqueue (ioc->fault_reset_work_q_name); +if (!ioc->fault_reset_work_q) { +printk (MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: failed (line=%d)\n" , + ioc->name, __func__, __LINE__); +return ; + } +spin_lock_irqsave (&ioc->ioc_reset_in_progress_lock, flags); +if (ioc->fault_reset_work_q) +queue_delayed_work (ioc->fault_reset_work_q, + &ioc->fault_reset_work, +msecs_to_jiffies (FAULT_POLLING_INTERVAL )); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ioc->ioc_reset_in_progress_lock, flags); +} + +/** +* mpt2sas_base_stop_watchdog - stop the fault_reset_work_q +* @ioc: pointer to scsi command object +* Context: sleep. +* +* Return nothing. +*/ +void +mpt2sas_base_stop_watchdog (struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc) +{ +unsigned long flags; +struct workqueue_struct *wq; + +spin_lock_irqsave (&ioc->ioc_reset_in_progress_lock, flags); + wq = ioc->fault_reset_work_q; + ioc->fault_reset_work_q =NULL ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ioc->ioc_reset_in_progress_lock, flags); +if (wq) { +if (!cancel_delayed_work (&ioc->fault_reset_work)) +flush_workqueue (wq); +destroy_workqueue (wq); + } +} +#ifdef CONFIG_SCSI_MPT2SAS_LOGGING /** * _base_sas_ioc_info - verbose translation of the ioc status
@@ -3209,7 +3267,6 @@ int mpt2sas_base_attach(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc) {int r, i; -unsigned long flags;dinitprintk (ioc,printk (MPT2SAS_DEBUG_FMT "%s\n" , ioc->name, __func__));
@@ -3292,23 +3349,7 @@ mpt2sas_base_attach(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTif (r) goto out_free_resources; -/* initialize fault polling */ -INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&ioc->fault_reset_work, _base_fault_reset_work); -snprintf (ioc->fault_reset_work_q_name, -sizeof (ioc->fault_reset_work_q_name),"poll_%d_status" , ioc->id); - ioc->fault_reset_work_q = -create_singlethread_workqueue (ioc->fault_reset_work_q_name); -if (!ioc->fault_reset_work_q) { -printk (MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: failed (line=%d)\n" , - ioc->name, __func__, __LINE__); - goto out_free_resources; - } -spin_lock_irqsave (&ioc->ioc_reset_in_progress_lock, flags); -if (ioc->fault_reset_work_q) -queue_delayed_work (ioc->fault_reset_work_q, - &ioc->fault_reset_work, -msecs_to_jiffies (FAULT_POLLING_INTERVAL )); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ioc->ioc_reset_in_progress_lock, flags); +mpt2sas_base_start_watchdog (ioc);return 0 ; out_free_resources:
@@ -3341,20 +3382,11 @@ mpt2sas_base_attach(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTvoid mpt2sas_base_detach (struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc) { -unsigned long flags; -struct workqueue_struct *wq;dexitprintk (ioc,printk (MPT2SAS_DEBUG_FMT "%s\n" , ioc->name, __func__)); -spin_lock_irqsave (&ioc->ioc_reset_in_progress_lock, flags); - wq = ioc->fault_reset_work_q; - ioc->fault_reset_work_q =NULL ; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ioc->ioc_reset_in_progress_lock, flags); -if (!cancel_delayed_work (&ioc->fault_reset_work)) -flush_workqueue (wq); -destroy_workqueue (wq); - +mpt2sas_base_stop_watchdog (ioc);mpt2sas_base_free_resources (ioc);_base_release_memory_pools (ioc);kfree (ioc->pfacts);
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_base.h +2 -0
@@ -672,6 +672,8 @@ typedef void (*MPT_CALLBACK)(struct MPT2/* base shared API */ extern struct list_head mpt2sas_ioc_list; +void mpt2sas_base_start_watchdog (struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc); +void mpt2sas_base_stop_watchdog (struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc);int mpt2sas_base_attach (struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc);void mpt2sas_base_detach (struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc);
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_scsih.c +2 -0
@@ -5599,6 +5599,7 @@ scsih_suspend(struct pci_dev *pdev, pm_mstruct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *ioc =shost_priv (shost);u32 device_state; +mpt2sas_base_stop_watchdog (ioc);flush_scheduled_work ();scsi_block_requests (shost); device_state =pci_choose_state (pdev, state);
@@ -5641,6 +5642,7 @@ scsih_resume(struct pci_dev *pdev)mpt2sas_base_hard_reset_handler (ioc,CAN_SLEEP ,SOFT_RESET );scsi_unblock_requests (shost); +mpt2sas_base_start_watchdog (ioc); return 0; }#endif /* CONFIG_PM */
PATCH 44/71 SCSI: mpt2sas: fix oops because drv data points to NULL on resume from hibernate
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Kashyap, Desai <[email protected]>
commit fcfe6392d18283df3c561b5ef59c330d485ff8ca upstream.
Fix another ocurring when the system resumes. This oops was due to driver setting the pci drvdata to NULL on the prior hibernation. Becuase it was set to NULL, upon resmume we assume the pci drvdata is non-zero, and we oops. To fix the ooops, we don't set pci drvdata to NULL at hibernation time.
--- drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_base.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_base.c +3 -3
@@ -1171,7 +1171,6 @@ mpt2sas_base_map_resources(struct MPT2SA } } -pci_set_drvdata (pdev, ioc->shost);_base_mask_interrupts (ioc); r =_base_enable_msix (ioc);if (r)
@@ -1194,7 +1193,6 @@ mpt2sas_base_map_resources(struct MPT2SA ioc->pci_irq =-1 ;pci_release_selected_regions (ioc->pdev, ioc->bars);pci_disable_device (pdev); -pci_set_drvdata (pdev,NULL );return r; }
@@ -3253,7 +3251,6 @@ mpt2sas_base_free_resources(struct MPT2S ioc->chip_phys =0 ;pci_release_selected_regions (ioc->pdev, ioc->bars);pci_disable_device (pdev); -pci_set_drvdata (pdev,NULL );return ; }
@@ -3275,6 +3272,7 @@ mpt2sas_base_attach(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTif (r)return r; +pci_set_drvdata (ioc->pdev, ioc->shost); r =_base_make_ioc_ready (ioc,CAN_SLEEP ,SOFT_RESET );if (r) goto out_free_resources;
@@ -3357,6 +3355,7 @@ mpt2sas_base_attach(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPT ioc->remove_host =1 ;mpt2sas_base_free_resources (ioc);_base_release_memory_pools (ioc); +pci_set_drvdata (ioc->pdev,NULL );kfree (ioc->tm_cmds.reply);kfree (ioc->transport_cmds.reply);kfree (ioc->config_cmds.reply);
@@ -3389,6 +3388,7 @@ mpt2sas_base_detach(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTmpt2sas_base_stop_watchdog (ioc);mpt2sas_base_free_resources (ioc);_base_release_memory_pools (ioc); +pci_set_drvdata (ioc->pdev,NULL );kfree (ioc->pfacts);kfree (ioc->ctl_cmds.reply);kfree (ioc->base_cmds.reply);
PATCH 45/71 mpt2sas: fix config request and diag reset deadlock
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Kashyap, Desai <[email protected]>
commit 388ce4beb7135722c584b0af18f215e3ec657adf upstream.
Moving the setting and clearing of the mutex's to _config_request. There was a mutex deadlock when diag reset is called from inside _config_request, so diag reset was moved to outside the mutexs.
--- drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_config.c | 85 ++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/mpt2sas/mpt2sas_config.c +20 -65
@@ -236,12 +236,14 @@ _config_request(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *Mpi2ConfigRequest_t *config_request;int r;u8 retry_count; -u8 issue_reset; +u8 issue_host_reset =0 ;u16 wait_state_count; +mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);if (ioc->config_cmds.status !=MPT2_CMD_NOT_USED ) {printk (MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: config_cmd in use\n" , ioc->name, __func__); +mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return -EAGAIN ; } retry_count =0 ;
@@ -260,8 +262,8 @@ _config_request(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *printk (MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: failed due to ioc not operational\n" , ioc->name, __func__); - ioc->config_cmds.status =MPT2_CMD_NOT_USED ; -return -EFAULT ; + r = -EFAULT ; + goto out; }ssleep (1 ); ioc_state =mpt2sas_base_get_iocstate (ioc,1 );
@@ -277,8 +279,8 @@ _config_request(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *if (!smid) {printk (MPT2SAS_ERR_FMT "%s: failed obtaining a smid\n" , ioc->name, __func__); - ioc->config_cmds.status =MPT2_CMD_NOT_USED ; -return -EAGAIN ; + r = -EAGAIN ; + goto out; } r =0 ;
@@ -298,9 +300,15 @@ _config_request(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER * ioc->name, __func__);_debug_dump_mf (mpi_request,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)/4 ); -if (!(ioc->config_cmds.status &MPT2_CMD_RESET )) - issue_reset =1 ; - goto issue_host_reset; + retry_count++; +if (ioc->config_cmds.smid == smid) +mpt2sas_base_free_smid (ioc, smid); +if ((ioc->shost_recovery) || + (ioc->config_cmds.status &MPT2_CMD_RESET )) + goto retry_config; + issue_host_reset =1 ; + r = -EFAULT ; + goto out; }if (ioc->config_cmds.status &MPT2_CMD_REPLY_VALID ) memcpy(mpi_reply, ioc->config_cmds.reply,
@@ -308,21 +316,13 @@ _config_request(struct MPT2SAS_ADAPTER *if (retry_count)printk (MPT2SAS_INFO_FMT "%s: retry completed!!\n" , ioc->name, __func__); +out: ioc->config_cmds.status =MPT2_CMD_NOT_USED ; -return r; - - issue_host_reset: -if (issue_reset) +mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex); +if (issue_host_reset)mpt2sas_base_hard_reset_handler (ioc,CAN_SLEEP ,FORCE_BIG_HAMMER ); - ioc->config_cmds.status =MPT2_CMD_NOT_USED ; -if (!retry_count) { -printk (MPT2SAS_INFO_FMT "%s: attempting retry\n" , - ioc->name, __func__); - retry_count++; - goto retry_config; - } -return -EFAULT ; +return r; }/**
@@ -381,7 +381,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_manufacturing_pg0(strint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ManufacturingPage0_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -423,7 +422,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_manufacturing_pg0(str_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -444,7 +442,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_bios_pg2(struct MPT2Sint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2BiosPage2_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -486,7 +483,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_bios_pg2(struct MPT2S_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -507,7 +503,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_bios_pg3(struct MPT2Sint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2BiosPage3_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -549,7 +544,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_bios_pg3(struct MPT2S_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -570,7 +564,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_iounit_pg0(struct MPTint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2IOUnitPage0_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -612,7 +605,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_iounit_pg0(struct MPT_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -633,7 +625,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_iounit_pg1(struct MPTint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2IOUnitPage1_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -675,7 +666,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_iounit_pg1(struct MPT_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -696,7 +686,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_set_iounit_pg1(struct MPTint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ; mpi_request.Action =MPI2_CONFIG_ACTION_PAGE_HEADER ;
@@ -738,7 +727,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_set_iounit_pg1(struct MPT_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -759,7 +747,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_ioc_pg8(struct MPT2SAint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2IOCPage8_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -801,7 +788,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_ioc_pg8(struct MPT2SA_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -824,7 +810,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_sas_device_pg0(structint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2SasDevicePage0_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -869,7 +854,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_sas_device_pg0(struct_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -892,7 +876,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_sas_device_pg1(structint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2SasDevicePage1_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -937,7 +920,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_sas_device_pg1(struct_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -959,7 +941,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_number_hba_phys(strucMpi2ConfigReply_t mpi_reply;Mpi2SasIOUnitPage0_t config_page; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ; mpi_request.Action =MPI2_CONFIG_ACTION_PAGE_HEADER ;
@@ -1008,7 +989,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_number_hba_phys(struc_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1032,8 +1012,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_sas_iounit_pg0(structMpi2ConfigRequest_t mpi_request;int r;struct config_request mem; - -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 , sz);memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1076,7 +1054,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_sas_iounit_pg0(struct_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1101,7 +1078,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_sas_iounit_pg1(structint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 , sz);memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1144,7 +1120,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_sas_iounit_pg1(struct_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1167,7 +1142,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_expander_pg0(struct Mint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ExpanderPage0_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1212,7 +1186,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_expander_pg0(struct M_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1236,7 +1209,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_expander_pg1(struct Mint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ExpanderPage1_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1283,7 +1255,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_expander_pg1(struct M_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1306,7 +1277,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_enclosure_pg0(structint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2SasEnclosurePage0_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1351,7 +1321,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_enclosure_pg0(struct_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1373,7 +1342,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_phy_pg0(struct MPT2SAint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2SasPhyPage0_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1419,7 +1387,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_phy_pg0(struct MPT2SA_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1441,7 +1408,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_phy_pg1(struct MPT2SAint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2SasPhyPage1_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1487,7 +1453,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_phy_pg1(struct MPT2SA_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1511,7 +1476,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_raid_volume_pg1(strucint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2RaidVolPage1_t));memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1554,7 +1518,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_raid_volume_pg1(struc_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1578,7 +1541,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_number_pds(struct MPTstruct config_request mem;u16 ioc_status; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); *num_pds =0 ; mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1626,7 +1588,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_number_pds(struct MPT_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1651,7 +1612,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_raid_volume_pg0(strucint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t));memset (config_page,0 , sz); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1693,7 +1653,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_raid_volume_pg0(struc_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1717,7 +1676,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_phys_disk_pg0(structint r;struct config_request mem; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t));memset (config_page,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2RaidPhysDiskPage0_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1760,7 +1718,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_phys_disk_pg0(struct_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
@@ -1784,7 +1741,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_volume_handle(structstruct config_request mem;u16 ioc_status; -mutex_lock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex); *volume_handle =0 ;memset (&mpi_request,0 ,sizeof (Mpi2ConfigRequest_t)); mpi_request.Function =MPI2_FUNCTION_CONFIG ;
@@ -1848,7 +1804,6 @@ mpt2sas_config_get_volume_handle(struct_config_free_config_dma_memory (ioc, &mem); out: -mutex_unlock (&ioc->config_cmds.mutex);return r; }
PATCH 46/71 do_sigaltstack: avoid copying stack_t as a structure to user space
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit 0083fc2c50e6c5127c2802ad323adf8143ab7856 upstream.
Ulrich Drepper correctly points out that there is generally padding in the structure on 64-bit hosts, and that copying the structure from kernel to user space can leak information from the kernel stack in those padding bytes.
Avoid the whole issue by just copying the three members one by one instead, which also means that the function also can avoid the need for a stack frame. This also happens to match how we copy the new structure from user space, so it all even makes sense.
[ The obvious solution of adding a memset() generates horrid code, gcc
does really stupid things. ]
--- kernel/signal.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
kernel/signal.c +8 -7
@@ -2414,11 +2414,9 @@ do_sigaltstack (const stack_t __user *usstack_t oss;int error; -if (uoss) { - oss.ss_sp = (void __user *) current->sas_ss_sp; - oss.ss_size = current->sas_ss_size; - oss.ss_flags =sas_ss_flags (sp); - } + oss.ss_sp = (void __user *) current->sas_ss_sp; + oss.ss_size = current->sas_ss_size; + oss.ss_flags =sas_ss_flags (sp);if (uss) {void __user *ss_sp;
@@ -2461,13 +2459,16 @@ do_sigaltstack (const stack_t __user *us current->sas_ss_size = ss_size; } + error =0 ;if (uoss) { error = -EFAULT ; -if (copy_to_user (uoss, &oss,sizeof (oss))) +if (!access_ok (VERIFY_WRITE , uoss,sizeof (*uoss))) goto out; + error =__put_user (oss.ss_sp, &uoss->ss_sp) | +__put_user (oss.ss_size, &uoss->ss_size) | +__put_user (oss.ss_flags, &uoss->ss_flags); } - error =0 ; out:return error; }
PATCH 47/71 Bug Fix arch/ia64/kernel/pci-dma.c: fix recursive dma_supported() call in iommu_dma_supported()
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Fenghua Yu <[[email protected]]>
commit 51b89f7a6615eca184aa0b85db5781d931e9c8d1 upstream.
In commit 160c1d8e40866edfeae7d68816b7005d70acf391, dma_ops->dma_supported = iommu_dma_supported;
This dma_ops->dma_supported is first called in platform_dma_init() during kernel boot. Then dma_ops->dma_supported will be called recursively in iommu_dma_supported.
Kernel can not boot because kernel can not get out of iommu_dma_supported until it runs out of stack memory.
--- arch/ia64/kernel/pci-dma.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
arch/ia64/kernel/pci-dma.c +0 -5
@@ -67,11 +67,6 @@ iommu_dma_init(void)int iommu_dma_supported (struct device *dev,u64 mask) { -struct dma_map_ops *ops =platform_dma_get_ops (dev); - -if (ops->dma_supported) -return ops->dma_supported (dev, mask); -/* Copied from i386. Doesn't make much sense, because it will only work for pci_alloc_coherent. The caller just has to use GFP_DMA in this case. */
PATCH 48/71 x86, amd: Dont probe for extended APIC ID if APICs are disabled
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <[email protected]>
commit 2cb078603abb612e3bcd428fb8122c3d39e08832 upstream.
If we've logically disabled apics, don't probe the PCI space for the AMD extended APIC ID.
[ Impact: prevent boot crash under Xen. ]
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +1 -1
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ static void __cpuinit early_init_amd(str#endif #if defined(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC ) && defined(CONFIG_PCI )/* check CPU config space for extended APIC ID */ -if (c->x86 >=0xf ) { +if (cpu_has_apic && c->x86 >=0xf ) {unsigned int val; val =read_pci_config (0 ,24 ,0 ,0x68 );if ((val & ((1 <<17 ) | (1 <<18 ))) == ((1 <<17 ) | (1 <<18 )))
PATCH 49/71 ocfs2: Initialize the cluster were writing to in a non-sparse extend
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Sunil Mushran <[email protected]>
commit e7432675f8ca868a4af365759a8d4c3779a3d922 upstream.
In a non-sparse extend, we correctly allocate (and zero) the clusters between the old_i_size and pos, but we don't zero the portions of the cluster we're writing to outside of pos<->len.
It handles clustersize > pagesize and blocksize < pagesize.
