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fs: fix overflow in sys_mount() for in-kernel calls

PATCH In review [email protected] 3 participants 3 messages Sep 18, 2009 – Sep 23, 2009 VFS

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PATCH 7/21 fs: fix overflow in sys_mount() for in-kernel calls

From: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>

On 2009/6/17 Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> reported:

Quoted 27 lines

btw., here's an old friend of a warning:

async_continuing @ 1 after 0 usec
WARNING: kmemcheck: Caught 8-bit read from freed memory (f5f33004) 0040f3f57400686f74706c756700000000000000000000000000000000000000
i i i i f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f f

         ^

Pid: 1, comm: swapper Not tainted (2.6.30-tip-04303-g5ada65e-dirty #767) P4DC6
EIP: 0060:[<c1248df4>] EFLAGS: 00010246 CPU: 0
EIP is at exact_copy_from_user+0x64/0x130
EAX: 00000000 EBX: 00000001 ECX: 000000f5 EDX: 000000f5
ESI: f5fdeffb EDI: f5f33004 EBP: f6c48ee8 ESP: c29598cc
DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0000 SS: 0068
CR0: 8005003b CR2: f6c20044 CR3: 0294d000 CR4: 000006d0
DR0: 00000000 DR1: 00000000 DR2: 00000000 DR3: 00000000
DR6: ffff4ff0 DR7: 00000400

 [<c124916a>] copy_mount_options+0xba/0x1c0
 [<c124dc0a>] sys_mount+0x1a/0x170
 [<c263c937>] do_mount_root+0x27/0xe0
 [<c263ca33>] mount_block_root+0x43/0x140
 [<c263cc02>] mount_root+0xd2/0x160
 [<c263ce49>] prepare_namespace+0x1b9/0x380
 [<c263c4c8>] kernel_init+0xb8/0x110
 [<c103ab13>] kernel_thread_helper+0x7/0x14
 [<ffffffff>] 0xffffffff
Quoted 2 lines

EXT3-fs: INFO: recovery required on readonly filesystem.
EXT3-fs: write access will be enabled during recovery.

sys_mount() reads/copies a whole page for its "type" parameter. When do_mount_root() passes a kernel address that points to an object which is smaller than a whole page, copy_mount_options() will happily go past this memory object, possibly dereferencing "wild" pointers that could be in any state (hence the kmemcheck warning, which shows that parts of the next page are not even allocated).

(The likelihood of something going wrong here is pretty low -- first of all this only applies to kernel calls to sys_mount(), which are mostly found in the boot code. Secondly, I guess if the page was not mapped, exact_copy_from_user() _would_ in fact handle it correctly because of its access_ok(), etc. checks.)

But it is much nicer to avoid the dubious reads altogether, by stopping as soon as we find a NUL byte. Is there a good reason why we can't do something like this, using the already existing strndup_from_user()?

[[email protected]: make copy_mount_string() static]
Cc Al Viro <[email protected]>
Cc Pekka Enberg <[email protected]>

---

 fs/namespace.c |   81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
fs/namespace.c renamed from fs/namespace.c~fs-fix-overflow-in-sys_mount-for-in-kernel-calls +49 -32
diff -puN fs/namespace.c~fs-fix-overflow-in-sys_mount-for-in-kernel-calls fs/namespace.c
@@ -1640,7 +1640,7 @@ static int do_new_mount(struct path *pat
 {
 	struct vfsmount *mnt;
 
-	if (!type || !memchr(type, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
+	if (!type)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* we need capabilities... */
@@ -1871,6 +1871,23 @@ int copy_mount_options(const void __user
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int copy_mount_string(const void __user *data, char **where)
+{
+	char *tmp;
+
+	if (!data) {
+		*where = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	tmp = strndup_user(data, PAGE_SIZE);
+	if (IS_ERR(tmp))
+		return PTR_ERR(tmp);
+
+	*where = tmp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /*
  * Flags is a 32-bit value that allows up to 31 non-fs dependent flags to
  * be given to the mount() call (ie: read-only, no-dev, no-suid etc).
@@ -1900,8 +1917,6 @@ long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_
 
 	if (!dir_name || !*dir_name || !memchr(dir_name, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (dev_name && !memchr(dev_name, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
-		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (data_page)
 		((char *)data_page)[PAGE_SIZE - 1] = 0;
@@ -2070,40 +2085,42 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(create_mnt_ns);
 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(mount, char __user *, dev_name, char __user *, dir_name,
 		char __user *, type, unsigned long, flags, void __user *, data)
 {
-	int retval;
+	int ret;
+	char *kernel_type;
+	char *kernel_dir;
+	char *kernel_dev;
 	unsigned long data_page;
-	unsigned long type_page;
-	unsigned long dev_page;
-	char *dir_page;
 