[Cleaned up by Joel Becker.]
--- fs/ocfs2/aops.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
fs/ocfs2/aops.c +47 -19
@@ -894,18 +894,17 @@ struct ocfs2_write_cluster_desc {*/ unsigned c_new;unsigned c_unwritten; +unsigned c_needs_zero; }; -static inline int ocfs2_should_zero_cluster (struct ocfs2_write_cluster_desc *d) -{ -return d->c_new || d->c_unwritten; -} -struct ocfs2_write_ctxt {/* Logical cluster position / len of write */ u32 w_cpos;u32 w_clen; +/* First cluster allocated in a nonsparse extend */ +u32 w_first_new_cpos; +struct ocfs2_write_cluster_desc w_desc[OCFS2_MAX_CLUSTERS_PER_PAGE ];/*
@@ -983,6 +982,7 @@ static int ocfs2_alloc_write_ctxt(structreturn -ENOMEM ; wc->w_cpos = pos >> osb->s_clustersize_bits; + wc->w_first_new_cpos =UINT_MAX ; cend = (pos + len -1 ) >> osb->s_clustersize_bits; wc->w_clen = cend - wc->w_cpos +1 ;get_bh (di_bh);
@@ -1217,20 +1217,18 @@ out:*/ static int ocfs2_write_cluster (struct address_space *mapping,u32 phys,unsigned int unwritten, +unsigned int should_zero,struct ocfs2_alloc_context *data_ac,struct ocfs2_alloc_context *meta_ac,struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc,u32 cpos,loff_t user_pos,unsigned user_len) { -int ret, i, new, should_zero =0 ; +int ret, i, new;u64 v_blkno, p_blkno;struct inode *inode = mapping->host;struct ocfs2_extent_tree et; new = phys ==0 ?1 :0 ; -if (new || unwritten) - should_zero =1 ; -if (new) {u32 tmp_pos;
@@ -1341,7 +1339,9 @@ static int ocfs2_write_cluster_by_desc(s local_len = osb->s_clustersize - cluster_off; ret =ocfs2_write_cluster (mapping, desc->c_phys, - desc->c_unwritten, data_ac, meta_ac, + desc->c_unwritten, + desc->c_needs_zero, + data_ac, meta_ac, wc, desc->c_cpos, pos, local_len);if (ret) {mlog_errno (ret);
@@ -1391,14 +1391,14 @@ static void ocfs2_set_target_boundaries(* newly allocated cluster. */ desc = &wc->w_desc[0 ]; -if (ocfs2_should_zero_cluster (desc)) +if (desc->c_needs_zero)ocfs2_figure_cluster_boundaries (osb, desc->c_cpos, &wc->w_target_from,NULL ); desc = &wc->w_desc[wc->w_clen -1 ]; -if (ocfs2_should_zero_cluster (desc)) +if (desc->c_needs_zero) ocfs2_figure_cluster_boundaries(osb, desc->c_cpos, NULL,
@@ -1466,13 +1466,28 @@ static int ocfs2_populate_write_desc(str phys++; } +/* +* If w_first_new_cpos is < UINT_MAX, we have a non-sparse +* file that got extended. w_first_new_cpos tells us +* where the newly allocated clusters are so we can +* zero them. +*/ +if (desc->c_cpos >= wc->w_first_new_cpos) { +BUG_ON (phys ==0 ); + desc->c_needs_zero =1 ; + } + desc->c_phys = phys;if (phys ==0 ) { desc->c_new =1 ; + desc->c_needs_zero =1 ; *clusters_to_alloc = *clusters_to_alloc +1 ; } -if (ext_flags &OCFS2_EXT_UNWRITTEN ) + +if (ext_flags &OCFS2_EXT_UNWRITTEN ) { desc->c_unwritten =1 ; + desc->c_needs_zero =1 ; + } num_clusters--; }
@@ -1632,10 +1647,13 @@ static int ocfs2_expand_nonsparse_inode(if (newsize <=i_size_read (inode))return 0 ; - ret =ocfs2_extend_no_holes (inode, newsize, newsize - len); + ret =ocfs2_extend_no_holes (inode, newsize, pos);if (ret)mlog_errno (ret); + wc->w_first_new_cpos = +ocfs2_clusters_for_bytes (inode->i_sb,i_size_read (inode)); +return ret; }
@@ -1644,7 +1662,7 @@ int ocfs2_write_begin_nolock(struct addr struct page **pagep, void **fsdata, struct buffer_head *di_bh, struct page *mmap_page) { - int ret, credits = OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS; + int ret, cluster_of_pages, credits = OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS;unsigned int clusters_to_alloc, extents_to_split;struct ocfs2_write_ctxt *wc;struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
@@ -1722,8 +1740,19 @@ int ocfs2_write_begin_nolock(struct addr } -ocfs2_set_target_boundaries (osb, wc, pos, len, - clusters_to_alloc + extents_to_split); +/* +* We have to zero sparse allocated clusters, unwritten extent clusters, +* and non-sparse clusters we just extended. For non-sparse writes, +* we know zeros will only be needed in the first and/or last cluster. +*/ +if (clusters_to_alloc || extents_to_split || + wc->w_desc[0 ].c_needs_zero || + wc->w_desc[wc->w_clen -1 ].c_needs_zero) + cluster_of_pages =1 ; +else + cluster_of_pages =0 ; + +ocfs2_set_target_boundaries (osb, wc, pos, len, cluster_of_pages); handle =ocfs2_start_trans (osb, credits);if (IS_ERR (handle)) {
@@ -1756,8 +1785,7 @@ int ocfs2_write_begin_nolock(struct addr* extent. */ ret =ocfs2_grab_pages_for_write (mapping, wc, wc->w_cpos, pos, - clusters_to_alloc + extents_to_split, - mmap_page); + cluster_of_pages, mmap_page);if (ret) {mlog_errno (ret); goto out_quota;
PATCH 50/71 ACPI processor: force throttling state when BIOS returns incorrect value
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Frans Pop <[email protected]>
commit 2a908002c7b1b666616103e9df2419b38d7c6f1f upstream.
If the BIOS reports an invalid throttling state (which seems to be fairly common after system boot), a reset is done to state T0. Because of a check in acpi_processor_get_throttling_ptc(), the reset never actually gets executed, which results in the error reoccurring on every access of for example /proc/acpi/processor/CPU0/throttling.
Add a 'force' option to acpi_processor_set_throttling() to ensure the reset really takes effect.
Addresses http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13389
This patch, together with the next one, fixes a regression introduced in 2.6.30, listed on the regression list. They have been available for 2.5 months now in bugzilla, but have not been picked up, despite various reminders and without any reason given.
Google shows that numerous people are hitting this issue. The issue is in itself relatively minor, but the bug in the code is clear.
The patches have been in all my kernels and today testing has shown that throttling works correctly with the patches applied when the system overheats (http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=13918#c14).
--- drivers/acpi/processor_thermal.c | 6 +++--- drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c | 26 ++++++++++++++------------ include/acpi/processor.h | 5 +++-- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/processor_thermal.c +3 -3
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static int acpi_processor_apply_limit(stif (pr->limit.thermal.tx > tx) tx = pr->limit.thermal.tx; - result =acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr, tx); + result =acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr, tx, false);if (result) goto end; }
@@ -421,12 +421,12 @@ processor_set_cur_state(struct thermal_cif (state <= max_pstate) {if (pr->flags.throttling && pr->throttling.state) - result =acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr,0 ); + result =acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr,0 , false);cpufreq_set_cur_state (pr->id, state); }else {cpufreq_set_cur_state (pr->id, max_pstate); result =acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr, - state - max_pstate); + state - max_pstate, false); }return result; }
drivers/acpi/processor_throttling.c +14 -12
@@ -62,7 +62,8 @@ struct throttling_tstate {#define THROTTLING_POSTCHANGE (2)static int acpi_processor_get_throttling (struct acpi_processor *pr); -int acpi_processor_set_throttling (struct acpi_processor *pr,int state); +int acpi_processor_set_throttling (struct acpi_processor *pr, +int state,bool force);static int acpi_processor_update_tsd_coord (void ) {
@@ -361,7 +362,7 @@ int acpi_processor_tstate_has_changed(st*/ target_state = throttling_limit; } -return acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr, target_state); +return acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr, target_state, false); }/*
@@ -842,7 +843,7 @@ static int acpi_processor_get_throttlingACPI_WARNING ((AE_INFO ,"Invalid throttling state, reset" )); state =0 ; - ret =acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr, state); + ret =acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr, state, true);if (ret)return ret; }
@@ -915,7 +916,7 @@ static int acpi_processor_get_fadt_info( }static int acpi_processor_set_throttling_fadt (struct acpi_processor *pr, -int state) +int state,bool force) {u32 value =0 ;u32 duty_mask =0 ;
@@ -930,7 +931,7 @@ static int acpi_processor_set_throttlingif (!pr->flags.throttling)return -ENODEV ; -if (state == pr->throttling.state) +if (!force && (state == pr->throttling.state))return 0 ;if (state < pr->throttling_platform_limit)
@@ -988,7 +989,7 @@ static int acpi_processor_set_throttling }static int acpi_processor_set_throttling_ptc (struct acpi_processor *pr, -int state) +int state,bool force) {int ret;acpi_integer value;
@@ -1002,7 +1003,7 @@ static int acpi_processor_set_throttlingif (!pr->flags.throttling)return -ENODEV ; -if (state == pr->throttling.state) +if (!force && (state == pr->throttling.state))return 0 ;if (state < pr->throttling_platform_limit)
@@ -1018,7 +1019,8 @@ static int acpi_processor_set_throttlingreturn 0 ; } -int acpi_processor_set_throttling (struct acpi_processor *pr,int state) +int acpi_processor_set_throttling (struct acpi_processor *pr, +int state,bool force) {cpumask_var_t saved_mask;int ret =0 ;
@@ -1070,7 +1072,7 @@ int acpi_processor_set_throttling(struct/* FIXME: use work_on_cpu() */ set_cpus_allowed_ptr (current,cpumask_of (pr->id)); ret = p_throttling->acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr, - t_state.target_state); + t_state.target_state, force); }else {/* * When the T-state coordination is SW_ALL or HW_ALL,
@@ -1103,7 +1105,7 @@ int acpi_processor_set_throttling(structset_cpus_allowed_ptr (current,cpumask_of (i)); ret = match_pr->throttling.acpi_processor_set_throttling ( - match_pr, t_state.target_state); + match_pr, t_state.target_state, force); } }/*
@@ -1201,7 +1203,7 @@ int acpi_processor_get_throttling_info(sACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_INFO ,"Disabling throttling (was T%d)\n" , pr->throttling.state)); - result =acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr,0 ); + result =acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr,0 , false);if (result) goto end; }
@@ -1307,7 +1309,7 @@ static ssize_t acpi_processor_write_throif (strcmp (tmpbuf, charp) !=0 )return -EINVAL ; - result =acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr, state_val); + result =acpi_processor_set_throttling (pr, state_val, false);if (result)return result;
include/acpi/processor.h +3 -2
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ struct acpi_processor_throttling {cpumask_var_t shared_cpu_map;int (*acpi_processor_get_throttling) (struct acpi_processor * pr);int (*acpi_processor_set_throttling) (struct acpi_processor * pr, -int state); +int state,bool force);u32 address;u8 duty_offset;
@@ -320,7 +320,8 @@ static inline int acpi_processor_ppc_has/* in processor_throttling.c */ int acpi_processor_tstate_has_changed (struct acpi_processor *pr);int acpi_processor_get_throttling_info (struct acpi_processor *pr); -extern int acpi_processor_set_throttling (struct acpi_processor *pr,int state); +extern int acpi_processor_set_throttling (struct acpi_processor *pr, +int state,bool force);extern const struct file_operations acpi_processor_throttling_fops;extern void acpi_processor_throttling_init (void );/* in processor_idle.c */
PATCH 51/71 vfs: fix inode_init_always calling convention
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
backport of upstream commit 54e346215e4fe2ca8c94c54e546cc61902060510
Currently inode_init_always calls into ->destroy_inode if the additional initialization fails. That's not only counter-intuitive because inode_init_always did not allocate the inode structure, but in case of XFS it's actively harmful as ->destroy_inode might delete the inode from a radix-tree that has never been added. This in turn might end up deleting the inode for the same inum that has been instanciated by another process and cause lots of cause subtile problems.
Also in the case of re-initializing a reclaimable inode in XFS it would free an inode we still want to keep alive.
--- fs/inode.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++------------- fs/xfs/xfs_iget.c | 17 +++++------------ include/linux/fs.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
fs/inode.c +17 -13
@@ -118,12 +118,11 @@ static void wake_up_inode(struct inode ** These are initializations that need to be done on every inode * allocation as the fields are not initialised by slab allocation. */ -struct inode *inode_init_always (struct super_block *sb,struct inode *inode) +int inode_init_always (struct super_block *sb,struct inode *inode) {static const struct address_space_operations empty_aops;static struct inode_operations empty_iops;static const struct file_operations empty_fops; -struct address_space *const mapping = &inode->i_data; inode->i_sb = sb;
@@ -150,7 +149,7 @@ struct inode *inode_init_always(struct s inode->dirtied_when =0 ;if (security_inode_alloc (inode)) - goto out_free_inode; + goto out;/* allocate and initialize an i_integrity */ if (ima_inode_alloc (inode))
@@ -189,16 +188,12 @@ struct inode *inode_init_always(struct s inode->i_private =NULL ; inode->i_mapping = mapping; -return inode; +return 0 ; out_free_security:security_inode_free (inode); -out_free_inode: -if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode) - inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode (inode); -else -kmem_cache_free (inode_cachep, (inode)); -return NULL ; +out: +return -ENOMEM ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (inode_init_always);
@@ -211,9 +206,18 @@ static struct inode *alloc_inode(structelse inode =kmem_cache_alloc (inode_cachep,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (inode) -return inode_init_always (sb, inode); -return NULL ; +if (!inode) +return NULL ; + +if (unlikely (inode_init_always (sb, inode))) { +if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode) + inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode (inode); +else +kmem_cache_free (inode_cachep, inode); +return NULL ; + } + +return inode; }void destroy_inode (struct inode *inode)
fs/xfs/xfs_iget.c +5 -12
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ xfs_inode_alloc( ip =kmem_zone_alloc (xfs_inode_zone,KM_SLEEP );if (!ip)return NULL ; +if (inode_init_always (mp->m_super,VFS_I (ip))) { +kmem_zone_free (xfs_inode_zone, ip); +return NULL ; + }ASSERT (atomic_read (&ip->i_iocount) ==0 );ASSERT (atomic_read (&ip->i_pincount) ==0 );
@@ -104,17 +108,6 @@ xfs_inode_alloc(#ifdef XFS_DIR2_TRACE ip->i_dir_trace =ktrace_alloc (XFS_DIR2_KTRACE_SIZE ,KM_NOFS );#endif -/* -* Now initialise the VFS inode. We do this after the xfs_inode -* initialisation as internal failures will result in ->destroy_inode -* being called and that will pass down through the reclaim path and -* free the XFS inode. This path requires the XFS inode to already be -* initialised. Hence if this call fails, the xfs_inode has already -* been freed and we should not reference it at all in the error -* handling. -*/ -if (!inode_init_always (mp->m_super,VFS_I (ip))) -return NULL ;/* prevent anyone from using this yet */ VFS_I (ip)->i_state =I_NEW |I_LOCK ;
@@ -166,7 +159,7 @@ xfs_iget_cache_hit(* errors cleanly, then tag it so it can be set up correctly * later. */ -if (!inode_init_always (mp->m_super,VFS_I (ip))) { +if (inode_init_always (mp->m_super,VFS_I (ip))) { error =ENOMEM ; goto out_error; }
include/linux/fs.h +1 -1
@@ -2135,7 +2135,7 @@ extern loff_t default_llseek(struct fileextern loff_t vfs_llseek (struct file *file,loff_t offset,int origin); -extern struct inode *inode_init_always (struct super_block *,struct inode *); +extern int inode_init_always (struct super_block *,struct inode *);extern void inode_init_once (struct inode *);extern void inode_add_to_lists (struct super_block *,struct inode *);extern void iput (struct inode *);
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PATCH 52/71 vfs: add __destroy_inode
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
backport of upstream commit 2e00c97e2c1d2ffc9e26252ca26b237678b0b772
When we want to tear down an inode that lost the add to the cache race in XFS we must not call into ->destroy_inode because that would delete the inode that won the race from the inode cache radix tree.
This patch provides the __destroy_inode helper needed to fix this, the actual fix will be in th next patch. As XFS was the only reason destroy_inode was exported we shift the export to the new __destroy_inode.
--- fs/inode.c | 10 +++++++--- include/linux/fs.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/inode.c +7 -3
@@ -220,18 +220,22 @@ static struct inode *alloc_inode(structreturn inode; } -void destroy_inode (struct inode *inode) +void __destroy_inode (struct inode *inode) {BUG_ON (inode_has_buffers (inode));ima_inode_free (inode);security_inode_free (inode); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__destroy_inode); + +void destroy_inode (struct inode *inode) +{ +__destroy_inode (inode);if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode) inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode (inode);else kmem_cache_free (inode_cachep, (inode)); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (destroy_inode); -/* * These are initializations that only need to be done
include/linux/fs.h +1 -0
@@ -2162,6 +2162,7 @@ extern void __iget(struct inode * inode)extern void iget_failed (struct inode *);extern void clear_inode (struct inode *);extern void destroy_inode (struct inode *); +extern void __destroy_inode (struct inode *);extern struct inode *new_inode (struct super_block *);extern int should_remove_suid (struct dentry *);extern int file_remove_suid (struct file *);
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PATCH 53/71 xfs: fix freeing of inodes not yet added to the inode cache
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
upstream commit b36ec0428a06fcbdb67d61e9e664154e5dd9a8c7
When freeing an inode that lost race getting added to the inode cache we must not call into ->destroy_inode, because that would delete the inode that won the race from the inode cache radix tree.
This patch uses splits a new xfs_inode_free helper out of xfs_ireclaim and uses that plus __destroy_inode to make sure we really only free the memory allocted for the inode that lost the race, and not mess with the inode cache state.