-	retval = copy_mount_options(type, &type_page);
-	if (retval < 0)
-		return retval;
+	ret = copy_mount_string(type, &kernel_type);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out_type;
+
+	kernel_dir = getname(dir_name);
+	if (IS_ERR(kernel_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(kernel_dir);
+		goto out_dir;
+	}
+
+	ret = copy_mount_string(dev_name, &kernel_dev);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out_dev;
+
+	ret = copy_mount_options(data, &data_page);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out_data;
 
-	dir_page = getname(dir_name);
-	retval = PTR_ERR(dir_page);
-	if (IS_ERR(dir_page))
-		goto out1;
-
-	retval = copy_mount_options(dev_name, &dev_page);
-	if (retval < 0)
-		goto out2;
-
-	retval = copy_mount_options(data, &data_page);
-	if (retval < 0)
-		goto out3;
+	ret = do_mount(kernel_dev, kernel_dir, kernel_type, flags,
+		(void *) data_page);
 
-	retval = do_mount((char *)dev_page, dir_page, (char *)type_page,
-			  flags, (void *)data_page);
 	free_page(data_page);
-
-out3:
-	free_page(dev_page);
-out2:
-	putname(dir_page);
-out1:
-	free_page(type_page);
-	return retval;
+out_data:
+	kfree(kernel_dev);
+out_dev:
+	putname(kernel_dir);
+out_dir:
+	kfree(kernel_type);
+out_type:
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /*

_

maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · On Fri, Sep 18, 2009 at 01:05:45PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:

From: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>

On 2009/6/17 Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> reported:

Quoted 3 lines

btw., here's an old friend of a warning:

[snip]

Quoted 14 lines
fs/namespace.c renamed from fs/namespace.c~fs-fix-overflow-in-sys_mount-for-in-kernel-calls +1 -1
@@ -1640,7 +1640,7 @@ static int do_new_mount(struct path *pat
 {
 	struct vfsmount *mnt;
 
-	if (!type || !memchr(type, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
+	if (!type)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* we need capabilities... */
@@ -1871,6 +1871,23 @@ int copy_mount_options(const void __user
 	return 0;
 }
 

fs/namespace.c long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_ · line 1922

Quoted 8 lines
fs/namespace.c renamed from fs/namespace.c~fs-fix-overflow-in-sys_mount-for-in-kernel-calls +0 -2
@@ -1900,8 +1917,6 @@ long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_
 
 	if (!dir_name || !*dir_name || !memchr(dir_name, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (dev_name && !memchr(dev_name, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
-		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (data_page)
 		((char *)data_page)[PAGE_SIZE - 1] = 0;

In this form it's simply b0rken - you need to take care of other do_mount() callers. arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c is safe, but fs/compat.c isn't...

#2 lore raw
Quoted 30 lines · Al Viro
Quoted 6 lines · On Fri, Sep 18, 2009 at 01:05:45PM -0700, [email protected] wrote:

From: Vegard Nossum <[email protected]>

On 2009/6/17 Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> reported:

Quoted 3 lines

btw., here's an old friend of a warning:

[snip]

Quoted 20 lines
fs/namespace.c renamed from fs/namespace.c~fs-fix-overflow-in-sys_mount-for-in-kernel-calls +1 -3
@@ -1640,7 +1640,7 @@ static int do_new_mount(struct path *pat
 {
 	struct vfsmount *mnt;
 
-	if (!type || !memchr(type, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
+	if (!type)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* we need capabilities... */
@@ -1871,6 +1871,23 @@ int copy_mount_options(const void __user
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1900,8 +1917,6 @@ long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_
 
 	if (!dir_name || !*dir_name || !memchr(dir_name, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (dev_name && !memchr(dev_name, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
-		return -EINVAL;
 
Quoted 5 lines

fs/namespace.c long do_mount(char *dev_name, char *dir_ · line 1922

Quoted 2 lines
fs/namespace.c renamed from fs/namespace.c~fs-fix-overflow-in-sys_mount-for-in-kernel-calls +0 -0
 	if (data_page)
 		((char *)data_page)[PAGE_SIZE - 1] = 0;

In this form it's simply b0rken - you need to take care of other do_mount() callers. arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c is safe, but fs/compat.c isn't...

Vegard, ping?