--- fs/xfs/xfs_iget.c | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- fs/xfs/xfs_inode.h | 17 ------- 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_iget.c +68 -57
@@ -115,6 +115,71 @@ xfs_inode_alloc(return ip; } +STATIC void +xfs_inode_free ( +struct xfs_inode *ip) +{ +switch (ip->i_d.di_mode &S_IFMT ) { +case S_IFREG : +case S_IFDIR : +case S_IFLNK : +xfs_idestroy_fork (ip,XFS_DATA_FORK ); +break ; + } + +if (ip->i_afp) +xfs_idestroy_fork (ip,XFS_ATTR_FORK ); + +#ifdef XFS_INODE_TRACE +ktrace_free (ip->i_trace); +#endif +#ifdef XFS_BMAP_TRACE +ktrace_free (ip->i_xtrace); +#endif +#ifdef XFS_BTREE_TRACE +ktrace_free (ip->i_btrace); +#endif +#ifdef XFS_RW_TRACE +ktrace_free (ip->i_rwtrace); +#endif +#ifdef XFS_ILOCK_TRACE +ktrace_free (ip->i_lock_trace); +#endif +#ifdef XFS_DIR2_TRACE +ktrace_free (ip->i_dir_trace); +#endif + +if (ip->i_itemp) { +/* +* Only if we are shutting down the fs will we see an +* inode still in the AIL. If it is there, we should remove +* it to prevent a use-after-free from occurring. +*/ +xfs_log_item_t *lip = &ip->i_itemp->ili_item; +struct xfs_ail *ailp = lip->li_ailp; + +ASSERT (((lip->li_flags &XFS_LI_IN_AIL ) ==0 ) || +XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN (ip->i_mount)); +if (lip->li_flags &XFS_LI_IN_AIL ) { +spin_lock (&ailp->xa_lock); +if (lip->li_flags &XFS_LI_IN_AIL ) +xfs_trans_ail_delete (ailp, lip); +else +spin_unlock (&ailp->xa_lock); + } +xfs_inode_item_destroy (ip); + ip->i_itemp =NULL ; + } + +/* asserts to verify all state is correct here */ +ASSERT (atomic_read (&ip->i_iocount) ==0 ); +ASSERT (atomic_read (&ip->i_pincount) ==0 ); +ASSERT (!spin_is_locked (&ip->i_flags_lock)); +ASSERT (completion_done (&ip->i_flush)); + +kmem_zone_free (xfs_inode_zone, ip); +} +/* * Check the validity of the inode we just found it the cache */
@@ -291,7 +356,8 @@ out_preload_end:if (lock_flags)xfs_iunlock (ip, lock_flags); out_destroy: -xfs_destroy_inode (ip); +__destroy_inode (VFS_I (ip)); +xfs_inode_free (ip);return error; }
@@ -499,62 +565,7 @@ xfs_ireclaim(XFS_QM_DQDETACH (ip->i_mount, ip);xfs_iunlock (ip,XFS_ILOCK_EXCL |XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL ); -switch (ip->i_d.di_mode &S_IFMT ) { -case S_IFREG : -case S_IFDIR : -case S_IFLNK : -xfs_idestroy_fork (ip,XFS_DATA_FORK ); -break ; - } - -if (ip->i_afp) -xfs_idestroy_fork (ip,XFS_ATTR_FORK ); - -#ifdef XFS_INODE_TRACE -ktrace_free (ip->i_trace); -#endif -#ifdef XFS_BMAP_TRACE -ktrace_free (ip->i_xtrace); -#endif -#ifdef XFS_BTREE_TRACE -ktrace_free (ip->i_btrace); -#endif -#ifdef XFS_RW_TRACE -ktrace_free (ip->i_rwtrace); -#endif -#ifdef XFS_ILOCK_TRACE -ktrace_free (ip->i_lock_trace); -#endif -#ifdef XFS_DIR2_TRACE -ktrace_free (ip->i_dir_trace); -#endif -if (ip->i_itemp) { -/* -* Only if we are shutting down the fs will we see an -* inode still in the AIL. If it is there, we should remove -* it to prevent a use-after-free from occurring. -*/ -xfs_log_item_t *lip = &ip->i_itemp->ili_item; -struct xfs_ail *ailp = lip->li_ailp; - -ASSERT (((lip->li_flags &XFS_LI_IN_AIL ) ==0 ) || -XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN (ip->i_mount)); -if (lip->li_flags &XFS_LI_IN_AIL ) { -spin_lock (&ailp->xa_lock); -if (lip->li_flags &XFS_LI_IN_AIL ) -xfs_trans_ail_delete (ailp, lip); -else -spin_unlock (&ailp->xa_lock); - } -xfs_inode_item_destroy (ip); - ip->i_itemp =NULL ; - } -/* asserts to verify all state is correct here */ -ASSERT (atomic_read (&ip->i_iocount) ==0 ); -ASSERT (atomic_read (&ip->i_pincount) ==0 ); -ASSERT (!spin_is_locked (&ip->i_flags_lock)); -ASSERT (completion_done (&ip->i_flush)); -kmem_zone_free (xfs_inode_zone, ip); +xfs_inode_free (ip); }/*
fs/xfs/xfs_inode.h +0 -17
@@ -309,23 +309,6 @@ static inline struct inode *VFS_I(struct }/* -* Get rid of a partially initialized inode. -* -* We have to go through destroy_inode to make sure allocations -* from init_inode_always like the security data are undone. -* -* We mark the inode bad so that it takes the short cut in -* the reclaim path instead of going through the flush path -* which doesn't make sense for an inode that has never seen the -* light of day. -*/ -static inline void xfs_destroy_inode (struct xfs_inode *ip) -{ -make_bad_inode (VFS_I (ip)); -return destroy_inode (VFS_I (ip)); -} - -/* * i_flags helper functions */ static inline void
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PATCH 54/71 xfs: fix spin_is_locked assert on uni-processor builds
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
upstream commit a8914f3a6d72c97328597a556a99daaf5cc288ae
Without SMP or preemption spin_is_locked always returns false, so we can't do an assert with it. Instead use assert_spin_locked, which does the right thing on all builds.
--- fs/xfs/xfs_log.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/xfs/xfs_log.c +1 -1
@@ -3180,7 +3180,7 @@ try_again: STATIC voidxlog_state_want_sync (xlog_t *log,xlog_in_core_t *iclog) { -ASSERT (spin_is_locked (&log->l_icloglock)); +assert_spin_locked (&log->l_icloglock);if (iclog->ic_state ==XLOG_STATE_ACTIVE ) {xlog_state_switch_iclogs (log, iclog,0 );
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PATCH 55/71 gspca - ov534: Fix ov772x
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Jean-Francois Moine <[email protected]>
The scan of the image packets of the sensor ov772x was broken when the sensor ov965x was added.
[ Based on upstream c874f3aa, modified slightly for v2.6.30.5 ]
--- drivers/media/video/gspca/ov534.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/video/gspca/ov534.c +3 -1
@@ -832,9 +832,11 @@ static void sd_pkt_scan(struct gspca_dev__u32 this_pts;u16 this_fid;int remaining_len = len; +int payload_len; + payload_len = (sd->sensor ==SENSOR_OV772X ) ?2048 :2040 ; do { - len = min(remaining_len, 2040); /*fixme: was 2048*/ + len = min(remaining_len, payload_len); /* Payloads are prefixed with a UVC-style header. We consider a frame to start when the FID toggles, or the PTS
PATCH 56/71 kthreads: fix kthread_create() vs kthread_stop() race
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Oleg Nesterov <[email protected]>
The bug should be "accidently" fixed by recent changes in 2.6.31, all kernels <= 2.6.30 need the fix. The problem was never noticed before, it was found because it causes mysterious failures with GFS mount/umount.
Credits to Robert Peterson. He blaimed kthread.c from the very beginning. But, despite my promise, I forgot to inspect the old implementation until he did a lot of testing and reminded me. This led to huge delay in fixing this bug.
kthread_stop() does put_task_struct(k) before it clears kthread_stop_info.k. This means another kthread_create() can re-use this task_struct, but the new kthread can still see kthread_should_stop() == T and exit even without calling threadfn().
--- kernel/kthread.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/kthread.c +1 -1
@@ -216,12 +216,12 @@ int kthread_stop(struct task_struct *k)/* Now set kthread_should_stop() to true, and wake it up. */ kthread_stop_info.k = k;wake_up_process (k); -put_task_struct (k);/* Once it dies, reset stop ptr, gather result and we're done. */ wait_for_completion (&kthread_stop_info.done); kthread_stop_info.k =NULL ; ret = kthread_stop_info.err; +put_task_struct (k);mutex_unlock (&kthread_stop_lock);trace_sched_kthread_stop_ret (ret);
PATCH 57/71 ipv6: Fix commit 63d9950b08184e6531adceb65f64b429909cc101 (ipv6: Make v4-mapped bindings consistent with IPv4)
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Bruno Prémont <[email protected]>
commit ca6982b858e1d08010c1d29d8e8255b2ac2ad70a upstream.
Commit 63d9950b08184e6531adceb65f64b429909cc101
(ipv6: Make v4-mapped bindings consistent with IPv4)
changes behavior of inet6_bind() for v4-mapped addresses so it should behave the same way as inet_bind().
During this change setting of err to -EADDRNOTAVAIL got lost:
af_inet.c:469 inet_bind()
err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL; if (!sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind && !(inet->freebind || inet->transparent) && addr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY) && chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL && chk_addr_ret != RTN_MULTICAST && chk_addr_ret != RTN_BROADCAST) goto out;
af_inet6.c:463 inet6_bind()
if (addr_type == IPV6_ADDR_MAPPED) {
int chk_addr_ret;
/* Binding to v4-mapped address on a v6-only socket
* makes no sense
*/
if (np->ipv6only) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
/* Reproduce AF_INET checks to make the bindings consitant */
v4addr = addr->sin6_addr.s6_addr32[3];
chk_addr_ret = inet_addr_type(net, v4addr);
if (!sysctl_ip_nonlocal_bind &&
!(inet->freebind || inet->transparent) &&
v4addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY) &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_MULTICAST &&
chk_addr_ret != RTN_BROADCAST)
goto out;
} else {--- net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/af_inet6.c +3 -1
@@ -294,8 +294,10 @@ int inet6_bind(struct socket *sock, stru v4addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY) && chk_addr_ret != RTN_LOCAL && chk_addr_ret != RTN_MULTICAST && - chk_addr_ret != RTN_BROADCAST) + chk_addr_ret != RTN_BROADCAST) { + err = -EADDRNOTAVAIL ; goto out; + } }else {if (addr_type !=IPV6_ADDR_ANY ) {struct net_device *dev =NULL ;
PATCH 58/71 USB: fix the clear_tt_buffer interface
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
commit cb88a1b887bb8908f6e00ce29e893ea52b074940 upstream.
This patch (as1255) updates the interface for calling usb_hub_clear_tt_buffer(). Even the name of the function is changed!
When an async URB (i.e., Control or Bulk) going through a high-speed hub to a non-high-speed device is cancelled or fails, the hub's Transaction Translator buffer may be left busy still trying to complete the transaction. The buffer has to be cleared; that's what usb_hub_clear_tt_buffer() does.
It isn't safe to send any more URBs to the same endpoint until the TT buffer is fully clear. Therefore the HCD needs to be told when the Clear-TT-Buffer request has finished. This patch adds a callback method to struct hc_driver for that purpose, and makes the hub driver invoke the callback at the proper time.
The patch also changes a couple of names; "hub_tt_kevent" and "tt.kevent" now look rather antiquated.
--- drivers/usb/core/hcd.h | 4 ++++ drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- drivers/usb/core/hub.h | 6 ++++-- drivers/usb/host/ehci-q.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/core/hcd.h +4 -0
@@ -224,6 +224,10 @@ struct hc_driver {void (*relinquish_port)(struct usb_hcd *,int );/* has a port been handed over to a companion? */ int (*port_handed_over)(struct usb_hcd *,int ); + +/* CLEAR_TT_BUFFER completion callback */ +void (*clear_tt_buffer_complete)(struct usb_hcd *, +struct usb_host_endpoint *); };extern int usb_hcd_link_urb_to_ep (struct usb_hcd *hcd,struct urb *urb);
drivers/usb/core/hub.c +26 -14
@@ -448,10 +448,10 @@ hub_clear_tt_buffer (struct usb_device ** talking to TTs must queue control transfers (not just bulk and iso), so * both can talk to the same hub concurrently. */ -static void hub_tt_kevent (struct work_struct *work) +static void hub_tt_work (struct work_struct *work) {struct usb_hub *hub = - container_of(work, struct usb_hub, tt.kevent); + container_of(work, struct usb_hub, tt.clear_work);unsigned long flags;int limit =100 ;
@@ -460,6 +460,7 @@ static void hub_tt_kevent (struct work_sstruct list_head *temp;struct usb_tt_clear *clear;struct usb_device *hdev = hub->hdev; +const struct hc_driver *drv;int status; temp = hub->tt.clear_list.next;
@@ -469,21 +470,25 @@ static void hub_tt_kevent (struct work_s/* drop lock so HCD can concurrently report other TT errors */ spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hub->tt.lock, flags); status =hub_clear_tt_buffer (hdev, clear->devinfo, clear->tt); -spin_lock_irqsave (&hub->tt.lock, flags); -if (status)dev_err (&hdev->dev,"clear tt %d (%04x) error %d\n" , clear->tt, clear->devinfo, status); + +/* Tell the HCD, even if the operation failed */ + drv = clear->hcd->driver; +if (drv->clear_tt_buffer_complete) + (drv->clear_tt_buffer_complete)(clear->hcd, clear->ep); +kfree (clear); +spin_lock_irqsave (&hub->tt.lock, flags); }spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hub->tt.lock, flags); }/** -* usb_hub_tt_clear_buffer - clear control/bulk TT state in high speed hub -* @udev: the device whose split transaction failed -* @pipe: identifies the endpoint of the failed transaction +* usb_hub_clear_tt_buffer - clear control/bulk TT state in high speed hub +* @urb: an URB associated with the failed or incomplete split transaction * * High speed HCDs use this to tell the hub driver that some split control or * bulk transaction failed in a way that requires clearing internal state of
@@ -493,8 +498,10 @@ static void hub_tt_kevent (struct work_s* It may not be possible for that hub to handle additional full (or low) * speed transactions until that state is fully cleared out. */ -void usb_hub_tt_clear_buffer (struct usb_device *udev,int pipe) +int usb_hub_clear_tt_buffer (struct urb *urb) { +struct usb_device *udev = urb->dev; +int pipe = urb->pipe;struct usb_tt *tt = udev->tt;unsigned long flags;struct usb_tt_clear *clear;
@@ -506,7 +513,7 @@ void usb_hub_tt_clear_buffer (struct usbif ((clear =kmalloc (sizeof *clear,GFP_ATOMIC )) ==NULL ) {dev_err (&udev->dev,"can't save CLEAR_TT_BUFFER state\n" );/* FIXME recover somehow ... RESET_TT? */ -return ; +return -ENOMEM ; }/* info that CLEAR_TT_BUFFER needs */
@@ -518,14 +525,19 @@ void usb_hub_tt_clear_buffer (struct usb : (USB_ENDPOINT_XFER_BULK << 11);if (usb_pipein (pipe)) clear->devinfo |=1 <<15 ; - + +/* info for completion callback */ + clear->hcd =bus_to_hcd (udev->bus); + clear->ep = urb->ep; +/* tell keventd to clear state for this TT */ spin_lock_irqsave (&tt->lock, flags);list_add_tail (&clear->clear_list, &tt->clear_list); -schedule_work (&tt->kevent); +schedule_work (&tt->clear_work);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&tt->lock, flags); +return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (usb_hub_tt_clear_buffer); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (usb_hub_clear_tt_buffer);/* If do_delay is false, return the number of milliseconds the caller * needs to delay.
@@ -816,7 +828,7 @@ static void hub_quiesce(struct usb_hub *if (hub->has_indicators)cancel_delayed_work_sync (&hub->leds);if (hub->tt.hub) -cancel_work_sync (&hub->tt.kevent); +cancel_work_sync (&hub->tt.clear_work); }/* caller has locked the hub device */
@@ -933,7 +945,7 @@ static int hub_configure(struct usb_hubspin_lock_init (&hub->tt.lock);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&hub->tt.clear_list); -INIT_WORK (&hub->tt.kevent, hub_tt_kevent); +INIT_WORK (&hub->tt.clear_work, hub_tt_work);switch (hdev->descriptor.bDeviceProtocol) {case 0 :break ;
drivers/usb/core/hub.h +4 -2
@@ -185,16 +185,18 @@ struct usb_tt {/* for control/bulk error recovery (CLEAR_TT_BUFFER) */ spinlock_t lock;struct list_head clear_list;/* of usb_tt_clear */ - struct work_struct kevent; + struct work_struct clear_work; };struct usb_tt_clear {struct list_head clear_list;unsigned tt;u16 devinfo; +struct usb_hcd *hcd; +struct usb_host_endpoint *ep; }; -extern void usb_hub_tt_clear_buffer (struct usb_device *dev,int pipe); +extern int usb_hub_clear_tt_buffer (struct urb *urb);extern void usb_ep0_reinit (struct usb_device *);#endif /* __LINUX_HUB_H */
drivers/usb/host/ehci-q.c +1 -1
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int qtd_copy_status (/* REVISIT ARC-derived cores don't clear the root * hub TT buffer in this way... */ -usb_hub_tt_clear_buffer (urb->dev, urb->pipe); +usb_hub_clear_tt_buffer (urb); } }
PATCH 59/71 USB: EHCI: use the new clear_tt_buffer interface
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
commit 914b701280a76f96890ad63eb0fa99bf204b961c upstream.
This patch (as1256) changes ehci-hcd and all the other drivers in the EHCI family to make use of the new clear_tt_buffer callbacks. When a Clear-TT-Buffer request is in progress for a QH, the QH is not allowed to be linked into the async schedule until the request is finished. At that time, if there are any URBs queued for the QH, it is linked into the async schedule.
--- drivers/usb/host/ehci-au1xxx.c | 2 drivers/usb/host/ehci-fsl.c | 2 drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c | 2 drivers/usb/host/ehci-ixp4xx.c | 2 drivers/usb/host/ehci-orion.c | 2 drivers/usb/host/ehci-pci.c | 2 drivers/usb/host/ehci-ppc-of.c | 2 drivers/usb/host/ehci-ps3.c | 2 drivers/usb/host/ehci-q.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- drivers/usb/host/ehci.h | 2 10 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/host/ehci-au1xxx.c +2 -0
@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ static const struct hc_driver ehci_au1xx .bus_resume = ehci_bus_resume, .relinquish_port = ehci_relinquish_port, .port_handed_over = ehci_port_handed_over, + + .clear_tt_buffer_complete = ehci_clear_tt_buffer_complete, };static int ehci_hcd_au1xxx_drv_probe (struct platform_device *pdev)
drivers/usb/host/ehci-fsl.c +2 -0
@@ -324,6 +324,8 @@ static const struct hc_driver ehci_fsl_h .bus_resume = ehci_bus_resume, .relinquish_port = ehci_relinquish_port, .port_handed_over = ehci_port_handed_over, + + .clear_tt_buffer_complete = ehci_clear_tt_buffer_complete, };static int ehci_fsl_drv_probe (struct platform_device *pdev)
drivers/usb/host/ehci.h +2 -0
@@ -353,7 +353,9 @@ struct ehci_qh {unsigned short period;/* polling interval */ unsigned short start;/* where polling starts */ #define NO_FRAME ((unsigned short)~0)/* pick new start */ +struct usb_device *dev;/* access to TT */ + unsigned clearing_tt:1; /* Clear-TT-Buf in progress */ } __attribute__ ((aligned (32)));/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c +2 -0
@@ -1003,6 +1003,8 @@ idle_timeout:schedule_timeout_uninterruptible (1 ); goto rescan;case QH_STATE_IDLE :/* fully unlinked */ +if (qh->clearing_tt) + goto idle_timeout;if (list_empty (&qh->qtd_list)) {qh_put (qh);break ;
drivers/usb/host/ehci-ixp4xx.c +2 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ static const struct hc_driver ixp4xx_ehc#endif .relinquish_port = ehci_relinquish_port, .port_handed_over = ehci_port_handed_over, + + .clear_tt_buffer_complete = ehci_clear_tt_buffer_complete, };static int ixp4xx_ehci_probe (struct platform_device *pdev)
drivers/usb/host/ehci-orion.c +2 -0
@@ -164,6 +164,8 @@ static const struct hc_driver ehci_orion .bus_resume = ehci_bus_resume, .relinquish_port = ehci_relinquish_port, .port_handed_over = ehci_port_handed_over, + + .clear_tt_buffer_complete = ehci_clear_tt_buffer_complete, }; static void __init
drivers/usb/host/ehci-pci.c +2 -0
@@ -408,6 +408,8 @@ static const struct hc_driver ehci_pci_h .bus_resume = ehci_bus_resume, .relinquish_port = ehci_relinquish_port, .port_handed_over = ehci_port_handed_over, + + .clear_tt_buffer_complete = ehci_clear_tt_buffer_complete, };/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
drivers/usb/host/ehci-ppc-of.c +2 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@ static const struct hc_driver ehci_ppc_o#endif .relinquish_port = ehci_relinquish_port, .port_handed_over = ehci_port_handed_over, + + .clear_tt_buffer_complete = ehci_clear_tt_buffer_complete, };
drivers/usb/host/ehci-ps3.c +2 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ static const struct hc_driver ps3_ehci_h#endif .relinquish_port = ehci_relinquish_port, .port_handed_over = ehci_port_handed_over, + + .clear_tt_buffer_complete = ehci_clear_tt_buffer_complete, };static int ps3_ehci_probe (struct ps3_system_bus_device *dev)
drivers/usb/host/ehci-q.c +68 -23
123 lines not on this page · raw message
PATCH 60/71 USB: EHCI: fix two new bugs related to Clear-TT-Buffer
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Alan Stern <[email protected]>
commit 7a0f0d951273eee889c2441846842348ebc00a2a upstream.
This patch (as1273) fixes two(!) bugs introduced by the new Clear-TT-Buffer implementation in ehci-hcd.
It is now possible for an idle QH to have some URBs on its queue -- this will happen if a Clear-TT-Buffer is pending for the QH's endpoint. Consequently we should not issue a warning when someone tries to unlink an URB from an idle QH; instead we should process the request immediately.
The refcounts for QHs could get messed up, because submit_async() would increment the refcount when calling qh_link_async() and qh_link_async() would then refuse to link the QH into the schedule if a Clear-TT-Buffer was pending. Instead we should increment the refcount only when the QH actually is added to the schedule. The current code tries to be clever by leaving the refcount alone if an unlink is immediately followed by a relink; the patch changes this to an unconditional decrement and increment (although they occur in the opposite order).
--- drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c | 3 ++- drivers/usb/host/ehci-q.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/host/ehci-hcd.c +2 -1
@@ -903,7 +903,8 @@ static int ehci_urb_dequeue(struct usb_h/* already started */ break ;case QH_STATE_IDLE : -WARN_ON (1 ); +/* QH might be waiting for a Clear-TT-Buffer */ +qh_completions (ehci, qh);break ; }break ;
drivers/usb/host/ehci-q.c +3 -3
@@ -938,6 +938,7 @@ static void qh_link_async (struct ehci_h head->qh_next.qh = qh; head->hw_next = dma; +qh_get (qh); qh->xacterrs =QH_XACTERR_MAX ; qh->qh_state =QH_STATE_LINKED ;/* qtd completions reported later by interrupt */
@@ -1078,7 +1079,7 @@ submit_async (* the HC and TT handle it when the TT has a buffer ready. */ if (likely (qh->qh_state ==QH_STATE_IDLE )) -qh_link_async (ehci,qh_get (qh)); +qh_link_async (ehci, qh); done:spin_unlock_irqrestore (&ehci->lock, flags);if (unlikely (qh ==NULL ))
@@ -1113,8 +1114,6 @@ static void end_unlink_async (struct ehc && HC_IS_RUNNING (ehci_to_hcd(ehci)->state)) qh_link_async (ehci, qh); else { -qh_put (qh);// refcount from async list -/* it's not free to turn the async schedule on/off; leave it * active but idle for a while once it empties. */
@@ -1122,6 +1121,7 @@ static void end_unlink_async (struct ehc && ehci->async->qh_next.qh == NULL)timer_action (ehci,TIMER_ASYNC_OFF ); } +qh_put (qh);/* refcount from async list */ if (next) { ehci->reclaim =NULL ;
PATCH 61/71 powerpc/ps3: Add missing check for PS3 to rtc-ps3 platform device registration
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
commit 7b6a09f3d6aedeaac923824af2a5df30300b56e9 upstream.
On non-PS3, we get:
| kernel BUG at drivers/rtc/rtc-ps3.c:36!
because the rtc-ps3 platform device is registered unconditionally in a kernel with builtin support for PS3.
arch/powerpc/platforms/ps3/time.c +4 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/platform_device.h> +#include <asm/firmware.h> #include <asm/rtc.h> #include <asm/lv1call.h> #include <asm/ps3.h>
@@ -84,6 +85,9 @@ static int __init ps3_rtc_init(void) {struct platform_device *pdev; +if (!firmware_has_feature (FW_FEATURE_PS3_LV1 )) +return -ENODEV ; + pdev =platform_device_register_simple ("rtc-ps3" ,-1 ,NULL ,0 );if (IS_ERR (pdev))return PTR_ERR (pdev);
PATCH 62/71 ipv4: make ip_append_data() handle NULL routing table
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Julien TINNES <[email protected]>
commit 788d908f2879a17e5f80924f3da2e23f1034482d upstream.
Add a check in ip_append_data() for NULL *rtp to prevent future bugs in callers from being exploitable.
--- net/ipv4/ip_output.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/ipv4/ip_output.c +2 -0
@@ -814,6 +814,8 @@ int ip_append_data(struct sock *sk, inet->cork.addr = ipc->addr; } rt = *rtp; +if (unlikely (!rt)) +return -EFAULT ;/* * We steal reference to this route, caller should not release it */
PATCH 63/71 ar9170: fix read & write outside array bounds
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]>
commit e9d126cdfa60b575f1b5b02024c4faee27dccf07 upstream.
Backport done by Christian Lamparter <[email protected]>
queue == __AR9170_NUM_TXQ would cause a bug on the next line.
found by Smatch ( http://repo.or.cz/w/smatch.git ).
--- drivers/net/wireless/ar9170/main.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ar9170/main.c +3 -2
@@ -1486,13 +1486,14 @@ static int ar9170_conf_tx(struct ieee802int ret;mutex_lock (&ar->mutex); -if ((param) && !(queue > ar->hw->queues)) { +if (queue < __AR9170_NUM_TXQ) {memcpy (&ar->edcf[ar9170_qos_hwmap[queue]], param,sizeof (*param)); ret =ar9170_set_qos (ar); - }else + }else { ret = -EINVAL ; + }mutex_unlock (&ar->mutex);return ret;
PATCH 64/71 xenfb: connect to backend before registering fb
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Michal Schmidt <[email protected]>
commit 0a80fb10239b04c45e5e80aad8d4b2ca5ac407b2 upstream.
As soon as the framebuffer is registered, our methods may be called by the kernel. This leads to a crash as xenfb_refresh() gets called before we have the irq.
Connect to the backend before registering our framebuffer with the kernel.
[ Fixes bug http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14059 ]
--- drivers/video/xen-fbfront.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/video/xen-fbfront.c +4 -4
@@ -454,6 +454,10 @@ static int __devinit xenfb_probe(structxenfb_init_shared_page (info, fb_info); + ret =xenfb_connect_backend (dev, info); +if (ret <0 ) + goto error; + ret =register_framebuffer (fb_info);if (ret) {fb_deferred_io_cleanup (fb_info);
@@ -464,10 +468,6 @@ static int __devinit xenfb_probe(struct } info->fb_info = fb_info; - ret =xenfb_connect_backend (dev, info); -if (ret <0 ) - goto error; -xenfb_make_preferred_console ();return 0 ;
PATCH 65/71 can: Fix raw_getname() leak
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit e84b90ae5eb3c112d1f208964df1d8156a538289 upstream.
raw_getname() can leak 10 bytes of kernel memory to user
(two bytes hole between can_family and can_ifindex, 8 bytes at the end of sockaddr_can structure)
--- net/can/raw.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/can/raw.c +1 -0
@@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ static int raw_getname(struct socket *soif (peer)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +memset (addr,0 ,sizeof (*addr)); addr->can_family =AF_CAN ; addr->can_ifindex = ro->ifindex;
PATCH 66/71 irda: Fix irda_getname() leak
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 09384dfc76e526c3993c09c42e016372dc9dd22c upstream.
irda_getname() can leak kernel memory to user.
--- net/irda/af_irda.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/irda/af_irda.c +1 -0
@@ -714,6 +714,7 @@ static int irda_getname(struct socket *sstruct sock *sk = sock->sk;struct irda_sock *self =irda_sk (sk); +memset (&saddr,0 ,sizeof (saddr));if (peer) {if (sk->sk_state !=TCP_ESTABLISHED )return -ENOTCONN ;
PATCH 67/71 appletalk: fix atalk_getname() leak
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 3d392475c873c10c10d6d96b94d092a34ebd4791 upstream.
atalk_getname() can leak 8 bytes of kernel memory to user
--- net/appletalk/ddp.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/appletalk/ddp.c +1 -0
@@ -1242,6 +1242,7 @@ static int atalk_getname(struct socket *return -ENOBUFS ; *uaddr_len =sizeof (struct sockaddr_at ); +memset (&sat.sat_zero,0 ,sizeof (sat.sat_zero));if (peer) {if (sk->sk_state !=TCP_ESTABLISHED )
PATCH 68/71 netrom: Fix nr_getname() leak
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit f6b97b29513950bfbf621a83d85b6f86b39ec8db upstream.
nr_getname() can leak kernel memory to user.
--- net/netrom/af_netrom.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/netrom/af_netrom.c +1 -0
@@ -848,6 +848,7 @@ static int nr_getname(struct socket *soc sax->fsa_ax25.sax25_family =AF_NETROM ; sax->fsa_ax25.sax25_ndigis =1 ; sax->fsa_ax25.sax25_call = nr->user_addr; +memset (sax->fsa_digipeater,0 ,sizeof (sax->fsa_digipeater)); sax->fsa_digipeater[0 ] = nr->dest_addr; *uaddr_len =sizeof (struct full_sockaddr_ax25 ); }else {
PATCH 69/71 econet: Fix econet_getname() leak
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 80922bbb12a105f858a8f0abb879cb4302d0ecaa upstream.
econet_getname() can leak kernel memory to user.
--- net/econet/af_econet.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/econet/af_econet.c +1 -0
@@ -520,6 +520,7 @@ static int econet_getname(struct socketif (peer)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +memset (sec,0 ,sizeof (*sec));mutex_lock (&econet_mutex); sk = sock->sk;
PATCH 70/71 rose: Fix rose_getname() leak
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 17ac2e9c58b69a1e25460a568eae1b0dc0188c25 upstream.
rose_getname() can leak kernel memory to user.
--- net/rose/af_rose.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/rose/af_rose.c +1 -0
@@ -957,6 +957,7 @@ static int rose_getname(struct socket *sstruct rose_sock *rose =rose_sk (sk);int n; +memset (srose,0 ,sizeof (*srose));if (peer !=0 ) {if (sk->sk_state !=TCP_ESTABLISHED )return -ENOTCONN ;
PATCH 71/71 NET: llc, zero sockaddr_llc struct
In reply to Greg KH2.6.30-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------
From: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]>
commit 28e9fc592cb8c7a43e4d3147b38be6032a0e81bc upstream.
sllc_arphrd member of sockaddr_llc might not be changed. Zero sllc before copying to the above layer's structure.
--- net/llc/af_llc.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/llc/af_llc.c +1 -0
@@ -914,6 +914,7 @@ static int llc_ui_getname(struct socketstruct llc_sock *llc =llc_sk (sk);int rc =0 ; +memset (&sllc,0 ,sizeof (sllc));lock_sock (sk);if (sock_flag (sk,SOCK_ZAPPED )) goto out;
Quoted 11 lines · you
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.30.6 release. There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let us know. If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.
These patches are sent out with a number of different people on the Cc:
line. If you wish to be a reviewer, please email [email protected] to add your name to the list. If you want to be off the reviewer list, also email us.
Quoted 5 lines
Responses should be made by Sunday, Sept 6, 21:00:00 UTC. Anything Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/stable-review/patch-2.6.30.6-rc1.gz
Hi Greg,
'Snot there yet.
Grant.
Signature · 1 line
http://bugsplatter.id.au
Quoted 16 lines · Grant Coady
Quoted 14 lines · you
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.30.6 release. There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let us know. If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.
These patches are sent out with a number of different people on the Cc:
line. If you wish to be a reviewer, please email [email protected] to add your name to the list. If you want to be off the reviewer list, also email us.Responses should be made by Sunday, Sept 6, 21:00:00 UTC. Anything Anything received after that time might be too late.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/stable-review/patch-2.6.30.6-rc1.gzHi Greg,
'Snot there yet.
Doh, sorry about that, is there now.
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 9 lines · Greg KH
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.30.6 release. There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let us know. If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.
These patches are sent out with a number of different people on the Cc:
line. If you wish to be a reviewer, please email [email protected] to add your name to the list.
I think this automated message needs some updated to reflect the fact that a mailman list is used now, and redirect people to help themselves to help us by subscribing to:
http://linux.kernel.org/mailman/listinfo/stable-review
Quoted 2 lines
If you want to be off the reviewer list,
also email us.
This seems to not be required any more.
Quoted 2 lines
Responses should be made by Sunday, Sept 6, 21:00:00 UTC. Anything Anything received after that time might be too late.
I'm a bit too late, but oh well.
Quoted 11 lines
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.6/stable-review/patch-2.6.30.6-rc1.gz and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
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drivers/net/wireless/ar9170/main.c | 5 +-
drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-rfkill.c| 26 +++--drivers/net/wireless/iwlwifi/iwl-sta.c| 12 +++drivers/net/wireless/rt2x00/rt2x00.h| 6 +-net/mac80211/agg-tx.c | 8 ++
These look good.
Luis
Quoted 15 lines · Luis R. Rodriguez
Quoted 9 lines · Greg KH
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.30.6 release. There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let us know. If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.
These patches are sent out with a number of different people on the Cc:
line. If you wish to be a reviewer, please email [email protected] to add your name to the list.I think this automated message needs some updated to reflect the fact that a mailman list is used now, and redirect people to help themselves to help us by subscribing to:
Quoted 6 lines
http://linux.kernel.org/mailman/listinfo/stable-review
Quoted 2 lines
If you want to be off the reviewer list,
also email us.This seems to not be required any more.
True. Care to send a patch against the stable-queue where this message is:
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/chrisw/stable-queue.git;a=summary
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 18 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 17 lines · Luis R. Rodriguez
Quoted 9 lines · Greg KH
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.30.6 release. There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let us know. If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.
These patches are sent out with a number of different people on the Cc:
line. If you wish to be a reviewer, please email [email protected] to add your name to the list.I think this automated message needs some updated to reflect the fact that a mailman list is used now, and redirect people to help themselves to help us by subscribing to:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
If you want to be off the reviewer list,
also email us.This seems to not be required any more.
True. Care to send a patch against the stable-queue where this message is:
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/chrisw/stable-queue.git;a=summary
Sure, that hasn't been updated since 2006, is that the right tree?
Luis
Quoted 22 lines · Luis R. Rodriguez
Quoted 21 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 20 lines · Luis R. Rodriguez
Quoted 9 lines · Greg KH
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 2.6.30.6 release. There are 71 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let us know. If anyone is a maintainer of the proper subsystem, and wants to add a Signed-off-by: line to the patch, please respond with it.
These patches are sent out with a number of different people on the Cc:
line. If you wish to be a reviewer, please email [email protected] to add your name to the list.I think this automated message needs some updated to reflect the fact that a mailman list is used now, and redirect people to help themselves to help us by subscribing to:
http://linux.kernel.org/mailman/listinfo/stable-review
Quoted 2 lines
If you want to be off the reviewer list,
also email us.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
This seems to not be required any more.
True. Care to send a patch against the stable-queue where this message is:
http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/chrisw/stable-queue.git;a=summarySure, that hasn't been updated since 2006, is that the right tree?
Bah, no, it isn't, use the one in the git/stable/stable-queue.git location, sorry about that.
Chris, you might want to delete this old one :)
thanks,
greg k-h